In 1972 a public choice model predicted that the incipient environmental movement in the United States would grow but encounter overwhelming industrial opposition. Twenty years later we find the model overstated this opposition. Environmental pressure groups were able to pass substantial legislation, resist counter forces, and reduce most targeted pollutants. A revised public choice model predicts that the success of the present global environmental movement depends on (1) information flows between scientists and the public on the potential costs of deterioration, (...) and (2) means for reducing the costs of regulation such as relying more on market incentives. (shrink)

This article reexamines the rational choice or economic approach to human studies. Its adherents claim that its extension beyond its original domain to all human behavior can finally lead to integration of the human studies, especially social theory, and thus their elevation from what they see as a chaotic state. Specifically, they propose grounding human studies on the premise that humans are rational egoists or self-interested utility maximizers. Although this premise has been the conceptual foundation of orthodox economic theory, it (...) has been questioned, and even in part discredited in its heterodox versions. This reexamination casts serious doubts on such claims. (shrink)

SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE : HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY by William Greider New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. 798 pp., $24.95 Greider pursues the theme that the Federal Reserve System promotes the interests of Wall Street?banks and bondholders?over those of Main Street?the rest of society. The wealth of fascinating observations he makes are, unfortunately, organized by a 1950s?style Keynesianism and a faith in unlimited, majoritarian democracy. Neither of these beliefs are at all adequate for remedying the deficiencies (...) of political control of the money supply, which is the real problem Greider has uncovered. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We examine the influence of neo-liberalism in re-shaping the accountability of five professional groups (accountants, solicitors, social workers, nurses and doctors) and its consequence for their CPD policies. Documentary analysis and Quarterly Labour Force Survey data (n=31,260) from the 1990s to the present are integrated in a comparative method which examines whether changes are specific to a profession or represent more general patterns. Using complementary theories from neo-liberal economics and the sociology of professionalism, we show how regulatory oversight has (...) altered accountabilities. Its consequences for the autonomy of professions and individuals in determining CPD requirements differ amongst the five groups, mediated by status, public concern, regulator activism and, possibly, alignment with the financial sector. Efficiency and equity are analysed using theories of professional learning and human capital. Wider economic conditions influence the incidence of CPD with recent years showing declining participation; we also show changes in ?what counts? as CPD and its greater integration with performance management. Findings on selected equity criteria are also reported. Some regulators are becoming more specific about the content of CPD, while others are defining what constitutes good practice and requiring its use in planning CPD. Greater attention is being given to issues of ethics and probity. (shrink)

Joseph Schumpeter's work has been all too selectively appropriated by public choice theorists. Schumpeter criticized the high level of rationality the classical model of democracy imputes to citizens, and he provided an alternative theory, inspiring rational choice theory and allowing for diverse forms of irrationality. Following in Schumpeter's footsteps I will discuss four problems: the deficient rationality of voters, politicians as ?political entrepreneurs,? leadership in democracy and the rise of the ?political class,? and the affinity between democracy and capitalism.

Since Schweickart asserts that I have not addressed his main argument, let me consider briefly the four claims he advances at the beginning of his second reply. Regarding 1: To argue, as I have, that there would be a strong tendency for market socialism to degenerate into capitalism, it is necessary to spell out carefully what capitalism is. Following Marx, I defined capitalism as a system in which the workers do not control the means of production and the workers sell (...) their labor power as a commodity. As G.A. Cohen has pointed out, this definition can be given a rechtsfrei characterization in terms of effective powers over means of production and labor power. Actual legal arrangements are not the issue. In my original paper, I never said that the workers would sell the means of production. Thus 1 is irrelevant. The real questions are: Who effectively controls the means of production? Who effectively gets the profits? If the answer to both of these questions is, “Not the workers,” it follows that the workers are effectively proletarians and the system is a form of capitalism. (shrink)

The most common argument against the use of rational choice models outside economics is that they make unrealistic assumptions about individual behavior. We argue that whether the falsity of assumptions matters in a given model depends on which factors are explanatorily relevant. Since the explanatory factors may vary from application to application, effective criticism of economic model building should be based on model-specific arguments showing how the result really depends on the false assumptions. However, some modeling results in imperialistic applications (...) are relatively robust with respect to unrealistic assumptions. Key Words: unrealistic assumptions • economics imperialism • rational choice • as if • robustness. (shrink)

The rational choice paradigm has proved to be a fruitful means of analysis and explanation in various disciplines concerned with questions of practical rationality, but in various attempts to extend its fields of application the deficiencies of the original account of rational choice have become evident. This paper tries to give a systematic overview of ways in which the rational choice paradigm can be extended and modified.

The pace of scientific progress may be hindered by the tendency of our academic institutions to reward being popular rather than being right. A market-based alternative, where scientists can more formally 'stake their reputation', is presented here. It offers clear incentives to be careful and honest while contributing to a visible, self-consistent consensus on controversial scientific questions. In addition, it allows patrons to choose questions to be researched without choosing people or methods. The bulk of this paper is spent in (...) examining potential problems with the proposed approach. After this examination, the idea still seems to be plausible and worthy of further study. (shrink)

Professions are granted autonomy by society, to regulate their own affairs. In return for the economic benefits autonomy grants to professions, society expects professions to act in a socially responsible manner. This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of the relationship between society and professions, which shows that the relationship is unstable in the face of opportunities for professions to renege on the social contract. It also shows how periodic controversies regarding the degree to which professionals act in the public interest (...) are expected to occur periodically, and how they are resolved. (shrink)

In 1972 a public choice model predicted that the incipient environmental movement in the United States would grow but encounter overwhelming industrial opposition. Twenty years later we find the model overstated this opposition. Environmental pressure groups were able to pass substantial legislation, resist counter forces, and reduce most targeted pollutants. A revised public choice model predicts that the success of the present global environmental movement depends on (1) information flows between scientists and the public on the potential costs of deterioration, (...) and (2) means for reducing the costs of regulation such as relying more on market incentives. (shrink)

According to a widely credited model in the business ethics literature, ethical decisions are a function of two kinds of factors, personal(individual) and situational, and these factors interact with each other. According to a contrary view of decision making that is widely held in some areas of business research, individuals’ decisions about ethical issues (and subsequent actions) are purely a function of their self-interest.The laboratory experiment reported in this paper provides a test of the person-situation interactionist model, using the general (...) theoretical and experimental framework used in the experimental economics literature. One individual and two situational factors relating to moral intensity were examined which may influence decisions to misrepresent information in the course of business activities.The individual and one situational variable were significantly related to participants’ actions. The interactions among individual andsituation variables were not individually significant, although the model including interactions had a much higher level of statistical significance. Gender was significant, both directly and in interaction with moral development, suggesting that it may be worthy of further examination. (shrink)

Consequentialism is often criticized for failing to accommodate impersonal constraints and personal options. A common consequentialist response is to acknowledge the anticonsequentialist intuitions but to argue either that the consequentialist can, after all, accommodate the allegedly recalcitrant intuitions or that, where accommodation is impossible, the recalcitrant intuition can be dismissed for want of an adequate philosophical rationale. Whereas these consequentialist responses have some plausibility, associational duties represent a somewhat different challenge to consequentialism, inasmuch as they embody neither impersonal constraints nor (...) personal options, but rather personal constraints. Our intuitions about associational duties resist capture within the intellectual net of consequentialism, and such duties do admit of a philosophical rationale at least as plausible as anything the consequentialist has to offer. (shrink)

Prevailing opinion—defended by Jason Brennan and others—is that voting to change the outcome is irrational, since although the payoffs of tipping an election can be quite large, the probability of doing so is extraordinarily small. This paper argues that prevailing opinion is incorrect. Voting is shown to be rational so long as two conditions are satisfied: First, the average social benefit of electing the better candidate must be at least twice as great as the individual cost of voting, and second, (...) the chance of casting the decisive vote must be at least 1/N, where N stands for the number of citizens. It is argued that both of these conditions are often true in the real world. (shrink)

Proponents of the public goods argument ('PGA') seek to ground the authority of the state on its putative indispensability as a means of providing public goods. But many of the things we take to be public goods – including many of the goods commonly invoked in support of the PGA – are actually what we might term publicized goods. A publicized good is any whose ‘public’ character results only from a policy decision to make some good freely and universally available. (...) This fact poses complications for the PGA, insofar as the set of possible publicized goods is quite extensive indeed. (shrink)

Any ethical argument involving the problems of access to assisted reproductive technologies should entail the discussion of the decision protocol and consider the individual deliberating on the appropriateness of these remedies from the point of view of self and community. Yet, arguments based on patients' own moral calculations are rare in the bioethics literature. The moral voice behind most discourses concerning ARTs is that of an outwardly independent spectator, who nonetheless proceeds to justify a personally significant worldview in the utilization (...) of these resources. Investigators grounded in social and legal sciences have offered relevant arguments in this regard, but because their discourses are derived from research protocols specific to their respective disciplines, they fail to provide a general rationale applicable to moral deliberation. (shrink)