Oxford University Press (2007)
AbstractErnest Sosa argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment.
9780199297023 9780199568208 0199297029 0199568200 9780191711411
A Virtue Epistemology
This chapter presents a theory of knowledge as coming in two main varieties: the animal and the reflective. Animal knowledge is apt belief, which hits the mark of truth through the exercise of competence, of intellectual virtue. This account enables a further, broader approach to scepticis... see more
The Problem of the Criterion
This chapter confronts the Pyrrhonian problematic based on the fearsome circle/regress/foundations trilemma using the animal/reflective epistemology developed in earlier chapters. It is argued that this is the main key to Cartesian epistemology.
It has been argued powerfully by Alvin Plantinga that naturalism suffers a kind of epistemic self-refutation, for it cannot provide appropriately for the very possibility of its being accepted rationally and known to be true. This argument is explained carefully, and its merits assessed, b... see more
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Citations of this work
The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering (Open Access).Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):99-107.
Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.
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