This Handbook contains forty essays by an international team of experts on the antecedents, the content, and the reception of the Dionysian corpus, a body of writings falsely ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite, a convert of St Paul, but actually written about 500 AD. The first section contains discussions of the genesis of the corpus, its Christian antecedents, and its Neoplatonic influences. In the second section, studies on the Syriac reception, the relation of the Syriac to the original Greek, and (...) the editing of the Greek by John of Scythopolis are followed by contributions on the use of the corpus in such Byzantine authors as Maximus the Confessor, John of Damascus, Theodore the Studite, Niketas Stethatos, Gregory Palamas, and Gemistus Pletho. In the third section attention turns to the Western tradition, represented first by the translators John Scotus Eriugena, John Sarracenus, and Robert Grosseteste and then by such readers as the Victorines, the early Franciscans, Albert the Great, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Dante, the English mystics, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino. The contributors to the final section survey the effect on Western readers of Lorenzo Valla's proof of the inauthenticity of the corpus and the subsequent exposure of its dependence on Proclus by Koch and Stiglmayr. The authors studied in this section include Erasmus, Luther and his followers, Vladimir Lossky, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Jacques Derrida, as well as modern thinkers of the Greek Church. Essays on Dionysius as a mystic and a political theologian conclude the volume. (shrink)

Este libro de reciente aparición representa una síntesis actualizada de los orígenes, recepciones e influencia del Corpus Dionysiacum. Los tópicos que desarrolla no se limitan a la raíz neoplatónica y su fusión con el cristianismo, sino que explora asimismo las tradiciones que confluyen en el pensamiento de (Pseudo) Dionisio Areopagita y su despliegue en diversas filosofías y teologías que son profundamente afectadas por los modos de lectura del Corpus. La reconocida autoridad de los firmantes y la extensión temática que abarcan (...) constituyen este volumen en una nueva obra de referencia necesaria para los estudios dionisianos y de las recepciones del pensamiento tardo-antiguo en general. (shrink)

Cardinal Bessarion (1408–1472), in the second chapter of the first book of his influential work In calumniatorem Platonis, attempted to reply to Georgios Trapezuntios’ (1396–1474) criticism against Plato in the Comparatio Philosophorum Platonis et Aristotelis. Bessarion investigates why the Athenian philosopher maintained, in several dialogues, that the sacred truths should not be communicated to the general public and argued in favor of the value of oral transmission of knowledge, largely based on his theory about the cognitive processes. Recently, Fr. (...) Bessarion Kouotsis has argued that Cardinal Bessarion’s reasoning draws primarily on the “Disciplina Arcani”, i.e., the rule of secrecy, which was an established practice of the Early Christian Church, aimed at protecting and preserving the core elements of the religion from outsiders. While I find Kouotsis’ approach interesting and thought-provoking—for instance, the idea that Bessarion’s argumentation was likely influenced by Eastern Christian views on the rule of secrecy—I intend, first of all, to discuss why Bessarion did not explicitly mention it. Moreover, I would like to argue that Bessarion’s good knowledge of the long Platonic tradition and Eastern mysticism, encompassing both pagan and Christian elements, should also be considered a significant source. Furthermore, I would like to question Kouotsis’ implicit argument that Bessarion’s views were dominated by his training in Orthodox theology and discuss the possibility that Pletho’s (1355–1454) teaching was the obvious influence for Bessarion’s defense of secrecy. After all, we should bear in mind that Anastos has already pointed out Pletho’s reverence for the rule of secrecy. Finally, I would like to support that Bessarion, in the specific text, focused predominantly on the epistemological and cognitive aspects of oral teaching, resorting to the rule of secrecy only to enhance his views. (shrink)

Plotinus’ thesis of the relationship between the One and Nous (Intellect) is central to his thought. In dealing with this relationship, he concentrates far more on what makes the One and Nous alike than on what makes them different. This is because by preference he envisages the One as the ‘causal principle () of everything’, in what might be termed a ‘top‐down’ model of metaphysics in which first cause (the One) leads downwards to second cause (Nous). Plotinus is obliged to (...) present the distinction between the One and Nous as relative, not as absolute, precisely because he wants to show that Nous is firmly grounded in the One. The One differs from Nous to no more than the degree, and in no more than the manner, that are necessary for there to be created a Nous which is as like as possible to the One Itself. (shrink)

This study of the interpretations of Aristotle's "Categories" in the thirteenth century provides an introduction to some main themes of medieval philosophical ...

The problem of economic justice is the division and distribution of income and wealth. Is a just distribution an equal distribution, or are some unequal distributions just, and if so which ones? We critically examine what the ideal theories of justice of Aristotle and Rawls say or imply about a just distribution of wealth and income in the best of circumstances. Rawls’ contractarian view takes strict equality to be the benchmark of justice; Aristotle’s teleological theory claims that the equality appropriate (...) to distributive justice is proportional, equality of ratios among persons’ shares of a good and their respective merits for that good. The applications of the two theories result in different distributional outcomes. Aristotle’s justice principle will result in unequal outcomes if the merits of persons are unequal and in equal outcomes if the merits are equal. An example of the latter is his best polis and constitution--its ideal citizens will have superlative and equal merits and they will justly receive equal political and economic shares. Although he supports reducing economic inequalities in actual cities, serious inequalities in resources will remain. Rawls’ basic principle of justice will produce equal shares. But democracies allow great inequalities in wealth and income, presumably recognizing that some inequalities promote the common good; everyone is better off when some economic incentives are rewarded. But which economic inequalities are just? Rawls in his second principle of justice identifies the most widely held way of answering this question. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to analyze Kierkegaard’s philosophical views concerning the problem of the nature of the human self. With the help of a close examination of Kierkegaard’s texts The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death, we argue that Kierkegaard “constructs” the human self in a specific way. This way reveals, through the examination by Kierkegaard of “anxiety” and “despair,” three main characteristics of the human self: a) the self is a dynamic process, always “becoming” in (...) time through free will and freedom of choice, b) the human self is always a historical self, so that history is then a direct product of “becoming a self,” and c) the human self, in order to be “whole,” must freely ground itself in a transcendental being. (shrink)

Georgios Pentzaropoulos continues his investigation undertaken in 'Generating Stable Knowledge via Reduction in Entropy' (Philosophy Pathways Issue 167, 28 November 2011) looking at knowledge not as something we 'possess' -- the knowledge contained in a book, for example -- but rather as an active, or interactive process of increasing understanding through the judicious sifting and processing of raw information. As Macmurray argued in his Gifford Lectures, 'All knowledge is for the sake of action.' Instead of seeking to define some (...) abstract notion of knowledge in a vacuum, what philosophers should be getting to grips with is the notion of actionable knowledge. - Geoffrey Klempner, Editor. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage se propose de confronter les problématiques relatives à la falsafa et à la religion islamique dans leur approche du corps. Le corps a toujours été marginalisé au profit de la notion de l'âme. Pendant que les penseurs ont été intéressés par l'étude de l'âme, le corps a toujours été leur point de départ. Son statut éthique et ontologique doit être réexaminé en refusant de se limiter aux dualismes classiques corps/âme ou matérialisme/spiritualisme qui masquent par leur dimension formelle ou (...) réductrice l'enjeu politique et existentiel de la question ainsi que ses implications théoriques et pratiques. Deux grandes perspectives apparaissent dans le développement de la falsafa lorsqu'elle problématise la question du corps. La première porte sur le fondement psychologique du lien existant entre l'âme et le corps et ses conséquences quant à la détermination de leur valeur réciproque. La deuxième est métaphysique et s'inscrit dans une visée eschatologique impliquant une conception de l'au-delà et du jugement dernier. Comment penser le corps d'un point de vue philosophique pour qu'il ne soit pas incompatible avec l'islam? Pour répondre à cette question, nous étudions les textes fondateurs de la falsafa spécialement ceux de Al-F r b, Ibn S n, Al-Ghaz l et Mull Sadr tout en les comparant aux textes coraniques. Georgio Rahal enseigne l'islamologie, l'histoire médiévale de l'islam, l'arabe littéraire et la philosophie arabe à l'Institut Catholique de Toulouse. (shrink)

Those who work with topics related to Modern Greek identity usually start discussing these issues by quoting the famous Georgios Gemistos Pletho (c.1360-1454): we, over whom you rule and hold sway, are Hellenes by genos (γένος), as is witnessed by our language and ancestral education. Although Woodhouse thought of Pletho as the last of the Hellenes, others prefer to denounce him the last of the Byzantines and the first and foremost Modern Greek. During the 14th and 15th centuries, a (...) number of influential intellectuals in the Eastern Roman Empire preferred the term Hellene (Ἓλλην) to identify themselves, instead of the formal Roman (Ρωμαῖος) and the common Greek (Γραικός). According to the prevalent view of modern scholarship, the shift should not be interpreted only as a statement of proto-national identity, but also as the outcome of growing archaism. As Vryonis pointed out, the historian Critoboulos used to call the Balkan nations with their archaic names: Byzantines became “Hellenes,” Albanians became “Illyrians,” etc. Chalkokondyles followed in the same path. Furthermore, in order to lament the decline of their Empire, byzantine intellectuals tended to compare their sad present to the glory of ancient Greece. Besides archaism, proto-nationalism and Hellenism, I suggest that a careful reading of the sources would lead us to reappraise the ways 15th century intellectuals perceived identity. Whilst I do not accept Vakalopoulos’ views on diachronic Hellenic identity, I support that, in the 15th century, Byzantine scholars attempted to create an identity based on cultural and historical continuity and otherness. Moreover, Laiou’s definition of Greek identity as a resultant of language, history, tradition and interests does not cover the case of 15th century Byzantine philosophers, since the latter strived to enrich and enlarge Greek identity with additional elements. It is worth noting that those philosophers who fled to Italy deliberately chose to describe themselves as Greeks (Greci/Γραικοί) or Hellenes (Ἓλληνες) and not as Romans (Ρωμιοί/Ρωμαῖοι), according to the Byzantine official terminology. During the 15th century a major shift occurred in the Byzantine intelligentsia and its prominent members revisited matters of identity. In this paper, I attempt to scrutinize the ways Byzantine philosophers of the 15th century, who lived in the territories of the Byzantine Empire and in Italy, perceived identity and otherness. In my research, I include not only Greek, but also Latin sources, since their works is written in both languages. (shrink)

This book provides a thorough study of Mill's thought and writing on nationhood, nationalism and patriotism, whilst placing them firmly within his socio-cultural context.

Summary During the Hellenistic and Imperial periods, Greek populations coexisted with several other cultures, which were very often more multitudinous. Those ‘Hellenes’, however, came together in big Panhellenic and smaller, local festivals to honour their gods and celebrate their common Hellenic culture. As a result, numerous new festivals and contests were founded after the third century BC, gradually forming a large festival network. Even though this festival network has repeatedly been at the centre of scholarly attention – and still is (...) – the rhetoric of athletic inscriptions, i.e. how athletic Panhellenism is demonstrated and what it is prompted by still remains largely unexplored. The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate how the accumulation of citizenships by athletes contributes to Panhellenic self-representation, by showing another way that this association with Hellenic culture was communicated and negotiated in the public discourse. The portrayal of citizenships by an array of ethnic names along with the name of the honoree, presented the athlete as a larger-than-city figure and an essential part of that Hellenic community. One of the other aims of this paper is to suggest two factors in the development of these conventions of athletic representation, whose significance has not been understood in full: the athletic synod and the formation of Panhellenion. It is a central tenet of this paper that the study of citizenship in athletic inscriptions cannot only help us reveal more ways that Hellenicity was projected, but also better understand how all these different textual images helped shape views about what Hellas was. (shrink)

al-Fārābi was well aware that ecumenism can easily convert to tyranny if a certain city–state attempts to impose its laws outside its territory. State legislation depends on specific cultural and historical factors which deprives it from being universal because culture and history could not unite different nations in an ecumenical state. Legislation has to be built on universal premises, e.g. on philosophy, so as to serve the needs of a global state. Philosophy is the bond which unites humans and communities, (...) while religion and legislation are disruptive factors. Despite the fact that in our days there are different philosophies, philosophy encourages dialogue, not hatred. As a result, al-Fārābi was right when he founded his ecumenical state on philosophy. Consequently, philosophers ought to persuade the citizens through rational arguments, dialectic, symbols and religion so as to accept the existence of an ecumenical state. The goal of this state is the supreme good, understood as the theoretical living. Al-Fārābi’s ecumenism is a means for the perfection of human beings and societies and not simply for the augmentation of wealth, as it is seen today. Al-Fārābi dreams of an anthropocentric ecumenical state. I support that this should be the form of modern ecumenism. While modern scholars have strong objections to the governing of philosophers, we should agree that philosophy is the appropriate universal language. The persistence on power and other divisive factors, such as religion or tradition, is doomed to fail. (shrink)

_The Blackwell Companion to Aristotle_ provides in-depth studies of the main themes of Aristotle's thought, from art to zoology. The most comprehensive single volume survey of the life and work of Aristotle Comprised of 40 newly commissioned essays from leading experts Coves the full range of Aristotle's work, from his 'theoretical' inquiries into metaphysics, physics, psychology, and biology, to the practical and productive "sciences" such as ethics, politics, rhetoric, and art.

Summary The article analyses the extensive and passionate responses that the American Civil War and the issues it raised elicited from John Stuart Mill. While it attempts to offer a brief but comprehensive overall account of Mill's influential involvement in debates on the Civil War both in Britain and in America, it focuses particularly on Mill's defence of racial equality for the American ?negroes? both during the war and in the course of debates on reconstruction after the war. Mill's concerted (...) efforts to contribute to the improvement of Anglo-American relations and to influence both British public opinion and how that opinion was viewed from America are also analysed. Detailed attention is paid to Mill's strong views on reconstruction, which have not received the attention they deserve. A number of Mill's views and ?crotchets? were tested in the debates on reconstruction, and, whenever he had to choose between conflicting principles, his uncompromising hatred of slavery and racial inequality took priority over any other considerations (even ones as important as educational qualifications for voters, and free trade). (shrink)

Georgios Mantzarides; Globalization and Universality: Chimera and Truth, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Volume 8, Issue 2, 1 J.

Cardinal Bessarion (1408–1472), in the second chapter of the first book of his influential work In calumniatorem Platonis, attempted to reply to Georgios Trapezuntios’ (1396–1474) criticism against Plato in the Comparatio Philosophorum Platonis et Aristotelis. Bessarion investigates why the Athenian philosopher maintained, in several dialogues, that the sacred truths should not be communicated to the general public and argued in favor of the value of oral transmission of knowledge, largely based on his theory about the cognitive processes. Recently, Fr. (...) Bessarion Kouotsis has argued that Cardinal Bessarion’s reasoning draws primarily on the “Disciplina Arcani”, i.e., the rule of secrecy, which was an established practice of the Early Christian Church, aimed at protecting and preserving the core elements of the religion from outsiders. While I find Kouotsis’ approach interesting and thought-provoking—for instance, the idea that Bessarion’s argumentation was likely influenced by Eastern Christian views on the rule of secrecy—I intend, first of all, to discuss why Bessarion did not explicitly mention it. Moreover, I would like to argue that Bessarion’s good knowledge of the long Platonic tradition and Eastern mysticism, encompassing both pagan and Christian elements, should also be considered a significant source. Furthermore, I would like to question Kouotsis’ implicit argument that Bessarion’s views were dominated by his training in Orthodox theology and discuss the possibility that Pletho’s (1355–1454) teaching was the obvious influence for Bessarion’s defense of secrecy. After all, we should bear in mind that Anastos has already pointed out Pletho’s reverence for the rule of secrecy. Finally, I would like to support that Bessarion, in the specific text, focused predominantly on the epistemological and cognitive aspects of oral teaching, resorting to the rule of secrecy only to enhance his views. (shrink)

This paper proposes and axiomatically characterizes a model of choice that builds on the criterion of partial dominance and allows for two types of avoidant behavior: choice deferral and status quo bias. These phenomena are explained in a unified way that allows for a clear theoretical distinction between them to be made. The model also explains the strengthening of the attraction effect that has been observed when deferral is permissible. Unlike other models of status quo biased behavior, the one analyzed (...) in this paper builds on a unique, reference-independent preference relation that is acyclic and generally incomplete. When this relation is complete, the model reduces to rational choice. (shrink)

The object of this thesis is the examination of the concept of political representation in the corpus of Hobbes, Locke, Hegel and Marx. Through the method of textualreconstruction I foreground the concept’s salience in their writings. Political representation constitutes a unitary political society as the basis of representative government by entrusting to a separate part of the political community the exercise of the legislative and executive functions on behalf of the political society. Hobbes’s author-actor model grounded the concept of political (...) representation by introducing the act of the transfer of will to a representative by authorisation. Thereby he established the problematic relationship of permanently alienated, absolute, representative power acting in the name of the political community. Locke conceptualised political representation in a way that restored to political society the power to determine the legitimacy of its representative government in case the latter transgressed the norm of acting for the public good of society. Hegel, in turn, assigned to political representation the crucial function of integrating civil society into the power system of the state thus securing the identity of subjective and objective freedom in the rational state, though political representation bestows only formal freedom to civil society’s involvement in the affairs of the state. For Marx, the relationship of political representation makes the representative polity appear as a democratically governed political society within which individual freedom and the public good are secured. This is vitiated by the rift between political society/state and civil society. Marx censures liberal and republican theory for ignoring the primacy of civil/bourgeois society over the representative political society. As a consequence,he argues,the representative polity is not a form of self-government but other-determined and neither freedom nor the public good are realised. Instead, under the regime of private property, money assumes the authorial function of organising social exchange and human relations, shaping the representative polity after its own image, and thus it renders democracy as popular sovereignty a lie. (shrink)

The critical concept of commodity fetishism and its developed forms of money and capital fetishism ground the contemporary shape of social life under the rule of capital. This chapter offers a novel interpretation based on Marx’s Capital, elucidating the oft-overlooked interconnection of the fetishism triptych that accounts for domination, as well as the normalisation of exploitation as experienced in capitalist life. In commodity fetishism, a market-based pseudo-social ‘thing-hood’ preponderates over commodity owners and producers, concealing the double inversion that constitutes the (...) ‘world of commodities’. Money’s fetish form makes it appear as the ‘sovereign’ of the commodity world, possessing the exclusive social power to establish the value hierarchy of all persons and objects relativised in regard to it. The universal condition of monetisation of the life process in bourgeois society necessitates the adoption of the competition principle, leading to the generalised formation of a commodity self, shaped by competitive individualism. The social separation of the great mass of commodity producers from the means of production and the consequent need to sell themselves as commodities in the form of wage labour constitutes the social basis of capital fetishism, through which the process of capital ‘valorisation’ is enfolded within the process of use value production, disappearing into its socio-material character and thus naturalised. Capital fetishism dissimulates the production of surplus value by social labour and constructs the harmonised appearance of an equitable contribution of ‘factors of production’ in the sharing of the surplus product, thereby obscuring distributional struggles over it. Such antagonisms over surplus undergird the logic of neoliberal capitalism’s two-pronged strategy, pursuing ‘deregulation of labour relations’ on the one hand and dismantling the welfare state on the other. (shrink)

Many Buddhist rulers attained the cultic status of divinity as buddhas or celestial bodhisattvas and were expected to exercise their power in accord with Buddhist principles. The bodhisatta is depicted as perfecting both the virtues of kingship and the virtues of renunciation, thus preparing the way for his supreme enlightenment in which the two strands of sovereignty and renunciation “receive their final synthesis and fulfilment”. Politics was realistically seen as an unavoidable exercise of power that can and ought to be (...) used to promote righteousness, while the philosophical interpretation of Buddhist doctrines reflects the pragmatic nature of Buddhist ethics, which, unlike the deontological and absolutist ethical traditions, allows for the expression of multiple and variant attitudes towards the state and the role of religion in shaping and being shaped by social and political conditions. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo ofrece una lectura de la pintura renacentista según los principios establecidos por Leon Battista Alberti, uno de los primeros teóricos de la perspectiva en cuyo Tratado de pintura se refiere al cuadro como “una ventana abierta a la historia”. El concepto de historia empleado por Alberti, que se presta a numerosas interpretaciones, es abordado a partir de las reflexiones de Erwin Panofsky en torno a la perspectiva como “forma simbólica”, avanzando hacia una hipótesis en torno al carácter (...) simbólico de la configuración y representación del tiempo en el cuadro-ventana albertiano.This paper offers a reading of the renaissance painting according to the principles established by Leon Battista Alberti, one of the first theorists of perspective in painting which Trattato della pittura define the frame of the painting as “an open window into history”. The concept of history employed by Alberti, which lends itself to many interpretations, is approached from the reflections of Erwin Panofsky about the prospect as “symbolic form”, moving towards a hypothesis about the symbolic nature of the configuration and representation of time in the alberti’s window. (shrink)

Despite the fact that Aristotelian philosophy prevailed during the middle Ages, the philosophy of Plato and his interpreters –Christian and Arabic- marked the intellectual tradition of the medieval era. Among the medieval Muslim thinkers, al-Fârâbî achieved the incorporation of Plato’s thought into the Arabic cultural milieu. The Alexandrian school of philosophy, according to which the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle could be harmonized, heavily influenced him. Later, Avicenna and Averroes read Plato through the lens of Neoplatonist commentators and presented a (...) new version of Platonism. Their approach on the Platonic texts was predominantly theological. In Western Europe, Platonic philosophy prevailed until the 11th century. It is noteworthy that the vast majority of the philosophers back then did not read the Platonic texts. Rather, their views on Plato were shaped by commentaries and secondary sources. After the 12th century and the translation movement, Aristotle dominated the Latin-speaking world. Plato and the Platonists regained their popularity in the 15th century, among Renaissance humanists. (shrink)

The pessimistic hypothesis is the hypothesis that life is bad for us, in the sense that we are worse off for having come into existence. Suppose this hypothesis turns out to be correct — existence turns out to be more of a burden than a gift. A natural next thought is that we should stop having children. But I contend that this is a mistake; procreation would often be permissible even if the pessimistic hypothesis turned out to be correct. Roughly, (...) this is because we are often in a position to know that future people will approve of having been created, and their approval will not be inappropriate even if they are worse off for having been created. And our respect for the attitudes of future people can permit us to create them. (shrink)

I argue that, insofar as we endorse the general idea that desires play an important role in well-being, we ought to believe that their significance for well-being is derived from a pair of more fundamental attitudes: attraction and aversion. Attraction has wholly positive significance for well-being, and aversion has wholly negative significance for well-being. Desire satisfaction and frustration have significance for well-being insofar as the relevant desires involve some combination of attraction and aversion. I defend these claims by illustrating how (...) our desires can be asymmetrical. They can have greater positive than negative significance for well-being, or vice versa. (shrink)

Heidegger’s reading of Plato is variable and multifaceted, giving way to different and, at times, opposing interpretations of Plato’s work. To give an example that is relevant to the following pape...

This article analyses the articulation of the relationship between ‘patriotism’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ or commitment to ‘humanity’ in the writings of some major Victorian political thinkers. It is argued that: (a) there was no neat distinction between ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’ in the thought of the time; (b) ‘patriotism’ was seen as a stepping stone to universalistic commitment to ‘humanity’ rather than as opposed to or incompatible with the latter; (c) most thinkers avoided the term ‘cosmopolitanism’, because of some of its associations, (...) and preferred to use love of ‘humanity’ or similar terms to refer to universalistic commitments; (d) all thinkers discussed here believed that some form of ‘patriotism’ was necessary, while all of them complained that the term was being misused by most of their contemporaries and inveighed against some misconceived and morally reprehensible version of ‘patriotism’; and (e) most discussions of patriotism and universalism were conducted in a religious or quasi-religious language. The main focus of this article is on John Stuart Mill (1806-73), Matthew Arnold (1822-88), Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), Thomas Hill Green (1836-82), Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), Frederic Harrison (1831-1923) and, to a lesser extent, Frederick Denison Maurice (1805-72), John Robert Seeley (1834-95) and Charles Henry Pearson (1830-94). (shrink)

Since the 19th century Renaissance studies gained gradually autonomy from the Medieval and the Early Modern studies. In countries like Greece, where the traditional view was that no Renaissance occurred in the Balkan Peninsula during the 14th -16th century as a result of the Turkish occupation, Renaissance studies had to struggle to gain autonomy and distinct presence in the curricula of Greek universities. This article aims to present the current status of the Renaissance studies in the Greek universities and to (...) give a critical account of it. The interest for Renaissance studies in Greece is not increased. Usually, Greek scholars and students feel awkward towards that period because they think of Renaissance as something alien to their culture. It is common among scholars of humanities when they refer to the period from 1450-1600, to use the term “post-byzantine” instead of Renaissance. Also, Renaissance studies do not have a rich tradition in Greek universities. There were no major academic figures who were experts in the period so as to promote Renaissance studies and leave a legacy of students and written works. Other Greek scholars hold that the Renaissance is not a distinct period and should be studied in the pattern of the Modern European period. (shrink)

Yet, that the Cratylus is of philosophical significance seems to me to be an assumption we can safely make. Plato rarely discusses other than philosophical problems--and even these other discussions are raised and carried on in the context of philosophical questions. Moreover, he could hardly be expected to write a whole dialogue of no philosophical concern and significance. To understand what the philosophical significance of the Cratylus is in general, and for Plato's thought in particular, we must be clear about (...) the question Plato is trying to answer and the answer he gives to this question. That is, we must be clear about the question of the Cratylus: What is the correctness of names? and the two answers to the question Plato considers: convention, and natural correctness. (shrink)

It has been repeatedly stated that Maximus the Confessor’s (c. 580–662) thought is of eminently philosophical interest, and his work has been approached from a philosophical point of view in a number of monographs. However, no dedicated collective scholarly engagement on Maximus the Confessor as a philosopher has been produced. Although Maximus’ treatises reflect a strong philosophical background, prior research has failed to determine with clarity his specific philosophical sources and predilections. Besides apologetic purposes, he referred occasionally to purely philosophical (...) topics, which are more adequate to reveal Maximus’ philosophical education and knowledge. Among these topics are representation and imagination, which have a significant role in epistemology. Maximus’ epistemology proves his dependence on ancient Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle, Stoicism and Alexandrian Neoplatonism. A few centuries later, Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Al-Farabi (c.870—c.950), the founder of medieval Arabic philosophy, dealt with the same topics in his epistemology. Al-Farabi’s philosophy has been studied extensively and we have a good idea about his possible sources. There are several indications that Al-Farabi and Maximus the Confessor share common insights, for they resort to the same ancient Greek tradition. In this paper, I attempt to compare Maximus’ and Al-Farabi’s epistemology in order to reveal affinities and differences that permit us to analyze and assess Maximus’ philosophical education. (shrink)

This article reports on the theoretical output of a design research study, which concerns the design of a learning environment for helping students challenge the ‘balance of nature’-idea and reach an up-to-date understanding about ecosystems’ contingency. Our focus is set on whether it is feasible to articulate an empirically tested theory of teaching/learning about contingency in nature while designing our LE. The study included an exploratory phase and three research cycles. The participants were first year educational sciences students who collaboratively (...) explored computer models that simulated ecosystems’ response to changes, in order to understand the underlying contingency. In the EP, we defined learning objectives/design criteria that informed the LE’s first version. This was driven by the global/overall question of how ecosystems may function, which was explored through inter-connected local/partial questions with the aid of scaffold questions embedded in worksheets linked to the computer models. Drawing upon the RC1 results, we introduced two-version models for each change that the peer groups had to explore and assigned the first version to half and the second to the other half. These changes made it through RC2-RC3 and account for key features of the study’s theoretical output, the ‘Bifurcated Domino Path Approach’. The RC3 results show that it works effectively, and thus, we suggest that the design of LEs addressing contingency in ecosystem’s response can integrate bifurcated domino paths with several forks, where some peer groups explore one version of the target phenomenon and others an alternative one and meeting points, where they all share their different, contingency-indicating conclusions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The complex web of intellectual exchanges between Britain and Europe remains a peripheral concern for historians interested in the circulation of ideas across national, international and imperial frameworks. This special issue attempts to fill the lacuna by presenting new research on the triangular relationship between Britain, Europe and the idea of liberty during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The articles featured in this issue revisit established narratives, discuss novel case-studies and address the question of Britain's special relationship with liberty (...) in an age marked by impediments to the freedom of movement and the erection of nationalist boundaries across Europe, and the world. (shrink)