The paper discusses the manner and extent to which Epicurean ethics can serve as a general philosophy of life, capable of supporting philosophical practice in the form of philosophical counseling. Unlike the modern age academic philosophy, the philosophical practice movement portrays the philosopher as a personal or corporate adviser, one who helps people make sense of their experiences and find optimum solutions within the context of their values and general preferences. Philosophical counseling may rest on almost any school (...) of philosophy, ranging — in the Western tradition from Platonism to the philosophy of language or logic. While any specialist school of philosophy may serve valuable purposes by elucidating specific aspects of one’s experiences and directing future action, the more ‘generalist’ the philosophy used as the basis for counseling is, the broader and more far-reaching its potential impact on the person undergoing counseling. Epicurean ethics is a prime example of a philosophy of life that is suitable for philosophical counseling today. Its closer examination reveals that, contrary to superficial opinion, it is not opposed to Stoicism and may in fact incorporate Stoicism and its antecedent virtues (including many Christian virtues) in a simple yet comprehensive practical system of directions for modern counseling. (shrink)

The paper explores the extent to which Epicurean ethics as a general philosophy of life can be integrated in a composite pragmatist approach to philosophical counseling. Epicureanism emerged in a historical era that was very different from the modern time and addressed a different philosophical ethos of the time. This alone makes it difficult for Epicureanism to satisfy all of the normative criteria for a modern ethics. On the other hand, the paper discusses aspects of the modern (...) ‘external’, duty- and demand-driven ethics that may contribute to the emergence of some of the main issues for modern philosophical counseling. The author points out aspects of Epicurean ethics that are potentially powerful tools to address the issues of mood and meaning in philosophical counseling, and thus serve as a contemporary complement to a complex duty-bound, yet pragmatist view of ethics. (shrink)

The fundamental problem of Epicurean philosophy is understood as the problem of being human in a mechanical universe, which brings out the philosophical importance of Epicurus and guards against treating him as a museum piece. This interpretation of Epicurean ethics is developed against the background of a critical discussion of earlier interpretations. Although the whole range of the tetrapharmakos is covered in the book, as well as the Epicurean social philosophy of justice and friendship, the argument (...) focuses on Epicurus' understanding of the nature of pleasure, and pain and on the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure. (shrink)

Horace's Satires owe debts of influence to a wide range of genres and authors, including, as this study demonstrates, the moral tradition of Epicureanism. Focusing on the philosopher Philodemus of Gadara, it argues that the central concerns of his work lie at the heart of the poet's criticisms of Roman society and its shortcomings.

Appeals to nature are ubiquitous in Epicurean ethics and politics. The foundation of Epicurean ethics is its claim that pleasure is the sole intrinsic good and pain the sole intrinsic evil, and this is supposedly shown by the behavior of infants who have not yet been corrupted, "when nature's judgement is pure and whole." Central to their recommendations about how to attain pleasure is their division between types of desires: the natural and necessary ones, the natural (...) but non-necessary ones, and the vain and empty ones. Elsewhere, the Epicureans talk about the "natural goods" of political power and fame, and they contrast "natural wealth" with wealth as "defined by empty opinion." Finally, in their politics, Epicurus claims that the "the justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, [i.e.,] neither to harm one another nor to be harmed." This paper explores two questions regarding these various appeals to nature. The first is: what is it for these things to be natural, i.e., what notion of "natural" or "nature" is at play here? (Furthermore, is there a single notion being used across these appeals, and if not, how are they related?) The second is: what normative work does a thing's being natural do? That is, what reason, if any, does a desire's being natural give me for pursuing the object of that desire and trying to fulfill that desire, as opposed to not doing so and trying to eliminate it, and similarly for the other appeals to nature? (shrink)

In recent years, the notion of ‘philosophy as a way of life’ has again received much attention. Fittingly, whilst this revived interest has generated numerous scholarly publications, attention has...

A long-lived and lively tradition of materialist philosophers flourished in classical India and in classical Greece. Due to the condition of their texts, however, they do not often receive close study. This essay compares the views of the classical Indian materialists, the Cārvākas, and the classical Greek materialists, the Epicureans. The first section introduces their philosophies. The second outlines their doctrines of empiricism and materialism. The third and fourth turn to two comparative topics in Cārvāka and Epicurean ethics: (...) their views on eliminating irrational fears caused by superstition and their understanding of pleasure as the goal of human action and life. (shrink)

Through a careful analysis of the ethics of Philodemus, this monograph offers the first book-length study of the Epicurean sage. It explores the different aspects of the sage’s way of life and offers a reconstruction of this Epicurean role model.

Epicurean ethics has been subject to withering ancient and contemporary criticism for the supposed irreconcilability of Epicurus’s emphatic endorsement of friendship and his equally clear and striking ethical egoism. Recently, Matthew Evans (2004) has suggested that the key to a plausible Epicurean response to these criticisms must begin by understanding why friendship is valuable for Epicurus. In the first section of this paper I develop Evans’ suggestion further. I argue that a shared conception of the human telos (...) and of what is required to attain it structures the confidence that characterizes friendship. In the second part of the paper I return to two contemporary criticisms of Epicurean friendship. The first criticism focuses on the problem of free riders. The second criticism points to a seeming inconsistency in Epicurean doctrine. I suggest that both criticisms can be adequately addressed once we understand Epicurean friendship in greater depth. (shrink)

Epicurus thought that the conventional values of Greek society—in particular, its celebration of luxury and wealth—often led people astray. It is by rejecting these values, reducing our desires, and leading a moderately ascetic life that we can attain happiness. But Epicurus’ message is also pertinent for those of us in modern Western culture, with an economy based on constant consumption and an advertising industry that molds us to serve that economy by enlarging our desires. This paper begins with an outline (...) of some of the basic tenets of Epicurean ethics, followed by an explanation of how these tenets lead to an Epicurean diagnosis of what ails modern consumers and of the cure they would propose. The paper closes with a consideration of recent psychological research in well-being and how it supports the Epicurean position. (shrink)

The Epicureans advocate a moderately ascetic lifestyle on instrumental grounds, as the most effective means to securing tranquility. The virtuous person will reduce his desires to what is natural and necessary in order to avoid the trouble and anxiety caused by excessive desire. So much is clear from Epicurus' general ethics. But the later Epicurean Philodemus fills in far more detail about the attitude a wise Epicurean will take toward wealth in his treatise On Property Management. This (...) paper explores some of Philodemus' distinctive doctrines and argues that Philodemus' position on crafts is an improvement on the Socratic and Aristotelian positions that he is reacting against. Philodemus rejects both constraints on what counts as a genuine craft proposed by Socrates in the Gorgias: that a craft aims at a genuine good, and that it is based on a grasp of the nature of its subject. Philodemus also rejects the attempts of Xenophon and Theophrastus to preserve an important place for the craft of property management, conceived of as aiming at maximizing your wealth, within the Socratic and Aristotelian ethical tradition that puts virtue and virtuous activity at the center of the happy life. According to Philodemus, cultivating and exercising the traditional technê of property management is actually incompatible with being a virtuous person and obtaining happiness. (shrink)

This paper argues that Epicurean friendship is instrumental in value, and Epicurus’s varied claims about friendship can be understood as teaching strategies that are tailored to different levels of students. After rejecting an argument that presents Epicurean friendship as intrinsic, I outline Epicurus’s methodology of teaching and examine his specific claims regarding friendship as intended for either novice, intermediate, or advanced students. This approach allows Epicurus’s weaker and stronger claims regarding friendship to be viewed as gradually progressing students (...) towards the good life without deviating from the ethical hedonism that frames his entire philosophical project. (shrink)

Epicurus is strongly committed to psychological and ethical egoism and hedonism. However, these commitments do not square easily with many of the claims made by Epicureans about friendship: for instance, that the wise man will sometimes die for his friend, that the wise man will love his friend as much as himself, feel exactly the same toward his friend as toward himself, and exert himself as much for his friend's pleasure as for his own, and that every friendship is worth (...) choosing for its own sake. These claims have led some scholars to assert that Epicurus inconsistently affirms that friendship has an altruistic element. I argue that the Epicurean claims about friendship can be reconciled with egoism and hedonism in psychology and ethics. Friendship is valuable because having friends provides one with security more effectively than any other means, and having confidence that one will be secure in the future either is identical to ataraxia, or the grounds on which one has it. (shrink)

The Epicurean view is that there is nothing bad about death, and we are wrong to loathe it. This paper distinguishes several different such views, and shows that while some of them really would undermine our loathing of death, others would not. It then argues that any version that did so could be at best vacuously true: If there is nothing bad about death, that can only be because there is nothing bad about anything.

In ’Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis’, Anna Christensen contends that Don Marquis’ influential ’future like ours’ argument for the immorality of abortion faces a significant challenge from the Epicurean claim that human beings cannot be harmed by their death. If deprivation requires a subject, then abortion cannot deprive a fetus of a future of value, as no individual exists to be deprived once death has occurred. However, the Epicurean account also implies that the wrongness of murder (...) is also not grounded in the badness of death, which is strongly counterintuitive. There is an alternative: we can save our intuitions by adopting a more moderate Epicurean account such as that proposed by David Hershenov, who grounds the wrongness of killing in the prevention of the benefit of further good life rather than in the badness of death. Hershenov’s account, however, is equally applicable to Marquis’ argument: abortion similarly prevents a fetus from enjoying the benefit of a future like ours. Consequently, we conclude that Christensen’s criticism of Marquis’ argument fails to undermine his reasoning. (shrink)

It is often assumed that Epicurean happiness can be achieved by everyone alike. This paper offers a corrective to this view. While it is true that the Epicureans abolish traditional differences among people like those between the sexes, social classes, and so on, they also maintain that there are people who are incapable of achieving happiness because they lack a certain bodily make-up or because they do not have the right ethnic or cultural origin.

A leading philosopher shows that if the pursuit of happiness is the question, Epicureanism is the answer Epicureanism has a reputation problem, bringing to mind gluttons with gout or an admonition to eat, drink, and be merry. In How to Be an Epicurean, philosopher Catherine Wilson shows that Epicureanism isn't an excuse for having a good time: it's a means to live a good life. Although modern conveniences and scientific progress have significantly improved our quality of life, many of (...) the problems faced by ancient Greeks -- love, money, family, politics -- remain with us in new forms. To overcome these obstacles, the Epicureans adopted a philosophy that promoted reason, respect for the natural world, and reverence for our fellow humans. By applying this ancient wisdom to a range of modern problems, from self-care routines and romantic entanglements to issues of public policy and social justice, Wilson shows us how we can all fill our lives with purpose and pleasure. (shrink)

Ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus provided some of our most cherished assumptions about physics and ethics. He postulated an infinite universe made exclusively of atoms and void. He also treated slaves and women as equals and defined our standards of pleasure and luxury. Now David Swift turns to Epicurus for help with another significant mystery: the scientific explanation of mind. Using Epicurean ideas that our minds are in our chests and, perhaps even more radically, that meaning is understood in (...) our sense organs he re-examines and reinterprets the works of philosophers like Descartes, Locke, Kant and Mill and scientists such as Pavlov, Freud, Skinner and Rogers. Seen in the light of the Epicurean concept, Renaissance philosophy and classic scientific psychology validate a surprisingly consistent and coherent scientific explanation of behaviour. The mechanisms of meaning, knowledge, learning and remembering are explained in terms of biological reflexes. The secrets of love, hate and loyalty are revealed as non-verbal knowledge only accessible as feelings. And success, failure, criminal and other behaviours are shown to be the results of learned experience not genetic predisposition. At last we have the possibility of a plausible biologically-based general psychological theory. (shrink)

Considering Greece from the Dark Age to the early Hellenistic era, Bryant (sociology, U. of New Brunswick, Canada) examines the main structural changes within the economic, political,.

Voula Tsouna presents a comprehensive study of the ethics of the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus, who taught Virgil, influenced Horace, and was praised by Cicero. His works have only recently become available to modern readers, through the decipherment of a papyrus carbonized by the eruption of Vesuvius in 79 AD. Tsouna examines Philodemus's theoretical principles in ethics, his contributions to moral psychology, his method, his conception of therapy, and his therapeutic techniques. The Ethics of Philodemus will be (...) of considerable interest to scholars and students of classics, ancient philosophy, and ethics. (shrink)

The surviving writings of Epicurus and his followers contain several references to epibolê – a puzzling notion that does not receive discussion in the extant Epicurean texts. There is no consensus about what epibolê is, what it is of, and what it operates on and, moreover, its epistemological status is controversial. This article aims to address these issues in both Epicurus and later Epicurean authors. Part One focuses mainly on Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus, highlights a crucial distinction hitherto (...) unnoticed in the literature between two different types of epibolê, and brings out he necessary connection between epibolê and the application of the criteria of truth. Part Two considers the philosophical merits of the traditional interpretation of epibolê as projection and/or attention. Part Three examines the two aforementioned types of epibolê in Lucretius and Philodemus and shows that these authors accord epibolê paramount epistemological and ethical importance. (shrink)

The virtue of μεγαλοψυχία or greatness of soul is prominent in the works of Aristotle as well as in the Peripatetic and Stoic traditions. However, mention of μεγαλοψυχία is extremely rare in our surviving evidence for the Epicurean school. In this paper I reconstruct a viable Epicurean position on μεγαλοψυχία. I argue that the Epicureans have a distinctive account of the virtue that is compatible with their hedonist ethics, and that can also be seen as a reaction (...) to Aristotle. I also demonstrate that the Epicurean account relates closely to their critical engagement with the Cynics and their emphasis on the importance of friendship and generosity in the good life. (shrink)

This paper argues that Epicurean friendship is instrumental in value, and Epicurus’s varied claims about friendship can be understood as teaching strategies that are tailored to different levels of students. After rejecting an argument that presents Epicurean friendship as intrinsic, I outline Epicurus’s methodology of teaching and examine his specific claims regarding friendship as intended for either novice, intermediate, or advanced students. This approach allows Epicurus’s weaker and stronger claims regarding friendship to be viewed as gradually progressing students (...) towards the good life without deviating from the ethical hedonism that frames his entire philosophical project. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMany texts in the Epicurean tradition mention gratitude but do not explicitly explain its function in Epicurean ethics. I review passages that mention or discuss gratitude and ingratitude a...

There has been a large amount of scholarly controversy over the precise nature of the motivations at play in the Epicurean accounts of justice and friendship, and whether any form of altruism or other-concern is compatible with Epicurean hedonist ethics. This paper addresses this tension between self- and other-concern from a novel angle, by examining the motivations behind Epicurean educational practice. What emerges is a rather complex motivational picture that reaffirms the Epicureans' philosophical commitment to egoism, (...) but at the same time shows it to be more nuanced and sensitive than one might expect given their theoretical postulates and the reaction of ancient critics such as Cicero. (shrink)

By means of a comprehensive and penetrating examination of the main elements of Epicurean ethics, Phillip Mitsis forces us to reevaluate this widely misunderstood figure in the history of philosophy.

Plutarch's epistolary essay, That a Philosopher ought to Converse especially with Men in Power, has been neglected because not recognized for what it is: an attempt to persuade an addressee attached to Epicurean principles that his attraction to political friendship should be honoured rather than eradicated. Rather than attack Epicureanism, Plutarch attempts to expand the horizons of a hedonic and utilitarian ethics so as to include noble benefaction on a political scale. This requires him to undermine the (...) class='Hi'>Epicurean insistence on restricting friendship to private like-minded circles, and to expand its hedonism into a political utilitarianism. Unlike Cicero's De Finibus , Plutarch's letter offers an indirect critique, and preserves elements of Epicurean ethics suitable to the moderating influence a friend and advisor can exert on the statesman's eros. (shrink)

Plutarch’s epistolary essay, That a Philosopher ought to Converse especially swith Men in Power, has been neglected because not recognized for what it is: an attempt to persuade an addressee attached to Epicurean principles that his attraction to political friendship should be honoured rather than eradicated. Rather than attack Epicureanism, Plutarch attempts to expand the horizons of a hedonic and utilitarian ethics so as to include noble benefaction on a political scale. This requires him to undermine the (...) class='Hi'>Epicurean insistence on restricting friendship to private like-minded circles, and to expand its hedonism into a political utilitarianism. Unlike Cicero’s De Finibus, Plutarch’s letter offers an indirect critique, and preserves elements of Epicurean ethics suitable to the moderating influence a friend and advisor can exert on the statesman’s eros. (shrink)

In Living for Pleasure, philosopher Emily Austin offers a lively, jargon-free tour of Epicurean strategies for diminishing anxiety, achieving satisfaction, and relishing joys.

The evidence concerning the existence of Epicurean gods has invited ever-growing attention, and has resulted in discussions of increasing sophistication. I aim to provide a roadmap to this controversy, and to argue for the following three claims. First, in the debate concerning ‘realist’ and ‘idealist’ readings of the Epicurean thesis that gods exist, there is no principled way of deciding which one to favour without having to compromise on some aspect of a minimally Epicurean position. Second, positing (...) an innate disposition to form the concept of god is not going to carry the day for an ‘idealist’ reading, though it does capture an important insight about the ethical orientation of the Epicurean theory. Third, in accor- dance with this ethical orientation, we have reason to suspect that Epicurus was genuinely uninterested in what the correct ontological position might be. (shrink)

The essay examines the central role that pleasure plays in a wide range of conceptualisations of happiness or ‘good life’, from Epicurean hedonism, to Christian asceticism, to contemporary cases of pastoral and philosophical counselling. Despite the apparent moral chasm between hedonists and ascetics, a look at the practices promoted by Epicurus and the Christian monastic fathers reveals striking similarities. The reason is that, at a fundamental level, both parties agree that one should reject the vulgar pleasures that society glorifies, (...) and develop a refined attitude that seeks the appropriate and natural pleasures, while ignoring the harmful or unnecessary ones. And such an attitude can only be acquired through moral training, either by philosophical instruction and reflection, or by pastoral counselling. We highlight some important parallels regarding the connection between pleasure and happiness, as conceived by Epicureans and monastic fathers of the Eastern Orthodox Church. We begin by discussing elements of Epicureanism that can also be found in its rival philosophical schools and Christianity, mainly the emphasis on forming the right conception of happiness and acting in accordance with it. We then examine the connection between morality and happiness in the Christian Orthodox monasticism. We argue that Christian ascetic ethics not only condone some types of pleasures, but in fact require them as elements of happiness in this life that play an instrumental role for the Christian soteriological dogma. The argument has wider philosophical significance because it shows that pleasure is indeed a fundamental conceptual ingredient of happiness across different normative ethical contexts. (shrink)

This paper discusses the presentation of the Epicurean virtues offered in the Letter to Menoeceus and in Cicero’s On Ends. It evaluates the proposals advanced by Phillip Mitsis and Pierre-Marie Morel. Against Morel, it is argued that Torquatus’ presentation of the virtues in On Ends is not part of an elaborate dialectical strategy. Instead, the paper sides with Mitsis’ more modest proposal: while Torquatus, like any good speaker, with high likelihood adapts his presentation to his audience, his ideas also (...) have a strong foundation in Epicureanism. Given the extant state of textual evidence, it is difficult to determine precisely, however, to what degree his presentation of the virtues (1) directly draws on ideas already present in the founder of the Garden himself, (2) reflects a later development in the Epicurean school, or (3) falsifies Epicurean ideas to make them more palatable for a Roman audience. (shrink)