This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II. Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent (...) seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls's social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss James Buchanan’s contribution in the narrow domain of understanding committee voting under majority rule. We then go on to discuss Charles Plott’s seminal experimental work on the topic that sparked a wave of public choice experimental work. However, given Plott’s claims that Buchanan influenced him significantly, it is puzzling that his work with Morris Fiorina explores a question outside of those which Buchanan and Tullock found interesting. We suggest several ways to resolve this (...) tension. Our chapter concludes by discussing a lacuna in the experimental public choice literature in which Buchanan was particularly interested—logrolling, or vote trading. (shrink)

In this volume, Sir Alan Peacock, one of Britain's most noted public economists, poses the question as to whether the history of economic thought is an essential part of the training of public finance economists. He argues that the perspective gained by studying the origins of public choice analysis can offer an important stimulus to scientific progress. The first lecture analyses the increasing popularity in recent years of the modernist, anti-historical point of view. The second criticises (...) those theories of growth in government expenditure which ignore the political process. The third lecture draws on Adam Smith and David Hume to extend the conventional economic model of bureaucracy. In the final lecture, Peacock considers the problem of controlling public sector growth and points to ways of overcoming them. The book ends with short commentaries by seven public economists. (shrink)

A part les contraintes imposées aux décisions publiques par 1a mobilité, l’analyse reçue des choix publics postule que le processus politique fonctionne essentiellement de la même façon en régime fédéral qu’en régime unitaire. Il s’avère cependant qu’il existe une dimension du processus politique en régime fédéral qui se prête spécifiquement à l’analyse économique, nommément le fait que, là où les fonctions se recoupent dans un même territoire, il se trouve deux niveaux de gouvernement qui se concurrencent dans l’offre des mêmes (...) services à un même groupe de votants. Si alors on définit les votes comme des inputs dans la production d’outputs politiques, on se trouve en situation de concurrence par deux offreurs ou plus visà- vis d’une même ressource placée en propriété commune. On peut supposer que l’analyse conventionnelle de l’allocation des ressources en régime de propriété commune puisse jeter un éclairage sur l’aboutissement du processus politique fédéral. Dans ces conditions, il y va de l’intérêt de chacun des deux offreurs de chercher à s’attirer les votes et donc d’être le premier à offrir l’output politique en question. En l’absence de droits exclusifs sur le bassin de votes, le chevauchement amène les deux joueurs à vouloir réaliser le profit politique, de crainte de le perdre à l’avantage de l’autre partie. Et pourtant, le profit s’en trouvera ultimement dissipé ex post pour les deux parties après l’avènement du deuxième joueur. On découvre ainsi que les forces mises en branle dans un régime fédéral type sont de deux ordres : une force restrictionniste d’abord, fondée sur la mobilité des ressources entre les entités décentralisées, et une force expansionniste liée à la dynamique politique étudiée dans ces lignes. Ce résultat peut expliquer pourquoi le dossier empirique reste ambigu sur la contribution du fédéralisme au freinage de la croissance du secteur public. Les conséquences de ce processus sont dégagées et les avenues possibles de solution explorées.Except for the mobility constraints imposed on political decisions of lowerlevel governments, public choice analysts assume that the working of the political process under federalism remains the same at all levels of government as under unitary state. This paper argues that one dimension of the political process in a federalist framework lends itself to specific economic analysis, namely the fact that, once constitutional limits break down and functions overlap, two or more levels of government compete for the same voters in the supply of services in a given territory.Viewing votes as inputs in the production of political outputs, the conventional analysis of allocation under cnmmon-property rule should shed light on the outcome of this process. The analysis shows that it is in the interest of both suppliers to seek to gain the votes in being first to implement programs.There are thus two forces operating in a typical federalist system, an expansionist one rooted in the political dynamics analyzed here, and a restrictionist one based on the mobility of resources among decentralized entities. This may explain why the empirical record is rather mixed on the contribution of federalism to containing government growth. The consequences of this process are derived and possible avenues for improvement are explored. (shrink)

This article argues that effective corporate social responsibility (CSR) of multinational pharmaceutical companies in developing countries should reflect context, opportunity, proximity, time and impact in accordance with the social integration and ethical approaches to CSR. It proposes a CSR model expressed as CSR=COPTI+SI+E, which acknowledges access-to-medicines as a matter in the global public domain, a public choice problem and a moral responsibility issue for multinational pharmaceutical companies. This model recognises the globalisation of the principle of humanity in (...) communities of place and communities of interest as highlighted by the Global Economic Ethic Manifesto 2009 as an integral part of the responsibilities of multinational pharmaceutical companies. The model reflects a global application of the concept of disadvantaged consumer already known to some national laws. The article suggests an access-to-medicines CSR framework for pharmaceutical companies which may include pricing, patents, testing and clinical trials, research and development, joint public private initiative and appropriate use of drugs. (shrink)

This essay is my analysis of Eamonn Butler’s fine book, Public Choice: a Primer. I suggest that Butler’s book is especially useful for philosophers, most of whom are to this day unfamiliar with public choice theory. This body of economics studies the role that universal self-interest plays in politics. This is an unpleasant truth for many philosophers, who have the Hegelian view of government as the realm of disinterested charity. Butler reviews the history of public (...) choice economics, discusses the various schools of the theory, and the major areas of application. (shrink)

The essay examines Schumpeter’s understanding of the capitalist process and develops a critical analysis of his explanation of why capitalism cannot survive. Part I deals with how Schumpeter understood capitalism. Part II studies why –- from his point of view — capitalism couldn’t survive. Part III analysis why it is actually socialism, as a socio-political alternative, that is impractical and must collapse from contradictions inherent in it. Part IV presents some final reflections, presenting the public choice and the (...) thought of James M. Buchanan, as an alternative to the pessimist Schumpeterian view. (shrink)

Public choice or rational politics differs from other approaches to the study of political behavior in that it builds on models in which rational individuals seek to advance their own interests. This five-part volume surveys the main ideas and contributions of the field. It contains twenty-five essays written by thirty scholars, both economists and political scientists, from North America and Europe. Part I discusses the nature and justification for the existence of government and various forms it can take, (...) including mixed, private, and public institutions, international organizations, federalisms, and constitutional governments. Part II examines the properties of different voting rules and preference aggregation procedures. Part III explores multiparty systems, interest groups, logrolling and political business cycles. The individual decisionmaker is the focus of Part IV, with surveys of the experimental literature on individual behavior, and why people vote as they do. The final section applies public-choice reasoning to bureaucracy, taxation, and the size of government. (shrink)

This monograph evaluates public policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic through a public choice lens. The book compares two prominent, albeit mutually exclusive, theories in social sciences—public interest theory and public choice theory—and explores how their predictions perform within the framework of the Covid-19 pandemic. The chapters present different pandemic policies alongside empirical data in order to draw conclusions about their efficacy, and, in turn, draw conclusions about the veracity of each theory. By the (...) end of the volume, the reader will be able to draw their own conclusions about whether the pandemic policy responses served the public interest, as public interest theory suggests, or the personal interests of the politicians who implemented them, as public choice theory holds. (shrink)

Much health and safety regulation can be understood as the product of political coalitions between two groups. The first, consisting of persons with self-control issues, enlists the government as an intermediary. The second either expects to benefit from the success of the first, or anticipates gains from a tax imposed on the first group’s behavior. A political entrepreneur might plausibly turn these groups’ preferences into law. This public choice perspective on regulation provides a positive explanation of why it (...) is more likely that a legal system will engage in some health and safety programs than in others. The important break from the conventional view of regulation, as something that either controls externalities or is imposed paternalistically, is in advancing the idea that the government is an intermediary deployed by those who want help. Internalities, associated with collective action problems or with time inconsistent preferences, deserve equal billing. The discussion considers smoking regulation and other health and safety regulation, and then contrasts these with anti-obesity efforts where private contracting is a more feasible means of controlling internalities, and where political coalitions are less likely. (shrink)

Chater & Loewenstein have done a service to the field by raising the fundamental issue of how the political process distorts well-intentioned efforts at behavioral public policy. We connect this argument to broader research on government failure, particularly public choice theory in economics. We further suggest ways that behavioral research can help identify and mitigate such failures.

The social phenomena discussed in this series of essays all center around the problem of individuals in groups faced with the choice of doing what is best for themselves or what is best for the group. Instances of the phenomena are called by many different names: "Volunteer's Dilemma", "Prisoner's Dilemma", "Collective Choice", "Rational Choice", "Social Choice", and "Voter's Paradox" to list just a few. Unfortunately, the academic programs that cover these various manifestations of the "individual vs. (...) group" dilemma do not fall under one discipline. You will not find the "Social Dilemma" department at any.. (shrink)

Mankind soon learn to make interested uses of every right and power which they possess, or may assume. The public money and public liberty...will soon be discovered to be sources of wealth and dominion to those who hold them; distinguished, too, by this tempting circumstance, that they are the instrument, as well as the object of acquisition. With money we will get men, said Caesar, and with men we will get money. Nor should our assembly be deluded by (...) the integrity of their own purposes, and conclude that these unlimited powers will never be abused, because themselves are not disposed to abuse them. They should look forward to a time, and that not a distant one, when a corruption in this, as in the country from which we derive our origin, will have seized the heads of government, and be spread by them through the body of the people; when they will purchase the voices of the people, and make them pay the price. (shrink)

We consider the problem of choosing the location of a public facility either (a) on a tree network or (b) in a Euclidean space. (a) (1996) characterize the class of target rules on a tree network by Pareto efficiency and population-monotonicity. Using Vohra's (1999) characterization of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency and replacement-domination, we give a short proof of the previous characterization and show that it also holds on the domain of symmetric preferences. (b) The result obtained for model (...) (a) proves to be crucial for the analysis of the problem of choosing the location of a public facility in a Euclidean space. Our main result is the characterization of the class of coordinatewise target rules by unanimity, strategy-proofness, and either replacement-domination or population-monotonicity. (shrink)

"This work traces the development of social ethics in European Protestantism from Barth's early dialectical theology (ca. 1920) through Bonhoeffer's Ethics, written during World War II. In this development, two major approaches to social ethics emerge: a theological radicalism, championed by Barth, which emphasizes the difference between Christian action and ordinary moral reflection; and a theological realism, exemplified by Brunner and Bonhoeffer, which streses the possibilities for Christian cooperation in making and sustaining the social order. A final chaper traces the (...) continuing influence of these approaches in Christian ethics today." -- Book cover. (shrink)

During the Covid-19 pandemic, public policy was not driven by findings from public health research, but by politicians’ desire to pursue their own interests. The media and politicians inflamed mass hysteria and then imposed ill-considered lockdowns to “solve” the problem. Lockdowns not only failed to protect those at risk from the virus, but also caused enormous collateral damage. Public choice theory helps explaining this decision-making. -/- .

American politicians often claim a moral imperative to ensure quality affordable health care to all Americans, but as Donald Munro points out, leaders rarely outline the content of this moral standard and whether it can be applied to all societies. Munro turns to recent research in cognitive science and evolutionary psychology to identify the ethical principles that help humans succeed as individuals and as cooperative groups. He then applies these principles to two practical problems affecting contemporary China: the moral complexity (...) of responding to global warming and the lack of consistency within the Chinese legal system. (shrink)

Property rights are the rules governing ownership in society. This Element offers an analytical framework to understand the origins and consequences of property rights. It conceptualizes of the political economy of property rights as a concern with the follow questions: What explains the origins of economic and legal property rights? What are the consequences of different property rights institutions for wealth creation, conservation, and political order? Why do property institutions change? Why do legal reforms relating to property rights such as (...) land redistribution and legal titling improve livelihoods in some contexts but not others? In analyzing property rights, the authors emphasize the complementarity of insights from a diversity of disciplinary perspectives, including Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics, including the Bloomington School of institutional analysis and political economy. (shrink)

Much management literature depends on the philosophical writings of F A Hayek and James M Buchanan. As such it is recognisably not Marxist but is in fact antithetical to Marxism. But there is a small, significant body of literature which attempts to recruit the ideas of writers in the field of ‘Public Choice’ (pre-eminently Buchanan) to the service of updated Marxist thinking about management. In this paper I argue that this endeavour, although it illustrates the common origins of (...) neoliberalism and Marxism, cannot succeed without doing violence to the original and perhaps fundamental concepts of Marxist thought. (shrink)

1 Since commentary on the M ideas t is s o fraugh t with controversy, let me state s ome of my s tarting p oints up front. I am a strong believer in a market economy, and in W estern civilization. My foreign p olicy instincts tend to be dovish, in recognition of the imperfections in governments, but I am not, like some libertarians , in principle oppo sed to A merican intervention abroad. I am not religious , and (...) the M iddle East holds no s pecial theological s ignificance fo r me. I h ave fo llowe d events in the region, and read wid ely on its h isto ry, but have no literacy in either Hebrew or Arabic. (shrink)

This paper was motivated by what we see as an inconsistency between a 1988 paper by Brennan and Buchanan expressing concern that public choice might erode public confidence in government and previous work by Buchanan, in particular Buchanan. The one advantage we saw with the 1988 paper was that it, all by itself, is all one needs to dismiss MacLean’s depiction of Buchanan as an ideologically rigid extremist. We also found the same inconsistency occurring simultaneously in Buchanan’s (...) writing in 1979. Yet, based on Wagner, we conclude that such inconsistencies may reflect a strength in Buchanan’s scholarship. (shrink)

James Buchanan, one of the founders of Public Choice theory, applies the conceptual apparatus of economics to the public domain. This article investigates which assumptions are crucial to Buchanan’s project, concentrating on methodological individualism and the Homo Economicus model. It shows that Buchanan from time to time moves away from these economic concepts, though only in minor ways. The article also focuses on Buchanan’s normative emphasis on the role of institutions in coordinating self-interested individual actions in mutually (...) beneficial ways. Criticizing Buchanan’s analysis, the paper argues that a broader view of the individual and of the role of institutions is necessary in a theory of constitutional choice. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are areas of political behavior for which the usual assumption of wealth maximizing homo economicus is to narrow to generate convincing explanation of behavior. In particular, it is argued that for many political decisions, people choose according to some set of moral preconceptions while for others, people have insufficient information to make economic choices even if they were inclined to do so. This implies that normative public choice can only be part of a (...) political decision process in which non-pecuniary concerns influence choices. Finally, constitutional economics insofar as it is conceptually conceived, must presume some set of moral and informational properties of the parties to the social contract. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:110 DAVID HUME'S INVISIBLE HAND IN THE WEALTH OF NATIONS THE PUBLIC CHOICE OF MORAL INFORMATION Introduction The thesis I shall defend is that there are systematic aspects of Adam Smith's economics which make little sense when read in isolation from a literature in which David Hume provides the signal contributions. Consequently, parts of Hume's own work are stripped of meaning, isolated as they are from later (...) developments. The puzzles about Smith's analysis which I find illuminated by Hume's are the following: 1. Why does Smith both defend the importance of economic growth for the material of well-being of the working class and claim that property originates as spoil, impoverishing the working class? After all, in the classical system the existence of property is one requisite for economic growth. 2. Why does Smith exalt the assumption of self-interested behavior in private activity but claim that irrationality dominates the political process? 3. Why does Smith deny the importance of benevolence in Wealth of Nations and insist on the importance of morality Sentiment morality in Theory of Moral its?3 The three questions have a common feature: they are related to the question of how public goods are provided. The particular public good in question is the institution of private property. As with all true I am obligated to the Center for Study of Public Choice for generous support of my research. Suzanne Levy gets the credit for the extent to which this approaches English. I have benefited from acute comments from Charles Rowley and Charles Griswold. The errors and obscurities which remain are solely my responsibility. Ill public goods, society considered as a whole benefits from having such an institution, but each individual considered separately can gain by anti-social behavior.4 Public goods provide a considerable difficulty for any social institution; neither competition in the market nor government requests that individuals reveal how much they wish to be taxed are certain to be efficient. There are aspects of the classical economic analysis which stress the importance of moral information as a partial solution to the public goods problem. By "moral information" I only require that the theory is employed as a guide and that if an individual acts contrary to the theory, this choice is not cited as "falsifying" the theory. Rather, something is said to be "wrong" or "wicked" about the choice.6 Much of modern economic analysis assumes that individuals have perfect information; this postulate rules out any significant role for moral information in the provision of the public goods. To avoid assuming away such a role for morality, we will drop the perfect information assumption and then examine if we can make sense of the classics' attack on the public goods problem. Of course, the specification that individuals see their own interests very poorly is consistent with Smith's general approach. The technique employed below is to look at the issue which Hume and Smith addressed as a problem in modern economics. The key difficulty is to determine under what conditions moral information could guide individuals with very imperfect perceptions to maximize their utility. In particular, suppose we find that moral guidance tells an individual how efficiently to produce. Is this morality self-enforcing or are resources required to persuade people to act in accord with these teachings? If resources are required, we will not pay much attention to just how this persuasion 112 is provided, e.g., whether we tell people that theft is "evil" or whether we hang a few thieves. General production theory tells us we probably will do both, but this is a separate issue. The argument to be advanced is that moral information has self-enforcement properties in private activities but these properties are missing in public activities. In this account, then, real resources will be required for implementing the morality. This consideration in turn raises an interesting issue. If the government expends these resources, what reason is there to believe that they will be provided to serve the public interest and not the interest of the government? Is it possible that the government can prosper by keeping people ignorant or by giving them advice... (shrink)

Attention to individual choice is a valuable dimension of public health policy; however, the creation of effective public health programmes requires policy makers to address the material and social structures that determine a person’s chance of actually achieving a good state of health. This statement summarizes a well understood and widely held view within public health practice. In this article, we (i) argue that advocates for public health can and should defend this emphasis on ‘structures’ (...) by reference to citizen autonomy and not simply by emphasizing concern for counter-balancing values such as ‘population health’ or ‘fairness’, (ii) map and critically explore the contrasting conceptions of autonomy that feature in such debates, with particular attention to conceptions of autonomy that might feature in the defence of an emphasis on structures. We draw on (i) a relational conception of autonomy and (ii) the distinction that can be made between autonomous deliberation and autonomous action to suggest that offering people the opportunity to make choices about their health without also supporting their capability to achieve the object of these choices falls short of what is often considered to be morally and politically important about promoting autonomy in relation to health. (shrink)

Most political liberals argue that only rules, policies and institutions that are part of society’s basic structure need to be justified with so-called public reasons. Laws enacted outside this set are legitimate if and when public reasons can justify the procedure that selects them. I argue that this view is susceptible to known problems from social choice theory. However, there are resources within political liberalism that could address them. If the scope of public reason is extended (...) beyond the basic structure it could order people’s preferences in a way that circumvents the identified issues. (shrink)

This article presents an approach to how to make reasonable social choices when independent criteria (e.g., prioritarianism, religious freedom) fail to fully determine what to do. The article outlines different explanations of why independent criteria sometimes fail to fully determine what to do and illustrates how they can still be used to eliminate ineligible alternatives, but it is argued that the independent criteria cannot ground a reasonable social choice in these situations. To complement independent criteria when they fail to (...) fully determine what to do, it is suggested that society must engage in public deliberation by way of generating new reasons that can determine how to rank the alternatives. It is suggested that the approach to social choice presented here reveals a way of accepting the relevance of independent criteria for social choice without letting go of the idea that the attitudes of affected parties matter. (shrink)