This volume offers papers touching on four inter-related themes: a critique of the European Enlightenment as a basis for the production of knowledge; the use of "gender" as a concept; problems in feminist theories of development; and the place of feminism in the production of knowledge.

Citizenship is the cornerstone of a democratic polity. It has three dimensions: legal, civic and affiliative. Citizens constitute the polity's demos, which often coincides with a nation. European Union (EU) citizenship was introduced to enhance ‘European identity’ (Europeans’ sense of belonging to their political community). Yet such citizenship faces at least two problems. First: Is there a European demos? If so, what is the status of peoples (nations, demoi) in the Member States? The original (...) class='Hi'>European project aimed at ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.’ Second: Citizens are members of a political community; to what kind of polity do EU citizens belong? Does the EU substitute Member States, assume them or coexist alongside them? After an analytical exposition of the demos and telos problems, I will argue for a normative self‐understanding of the EU polity and citizenship, neither in national nor in federal but in analogical terms. (shrink)

This article looks at the mutual relations and links between globalisation and the integration of countries within the European Union. As the economic sphere is undergoing unrestrained globalisation, the position and sovereignty of nation-states is being weakened and politics is becoming harnessed to the economy. The relationship between the economy and politics is thus changing and there is a need to regulate the economy at a supranational level. The European Union has the potential to make positive use of (...) the trend towards globalisation and limit its negative impacts on the economic, social, ecological and cultural levels. This requires, however, deeper integration and further harmonisation of the countries of the European Union in the economic and political spheres. In order for the countries to come closer together, as the current situation requires, a European people (or demos) and a European public space must be created. (shrink)

The very idea of the draft European Union (EU) Constitutional Treaty was reexamined after the failed French and Dutch referendums and the Treaty of Lisbon (also known as the Reform Treaty) was drafted and entered into force on 1 December 2009 after it’s ratification by all 27 member states. The traditional notion of a Constitution as a national legal document establishing the social contract and a moral minimum for a particular socially unified group still prevails in legal and political (...) thinking. Indeed, the European Union has some constitutional elements, but absence of the so called ‘European demos’ prevents us from recognizing the founding treaties as a real ‘European constitution’ in the proper sense of the word. The author agrees with the decision to exclude the term ‘Constitution’ from the title and contents of the new Reform Treaty. The author also suggests that softer terms, like ‘European constitutional order’ and ‘European Constitutionalism’ might better reflect the scope of contemporary European integration than the term of ‘a Constitution for Europe’. A rethinking of the ‘constitutional core’ of the Lisbon Treaty was inspired following the so-called Lisbon judgments of Czech, Latvian and German constitutional courts. (shrink)

Today democracy is both exalted as the "best means to realize human rights" and seen as weakened because of globalization and delegation of authority beyond the nation-state. In this provocative book, James Bohman argues that democracies face a period of renewal and transformation and that democracy itself needs redefinition according to a new transnational ideal. Democracy, he writes, should be rethought in the plural; it should no longer be understood as rule by the people, singular, with a specific territorial identification (...) and connotation, but as rule by peoples, across national boundaries. Bohman shows that this new conception of transnational democracy requires reexamination of such fundamental ideas as the people, the public, citizenship, human rights, and federalism, and he argues that it offers a feasible approach to realizing democracy in a globalized world.In his account, Bohman establishes the conceptual foundations of transnational democracy by examining in detail current theories of democracy beyond the nation-state and offers a deliberative alternative. He considers the importance of communicative freedom in the transnational public sphere, human rights as the normative basis of transnational democracy, and the European Union as a transnational polity. Finally, he examines the relationship between peace and democracy, concluding that peace requires democratization on interacting state and suprastate levels. (shrink)

I present three versions –Grimm, Offe and Streeck—of a general argument that is often used to establish that the EU-institutions meets a legitimacy-disabling condition, the so called “no demos” argument (II), embedding them in the context of the notorious “democratic deficit” suspicions against the legal system and practice of the EU (I). After examining the logical structure behind the no-demos intuition considered as an argument (III), I present principled reasons by Möllers and Habermas that show why the “no (...) demos” argument fails to have bite in discussions of the legitimacy and status of the supranational level in the multi-level EU-architecture. These are complemented by another principled reason arising from John Dewey’s conception of the “public” as a clearer alternative for the “popular” requirement of democratic legitimation (IV). I conclude that all three conceptions together suggest that the hunt after pre-politically existing peoples as foundations of democratic legitimacy expresses no more than methodological nationalism without any footing in the material and conceptual requirements of democratic legitimation. Given the absence of a principled problem with the legitimacy of the priority and interference of supranational EU-law in the national legal and political orders, there are thus also no principled reasons to abandon or discredit the European project in the absence of a European nation or society. (shrink)

This article explores the political, as opposed to the philosophical, impact of Leo Strauss’s exile in America on his thought. After a consideration of anti-Semitism and the importance Strauss attached to being a Jew, I argue that the fact that in America he no longer wrote in his Muttersprache but in English was central to his becoming a political theorist rather than a philosopher. Whereas as a philosopher he was unable to speak to the demos, as a political theorist (...) what he needed was a group of “rhetors” who would carry a particular message to the demos. (shrink)

Ancient Greek elite theorists and ordinary democratic practitioners shared a distinctive account of the institutional features of democracy: democracy requires both institutions that empower ordinary citizens to decide matters and the widespread diffusion of agenda-setting powers. In the Politics, Aristotle makes agenda control central to his understanding of what it is to be kurios in the city, to his distinction between oligarchy and democracy, and to his analysis of the preconditions for democratic control of the polis. For democratic citizens, isēgoria (...) (the equal right to speak and make proposals in the assembly) was more than an expression of the democratic commitment to equality. It was also an institutional tool to resist oligarchic domination of the agenda. Institutionalizing isēgoria was part of the Athenian response to a crucial problem for democratic theory and practice: how to ensure that popular participation reliably translates into popular control. (shrink)

This paper traces the contradictions of liberal ‘police’ power from Hegel’s analysis of modern polizei to a Foucauldian analysis of the 2011 judicial ruling on the police eviction of Occupy Wall Street protestors from Zucotti Plaza in New York. In the first section, I develop insights from Hegel and Foucault’s analysis of the contradictions of liberal police, whereby power in liberal government incorporates an ‘internal principle of limitation’ that distinguishes it from the unlimited internal objectives of the European police (...) state, while finding itself constantly violating its own internal normative principles. In the second section, I situate liberal police within Foucault’s history of police and the development of a political economy of the poor. In the third section, I challenge Foucault’s own portrayal of liberal police as ‘self-limiting’ in the 1978-79 lectures, through a detailed examination of ‘police’ in the life and thought of Benjamin Franklin. In the final section, I draw upon this historical background of police to analyse the police power jurisprudence laid out in the 2011 Waller v. City of New York ruling on the police eviction of protestors from Zucotti Plaza. Here, I argue that the ruling allows us to see how the discourse of ‘police power’ claims to uphold a (neo)liberal economic-juridical order, while at the same time functioning as a mechanism of repression and security against the ‘dangerous’ (democratic) element within the polity. (shrink)

Habermas maintains that neoliberalism precludes the building of a European demos and entails a regression towards the exclusionary but still democratic nation state. Although this article agrees with Habermas’s claim regarding the regressive impact of neoliberalism, it argues that this regression is best described as moving not towards an exclusionary but still democratic national people but rather towards an illiberal, anti-democratic nation state.

Volume 24, Issue 6, September 2019, Page 674-676.

Toynbee suggests that the European Modern civilization is confronted with the existential challenge “unite or perish”. The specific current crises foster de-civilizing processes in European society and politics. Europeans need to decouple state and nation, and demos and ethnos to conceptualize and create a supra-national and post-national democracy. This attempt has a global historical significance for the prospects of a new global order, based on a peaceful process of pooling and sharing of sovereignty, to cope with global (...) problems. (shrink)

Is there a ‘constitutional moment’in contemporary Europe? What if anything is the constitution of the European Union; what kind of polity is the Union? The suggestion offered is that there is a legally constituted order, and that a suitable term to apply to it is a ‘commonwealth’, comprising a commonwealth of ‘post-sovereign’ states. Is it a democratic commonwealth, and can it be? Is there sufficiently a demos or ‘people’ for democracy to be possible? If not democratic, what is (...) it? Monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy, or a ‘mixed constitution’? Argued: there is a mixed constitution containing a reasonable element of democratic rule. The value of democracy is then explored in terms of individualistic versus holistic evaluation and instrumental versus intrinsic value. Subsidiarity can be considered in a similar light, suggestively in terms of forms of democracy appropriate to different levels of self-government. The conclusion is that there is no absolute democratic deficit in the European commonwealth. (shrink)

The article shows Sarmatism as an element of the Polish identity discourse in its community dimension, which mainly takes account of its civilisation and cultural aspect, defined by relations with modernity. Although this discourse includes Sarmatism in reflection on the key determinants of collective identity, such as community, Polishness and so on, it generally does so in a simplified manner, not free from prejudices and excessive bias. Liberal thought, which should have the greatest share in shaping the sphere of self-ideas (...) of modern society, shows a clear reluctance towards Sarmatian heritage, which is hardly surprising given its Enlightenment origin. However, one should understand the reasons for this reluctance, taking into account its stricter context, which is determined by the mechanism of programming Polish cultural projects in essentialist codes. Meanwhile, according to the author, the ‘post-mortem’ history of Sarmatism is part of the pan-European struggle of Tradition and modernity. When set on this plane, Sarmatism can be considered in terms of lack and compensation. The Sarmatian heritage, torn out of the vicious circle of stereotypes, myths and silences, should now be included in the debate on the foundations of Polish civic culture, because it belongs to the contingent history of the Polish habitus, and it is also characterised by the syndrome of un-working. It also needs to be made real by being located in the circle of geopolitical discourse. The perspective of the recontextualisation of Sarmatism, which neo-Sarmatism with its essentialist-nostalgic poetics has created in contemporary identity discourse and postcolonial thought with its binary schemas, seems insufficient. (shrink)

Is there a 'constitutional moment' in contemporary Europe? What if anything is the constitution of the European Union; what kind of polity is the Union? The suggestion offered is that there is a legally constituted order, and that a suitable term to apply to it is a 'commonwealth', comprising a commonwealth of 'post-sovereign' states. Is it a democratic commonwealth, and can it be? Is there sufficiently a demos or 'people' for democracy to be possible? If not democratic, what (...) is it? Monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy, or a 'mixed constitution'? Argued: there is a mixed constitution containing a reasonable element of democratic rule. The value of democracy is then explored in terms of individualistic versus holistic evaluation and instrumental versus intrinsic value. Subsidiarity can be considered in a similar light, suggestively in terms of forms of democracy appropriate to different levels of self-government. The conclusion is that there is no absolute democratic deficit in the European commonwealth. (shrink)

The peaceful and democratic integration of the European countries cannot be completed if the EU does not become a true, though not-federal, polity. Making the European institutions fully legitimate and accountable requires the development of political identity in a shape which is different from both national and cultural identity and is not merely opposite to diversity and change. Its contents can be seen in a specific set of constitutional values and principles, including a model of social relations, an (...) international standing and a peculiar and unprecedented system of governance. Identity-formation in the EU goes through several channels, but has still to generate a European public sphere, though the source of this difficulty does not lie in the lack of a European people or demos. (shrink)

We are still unable to correctly identify the true crisis in Europe: whether it is a question of a lack of a demos or cratos; whether it is the democracy, legitimacy, or justice that is inadequate; whether we are facing a problem of intelligibility or of too little politicization. The article begin the analysis with three hypotheses: (1) none of the attempts to explain the crisis that focus on a single deficit or weakness seems satisfactory, so the discussion should (...) focus on the way these types of deficiencies are expressed and the extent to which each one of them is involved. For this very reason, it makes no sense to entrust the entire solution to the strengthening of one single criterion (participation, effectiveness, or communication, for example). (2) Polarizing the legitimacy framework around two possibilities (input and output) seems to be a simplification that does not do justice to the intricate way in which the results and the procedures, effectiveness and consent are related in a democracy. (3) The resulting description cannot be less complex than that which it is attempting to describe, so the task of repairing EU legitimacy should be carried out through a sophisticated division of labor (between institutions, criteria, and values). The process of European integration may be one of the most interesting manifestations of a general problem in today’s societies: how to reconstruct political authority to confront the new challenges of communal life. (shrink)

The Eurozone crisis has brought the imperative of democratic autonomy within the EU to the forefront, a concern at the core of demoicratic theory. The article seeks to move the scholarship on demoicratic theory a step further by exploring what we call the social construction of demoicratic reality. While the EU’s legal-institutional infrastructure may imperfectly approximate a demoicratic structure, we need ask to what extent the ‘bare bones’ demoicratic character of a polity can actually be grounded in a full-flesh social (...) construct that is or could be acted out in the democratic experience and the self-awareness of its peoples. Ultimately, such an enquiry should help us understand whether a polity like the EU is actually and potentially a stable or unstable political form. We develop a consistent theory of popular sovereignty drawing on John Searle and HLA Hart to conceive the constitutionalised people as a social fact and the sovereignty of the people as a status ascribed to the people. We use this construction of demoicratic reality as a conceptual framework to understand the possibility of popular sovereignty being exercised concurrently by several rather than just one dêmos. (shrink)

The Eurozone crisis has brought the imperative of democratic autonomy within the EU to the forefront, a concern at the core of demoicratic theory. The article seeks to move the scholarship on demoicratic theory a step further by exploring what we call the social construction of demoicratic reality. While the EU’s legal-institutional infrastructure may imperfectly approximate a demoicratic structure, we need ask to what extent the ‘bare bones’ demoicratic character of a polity can actually be grounded in a full-flesh social (...) construct that is or could be acted out in the democratic experience and the self-awareness of its peoples. Ultimately, such an enquiry should help us understand whether a polity like the EU is actually and potentially a stable or unstable political form. We develop a consistent theory of popular sovereignty drawing on John Searle and HLA Hart to conceive the constitutionalised people (dêmos) as a social fact and the sovereignty of the people as a status ascribed to the people. We use this construction of demoicratic reality as a conceptual framework to understand the possibility of popular sovereignty being exercised concurrently by several rather than just one dêmos. (shrink)

Economic globalization has resulted in the transfer of national power to supranational actors and their supranational procedures and institutions. Concomitant with this trend is the ascendancy of the discourses of democracy and human rights that have given rise to the idea of cosmopolitan justice. These trends, in turn, have weakened statehood [ Entstaatlichung ], requiring theoretical envisioning and practical institutionalization of a supranational model of political association. Among the competing theories, in this article I will defend the Kantian project of (...) constitutionalization of international law. In doing so, I take the doctrine of constitutional patriotism as an appropriate model of supranational political association in the European Union and defend it against the republican critique that rejects the idea as deficient. I argue that the European project of constitution-making can overcome the charges of democratic deficit and the lack of European demos by establishing the terms and conditions for democratic negotiation and institutionalizing shared practices of law-making. Key Words: constitutional patriotism • democratic deficit • the European Union • nation-state • supranational political community. (shrink)

In this article, the author discusses two aspects of the representation of “Europe” as a historical subject that are bound to prove controversial: its relationship to universality, and the conditions of its becoming democratic as a polity. The paradox of “European identity” is that it conceived of itself as the particular site of the invention of the universal and its revelation to the world. A dialectics of recognition through the confrontation with the Other was always involved (above all in (...) the colonial form), but it must pass now from projection to exposure to alterity. In that way a planetary construction of the universal can include a decisive contribution from Europe as one of its “provinces.” Democratizing democracy itself via the invention of a trans-national “co-citizenship” would be an element of this contribution. This is the object of a “material constitution” of Europe already on its way, but still lacking a clear representation of its “constituent power.” Debates on the absence of a European demos and the positive conditions for a federal government have shown that it will require a deconstruction of the notion of “sovereignty of the people,” separating its insurgent dimension from its function as a legitimation of the monopoly of violence, which was closely associated in nation-states with the legal guarantee of individual subjective rights. (shrink)

I argue that transnational democracy provides the basis for a solution to the problem of the “democratic circle”—that in order for democracy to promote justice, it must already be just—at the international level. Transnational democracy could be a means to global justice. First, I briefly recount my argument for the “democratic minimum.” This minimum is freedom from domination, understood in a very specific sense. Employing Hannah Arendt's conception of freedom as “the capacity to begin,” the form of nondomination sufficient for (...) the democratic minimum is the capability to initiate deliberation and thus democratic decision-making processes. My point in developing this argument further concerns the political form of a transnational polity: its citizens enjoy the democratic minimum as members of variousdemoi. In the case of the European Union, this leads to a potential for democratic domination. I call this thedemoiproblem, a difficulty that holds for any multilevel polity, for bounded as well as transnational political communities. Second, I argue that such domination is overcome so long as the capacity to initiate deliberation is distributed among various units and various levels. The democratic minimum could fail to obtain not only because individuals or groups are dominated by nondemocratic means, but also because they are dominated democratically to the extent that the demos of one unit lacks the normative power to initiate deliberation and thus is subordinated to others. (shrink)

La présente étude part d’une discussion de la thèse exposée par Catherine Colliot-Thélène dans son ouvrage La démocratie sans « demos » selon laquelle la démocratie moderne est « sans demos », composée uniquement de sujets de droits individuels. Appliquée à la construction européenne, cette thèse s’avère féconde, mais aussi problématique. Si elle conduit à sortir des mythes du contrat social et du pouvoir constituant et de poursuivre la démocratisation par la seule garantie du droit subjectif, elle le (...) fait néanmoins en maintenant l’un des axiomes principaux du contractualisme qu’elle réfute, à savoir l’idée que face à l’État seul l’individu est source de droit, non les corps intermédiaires, les communautés et les collectifs. Une autre tradition constitutionnelle fait pourtant plus efficacement l’économie du concept de pouvoir constituant, l’anglaise et l’allemande. Celle-ci développe l’idée d’une « constitution matérielle » ou « réelle », issue des rapports de la pluralité des puissances sociales et non de la volonté du législateur. On postule que cette tradition permet de mieux décrire l’intégration européenne et qu’elle livre des pistes précieuses pour démocratiser l’Europe. (shrink)

This article explores the meaning and relevance of the ‘Idea of Europe’ in the context of a multicultural and multi-ethnic continent that increasingly draws on the presence and practices of people from non-European backgrounds. The Idea of Europe, even in its contemporary use, remains an ideal based on a Christian-Enlightenment-Romantic heritage, mobilized by supporters of European integration as the bridge between diverse European national cultures. In a Europe of extraordinary cultural interchange and immigration from all corners of (...) the world, the classical Idea of Europe is strikingly exclusionary and backward looking – a poor motif for the future. The article tries to develop an alternative Idea of Europe, one based on a particular politics of the public domain and a particular ethos of belonging in Europe seen as a migrant space, rather than one based on the enduring cultural values of a body of people called Europeans. It outlines a commons, protected by appropriate EU-level rights, that can both support and bind cultural pluralism and difference, and it proposes democratic vitalism as Europe’s core political project, an idea of becoming European, read as the process of never-settled cultural invention resulting from the vibrant clashes of an equal and empowered multiple public. No myth of origin, no myth of destination, only the commitment to a plural demos. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to investigate the Habermasian way of problematizing the European political situation through consideration of the conceptual framework within which he develops his proposal. I begin by clarifying various conceptual difficulties that emerge when thinking about politics within the European Union. I then focus on the concept of popular sovereignty as procedure, which Habermas develops in Between Facts and Norms against the historical backdrop of the nation state. In the debate regarding European (...) constitutionalization, the concept of popular sovereignty as procedure first assumes a critical function against proponents of the no demos thesis. More recently, Habermas has advanced a concept of shared/divided sovereignty, which becomes indispensable when we consider Europe as a democratic federation. The conclusions hereby drawn disclose two problematic aspects of Habermas’s recent proposal. Respectively, these concern the viability of his approach and the questionable plausibility of this proposed federation’s ability to uphold democracy in terms of self-determination. (shrink)

The article argues that the ‘crisis of Europe’, triggered by market and governance dysfunctionalities (summarized as the Euro crisis), represents a ‘critical moment’ in the evolution of a European society. This society so far does not offer much resistance to such critical moments which is due to its incapacity to form a demos capable of acting together. The existing European society – and this is the basic claim – is nothing but the sum of individuals living in (...) ‘sub-European’ (mainly national) groups. The evolution triggered by this critical situation opens pathways to turn these peoples of Europe into something more than being a sum of peoples governed by supranational bureaucracies. To decipher such processes a model is presented using Hirschman’s idea of exit, voice and loyalty as mechanisms to generate social ties. Two points arise as crucial. The first is the observation that national societies which continue to provide foundational claims for people have turned into interest groups in the context of the European Union. This undermines not only the ontological nationalism still dominating the self-presentation of national societies in Europe, but it also offers evolutionary paths towards a society beyond national foundational claims in Europe. Yet it also provokes reactive processes such as the return to the self-contained nation (or even ethnic group). This is the core of the crisis of Europe. The systemic crises of the state and the market in Europe are speeding up an evolutionary process of people-making, the outcome of which could be either the regression to a people with foundational identities or to a people without foundational identities. The latter will be described as a postnational society, which would make an emerging European society the first really modern society. (shrink)

In this essay, we revisit the concept of “political spirituality” that we developed in our book The Spirit of Revolution: Beyond the Dead Ends of Man (2016) in light of the profound political upheavals that have happened since its publication. We begin with theories about the breakdown of neoliberalism and the “return of politics” with the rise of so-called populist movements. We argue that notions of the “demos” and the “people” miss the dimension of transindividuality central to our thinking (...) of political spirituality. The second aspect of political spirituality missing from current critical theory is transcendence, or the desire to go beyond the limits of who and what we are. We capture both these dimensions through a notion of “relational finitude,” demonstrating both the poverty of European philosophy in this respect, and celebrating the contribution of feminism, decolonial theory, and African philosophy toward a new praxis of being human. (shrink)

The cultural, economic and political crisis affecting the European Union (EU) today is manifested in the political community’s lack of enthusiasm and cohesion. An effort to reverse this situation – foster ‘EU identity’ – was the creation of EU citizenship. Citizen- ship implies a people and a polity. But EU citizens already belong to national polities. Should EU citizenship override national citizenship or coexist with it? Postnationalists like Habermas have suggested EU citizenship can overcome nationalisms, grounding political belonging on (...) the body of laws that members of the post- national polity generate in the public sphere. Cosmopolitan communitarianists like Bellamy, by contrast, think that EU citizens should form a mixed commonwealth, with political belonging based on national citizenship. I will argue in favour of the second option, and submit an analogical reading of the ensuing ideas of citizenship, identity and polity. Cosmopolitan communitarianist EU citizenship promises to better foster the great richness of European national cultural, religious, historical, political, legal and linguistic diversity in a ‘mixed’ polity. Its main challenge is how to keep the diverse, mixed polity together. (shrink)

This essay identifies ‘oligarchic harm’ as a dire threat confronting contemporary democracies. I provide a formal standard for classifying oligarchs: those who use personal access to concentrated wealth to pursue harmful forms of discretionary influence. I then use Aristotle to think through both the moral and the epistemic dilemmas of oligarchic harm, highlighting Aristotle’s concerns about the difficulties of using wealth as a ‘proxy’ for virtue. While Aristotle’s thought provides great resources for diagnosing oligarchic threats, it proves less useful as (...) a guide to democratic institutional design. Aristotle raises a deep-seated objection to democratic forms of ‘rule by the poor.’ A successful response to oligarchy must move beyond Aristotle’s objection and affirm the demos’ tripartite status as many, free, and poor. I briefly outline the terms of this ‘new’ mixed regime: one that seeks to tame oligarchy through a mixture of aggregative, deliberative, and plebeian institutions. (shrink)

Demoscene is a computer subculture that proliferated throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This article examines one aspect of the Demoscene culture, the production of the ‘Demo’, a computer animation generated and performed in real-time visualization through digital code. I analyse the Demo as a technological and aesthetic form, speculating on its possibilities for theorizing a unique mode of digital image experience.

The influence of eastern thought on the culture of the United States and Western Europe is now seen in the spread of Buddhism, meditation, martial arts, yoga, oriental art, and hundreds of other Asian imports. Written during World War II, this classic work correctly anticipated the clash of eastern and western ideologies which has dominated the post-war landscape.

According to Spinoza, the categories of good and bad—in fact, all categories of value—are relative. The only valid category is that of substance; value as distinct from reality has no genuine meaning. Spinoza’s attack on valuation is based on two sets of arguments, one rationalistic and scientific, the other religious and theological. We will consider each in turn.

Tucked into Wolfgang Streeck’s influential crisis theory of contemporary capitalism are various attempts at causally linking processes of neoliberalisation to generalised depoliticisation, while depoliticisation is in its turn attributed to the emergence of a diffuse ‘consumerist’ ethos in the 1970s. Streeck argues that rising consumerism led to a generalised demotic embrace of marketised forms of need satisfaction and in so doing evacuated the political will to resist neoliberal reforms. If, however, we take neoliberalisation to entail both the depoliticisation of the (...) demos and the marketisation of the polity, then Streeck’s attempt to connect these processes to consumption is weakened by significant historical oversights on both ends. Streeck’s attribution of depoliticisation to a new consumerist ethos is beset by a reductive economism. At the same time, Streeck overlooks just how pivotal legitimatory ideals of consumer-side social order developed by specific networked elites have been for the marketisation of the polity. (shrink)