Le present livre propose l'etude de la constitution, durant le haut Moyen Age latin, d'une position philosophique: le realisme de l'immanence a propos des universaux. Cette position est fondee sur la conviction qu'il existe, dans le monde qui nous entoure, certes des individus particuliers - ce tilleul, cette tortue -, mais aussi des entites universelles. Ces entites n'existent pas separees des individus, mais integralement realisees en eux, sans variation ni degre. Cet engagement philosophique resulte d'une exegese des Categories d'Aristote, reinterpretees (...) selon des philosophemes issus de la pensee de Porphyre. La genealogie de cette position est ici retracee en abordant successivement ses sources tant grecques que latines et ses ancetres patristiques (avant tout Gregoire de Nysse), puis son elaboration conceptuelle durant les premiers siecles du Moyen Age latin jusqu'a la critique qu'en donnera Pierre Abelard, et ce, par l'analyse de l'ontologie des quatre philosophes qui l'ont soutenue: Jean Scot Erigene, Anselme de Canterbury, Odon de Cambrai et Guillaume de Champeaux. Ce parcours permet de dessiner les contours d'un projet philosophique: comprendre, analyser et decrire le monde sensible au moyen des concepts issus de la logique aristotelicienne. (shrink)

Nell'alto medioevo vi erano tre possibilità per il filosofo che volesse difendere l'esistenza degli universali: in primo luogo ante rem, seguendo la linea platonico-agostiniana degli universali trascendenti e questa è la via teologica; in secondo luogo la via post rem, cioè la via del concettualismo, conosciuta oggi come astrattismo, per cui gli universali sono il prodotto dell'astrazione della mente e questa è una via logica; la terza via è quella in re e difende gli universali immanenti che esistono negli universali (...) ed è una risposta ontologica. La seconda via fu difesa da Boezio nel secondo commento a Porfirio. La prima teoria è stata generalmente accettata da tutti i filosofi dell'alto medioevo eccetto Abelardo, mentre la terza via, quella degli universali immanenti, che ha come fonti antiche l'Isagoge di Porfirio e le Categoriae di Aristotele, fu difesa principalmente da quattro autori: Giovanni Scoto Eriugena, Anselmo d'Aosta, Odone di Cambrai e Guglielmo di Champeaux. L'A. prende in esame e confronta le soluzioni di Anselmo di Canterbury e Odone di Cambrai. (shrink)

This chapter analyzes the explanation of resemblance provided by the twelfth-century Latin philosopher Gilbert of Poitiers. As Gilbert holds that everything that exists is particular and rejects immanent universals, he is in need of an explanation for the resemblance of co-specific properties. His solution stems from a complex consideration of exact resemblance, which he calls ‘conformitas,’ based upon a thorough reflection about properties, as for him, only properties and not individuals can be exactly similar. In order to discuss his theory (...) of resemblance, the chapter first offers a reconstruction of the main tenets of Gilbert’s particularist ontology; it argues that Gilbert can adequately be categorized as a trope theorist. Gilbert analyzes the metaphysical constitution of an individual as a set of hierarchically organized co-present tropes, starting from an essential nucleus. For Gilbert, a universal is a collection of properties gathered on the basis of resemblance. At the end of the chapter, the possible role of divine ideas in his explanation of resemblance is discussed. (shrink)

The fourth-century thinker and theologian Gregory of Nyssa was a convinced realist about universals. According to him, there is just one substance man for all the individuals of the species man and this universal substance is completely instantiated by each individual. In two of his treatises – the Ad Ablabium and the Ad Graecos – he draws linguistic consequences from this realist position. This enquiry results in the thesis according to which it is incorrect to use natural kind terms in (...) the plural form, because that would involve stating a plurality of substances, when in fact there is just one substance for all the individuals of a given kind. In consequence, since the substance of all individual human beings is the same, the word ‘man’ can only be used adequately in the singular form. In this contribution, Gregory's reasoning is reconstructed. In the second part of the paper, the posterity of his theory and its endorsement by Theodore Abū Qurrah at the turn of the eighth and ninth centuries are examined. (shrink)

La problématique philosophique d’Erigène – catégories, universaux, individuation – se noue autour de la notion d’ousia, comprise soit comme l’essence générale, genre suprême unique, soit comme substance particulière. En opposition aux Catégories, Jean Scot défend un réalisme radical, concevant l’individuation comme accidentelle et le particulier comme un rassemblement de propriétés universelles. Guillaume de Champeaux reprendra cette position dans sa théorie réaliste dite de l’essence matérielle.

Résumé Cet article a pour but de montrer comment le penseur du IV e siècle Marius Victorinus a utilisé une thèse de la logique aristotélicienne dans son œuvre théologique, plus précisément dans sa démonstration de l’incorrection du concept d’ homoioousion (« de substance semblable ») et dans sa défense de la justesse du concept d’ homoousion (« de substance identique ») pour parler des personnes de la divine Trinité. Marius Victorinus argumente sur la base de la définition que donne Aristote (...) du propre de la qualité, selon laquelle il ne peut y avoir de ressemblance en matière de substance sous peine d’une confusion catégoriale, car la ressemblance appartient exclusivement à la catégorie de la qualité. Un concept postulant une similarité de substance est donc logiquement incorrect. Cette critique a le mérite de mettre en lumière la difficulté, au moins exégétique, à se réclamer des Catégories d’Aristote pour développer une théorie des universaux basée sur la ressemblance et non l’identité. (shrink)

Le penseur byzantin du neuvième siècle Photius a consacré plusieurs courts traités à la question catégoriale, commentant neuf des dix catégories aristotéliciennes une à une. Il est aussi revenu dans deux courts textes – les Amphilochia 27 et 230 – sur la question de la prédication. Il s’interroge dans ces deux traités sur le mode de prédication propre aux termes « homme » et « humanité », analysant notamment le référent de ces termes. Ces réflexions contiennent plusieurs thèses significatives de (...) son ontologie particulariste. (shrink)

In his major work, the Periphyseon, the ninth century Latin philosopher John Scottus Eriugena gives, with the help of what he calls "dialectic", a rational analysis of reality. According to him, dialectic is a science which pertains both to language and reality. Eriugena grounds this position in a realist ontological exegesis of the Aristotelian categories, which are conceived as categories of being. His interpretation tends to transform logical patterns, such as Porphyry's Tree or the doctrine of the categories, into a (...) structure which is both ontological and logical, and to use them as tools for the analysis of the sensible world. The combination of dialectic interpreted as a science of being, capable of expressing truths about the sensible world as well as about discourse, with an ontological interpretation of logical concepts allows Eriugena to develop his metaphysical theory, a strong realism. Eriugena not only supports a theological realism, but also, and principally, an ontological realism, the assertion of the immanent existence of forms. Eriugena claims that genera and species really subsist in the individuals: they are completely and simultaneously present in each of the entities which belong to them. (shrink)

The question of the simultaneity of relatives is one of the most debated aspects of Aristotle’s theory of relational properties. Are they exceptions to the rules of co-introduction and co-suppression for a pair of relatives? The present article studies a particular chapter of the long history of this problem, the contribution of three Byzantine thinkers of the ninth century. Their discussion is embedded in the complex phenomenon of the Iconoclast crisis. For reinvigorating their discourse on icons, these iconophiles thinkers deployed (...) Aristotelian logic, notably by treating the model and the image as Aristotelian relatives. This move implies tackling the issue of the simultaneity of relatives. Metrophanes, Nicephorus and Theodore solved it in three different ways which the present article reconstructs. (shrink)

Résumé Porphyre fait subir dans l’ Isagoge une inflexion platonicienne au système ontologique des Catégories d’Aristote et investit les catégories d’une signification métaphysique. Plusieurs penseurs du haut Moyen âge – les réalistes – ont amplifié et explicité cette métaphysique. La lecture et l’usage ontologiques de l’ Isagoge par Jean Scot Erigène, dans son Periphyseon, est à ce titre un cas d’école. Influencé par le néoplatonisme tardif de Proclus, Jean Scot se sert des outils conceptuels de l’ Isagoge pour élaborer son (...) système philosophique. (shrink)

Kant a consacre les dernieres annees de sa vie a l'ecriture d'un ample texte intitule Passage des principes metaphysiques de la science de la nature a la physique et qui, acheve, aurait ete la clef de voute de sa philosophie critique. Occupe depuis la Critique de la raison pure par la question de la liberte morale au sein d'un monde domine par la science et sa vision mecaniciste de la nature, Kant cherche dans l'Opus postumum a mettre au jour une (...) nouvelle fois l'identite fondamentale entre la raison theorique et la raison pratique, en appliquant alors a la nature un transcendantalisme materiel. Selon lui, l'identite des deux raisons releve en derniere instance d'une raison infinie divien qui sous-tend le systeme de la raison dans son ensemble. (shrink)

Résumé Porphyre fait subir dans l’ Isagoge une inflexion platonicienne au système ontologique des Catégories d’Aristote et investit les catégories d’une signification métaphysique. Plusieurs penseurs du haut Moyen âge – les réalistes – ont amplifié et explicité cette métaphysique. La lecture et l’usage ontologiques de l’ Isagoge par Jean Scot Erigène, dans son Periphyseon, est à ce titre un cas d’école. Influencé par le néoplatonisme tardif de Proclus, Jean Scot se sert des outils conceptuels de l’ Isagoge pour élaborer son (...) système philosophique. (shrink)

In an age where issues like climate change and the unintended consequences of technological innovation are high on the ethical and political agenda, questions about the nature and extent of our responsibilities to future generations have never been more important, yet simultaneously so difficult to answer. This book takes a unique approach to the problem by drawing on diverse traditions of thinking about care (including developmental psychology, phenomenology and feminist ethics) to explore the nature and meaning of our relationship with (...) the future. Demonstrating that many influential perspectives on intergenerational ethics, including positions advanced by John Rawls, Brian Barry, and Ulrich Beck are undermined by problems relating to uncertainty, it shows that an approach based on care ethics can confront the uncertain future successfully and give a viable account of the nature and scope of future-oriented responsibilities. (shrink)

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

Suppose we believe that God created the world. Then surely we want it to be the case that he intended, in some sense at least, to create THIS world. Moreover, most theists want to hold that God didn't just guess or hope that the world would take one course or another; rather, he KNEW precisely what was going to take place in the world he planned to create. In particular, of each person P, God knew that P was to exist. (...) Call this the "standard" conception. Most theists find the standard conception appealing. Unfortunately, the view seems to conflict with the equally appealing idea — call it "temporal actualism" — that there are no "future" individuals beyond those that already exist in the present moment. For, on this view, for any historical person P, prior to creation, there was no such person as P and hence nothing about P for God to know. Hence, in particular, God couldn't have known that P was to exist. This is of course not a new problem. But past solutions to it are highly problematic. In this paper, after canvassing previous approaches, I will propose a solution that seems to preserve both temporal actualism and a suitably robust form of the standard conception while avoiding the pitfalls of the past. (shrink)

Aristotle attaches particular significance to the homonymy of many central concepts in philosophy and science: that is, to the diversity of ways of being common to a single general concept. His preoccupation with homonymy influences his approach to almost every subject that he considers, and it clearly structures the philosophical methodology that he employs both when criticizing others and when advancing his own positive theories. Where there is homonymy there is multiplicity: Aristotle aims to find the order within this multiplicity, (...) and believes that doing so is crucial to scientific inquiry and philosophical progress.Christopher Shields investigates and evaluates Aristotle's approach to questions about homonymy, characterizing the metaphysical and semantic commitments necessary to establish the homonymy of a given concept. Then, in a series of case-studies, Shields examines in detail some of Aristotle's principal applications of homonymy--to the body, sameness and oneness, life, goodness, and being. Shields's aim is not only to give a fuller understanding of Aristotle's methodology and to illuminate his specific doctrines in a variety of areas, but to show that this methodology remains fruitful today. (shrink)

Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a ‘companion’ and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support relations or they are not. If (...) they are not, then the companions in guilt argument fails. If they are, then a reduction of epistemic reasons to evidential support relations becomes available and, consequently, epistemic reasons cease to be a viable ‘companion’ for moral reasons. I recommend this structure of argument over existing strategies within the literature and defend my claims against recent objections from companions in guilt theorists. (shrink)

The paper provides a systematic overview of recent debates in epistemology and philosophy of science on the nature of understanding. We explain why philosophers have turned their attention to understanding and discuss conditions for “explanatory” understanding of why something is the case and for “objectual” understanding of a whole subject matter. The most debated conditions for these types of understanding roughly resemble the three traditional conditions for knowledge: truth, justification and belief. We discuss prominent views about how to construe these (...) conditions for understanding, whether understanding indeed requires conditions of all three types and whether additional conditions are needed. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker's important study of epistemic injustice is focussed primarily on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice. It explores how agents' capacities to make assertions and provide testimony can be impaired in ways that can involve forms of distinctively epistemic injustice. My paper identifies a wider range of forms of epistemic injustice that do not all involve the ability to make assertions or offer testimony. The paper considers some examples of some other ways in which injustice can prevent someone from participating (...) in inquiry. (shrink)

The literature on the nature of understanding can be divided into two broad camps. Explanationists believe that it is knowledge of explanations that is key to understanding. In contrast, their manipulationist rivals maintain that understanding essentially involves an ability to manipulate certain representations. The aim of this paper is to provide a novel knowledge based account of understanding. More specifically, it proposes an account of maximal understanding of a given phenomenon in terms of fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge of (...) it and of degrees of understanding in terms of approximations to such knowledge. It is completed by a contextualist semantics for outright attributions of understanding according to which an attribution of understanding is true of one just in case one knows enough about it to perform some contextually determined task. It is argued that this account has an edge over both its explanationist and manipulationist competitors. (shrink)

DMet 10: Prime matter is the origin of all quantities. Hence it is the origin of every dimension of continuous quantity whatever. ...

Do famous athletes have special obligations to act virtuously? A number of philosophers have investigated this question by examining whether famous athletes are subject to special role model obligations (Wellman 2003; Feezel 2005; Spurgin 2012). In this paper we will take a different approach and give a positive response to this question by arguing for the position that sport and gaming celebrities are ‘ambassadors of the game’: moral agents whose vocations as rule-followers have unique implications for their non-lusory lives. According (...) to this idea, the actions of a game’s players and other stakeholders—especially the actions of its stars—directly affect the value of the game itself, a fact which generates additional moral reasons to behave in a virtuous manner. We will begin by explaining the three main positions one may take with respect to the question: moral exceptionalism, moral generalism, and moral exemplarism. We will argue that no convincing case for moral exemplarism has thus far been made, which gives us reason to look for new ways to defend this position. We then provide our own ‘ambassadors of the game’ account and argue that it gives us good reason to think that sport and game celebrities are subject to special obligations to act virtuously. (shrink)

According to commonsense psychology, one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all the things that one is conscious of. Recent lines of research purport to show that commonsense is mistaken on both of these points: Mack and Rock (1998) tell us that attention is necessary for consciousness, while Kentridge and Heywood (2001) claim that consciousness is not necessary for attention. If these lines of research were successful they would have important (...) implications regarding the prospects of using attention research to inform us about consciousness. The present essay shows that these lines of research are not successful, and that the commonsense picture of the relationship between attention and consciousness can be. (shrink)

According to the snapshot view of temporal experience, instances of movement and change cannot, strictly speaking, be objects of sensory perception. Perceptual consciousness instead consists of a succession of individual momentary experiences, none of which is itself an experience of movement or change. The snapshot view is often presented as an intuitively appealing view of the nature of temporal experience, even by philosophers who ultimately reject it. Yet, it is puzzling how this can be so, given that its central claim (...) – that we can never just perceive things moving or changing – clearly flies in the face of our common sense view of the phenomenology of experience. In this paper, I offer a diagnosis of how it is possible that the deep conflict between the snapshot view and our phenomenological intuitions can sometimes go unnoticed. The materials for this diagnosis can, I think, be found in some passages in Thomas Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, in which he criticises John Locke’s account of the origins of the idea of succession, as presented in chapter 14 of book II of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. As I argue, a crucial aspect of Reid’s criticisms can be seen to turn on the idea that Locke fails to distinguish between two quite different variants of the snapshot view, which I call the memory theory and the mirroring theory of temporal experience, respectively. It is the failure to distinguish between these two different variants of the snapshot view, I suggest, that can also make the snapshot view appear more compatible with our phenomenological intuitions than it in fact is. (shrink)

W. V. Quine famously defended two theses that have fallen rather dramatically out of fashion. The first is that intensions are “creatures of darkness” that ultimately have no place in respectable philosophical circles, owing primarily to their lack of rigorous identity conditions. However, although he was thoroughly familiar with Carnap’s foundational studies in what would become known as possible world semantics, it likely wouldn’t yet have been apparent to Quine that he was fighting a losing battle against intensions, due in (...) large measure to developments stemming from Carnap’s studies and culminating in the work of Kripke, Hintikka, and Bayart. These developments undermined Quine’s crusade against intensions on two fronts. First, in the context of possible world semantics, intensions could after all be given rigorous identity conditions by defining them (in the simplest case) as functions from worlds to appropriate extensions, a fact exploited to powerful and influential effect in logic and linguistics by the likes of Kaplan, Montague, Lewis, and Cresswell. Second, the rise of possible world semantics fueled a strong resurgence of metaphysics in contemporary analytic philosophy that saw properties and propositions widely, fruitfully, and unabashedly adopted as ontological primitives in their own right. This resurgence — happily, in my view — continues into the present day. -/- For a time, at any rate, Quine experienced somewhat better success with his second thesis: that higher-order logic is, at worst, confused and, at best, a quirky notational alternative to standard first-order logic. However, Quine notwithstanding, a great deal of recent work in formal metaphysics transpires in a higher-order logical framework in which properties and propositions fall into an infinite hierarchy of types of (at least) every finite order. Initially, the most philosophically compelling reason for embracing such a framework since Russell first proposed his simple theory of types was simply that it provides a relatively natural explanation of the paradoxes. However, since the seminal work of Prior there has been a growing trend to consider higher-order logic to be the most philosophically natural framework for metaphysical inquiry, many of the contributors to this volume being among the most important and influential advocates of this view. Indeed, this is now quite arguably the dominant view among formal metaphysicians. -/- In this paper, and against the current tide, I will argue in §1 that there are still good reasons to think that Quine’s second battle is not yet lost and that the correct framework for logic is first-order and type-free — properties and propositions, logically speaking, are just individuals among others in a single domain of quantification — and that it arises naturally out of our most basic logical and semantical intuitions. The data I will draw upon are not new and are well-known to contemporary higher-order metaphysicians. However, I will try to defend my thesis in what I believe is a novel way by suggesting that these basic intuitions ground a reasonable distinction between “pure” logic and non-logical theory, and that Russell-style semantic paradoxes of truth and exemplification arise only when we move beyond the purely logical and, hence, do not of themselves provide any strong objection to a type-free conception of properties and propositions. -/- Most of my arguments in §1 are largely independent of any specific account of the nature of properties and propositions beyond their type-freedom. However, I will in addition argue that there are good reasons to take propositions, at least, to be very fine-grained. My arguments are thus bolstered significantly if it can be shown that there are in fact well-defined examples of logics that are not only type-free but which comport with such a conception of propositions. It is the purpose of §2 to lay out a logic of this sort in some detail, drawing especially upon work by George Bealer and related work of my own. With the logic in place, it will be possible to generalize the line of argument noted above regarding Russell-style paradoxes and, in §3, apply it to two propositional paradoxes — the Prior-Kaplan paradox and the Russell-Myhill paradox — that are often taken to threaten the sort of account developed here. (shrink)

The psychological writing of Jung and the post-Jungians is all too often ignored as anachronistic, archaic and mystic. In Jung and the Postmodern, Christopher Hauke challenges this, arguing that Jungian psychology is more relevant now than ever before - not only can it be a response to modernity, but it can offer a critique of modernity and Enlightenment values which brings it in line with the postmodern critique of contemporary culture. After introducing Jungians to postmodern themes in Jameson, Baudrillard, Jencks (...) and Foucault, the author introduces postmodernists to Jung's cultural critique and post-Jungian discussions of representation, individuation, consciousness, and the alternatives to Enlightenment rationality. He also takes a totally fresh approach to topics such as hysteria and the body, Jung and Nietzsche, architecture and affect, Princess Diana and the 'death' of the subject, postmodern science and synchronicity, and to psychosis and alternative 'rationalities'. Jung and the Postmodern is vital reading for everyone interested in contemporary culture, not only Jungians and other psychotherapists who want to explore the social relevance of their discipline, but anyone who shares a assionate concern for where we are heading in postmodern times. (shrink)

This handbook article gives a critical overview of recent discussions of epistemic authority. It favors an account that brings into balance the dictates of rational deference with the ideals of intellectual self-governance. A plausible starting point is the conjecture that neither should rational deference to authorities collapse into total epistemic submission, nor the ideal of mature intellectual self-governance be conflated with (illusions of) epistemic autarky.

What is involved in the consciousness of a conscious, "occurrent" propositional attitude, such as a thought, a sudden conjecture or a conscious decision? And what is the relation of such consciousness to attention? I hope the intrinsic interest of these questions provides sufficient motivation to allow me to start by addressing them. We will not have a full understanding either of consciousness in general, nor of attention in general, until we have answers to these questions. I think there are constitutive (...) features of these states which can be identified by broadly philosophical investigation, and in the early part of this paper I will try to do some of that identification. -/- Beyond the intrinsic interest of the topic, the nature of such conscious attitudes is highly pertinent to a philosophical account of psychological self-knowledge. So I will also say something about the significance of the constitutive features of these conscious attitudes for a philosophical account of how it can be that a thinker has a distinctive kind of knowledge of some of his mental states. The general challenge in this area is to find anything intermediate between the unexceptionable but uninformative, on the one hand, and the absolutely unbelievable on the other. (shrink)