I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons (...) about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’. (shrink)

We discuss the case against Factorism, which is the standard assumption in quantum mechanics that the labels of the $$\otimes$$ ⊗ -factor Hilbert-spaces in direct-product Hilbert-spaces of composite physical systems of similar particles refer to particles, either directly or descriptively. We distinguish different versions of Factorism and argue for their truth or falsehood. In particular, by introducing the concepts of snapshot Hilbert-space and Schrödinger-movie, we demonstrate that there are Hilbert-spaces and $$\otimes$$ ⊗ -factorisations where the labels do refer, even descriptively, (...) to similar particles, which renders them probabilistically absolutely discernible. (shrink)

In October 2022, the International Association of Bioethics announced that the 17th World Congress of Bioethics (WCB) 2024 would be held in Doha, Qatar. The International Network on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics (FAB) traditionally holds its World Congress jointly with the WCB. As part of the ongoing debate about the ethics of bioethics conferencing, the FAB provided a detailed statement discussing concerns about choosing Qatar as the site for a feminist bioethics conference. In order to explore possible approaches towards the (...) FABs decision, the German Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics and Bioethics working group (FME) dedicated one of its meetings to the topic. In this commentary, we present two aspects that we consider particularly important for this current debate: (1) the participation of LGBTQIA+ people in the conference and (2) the possibility of racist and anti-Muslim bias in the evaluation of Qatar as the site for the WCB 2024. As members of the FME, we aim to contribute to an exchange of various perspectives within the international feminist bioethics community. (shrink)

We inquire into the question whether the Aristotelean or classical \emph{ideal} of science has been realised by the Model Revolution, initiated at Stanford University during the 1950ies and spread all around the world of philosophy of science --- \emph{salute} P.\ Suppes. The guiding principle of the Model Revolution is: \emph{a scientific theory is a set of structures in the domain of discourse of axiomatic set-theory}, characterised by a set-theoretical predicate. We expound some critical reflections on the Model Revolution; the conclusions (...) will be that the philosophical problem of what a \emph{scientific theory} is has \emph{not} been solved yet --- \emph{pace} P.\ Suppes. While reflecting critically on the Model Revolution, we also explore a proposal of how to complete the Revolution and briefly address the intertwined subject of \emph{scientific representation}, which has come to occupy center stage in philosophy of science over the past decade. (shrink)

We prove the following result which is due to the third author. Let [Formula: see text]. If [Formula: see text] determinacy and [Formula: see text] determinacy both hold true and there is no [Formula: see text]-definable [Formula: see text]-sequence of pairwise distinct reals, then [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable. The proof yields that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies that [Formula: see text] exists and is [Formula: see text]-iterable for all reals [Formula: see text]. A consequence is (...) the Determinacy Transfer Theorem for arbitrary [Formula: see text], namely the statement that [Formula: see text] determinacy implies [Formula: see text] determinacy. (shrink)

While the consequences of mathematically-based software, algorithms and strategies have become ever wider and better appreciated, ethical reflection on mathematics has remained primitive. We review the somewhat disconnected suggestions of commentators in recent decades with a view to piecing together a coherent approach to ethics in mathematics. Calls for a Hippocratic Oath for mathematicians are examined and it is concluded that while lessons can be learned from the medical profession, the relation of mathematicians to those affected by their work is (...) significantly different. There is something to be learned also from the codes of conduct of cognate but professionalised quantitative disciplines such as engineering and accountancy, as well as from legal principles bearing on professional work. We conclude with recommendations that professional societies in mathematics should sponsor an (international) code of ethics, institutional mission statements for mathematicians and syllabuses of ethics courses for incorporation into mathematics degrees. (shrink)

The notorious ‘measurement problem’ has been roving around quantum mechanics for nearly a century since its inception, and has given rise to a variety of ‘interpretations’ of quantum mechanics, which are meant to evade it. We argue that no less than six problems need to be distinguished, and that several of them classify as different types of problems. One of them is what traditionally is called ‘the measurement problem’. Another of them has nothing to do with measurements but is a (...) profound metaphysical problem. We also analyse critically Maudlin’s (Topoi 14:7–15, 1995) well-known statement of ‘three measurements problems’, and the clash of the views of Brown (Found Phys 16:857–870, 1986) and Stein (Maximal of an impossibility theorem concerning quantum measurement. In: R. S. Cohen et al. (Eds.), Potentiality, entanglement and passion-at-a-distance, 1997) on one of the six measurement problems. Finally, we summarise a solution to one measurement problem which has been largely ignored but tacitly if not explicitly acknowledged. (shrink)

This book engages with what are widely recognized as the two core dimensions of emotion. When we are afraid, glad or disappointed, we feel a certain way; moreover, our emotion is intentional or directed at something: we are afraid of something, glad or disappointed about something. Connecting with a vital strand of recent philosophical thinking, I conceive of these two aspects of emotion as unified. Examining different possible ways of developing the view that the feeling dimension of emotion is itself (...) intentional, I argue against the currently popular view that it is a form of perception-like receptivity to value. I instead propose that emotional feeling is a specific type of response to value, an affective ‘position-taking’. This alternative conceives of emotional feeling as intimately related to our cares and concerns. While situating itself within the analytic-philosophical debate on emotion, the discussion crucially draws on ideas from the early phenomenological tradition in an attempt to think past the theoretical strictures of many contemporary approaches to this subject. The result is a new view of emotional feeling as a thoroughly personal form of engagement with value. (shrink)

We maximally extend the quantum‐mechanical results of Muller and Saunders ( 2008 ) establishing the ‘weak discernibility’ of an arbitrary number of similar fermions in finite‐dimensional Hilbert spaces. This confutes the currently dominant view that ( A ) the quantum‐mechanical description of similar particles conflicts with Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII); and that ( B ) the only way to save PII is by adopting some heavy metaphysical notion such as Scotusian haecceitas or Adamsian primitive thisness. (...) We take sides with Muller and Saunders ( 2008 ) against this currently dominant view, which has been expounded and defended by many. *Received July 2008; revised May 2009. †To contact the authors, please write to: F. A. Muller, Faculty of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burg. Oudlaan 50, H5–16, 3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands; e‐mail: f.a.muller@fwb.eur.nl , and Institute for the History and Foundations of Science, Utrecht University, Budapestlaan 6, IGG–3.08, 3584 CD Utrecht, The Netherlands; e‐mail: f.a.muller@uu.nl . M. P. Seevinck, Institute for the History and Foundations of Science, Utrecht University, Budapestlaan 6, IGG–3.08, 3584 CD Utrecht, The Netherlands; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

The trajectory of Merleau-Ponty’s career is often seen as a progressive development: he begins by analyzing scientific consciousness in The Structure of Behavior, complements that account with a phenomenological analysis of behavior as lived in Phenomenology of Perception, and then overcomes the “philosophy of consciousness” to which the earlier texts are committed in the turn toward an ontology of flesh in The Visible and the Invisible. Through close readings of Merleau-Ponty’s engagements with Gestalt psychology in The Structure of Behavior, I (...) argue that the immanent critique of Gestalt theory in that text already anticipates the chiasmic logic of flesh. This challenges the idea of a turn in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. I begin by outlining the elemental, carnal, and reversible status of flesh. With careful attention to his source materials, I then distinguish Merleau-Ponty’s appropriations of Gestalt theoretical insights from his critical adaptations, defending three claims: (1) The Structure of Behavior borrows insights from Gestalt theorists that are undermined by their own, realistic ontology; (2) it modifies those insights to explicitly acknowledge the elemental status of nature; and (3) those modifications enable Merleau-Ponty to re-interpret Gestalt psychologists’ empirical findings, outlining how consciousness must emerge from nature as both carnal and reversible. (shrink)

Counter to the popular impression that Adam Smith was a champion of selfishness and greed, Jerry Muller shows that the Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations maintained that markets served to promote the well-being of ...

It is a commonplace that emotions are characteristically passive. As we ordinarily think of them, emotions are ways in which we are acted upon, that is, moved or affected by aspects of our environment. Moreover, we have no voluntary control over whether we feel them. In this paper, I call attention to a much-neglected respect in which emotions are active, which is no less central to our pretheoretical concept of them. That is, in having emotions, we are engaged with the (...) world insofar as we respond to aspects of our environment. In this context, to say that an emotion is a response to x is tantamount to saying that x is a reason for which we have it. Elaborating this claim in light of a historically prominent conception of the active/passive distinction, I will argue that emotions are a form of spontaneity in virtue of their responsive character and contrast in this respect with perceptions, which are fundamentally receptive. While this proposal is prima facie opposed to the ordinary image of emotions as passive, I will show that it actually allows us to make proper sense of it. (shrink)

Is Yogācāra a system of idealist metaphysics or a theory of experience without metaphysical commitments? An increasing amount of literature has argued, since the 1980s, in favor of the second answer. In this paper, I propose to review the background to the question. In fact, most of the attempts to answer the question have been made with reference to Buddhist texts and concepts. However, labels such as “idealism” emerged from Western philosophy and are reflective of specific historical situations and problems. (...) Extending their use to other contexts requires that these specificities are taken into account. Building on an historical survey, I suggest that some essential features of Yogācāra correspond to features of an ancient Greek tradition of metaphysics that has been characterized as idealist: Neoplatonism. On this basis, I come back to the initial question and argue in favor of the idealist interpretation. (shrink)

Space and time are geometrical notions that Sophie Germain, a French mathematician, discusses on several occasions in her Pensées diverses, however not only in a geometrical way but also in terms of a philosophical and moral understanding: she speaks of a human’s lifespan, the space they occupy, their place in creation and the knowledge toward which they always aim. This mixture of mathematical and philosophical thinking brings out Germain’s dream: she wants to apply the language of numbers to moral and (...) political issues. As such this chapter aims to examine Germain’s mathematical understanding of space and time in order to discover her moral theory. Furthermore, in a purely hypothetical context (because one does not know which authors she has read), I compare Germain’s moral thinking to Pascal’s moral and mathematical thoughts in Pensées. We underline the possible inspiration by Pascal by highlighting the similarities between these authors concerning space and time, which both treat mathematically and philosophically. These authors agree that time and space can be measured, and thus provide constant and mathematically uniform elements. At the same time, time and space provide the framework for moral thinking. The latter is not “capable” of enjoying the present moment; he is on a quest for the future. For Germain, this results into knowledge, but for Pascal, this is a sign of an unhappy life in which people do not find rest and are constantly looking for a diversion. (shrink)

Let us imagine an ideal ethical agent, i.e., an agent who (i) holds a certain ethical theory, (ii) has all factual knowledge needed for determining which action among those open to her is right and which is wrong, according to her theory, and who (iii) is ideally motivated to really do whatever her ethical theory demands her to do. If we grant that the notions of omniscience and ideal motivation both make sense, we may ask: Could there possibly be an (...) ideal utilitarian, that is, an ideal ethical agent whose ethical theory says that our only moral obligation consists in maximizing utility? I claim that an ideal agent cannot be utilitarian. My reasoning against ideal utilitarianism will parallel Putnam's famous argument against the brains in a vat. Putnam argues that an envatted brain cannot describe its own situation because its words do not refer to brains and vats; I argue that an ideal utilitarian cannot entertain or communicate the beliefs necessary to being a utilitarian. (shrink)

In this article I argue that one way of approaching Newman’s Idea of a University is to view it as a text about the formation of imagination. This is done in three parts. First, I identify the core features of imagination as Newman conceived it by drawing on various sources from his life and work. Second, I turn to Idea of a University in particular, primarily the “Lectures on University Teaching,” to demonstrate that the concept of imagination is a significant (...) underlying presence in Newman’s lectures. Finally, I conclude with a brief analysis of the relationship between reason and imagination within the university. (shrink)

This paper attempts to assess and evaluate some of the economic implications of the Convention on Biological Diversity. After outlining the main principles and the scope of this Convention, the following issues are addressed: the determination of the 'optimal' level of biodiversity loss, the meaning of incremental costs, and monetary evaluation problems of ecological resources and the problems it poses for the funding mechanism. The paper concludes with a discussion of the issues of commercialisation and access to genetic resources.

Socially engaged art presents social situations to be understood, experienced, and evaluated as works of art while they simultaneously retain everyday non-art functionality. This article begins with an account of the definitional and evaluative concerns that socially engaged art engenders, outlining the debates around the relative importance of ethical and aesthetic values that result from this unsettled relationship between art and non-art. Based on this account, I argue that all socially engaged art requires successful performative bids that declare the work (...) to be art and that it is possible to identify the felicity conditions in which these bids are likely to be successful, as well as the perlocutionary effects that occur when a situation is categorized as art. I apply this analytic framework in a discussion and comparison of pieces by Santiago Sierra and Mierle Laderman Ukeles, demonstrating how this framework facilitates assessments that account for the works as art, while interrogating and evaluating the ethics of their categorization as art. (shrink)

In his influential After Finitude. An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (2008), Quentin Meillassoux argues that *Correlationism* (an umbrella-term encompassing most varieties of Idealism) gives rise to an irresolvable paradox, called "the Paradox of the Arche-fossil", which is essentially a clash between philosophical principles and scientific findings. This irresolvable paradox of Correlationism then paves the way for the "Speculative Turn" and the ensuing rise of burgeoning "speculative realism" in Continental Philosophy: noumenal reality, as-it-is-in-and-of-itself, "the Great Outdoors", is back on (...) the Continental stage, open for speculative thought and even metaphysical knowledge. We attempt to provide a thorough and charitable analysis of the Paradox of the Arche-fossil. Our analyses lead us to conclude that Meillassoux's argument fails, due to an ambiguity with regard to the concept of being that cannot be repaired. We end by directing attention to another ominous threat to Correlationism, ignored by Meillassoux and all "speculative realists" alike, which is still breathing. (shrink)

Decisions about brain surgery pose existential challenges because they are often decisions about life or death, and sometimes about possible personality changes. Therefore they require rigorous neuroethical consideration. However, we doubt whether metaphysical interpretations of ambiguous statements of patients are useful for deriving ethical and legal conclusions. Particularly, we question the application of psychological theories of personal identity on neuroethical issues for several reasons. First, even the putative “standard view” on personal identity is contentious. Second, diverse accounts of personal identity (...) have been introduced into the neuroethical debate, which are incompatible. Third, the criteria for “diagnosing” the supposed changes in “identity” are ambiguous and indeterminate. Fourth, the metaphysical theories of personal identity imply highly questionable ethical and legal revisions, namely the denial of advance directives, particularly of Ulysses contracts, and, for patients with brain cancer, even therapeutic nihilism.We discuss three examples in which ideas from the personal identity debate in metaphysics are straightforwardly applied to discuss ethical issues of neurosurgery. We discuss revisions of the current medico-legal practice that have been proposed on grounds of psychological theories of personal identity. We argue that the established status quo in law and clinical practice is beneficial to the patients concerned. Furthermore, it is metaphysically neutral, which is an important principle of liberal, democratic, pluralistic societies.We recommend a pragmatic approach: empirical research on personality changes arising from brain disorders or interventions, comprehensive information about risks of personality changes, and advance directives, particularly Ulysses contracts. (shrink)

We ponder the question whether quantum physics has had any influence on philosophy, and if not, whether it ought to have had any. Answers to these questions are provided, and they turn out to depend on which branch of the tree of philosophy we sweep, sway and swing, and even which twig of the branch we touch when we sweep, sway and swing.

Jean-Luc Godard’s Alphaville puts forward a cultural critique of modern capitalism in a poetic form. The film subverts the standard classification of cinematographic “genres” and of cinematographic languages, without separating the content of the criticism from its form of expression. Thus, it uses an original language that integrates both philosophical and poetic referents, putting together elements from the dystopic imagination, the science fiction, the romantic film, and other cinematographic “genres”. Unlike Orwell and Huxley’s dystopias, Alphaville depicts a deeper, insidious, invisible (...) and more efficacious form of totalitarianism that invades the so-called “democratic” societies. This type of totalitarianism is dominated by instrumental rationality and techno-science, which expel art and imagery, the poetic and the possible, emotion, feelings and everything that is free. This paper analyzes the construction of this original form and interprets its critical content from the perspective of Godard’s thought. It is an exercise of looking and knowing how to look. (shrink)

My paper is motivated by two thoughts: that there’s significant overlap between J. G. Herder’s romanticism and, what I call, the ‘late’ conceptualism of John McDowell; that recognizing this helps to settle a dispute in contemporary epistemology concerning the contents of perception. I argue, on the basis of that overlap, that “romantic conceptualism” avoids two pressing criticisms of conceptualism: It offers a reply to the argument from the fineness of grain of perceptual experience and it explains the relationship between human (...) perceptual experience and the perceptual experiences of non-human animals. I start with the interpretation of McDowell’s views, tracing the significant revisions in the period following the publication of Mind and World; then I try to compare his views with Herder’s, trying to establish a framework for responding to the more trenchant criticisms of McDowell’s non-conceptualist opponents, and the explanatory force of conceptualist hypotheses beyond the context of contemporary epistemology. The first arc of the paper, therefore, traces the evolution of McDowell’s thought concerning perceptual contents. The second attempts to demonstrate where that view converges with a romantic philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Detailed criticisms of Buddhism by Confucian scholars in China were initiated in the writings of Han Yu, who lambasted Buddhism as a foreign religion whose practices were intrinsically deleterious to society and state. Tensions grew much stronger in the Song period after the appearance of Neo-Confucianism, especially in the philosophical form crystallized in the works of Cheng Yi, Cheng Hao, and Zhu Xi, all of whom attacked Buddhism strongly on philosophical grounds. In late-Goryeo and early-Joseon Korea, these tensions were brought (...) to new heights as the Neo-Confucian polemic became the central component of the movement to oust Buddhism from its position as the state religion. The gamut of arguments that had been made against Buddhist throughout this long history were drawn together in the essay of noted Confucian statesman Jeong Dojeon: Bulssi japbyeon. These arguments would be met with a commensurate Buddhist response in the Hyeon jeong non by the Seon monk Gihwa, considered by many as one of the sharpest thinkers and writers in the entire Korean Buddhist tradition. Thus, as one of the rare cases in the history of religions, a full-scale debate took place between these two distinct religious groups. (shrink)

On dit et répète que, dans la République, Platon a chassé les poètes de la cité. L’affirmation n’est pas fausse, à condition d’ajouter plusieurs réserves et précisions qui, si on les prend au sérieux, donnent une image très différente de l’attitude de Platon envers la poésie. La cité a besoin de poètes : une partie essentielle de l’éducation des gardiens (livres II-III) repose sur la musique-poésie, et c’est bien pourquoi Platon s’attarde longuement sur les règles à respecter en la matière. (...) Cette poésie soumise à la censure n’est pourtant pas la seule admise : vis-à-vis de la poésie existante (Homère, les Tragiques), le philosophe adopte une position nuancée : elle a beaucoup de charme, et si elle a beaucoup de défauts, il n’est pourtant pas impossible de l’accueillir dans la cité pour peu que les citoyens soient munis de l’antidote fourni par l’éducation. C’est à cette dernière qu’on doit apporter tous ses soins, à celle des gardiens mais aussi à celle des citoyens ordinaires. (shrink)

This article addresses paucity in literature on the conceptualising of the true nature of a Protestant revival. Through a literary review and document study, the article aims to compile a Protestant revival evaluation criterion to assess protestant revivals. This was done by integrating the distinctives of Evangelical revivals throughout history as described by prominent scholars such as Armstrong, Cairns, Edwards, Lloyd-Jones and Sprague in general. In addition, various past and present examples and exponents of true and juxtaposing anti-revivals were investigated (...) and beacons set for sustainable revival. From the PREC, three levels were established by which to assess revivals: individuals, the church and surrounding communities. For the case study, information was gleaned from multiple sources, including interviews, documents, sermons, newsletters, observations and research reports. Applying the PREC in a case study, demonstrates how it operates as a valuable tool; in this case, the revival among the Zulus in KwaSizabantu, South Africa. (shrink)

Skyphoi with painted dedications from the Artemision of Epidamnos-Dyrrhachion Among the most abundant material collected in 1970-1971 on the hill of Dautë at Dürres, ancient Epidamnos-Dyrrhachion, there has recently been recognized two inscribed sherds : rims of large skyphoi, carrying dedications respectively to Artemis and to Hekate, painted in a monumental way in an original technique – red figure emphasized in red outline. These inscriptions confirm the recently proposed identification of the sanctuary on the Dautë hill as the Artemision situated (...) at the gates of the city mentio<< ned by Appian (II. 60), a major fix-point for the topography of Epidamnos-Dyrrhachion. To these sherds are compared some further examples of dedications painted in an ostentatious manner, a very rare practice, but which provides precious indications regarding the commissioning of vases destined to be offered as ex-votos. (shrink)

Fully embracing one's embodied suffering, rather than denying it or mentally explaining it away, can open an individual to a broader sense of interbeing, to the ability to endure, survive, and move through pain and toward a deeper sense of compassion, peace, joy, and liberation. The self benefits from exploring interbeing using an environmental metaphor to consider the human body: the body as terroir. Terroir is analogous to the specific microclimate and natural environment in which quality wine is produced. Appreciation (...) of oneself as a unique mobile terroir can reveal estranged aspects of the host/guest relationship of interbeing within the individual body/self. Perhaps this is what those who practice interbeing in the real world have come to understand. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Framed by a critical assessment of R. M. Hare’s classic paper “What Is Wrong With Slavery?,” this article argues that traditional forms of philosophical analysis miss chattel slavery’s specifically racialized harm. A crucial reason is the failure to attend to how slavery was experienced by those who were enslaved. To remedy this neglect, and adapting Calvin Warren’s reading of the Dred Scott decision, I show that slave narratives are rich philosophical resources for thinking about the existential reality of enslavement (...) and that they anticipate later insights from the Afro-pessimist and Black nihilist traditions. I conclude by showing how these insights construe the harm of chattel slavery in ways that are inexpressible through the kinds of traditional philosophical sense-making that Hare pursues. (shrink)