The advent of the Web is one of the defining technological events of the twentieth century, yet its impact on the fundamental questions of philosophy has not yet been explored, much less systematized. The Web, as today implemented on the foundations of the Internet, is broadly construed as the space of all items of interest identified by URIs. Originally a space of linked hypertext documents, today the Web is rapidly evolving as a universal platform for data and computation. Even swifter (...) is the Web‐driven transformation of many previously unquestioned philosophical concepts of privacy, belief, intelligence, cognition, and even embodiment in surprising ways. The ensuing essays in this collection hope to explore the philosophical foundation of the World Wide Web and open the debate on whether or not the changes caused by the Web to technology and society warrant the creation of a philosophy of the Web. (shrink)

The advent of the Web is one of the defining technological events of the twentieth century, yet its impact on the fundamental questions of philosophy has not yet been explored, much less systematized. The Web, as today implemented on the foundations of the Internet, is broadly construed as the space of all items of interest identified by URIs. Originally a space of linked hypertext documents, today the Web is rapidly evolving as a universal platform for data and computation. Even swifter (...) is the Web-driven transformation of many previously unquestioned philosophical concepts of privacy, belief, intelligence, cognition, and even embodiment in surprising ways. The ensuing essays in this collection hope to explore the philosophical foundation of the World Wide Web and open the debate on whether or not the changes caused by the Web to technology and society warrant the creation of a philosophy of the Web. (shrink)

The advent of the Web is one of the defining technological events of the twentieth century, yet its impact on the fundamental questions of philosophy has not yet been explored, much less systematized. The Web, as today implemented on the foundations of the Internet, is broadly construed as the space of all items of interest identified by URIs. Originally a space of linked hypertext documents, today the Web is rapidly evolving as a universal platform for data and computation. Even swifter (...) is the Web-driven transformation of many previously unquestioned philosophical concepts of privacy, belief, intelligence, cognition, and even embodiment in surprising ways. The ensuing essays in this collection hope to explore the philosophical foundation of the World Wide Web and open the debate on whether or not the changes caused by the Web to technology and society warrant the creation of a philosophy of the Web. (shrink)

The advent of the Web is one of the defining technological events of the twentieth century, yet its impact on the fundamental questions of philosophy has not yet been explored, much less systematized. The Web, as today implemented on the foundations of the Internet, is broadly construed as the space of all items of interest identified by URIs. Originally a space of linked hypertext documents, today the Web is rapidly evolving as a universal platform for data and computation. Even swifter (...) is the Web‐driven transformation of many previously unquestioned philosophical concepts of privacy, belief, intelligence, cognition, and even embodiment in surprising ways. The ensuing essays in this collection hope to explore the philosophical foundation of the World Wide Web and open the debate on whether or not the changes caused by the Web to technology and society warrant the creation of a philosophy of the Web. (shrink)

Proceedings of PhiloWeb 2012, workshop at WWW 2012, on the philosophy of the Web.

This is the first interdisciplinary exploration of the philosophical foundations of the Web, a new area of inquiry that has important implications across a range of domains. -/- Contains twelve essays that bridge the fields of philosophy, cognitive science, and phenomenology Tackles questions such as the impact of Google on intelligence and epistemology, the philosophical status of digital objects, ethics on the Web, semantic and ontological changes caused by the Web, and the potential of the Web to serve as a (...) genuine cognitive extension Brings together insightful new scholarship from well-known analytic and continental philosophers, such as Andy Clark and Bernard Stiegler, as well as rising scholars in "digital native" philosophy and engineering Includes an interview with Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the Web. (shrink)

Does the centralization of the Web change both the diffusion of knowledge and the philosophical definition of knowledge itself? By exploring the origins of the Semantic Web in the philosophy of Carnap and of Google’s machine learning approach in Heidegger, we demonstrate that competing philosophical schools are deeply embedded in artificial intelligence and its evolution in the Web. Finally, we conclude that a decentralized approach to knowledge is necessary in order to bring the Web to its full potential as project (...) for the spread of human autonomy. (shrink)

The advent of the Web is one of the defining technological events of the twentieth century, yet its impact on the fundamental questions of philosophy has not yet been explored, much less systematized. The Web, as today implemented on the foundations of the Internet, is broadly construed as the space of all items of interest identified by URIs. Originally a space of linked hypertext documents, today the Web is rapidly evolving as a universal platform for data and computation. Even swifter (...) is the Web‐driven transformation of many previously unquestioned philosophical concepts of privacy, belief, intelligence, cognition, and even embodiment in surprising ways. The ensuing essays in this collection hope to explore the philosophical foundation of the World Wide Web and open the debate on whether or not the changes caused by the Web to technology and society warrant the creation of a philosophy of the Web. (shrink)

We examine a crucial question for the World Wide Web: What does a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) mean? Crucial for the next-generation Semantic Web, can it refer to things outside web-pages? The Web is a universal information space for naming and accessing information via URIs. However, the classical philosophical problems of meaning and reference that have been the source of debate within the philosophy of language return when the Web is given as the foundation for a knowledge representation with the (...) Semantic Web. Debates on the Semantic Web about the meaning and referential status of a URI are explored as analogues to debates about the meaning and reference of names in the philosophy of language. Three main positions are inspected: the logical position, as exemplified by the descriptivist theory of reference, the direct reference position, as exemplified by Putnam and Kripke’s causal theory of reference, and a Wittgensteinian position that views URIs as a public language, as exemplified by Web search engines. These positions show that debates within the philosophy of language are alive and well on the Web, and so in the philosophy of computer science. (shrink)

Cet article examine la place qu’occupent les réflexions sur la Planétarité en les situant par rapport à deux autres attracteurs, le Terrestre et le Global. Un certain nombre de positions idéologiques contemporaines sont ainsi comparées en fonction de leur situation vis-à-vis de ces trois opérateurs. L’élément central permettant de les distinguer n’est autre que leur rapport aux techniques. Nous proposons de dépasser la difficulté à politiser les enjeux techniques et planétaires en ayant recours au concept de communs négatifs.

The advent of the so-called Web 2.0 and the Semantic Web, for all their seemingly apparent (Floridi, 2009) differences, was instrumental in a renewed interest in questions that used to be addressed solely by the philosophy of language. Amongst these, the problem of meaning is paramount to many a Webservice. The fact that philosophical problematiques of such a magnitude as this one are brought up both in the design process and effective use of technical devices, forces us to realize that (...) some topics are already moving from the traditional realm of theoretical questions to an area packed with innumerable “artefacts of meaning” - tagging systems among many (we will focus on these for the time being). This shift, that we’ve chosen to dub “artefactualization” elsewhere (Monnin, 2009a), bespeaks the now common coupling between philosophical questions and technological realities. In other words, a process that exhibits continuity as well as radical change and deeply subverts established views about the relationships symbolic forms and artefacts entertain with one another. (shrink)

Built upon the foundations of the Internet, the World Wide Web has been the most significant technological development within recent history, sparking a reformulation of both capitalism and resistance. The Web is defined as a « universal information space » by its inventor Tim Berners-Lee of the W3C, reflecting the universal scope of politics and struggle today. Yet while its effects have been scrutinized, the Web itself has received little inquiry. The composition of the governing networks that control the infrastructure (...) of the Web have only recently been engaged with by activists with the ICANN affair and WSIS protests. The Web is governed by a network that is composed of an « immaterial aristocracy » of radical democratic « hackers », corporations such as Google and Microsoft, and non-governmental organizations such as the Internet Engineering Task Force and World Wide Web Consortium. These networks continually negotiate between the needs of global capitalism and the desires of immaterial labour on the Web. (shrink)

In this paper we show that URIs, sometimes dubbed "philosophical proper names, in fact do not always refer as proper names does. We provide an account explaining why, centered around the notion of "resource", central to webarch, and that we qualify ontologically.

Cette étude entend souligner l’influence méconnue de la pensée de Rudolf Carnap sur le développement de disciplines ou de dispositifs participant de la révolution numérique et qui, à des titres divers, poursuivent un projet apparenté à la philosophie. Nous retraçons le parcours de Carnap, marqué par deux idées majeures sur lesquelles les interprètes ont récemment attiré l’attention : le principe de tolérance et la notion d’explication ( explication ). Les développements de l’intelligence artificielle, de l’ingénierie des connaissances (ou knowledge representation (...) ) et du Web sémantique demandent en effet à être confrontés à ces aspects saillants de la pensée carnapienne, afin d’en démontrer la pertinence mais aussi les limites. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Tale of Two Philosophies: URIs between Proper Names and REST; From References to Referentialization; and Toward Ontological Politics.

Cette introduction invite à décadrer et à recadrer la thématique de l’effondrement, popularisée et médiatisée par la théorie dite « collapsologie », vers le plan des acteurs, des terrains, des temporalités, et des régimes d’énonciation. Nous appelons à documenter empiriquement ce que fait l’effondrement, et ce qu’en font celles et ceux à qui cette idée « fait » quelque chose. En effet, l’effondrisme pose la question des façons de se positionner non pas uniquement par rapport à une théorie, mais également (...) par rapport à des expériences individuelles et collectives. Le dossier vise à comprendre comment la réception de la « collapsologie » donne lieu à des jeux complexes entre désemparement et capacités d’agir. L’atterrissage sur un sol anthropocénique de plus en plus critique mérite une décisive discussion collective. L’hypothèse de cette majeure est que les expériences effondristes ont une valeur d’expérimentation à cet égard, notamment en créant un zone discursive et praxique où des cultures et des expériences politiques différentes sont amenées à se rencontrer et à collaborer. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Is Philosophy Part of Web Science?; Representations and the Web; Enactive Search; Cognitive Extension and Cognitive Intelligence; From the Extended Mind to the Web; and the Web as Collective Intelligence.

It has been nearly half a century since the publication of Harry Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital. That, along with Michael Burawoy’s subsequent interrogation of Braverman—Manufacturing Consent—set the terms for a robust and enduring research agenda that has focused on labor processes: the deskilling of work, managerial control over workers, consent, and the extraction of surplus value. This article endeavors to advance the labor process paradigm by highlighting recruitment as a tool by which employers maximize the likelihood that they (...) will hire people who will consent to their objectives, broadly defined. Drawing on a broad range of literatures, we show how recruitment and hiring practices constitute part of an overarching apparatus of control wherein managers imagine that particular people will be ideal for particular jobs and positions. We conclude by sketching a research agenda that sociologists of work and labor processes might undertake in order to understand these issues more thoroughly. (shrink)

It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the (...) first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires. (shrink)

This beautifully written book by one of the world's leading moral philosophers argues that the key to a fulfilled life is to pursue wholeheartedly what one cares about, that love is the most authoritative form of caring, and that the purest form of love is, in a complicated way, self-love. Harry Frankfurt writes that it is through caring that we infuse the world with meaning. Caring provides us with stable ambitions and concerns; it shapes the framework of aims and (...) interests within which we lead our lives. The most basic and essential question for a person to raise about the conduct of his or her life is not what he or she should care about but what, in fact, he or she cannot help caring about. The most important form of caring, Frankfurt writes, is love, a nonvoluntary, disinterested concern for the flourishing of what is loved. Love is so important because meaningful practical reasoning must be grounded in ends that we do not seek only to attain other ends, and because it is in loving that we become bound to final ends desired for their own sakes. Frankfurt argues that the purest form of love is self-love. This sounds perverse, but self-love--as distinct from self-indulgence--is at heart a disinterested concern for whatever it is that the person loves. The most elementary form of self-love is nothing more than the desire of a person to love. Insofar as this is true, self-love is simply a commitment to finding meaning in our lives. (shrink)

This collection of six essays centers on Professor Koyre;'s great theme: the relative importance of metaphysics and observation, with controlled experiment a kind of marriage between the two. Professor Koyre;'s thesis might be summed up as a claim that when one is seeking to explain the scientific revolution, attention must be concentrated on the philosophical outlook of the scientist and away from speculative theories. At the time of his death, Alexandre Koyre; was a professor at the Ecole Pratique des (...) Hautes Études (Sorbonne) and a memeber of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. (shrink)

Harry G. Frankfurt begins his inquiry by asking, “What is it about human beings that makes it possible for us to take ourselves seriously?” Based on The Tanner Lectures in Moral Philosophy, Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right delves into this provocative and original question. The author maintains that taking ourselves seriously presupposes an inward-directed, reflexive oversight that enables us to focus our attention directly upon ourselves, and “[it] means that we are not prepared to accept ourselves just (...) as we come. We want our thoughts, our feelings, our choices, and our behavior to make sense. We are not satisfied to think that our ideas are formed haphazardly, or that our actions are driven by transient and opaque impulses or by mindless decisions. We need to direct ourselves—or at any rate to believe that we are directing ourselves—in thoughtful conformity to stable and appropriate norms. We want to get things right.” The essays delineate two features that have a critical role to play in this: our rationality, and our ability to love. Frankfurt incisively explores the roles of reason and of love in our active lives, and considers the relation between these two motivating forces of our actions. The argument is that the authority of practical reason is less fundamental than the authority of love. Love, as the author defines it, is a volitional matter, that is, it consists in what we are actually committed to caring about. Frankfurt adds that “The object of love can be almost anything—a life, a quality of experience, a person, a group, a moral ideal, a nonmoral ideal, a tradition, whatever.” However, these objects and ideals are difficult to comprehend and often in conflict with each other. Moral principles play an important supporting role in this process as they help us develop and elucidate a vision that inspires our love. The first section of the book consists of the two lectures, which are entitled “Taking Ourselves Seriously” and “Getting It Right.” The second section consists of comments in response by Christine M. Korsgaard, Michael E. Bratman, and Meir Dan-Cohen. The book includes a preface by Debra Satz. (shrink)

This collection of six essays centers on Professor Koyre's great theme: the relative importance of metaphysics and observation, with controlled experiment a kind of marriage between the two. Professor Koyre's thesis might be summed up as a claim that when one is seeking to explain the scientific revolution, attention must be concentrated on the philosophical outlook of the scientist and away from speculative theories. At the time of his death, Alexandre Koyre was a professor at the Ecole Pratique des (...) Hautes Etudes (Sorbonne) and a memeber of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. (shrink)

In his ecological approach to perception, James Gibson introduced the concept of affordance to refer to the perceived meaning of environmental objects and events. this paper examines the relational and causal character of affordances, as well as the grounds for extending affordances beyond environmental features with transcultural meaning to include those features with culturally-specific meaning. such an extension is seen as warranted once affordances are grounded in an intentional analysis of perception. toward this end, aspects of merleau-ponty's treatment of perception (...) are explored. finally, a resolution of the apparent tension between the relational and perceiver-independent nature of affordances is presented. (shrink)

Cauchy’s contribution to the foundations of analysis is often viewed through the lens of developments that occurred some decades later, namely the formalisation of analysis on the basis of the epsilon-delta doctrine in the context of an Archimedean continuum. What does one see if one refrains from viewing Cauchy as if he had read Weierstrass already? One sees, with Felix Klein, a parallel thread for the development of analysis, in the context of an infinitesimal-enriched continuum. One sees, with Emile Borel, (...) the seeds of the theory of rates of growth of functions as developed by Paul du Bois-Reymond. One sees, with E. G. Björling, an infinitesimal definition of the criterion of uniform convergence. Cauchy’s foundational stance is hereby reconsidered. (shrink)

The Routledge Classic Edition of Daniels’ influential 2001 text _Vygotsky and Pedagogy_ explores the growing interest in Vygotsky and the pedagogic implications of the body of work that is developing under the influence of his theories. With a new preface from Harry Daniels this book explores the growing interest in Vygotsky and the pedagogic implications of the body of work that is developing under the influence of his theories. It provides an overview of the ways in which the original (...) writing has been extended and identifies areas for future development. The author considers how these developments are creating new and important possibilities for the practices of teaching and learning in school and beyond, and illustrates how Vygotskian theory can be applied in the classroom. The book is intended for students and academics in education and the social sciences and will be of interest to all those who wish to develop an analysis of pedagogic practice within and beyond the field of education. (shrink)

Having outlined a theory of bullshit and falsehood, Harry G. Frankfurt turns to what lies beyond them: the truth, a concept not as obvious as some might expect. Our culture's devotion to bullshit may seem much stronger than our apparently halfhearted attachment to truth. Some people won't even acknowledge "true" and "false" as meaningful categories, and even those who claim to love truth cause the rest of us to wonder whether they, too, aren't simply full of it. Practically speaking, (...) many of us deploy the truth only when absolutely necessary, often finding alternatives to be more saleable, and yet somehow civilization seems to be muddling along. But where are we headed? Is our fast and easy way with the facts actually crippling us? Or is it "all good"? Really, what's the use of truth, anyway? With the same leavening wit and commonsense wisdom that animates his pathbreaking work On Bullshit, Frankfurt encourages us to take another look at the truth: there may be something there that is perhaps too plain to notice but for which we have a mostly unacknowledged yet deep-seated passion. His book will have sentient beings across America asking, "The truth—why didn't I think of that?". (shrink)

This article investigates how we can reconcile conceptions of human nature with biological explanations. Therefore, it discusses essential differences between (neo) Cartesian substance dualism and (neo) Aristotelian substance monism. It argues that only the (neo) Aristotelian conception of the psuchē, as the set of potentialities the exercise of which is characteristic of the organism, is coherent. The question of how we can reconcile this conception with biological explanations is answered by discussing how it can be integrated with Tinbergen’s subdivision of (...) causal explanations into two proximate and two ultimate explanations, and with modern evolutionary theory. The use of the resulting overarching framework is illustrated by discussing its application to empirical phenomena. (shrink)

This chapter begins with a discussion of the “Epicurean view” — the view stating that death cannot intelligibly be regarded as an evil for the person who dies because the alleged evil lacks a subject or “recipient.” An argument is then presented in opposition to this view that possesses two key components. The first is an account of the “Values Connect with Feelings” requirement, according to which the connection need not be actual, but merely possible and that the requirement is (...) satisfied provided that the relevant object, state, or event is a possible object, even if it is not a possible cause, of the relevant feelings. The second key component is the employment of a four-dimensional framework that makes it possible to claim that temporally distant events or states, like spatially distant events, exist, and thus are possible objects of relevant feelings. (shrink)

In this classic work, best-selling author Harry Frankfurt provides a compelling analysis of the question that not only lies at the heart of Descartes ...

This article aims to discuss how Lucretius arranges the four ‘roots’ at the end of successive lines of verse in the De rerum natura (henceforth, DRN) (1.5–8). In this passage Lucretius, alluding to Empedocles, puts the words in such an order that one can see the layers of the world by a vertical reading. In the same passage, Lucretius imitates the very beginning of Homer's ecphrasis (Il. 18.478–85), which the allegorical tradition will explain as an image of the world, related (...) to Empedoclean theory. The article also discusses the allusion to Daedalus by means of the adjective daedalus in DRN 1.7 (daedala tellus), which could be related to both Empedocles and Homer. This adjective is a keyword for discussing the image produced by the words on the written page. (shrink)