Dans un article décisif sur la naissance du calcul des probabilités (1970), Ernest Coumet rappelait la formule de Cournot selon laquelle le retard qui marque la naissance de la théorie du hasard est «un pur effet du hasard». On se propose ici de soumettre ce jugement à l'examen critique non de l'histoire, mais de la pensée même de Cournot; sa philosophie de l'histoire et sa représentation de l'histoire des sciences au XVIIe siècle semblant, tout d'abord, dénoncer par avance (...) un jugement aussi péremptoire. Pour rendre compte de ce qui peut alors apparaître de sa part comme une inconséquence, voire un aveuglement, on forme l'hypothèse que cette affirmation constitue un artefact de sa conception internaliste de l'histoire des sciences et des révolutions scientifiques. En ce sens, larticle constitue une illustration de la nécessité théorique, mais aussi des difficultés de l'histoire des mathématiques. (shrink)

Dans son intervention au colloque Koyré (Paris, 1986), Ernest Coumet a suggéré que le terme « révolution scientifique » ne désigne pas chez Koyré un événement historique, mais un idéaltype, au sens de Max Weber. L'auteur discute d'abord cette thèse de Coumet et expose les arguments que ce dernier apporte pour la soutenir. Dans la deuxième partie de l'article, il critique l'usage de la notion de révolution en histoire des sciences, en s'opposant en particulier à la possibilité (...) de distinguer dans les productions des savants une « pensée scientifique » qui serait influencée par la « pensée philosophique » et dont les bouleversements marqueraient l'avènement d'une révolution. (shrink)

Partant de l'itinéraire d'une chose en plâtre qui avait passionné les statisticiens des années 1880 et qui a procuré à André Breton l'exemple même de l'objet surréaliste, on se demande si la théorie surréaliste du hasard est née par hasard. Il s'agit, en déplaçant la question que posait Ernest Coumet en 1970 à propos de la géométrie pascalienne du hasard, de s'interroger sur les rapports qu'entretiennent l'histoire des sciences, l'histoire de l'art et l'histoire de la culture scientifique au (...) siècle dernier. En retour, on espère faire valoir la démarche mise en oeuvre dans cet article qui ouvrit l'horizon des recherches sur l'histoire du calcul des probabilités il y a trente ans. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment.

In this book, Ernest Sosa explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by him years ago, known as virtue epistemology. Here he provides the first comprehensive account of his views on epistemic normativity as a form of performance normativity on two levels. On a first level is found the normativity of the apt performance, whose success manifests the performer's competence. On a higher level is found the normativity of the meta-apt performance, which manifests not necessarily first-order skill (...) or competence but rather the reflective good judgment required for proper risk assessment. Sosa develops this bi-level account in multiple ways, by applying it to issues much disputed in recent epistemology: epistemic agency, how knowledge is normatively related to action, the knowledge norm of assertion, and the Meno problem as to how knowledge exceeds merely true belief. A full chapter is devoted to how experience should be understood if it is to figure in the epistemic competence that must be manifest in the truth of any belief apt enough to constitute knowledge. Another takes up the epistemology of testimony from the performance-theoretic perspective. Two other chapters are dedicated to comparisons with ostensibly rival views, such as classical internalist foundationalism, a knowledge-first view, and attributor contextualism. The book concludes with a defense of the epistemic circularity inherent in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa presents a new approach to the problems of knowledge and scepticism. He argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment. Sosa's virtue epistemology illuminates different varieties of scepticism, the nature and status of intuitions, and epistemic normativity.

Private law governs our most pervasive relationships with other people: the wrongs we do to one another, the property we own and exclude from others' use, the contracts we make and break, and the benefits realized at another's expense that we cannot justly retain. The major rules of private law are well known, but how they are organized, explained, and justified is a matter of fierce debate by lawyers, economists, and philosophers.

In this new edition are a detailed bibliography, index, and textual supplements, making it the perfect text for scholars and advanced students of Hume, ...

The work of Donald Davidson (1917-2003) transformed the study of meaning. Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, two of the world's leading authorities on Davidson's work, present the definitive study of his widely admired and influential program of truth-theoretic semantics for natural languages, giving an exposition and critical examination of its foundations and applications.

In “Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge,” Ernest Sosa notes that in attempting to account for the conditions for knowledge, externalists have proposed that the justification condition be replaced or supplemented by the requirement that a certain modal relation be obtained between a fact and a subject's belief concerning that fact. While assessing attempts to identify such a relation, he focuses on an account labeled “Cartesian‐tracking”, which accounts for the relation in the form of two conditionals. If a person S believes (...) a proposition P → P P → S believes P. Sosa suggests that be abandoned as a requirement, and that, equipped with his modifications, can offer promising results in connection with skepticism. He argues that modified coupled with the requirement that S's belief be “virtuous” can illuminate the nature of propositional knowledge. (shrink)

This chapter reviews the work and influence of Donald Davidson across all the areas to which he contributed.

Mossner's Life of David Hume remains the standard biography of this great thinker and writer. First published in 1954, and updated in 1980, it is now reissued in paperback in response to increased interest in Hume. E. C. Mossner was Emeritus Professor of English at the University of Texas at Austin. 'Mossner's work is a quite remarkable scholarly achievement; it will be an indispensable tool for Hume scholars and a treasure-trove of information for all students of the intellectual and literary (...) history of the eighteenth century' Richard H. Popkin in the Philological Quarterly. (shrink)

For corrective justice, liability is the consequence of the parties' being correlatively situated as the doer and sufferer of an injustice, and the remedy is seen as undoing that injustice to the extent possible. Combining consideration of legal doctrine and private law theory, this article applies the framework of corrective justice to gain-based damages for torts. Within this framework, restitutionary damages ought to be available only insofar as they correspond to a constituent element in the injustice that the defendant has (...) done to the plaintiff. The radical proposal that allows restitutionary damages for any wrongful gain is unsatisfactory because it fails to link the damages that the plaintiff receives to the normative quality of the defendant's wrong. In contrast, dealings in another's property give rise to such damages because the idea of property includes within the owner's entitlement the potential gainsfrom the property's use or alienation. Restitutionary damages should not be seen as serving a deterrent or punitive function; such a function cannot account for why the plaintiff, of all people, is entitled to the defendant's gain. Properly understood, even situations where the plaintiff's wilfulness or calculation increases the damage award fit within the framework of corrective justice. The corrective justice approach thus repudiates the notion that restitutionary damages are occasions for the promotion of social purposes extrinsic to the juridical relationship between the parties. (shrink)

Ernest Nagel, one of the world's leading philosophers of science, is an unreconstructed empirical rationalist who continues to believe that the logical methods of the modern natural sciences are the most successful instruments men have devised to acquire reliable knowledge. This book presents "Teleology Revisited"-the John Dewey lectures delivered at Columbia University- and eleven of Nagel's articles on the philosophy of science.

This paper explores how the widely acknowledged conception of tort law as corrective justice is to be applied to the law of negligence. Corrective justice is an ordering of transactions between two parties which restores them to an antecedent equality. It is thus incompatible with the comprehensive aggregation of utilitarianism, and it stands in easy harmony with Kantian moral notions. This conception of negligence law excludes both maximizing theories, such as Holmes' and Posner's, and Fried's risk pool, which combines Kantianism (...) with distributive rather than corrective justice.Central to the Kantian approach is the impermissibility of self-preference. The two types of self-preference, self-preference in conception and self-preference in action can respectively account for the objective standard and the Learned Hand test, which are the two most characteristic features of negligence and which are generally (and wrongly) considered to be inescapably aggregative. This corrective justice conception of the negligence standard can then be compared to Epstein's corrective justice conception of strict liability, and arguments can be offered in favour of the superiority of the former. (shrink)

For me the two-day workshop was an excellent experience. It was very good to be reminded of all those issues that I had grappled with so intensely in earlier years, and I very much appreciated the opportunity to think about them again and to try to put them in perspective with the stimulus of the critical teams’ focused attention. I am very pleased and grateful for the intense attention and challenge to my views, and for the excellent comments. I will (...) do my best to respond with some helpful discussion. (shrink)

The philosolphy of strict finitism is a research programme containing developmental theory and mathematics as its main branches. The first branch is concerned with the ontogenetic and historicaldevelopment of various concepts of infinity. The frame work is Jean Piaget’s genetic epistemology. Based upon these develop mental studies, the mathematical branch introduces a new concept of infinity into mathematics. Cantor propagated the actual infinite, Brouwer and the constructivists the potential infinite. Still more radical is strict finitism, favoring the natural infinite, i.e. (...) the phenomena of the unsurveyable, unfeasible, unreachable. There exist by this time strict finitistic reconstructions for arithmetic, geometry, calculus, and even for infinitistic set theory. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

HUME’S PHILOSOPHICAL SUBVERSION OF RELIGION, NATURAL AND REVEALED, WAS LIFELONG: THE "RELIGIOUS HYPOTHESIS" IS EMPTY. SO I HAVE ARGUED IN A NEW READING OF THE "DIALOGUES". THE ONLY HOPE FOR HUMANITY LIES IN MAN HIMSELF. HUME DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN THE "VULGAR" AND THE "ENLIGHTENED." AT THE APEX OF THE "ENLIGHTENED" STAND THE "HEROES IN PHILOSOPHY," OF WHOM ONLY GALILEO AND NEWTON ARE SPECIFIED. THE "ENLIGHTENED" PROVIDE LEADERSHIP AND KNOWLEDGE, A DUTY WE MAY VIEW AS THE "RELIGION OF MAN." QUITE POSSIBLY HUME (...) CONSIDERED HIMSELF THE THIRD "HERO IN PHILOSOPHY." EVIDENCE IS PROVIDED BY HIS TRIUMPHAL RECEPTION IN PARIS, 1763-1765: "THEY CONSIDER ME AS ONE OF THE GREATEST GENIUSES IN THE WORLD." THUS THE "RELIGION OF MAN" IRONICALLY CONSTITUTES HUME’S PERSONAL RELIGION. (shrink)

Critics and champions alike have fussed and fretted for well over fifty years about whether Russell’s treatment is compatible with certain alleged acceptable uses of incomplete definite descriptions,[2] where a description (the F( is incomplete just in case more than one object satisfies its nominal F, as in (1).