Capítulo I. 1891-1901 -- Capítulo II. 1902-1907.

Fear to contamination is an easy-to-provoke, intense, hard-to-control, and extraordinarily persistent fear. A worsening of preexisting psychiatric disorders was observed during the COVID-19 outbreak, and several studies suggest that those with obsessive–compulsive disorder may be more affected than any other group of people. In the face of worsening OCD symptoms, there is a need for mental health professionals to provide the support needed not only to treat patients who still report symptoms, but also to improve relapse prevention. In this line, (...) it is recommended to improve alternative strategies such as online consultations and digital psychiatry. The aim of this study is to develop augmented reality stimuli that are clinically relevant for patients with cleaning OCD and assess their efficiency to obtain emotionally significant responses. Four AR stimuli were developed: a plastic bag full of garbage, a piece of bread with mold, a dirty sports shoe, and a piece of rotten meat. All stimuli were shown to a clinical group and a control group. Relevant results were the design of the AR stimuli. These stimuli were validated with the statistical difference in perceived anxiety in the meat stimuli between the clinical and control groups. Nevertheless, when looking at effect sizes, all stimuli present effect sizes from small to large, with both shoe and bread between small and medium effect sizes. These results are a valuable support for the clinical use of these AR stimuli in the treatment of cleaning OCD. (shrink)

In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic is to (...) be identified with an infinite sequence of consequence relations holding between increasingly complex relata: formulae, inferences, metainferences, and so on. As a result, the present proposal allows not only to differentiate Classical Logic from ST, but also from other systems sharing with it their valid metainferences. Finally, we show how these results have interesting consequences for some topics in the philosophical logic literature, among them for the debate around Logical Pluralism. The reason being that the discussion concerning this topic is usually carried out employing a rivalry criterion for logics that will need to be modified in light of the present investigation, according to which two logics can be non-identical even if they share the same valid inferences. (shrink)

In some recent articles, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley, & van Rooij have defended the idea that abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes. For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain a nontransitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid. However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there are not certain safe instances of Cut (...) involving semantic notions. In this article we intend to meet the challenge of answering how to regain all the safe instances of Cut, in the language of the theory, making essential use of a unary recovery operator. To fulfill this goal, we will work within the so-called Goodship Project, which suggests that in order to have nontrivial naïve theories it is sufficient to formulate the corresponding self-referential sentences with suitable biconditionals. Nevertheless, a secondary aim of this article is to propose a novel way to carry this project out, showing that the biconditionals in question can be totally classical. In the context of this article, these biconditionals will be essentially used in expressing the self-referential sentences and, thus, as a collateral result of our work we will prove that none of the recoveries expected of the target theory can be nontrivially achieved if self-reference is expressed through identities. (shrink)

Rejecting the Cut rule has been proposed as a strategy to avoid both the usual semantic paradoxes and the so-called v-Curry paradox. In this paper we consider if a Cut-free theory is capable of accurately representing its own notion of validity. We claim that the standard rules governing the validity predicate are too weak for this purpose and we show that although it is possible to strengthen these rules, the most obvious way of doing so brings with it a serious (...) problem: an internalized version of Cut can be proved for a Curry-like sentence. We also evaluate a number of possible ways of escaping this difficulty. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemological status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists include the semantic paradoxes as a part of the elements to accept a logical theory. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferential hierarchy of ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes. There is a whole ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} (...) \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-based hierarchy, of which LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document} and ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} themselves are only the first steps. This means that the logics in this hierarchy are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowed in a language that contains its own truth predicate. This paper explores these responses analyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. We show that LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document}, ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} and the logics of the ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data are not enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revision of classical logic. Which is the best explanation for the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? How close should we be to classical logic? And mainly, how could a logic obey the validities it contains? From an anti-exceptionalist perspective, we argue that ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-metainferential logics in general—and STTω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {STT}}_{\omega }$$\end{document} in particular—are the best available options to explain the inferential principles involved with the notion of truth. (shrink)

Modern zoos strive to educate visitors about zoo animals and their wild counterparts’ conservation needs while fostering appreciation for wildlife in general. This research review examines how zoos influence those who visit them. Much of the research to-date examines zoo visitors’ behaviors and perceptions in relation to specific exhibits, animals and/or programs. In general, visitors have more positive perceptions and behaviors about zoos, their animals and conservation initiatives the more they interact with animals, naturalistic exhibits, and zoo programming/staff. Furthermore, zoo (...) visitors are receptive to conservation messaging and initiatives at zoos, and are more likely to participate in on-site conservation opportunities as opposed to after their visits. The research also suggests that repeat visitors are even more inclined to seek out conservation efforts compared to those visiting zoos for the first time. While current research suggests that repeat-visitors are more likely to engage in conservation efforts, little is known about causal factors related to such findings, and almost no research exists to-date comparing the conservation efforts of visitors vs. non-visitors. This latter comparison will likely play a greater role in future zoo visitor research, since it poses one of the most important metrics for evaluating the specific effects visiting a zoo can have on people engaging in conservation efforts in general. (shrink)

The concept of _substructural logic_ was originally introduced in relation to limitations of Gentzen’s structural rules of Contraction, Weakening and Exchange. Recent years have witnessed the development of substructural logics also challenging the Tarskian properties of Reflexivity and Transitivity of logical consequence. In this introduction we explain this recent development and two aspects in which it leads to a reassessment of the bounds of classical logic. On the one hand, standard ways of defining the notion of logical consequence in classical (...) logic naturally induce substructural logics when admitting more than two truth values; on the other hand, these substructural logics give rise to hierarchies of _metainferences_ that can be used to approximate classical logic at different levels. (shrink)

This important collection of essays by Andrew Feenberg presents his critical theory of technology, an innovative approach to philosophy and sociology of technology based on a synthesis of ideas drawn from STS and Frankfurt School Critical Theory. The volume includes chapters on citizenship, modernity, and Heidegger and Marcuse.

El enfoque secular de la piedad significa padecer por el dolor ajeno; no apunta a la autocompasión, ni se circunscribe al ámbito estrictamente privado o religioso. En la afección por el dolor y/o humillación de cualquier ser humano es donde realmente se deja ver que la vida humana tiene valor universal por sí misma y por tanto dignidad. A partir del incordio de la piedad, el ser humano puede rebelarse contra la injusticia y en esa medida, puede ser principio de (...) acción política y de un auténtico humanismo. (shrink)

En su obra Eichmann en Jerusalén Arendt habla de la “banalidad del mal” para referirse a la ambigüedad del concepto de maldad por el que algunas personas pueden ser manipuladas por conceptos frívolos de lo bueno y de lo malo, banalidad que no minimiza la crueldad de sus efectos. Este enfoque arendtiano no pretende explicar, ni definir de forma total a la maldad, más bien deviene en una crítica a la trivialidad de los conceptos cerrados y dogmáticos de la maldad (...) por los que se puede atentar contra la vida o la dignidad de las personas. La autora refiere esta tesis a partir del seguimiento del caso Eichmann, quien siempre se mostró orgulloso de su colaboración con el genocidio nazi. Arendt explica la “banalidad del mal” a partir de la falta de pensamiento; sólo el pensamiento como autorreflexión que busca el significado puede prevenirnos de criterios que pueden ser altamente perniciosos. Ahora bien, la actualización del pensamiento no depende del nivel informativo ni del contexto histórico, sino que sólo depende de la libertad del Sujeto, por lo que no hay prescripciones universales para atreverse a pensar. Palabras clave: Banalidad del mal; Pensamiento; Autorreflexión; Significado y libertad. ABSTRACT Arendt talk abaut “banality of badness” in Eichmann in Jerusalem to refer the ambiguous criteria of badness which lead to manipulation’s people; so much people can follow frivolous concept of goodness and badness, and it banality don’t diminish the cruelty abaut consequences. It arendtian’s sence don’t try to explain the universal sence of the badness, it’s only a criticism abaut the triviality of the dogmatics concepts of badness wich can to attempt the life and the dignidty of so much persons. Arendt refer it sence of “banality of badness” because of the pursuit Eichmann’s prosecute; Eichmann always seems proud by his colaboration with the nazism. Arendt explain the banality of badness because the absence of thought, only the thought as a self-reflection process might prevent us from having ambiguous criteria which could be very pernicious. Now, to think don’t depend the informativ level neither the historic context, to think only depend abaut the fry, consequently there aren’t universal prescriptions for to dare do thinking. Key words: Banality of badness; Thought; Self-reflection process; Meaning and fry. (shrink)

Se desarrolla la concepción normativista de la autoconciencia hegeliana, de acuerdo con los aportes de los denominados “neohegelianos de Pittsburgh” (Robert Brandom, John McDowell), así como de otros autores anglosajones como Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard y Paul Redding. Se presenta el recorrido de la autoconciencia en el capítulo IVde la Fenomenología del Espíritu, y se desarrollan algunos rasgos que pueden extraerse de dicha presentación, de acuerdo con la lectura normativista de los autores mencionados.

In this article we present a new class of multiple contraction functionswhich are a generalization of the epistemic entrenchment-based contractions (Grdenfors & Makinson, 1988) to the case of contractions by (possibly nonsingleton) sets of sentences and provide an axiomatic characterization for that class of functions. Moreover, we show that the class of epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions coincides with the class of system of spheres-based multiple contractions introduced in Fermé & Reis (2012).

This article discusses the relation between colonialism and the sovereignty of peoples through a dialogue between Hegel and the thought of the French Revolution. These two sides are relevant to each other not only because of their historical proximity, but also because of the connections that can be established when we approach the topic of colonialism through these two manifestations. Hegel is explicit that his philosophy of history and his philosophy of right are supposed to be philosophies of freedom. Yet (...) despite the importance that he lends to freedom, Hegel also explicitly defends, in the very same text, colonial domination when he deals with the relation between peoples. A similar problem had arisen in the course of the French Revolution. Following the declarations of war, France is confronted on various occasions with the question of how to deal with other peoples and countries. With the foundation of the Republic in 1792, the relation with other peoples becomes central in the revolutionary debates. The topic of colonialism is part of the constituting debates, and not only because of the uprisings in then Saint Domingue leading to the Haitian Revolution. This article is a part of a larger research project that attempts to reassess the relations between Hegel and the French Revolution, and deals with the question of how we can re-read Hegel's interpretation of the French Revolution based on the evolving historiography of the Revolution. After an introduction of both sides of this dialogue, the paper discusses how Hegel's political philosophy can be applied to understand the debates about the emancipation of colonies that take place during the French Revolution. The next part further analyses some issues, such as the notion of sovereignty and, in the concluding remarks, I summarize my discussion and point to some avenues for further research. (shrink)

Este documento ofrece una propuesta desde la perspectiva de la bioética para la elaboración de un protocolo de triaje en el contexto de la pandemia de COVID-19. Dicha propuesta incluye recomendaciones sobre las normas procedimentales y normas sustantivas que deben regir la asignación y reasignación de recursos terapéuticos en condiciones de escasez extrema.

Democracy is seen today as being in erosion or crisis both in the Global North and South. This article puts forward the concept of ‘dependent democracy’ in order to explain that much of the lack of success of democracy in the South in guaranteeing political participation and economic inclusion and wellbeing for the majority of the population is due to a specific tendency of democracy there. Adapting some insights from the more economics focused Dependency theory towards a more contemporary point (...) of view from political sociology and international political sociology, dependent democracy is understood as a democracy that exists in a subaltern position within the hierarchical, post-imperial and neo-imperial global capitalist order. Dependent democracies thus tend to be less ‘democracies’ and more ‘oligarchies’ within a form of government in the South that can be understood as existing in a global pyramid of semi-peripheries, middle peripheries and outer peripheries. (shrink)

In this “Letter from Chile” I describe and comment the main features of philosophical activity in Chile. My perspective is related to my own academic experience: that of a Chilean academic, who earned his doctorate at the Free University of Berlin, worked in that same university for six years as an Assistant Professor, and has been an Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile in Santiago for the last eleven years. The first part (...) of the text offers a review of the historical development of philosophy in Chile. Afterwards, I refer to the current situation of our academic philosophy, analyzing various aspects: issues, currents, institutions, publications, research system, among others. Finally, I outline, from the above, some assessments and a general diagnosis of the present situation of philosophy in my country. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper defends David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of inductionb against Helen Beebee’s attack on that solution. To solve theproblem of induction, Armstrong contends that the timeless necessity explanation is the best explanation of our observed regularities, whereas Beebee attempts to demonstrate that the time-limited necessity explanation is an equally good explanation. Allegedly, this explanation blocks Armstrong’s solution. I demonstrate that even if the time-limited ecessity explanation were an equally good explanation of our observed regularities, this explanation does (...) not block Armstrong’s solution. I argue that, in fact, the timeless necessity explanation is a better explanation of our observed regularities than is the time-limited necessity explanation. (shrink)

Alchourrón devoted his last years to the analysis of the notion of defeasible conditionalization. He developed a formal system capturing the essentials of this notion. His definition of the defeasible conditional is given in terms of strict implication operator and a modal operator f which is interpreted as a revision function at the language level. In this paper, we will point out that this underlying revision function is more general than the well known AGM revision [4]. In addition, we will (...) give a complete characterization of that more general kind of revision and will show how permits to unify models of revision given by other authors. Alchourrón dedicó sus últimos años al análisis de la noción de condicionalización derrotable. Desarrolló un sistema formal que captura los aspectos esenciales de esta noción. Su definición de condicional revisable está dada en términos del operador de implicación estricta y un operador modal f el cual es interpretado en el nivel del lenguaje como una función de revisión. En este trabajo señalamos que la función de revisión subyacente es más general que la bien conocida función de revisión de AGM. Además, presentaremos una caracterización completa de una clase de revisión más general y mostraremos cómo nuestro modelo permite unificar los modelos de revisión propuestos por otros autores. (shrink)

The thesis that I wish to discuss in this paper is the next: Human Sciences (Cultural Sciences according to Dilthey, Historic-Hermeneutic sciences according to Habermas) are possible as far as the method that should make all of them possible can be epistemologically justified, this method is the hermeneutic understanding of meaning, whose central point is, in fact, the hermeneutic circle. The matter is to try to justify epistemologically the hermeneutic as understanding the meaning of the own and the other ones (...) life experiences within reflexivity and reciprocity that impregnates the structure of ordinary language. In the dialogue Habermas to Dilthey, in Knowledge and Human Interests appear many arguments to this foundation. Our text will make special emphasis in the next items: distinction between natural sciences and cultural sciences, hermeneutic understanding of meaning, ordinary language and reflexivity, specificity of the hermeneutic circle, science an vital context, and, finally, we are going to make an account of the Habermas interpretation of the Dilthey start point in bases to the relationships between Historic-hermeneutic sciences and the practice interest of the knowledge. (shrink)

El problema fundamental para que la Teoría de la relatividad pueda ser acorde con la filosofía de Kant es el de la utilización de una geometría no euclídea. Que sus principios sean interpretados como juicios sintéticos a priori es, a nuestro entender, un problema secundario. Si queremos que los principios de una ciencia de la naturaleza sean universales y necesarios sin recurrir a dogmatismos, no queda otra posibilidad que entenderlos trascendentalmente. Como se observa en el principio de relatividad, Einstein también (...) pensaba que las leyes físicas son universales y necesarias. Sin embargo, su perspectiva fue más racionalista que crítica. Sea como fuere, si los principios de la Teoría de la relatividad son a priori y enlazan sintéticamente la experiencia posible, esta teoría nos servirá para entender que las geometrías no euclídeas no son ajenas a los planteamientos de Kant, si bien requieren dar un rodeo epistemológico. La doctrina que nos permite fundamentar las geometrías no euclidianas desde la filosofía de Kant la llamamos “Álgebra de la experiencia”.The main problem for the Theory of the relativity to be in agreement with the Kant´s philosophy is the use of a non-Euclidean geometry. The fact that their principles could be interpreted a priori as synthetic trials is, in our opinion, a secondary problem. If we want that the principles of a science of the nature would be universal and necessary ones without appealing to dogmatisms, then, he have to understand them transcendentally. As in the principle of relativity it is observed, Einstein also thought that the physical laws are universal and necessary ones. However, their perspective was more rationalistic than critic. In any case, if the Theory of Relativity principles are a priori and they synthetically connect the possible experience, then, this theory will allow us to understand that the non-Euclidean geometries are not far away from the Kant´s positions, although they require to made a epistemological turn around. The principle that allows us to base the geometries non Euclidian from the Kant´s philosophy is called “Algebra of the experience”. (shrink)

A la teoría de la relatividad se la ha considerado una teoría empírica. Sobre esta interpretación se ha preconizado el triunfo del empirismo sobre cualquier otra concepción filosófica. Moritz Schlick vaticinó que no se podrían encontrar los principios sintéticos a priori de esta ciencia porque tal cosa no existía. Este artículo demuestra no ya sólo que se pueden encontrar, sino que ya estaban en posesión de Kant. La introducción de algunas pocas precisiones nos bastará para adaptar a la teoría de (...) la relatividad tan preciados principios. (shrink)

Muchas de las teorías educativas actuales son de corte constructivista. En este artículo, reflexionamos sobre diversas cuestiones antropológico-filosóficas que justifican los postulados del constructivismo aplicados a la didáctica expuestos por Giovanni Marcello Iafrancesco. Cuando nos adentramos en el constructivismo epistemológico encontramos diferentes orientaciones teóricas. Algunas de ellas se relacionan con la epistemología evolucionista y la idea de selección natural. Por ello, tras la introducción, se realiza una crítica a la idea de selección natural en el campo antropológico, después de la (...) cual aparecen expuestas las ideas necesarias para que los postulados del constructivismo, aplicados a la didáctica, resulten evidentes. (shrink)

This paper raises the question under what circumstances a plurality forms a set. My main point is that not always all things form sets. A provocative way of presenting my position is that, as a result of my approach, there are more pluralities than sets. Another way of presenting the same thesis claims that there are ways of talking about objects that do not always collapse into sets. My argument is related to expressive powers of formal languages. Assuming classical logic, (...) I show that if all plurality form a set and the quantifiers are absolutely general, then one gets a trivial theory. So, by reductio, one has to abandon one of the premiss. Then, I argue against the collapse of the pluralities into sets. What I am advocating is that the thesis of collapse limits important applications of the plural logic in model theory, when it is assumed that the quantifiers are absolutely general. (shrink)

This work is focused on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. This philosopher is one of the most important impeller of modern review of Neoplatonism. The subjects considered in this paper they are the relationship between goodness, freedom and difference in Levinas' thought. Levinas' thesis is that thought and freedom are originated by the relationship with the others. Thought and freedom suppose the difference.

I analyze some traditional distinctions around euthanasia. In contrast to those who most discuss the justification of active versus passive, or direct versus indirect euthanasia. I claim, following and expanding a Holly Smith´s argument, that the possibility of active and/or direct euthanasia cannot be morally excluded, once we have accepted passive and/or indirect euthanasia, even though we assume the asymmetry between killing and letting die, or between killing someone intentionally as a means and doing that as an undesired side-effect . (...) I evaluate then some objections and limits of the argument and make a shorter reference to the problem of voluntariness. (shrink)

Fishkin claims that the three liberals principles concerning assignment of social positions constitute a “trilemma”: the realization of any two of these principles precludes the realization of the third. In this paper, I try to prove that this is the case, only if these principles are interpreted in an extreme way. Liberalism, however, has strong reasons to reject such interpretation of each of these principles. Moreover, these reasons are independent from the question of whether their conjunction may be conflictive or (...) not. If we assume moderate versions of the principles , the trilemma disappears or, at least, becomes much weaker. (shrink)

Si bien en las últimas décadas se ha hecho énfasis en las ciencias sociales como disciplinas interpretativas, no por hecho han dejado de realizarse ?y en algunos casos consolidarse? las investigaciones de corte cuantitativo, en este sentido consideramos de primera importancia recuperar la discusión..

“Moral luck” alludes to the fact of being responsible for things over which we have no control. Typically, we have neither control over the consequences of our acts of will nor over the circumstances in which these acts are performed. The Kantian thesis on oral responsibility claims that every kind of moral responsibility claims that every kind of moral luck should be eliminated from our moral language and practice. In the case of consequences, this aim does not seem impossible. But (...) circumstances are more difficult to avoid because the act of will itself has to be performed within the framework of circumstances that the agent cannot control at all, and these circumstances will dramatically bear on his/her responsibility. Therefore, the following anti-Kantian argument can be construed. Either we reject circumstantial luck argument can be construed. Either we reject circumstantial luck or we accept it. If we reject it, then every attribution of responsibility becomes impossible. If we accept it, then we no longer have a good argument against consequential luck, the core of the Kantian rejection of moral luck. In this paper, I defend the Kantian position from this argument, claiming that both kinds of moral luck are relevantly different. This will, nevertheless, lead to a revision of the scope of our judgments of responsibility. They compare how someone acted with how others would act in identical 8or similar) circumstances. (shrink)

I try to show that Steiner’s theory has very implausible normative consequences since it does not accept the prima facie character or rights. This theory is unable to solve the conflicts of interests in which the only intuitively plausible solution consists in overriding someone’s rights.

State of the art paper on the problem of induction: how to justify the conclusion that ‘all Fs are Gs’ from the premise that ‘all observed Fs are Gs’. The most prominent theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, such as: inductivism, reliabilism, perspective of laws of nature, rationalism, falsificationism, the material theory of induction and probabilistic approaches, according to Carnap, Reichenbach and Bayesianism. In the end, we discuss the new problem of induction of Goodman, raised by the (...) grue predicate. (shrink)

Esta sección temática constituye la segunda discusión sobre el desafío de la adopción de reglas lógicas publicado en Análisis Filosófico. Al igual que la primera, esta colección de artículos puede verse como el resultado de la colaboración internacional que durante más de dos décadas hemos mantenido entre el Saul Kripke Center (SKC) y el IIF-SADAF-CONICET. Y más precisamente, entre Saul, Romina y el grupo de lógica de Buenos Aires (BA-Logic). Visitas, seminarios, workshops, proyectos internacionales, y fundamentalmente mucho afecto y pasión (...) por los problemas filosóficos fundamentales han marcado este proceso. Tanto Romina como Saul han apoyado sistemáticamente los esfuerzos desde Argentina para producir conocimiento en el área de lógica. Ambos han estado involucrados no solo institucionalmente en el apoyo al desarrollo de nuestro grupo, sino también a nivel personal. Fueron muchos los momentos que compartimos juntos. Muchos recuerdos e historias. Es importante destacar, solo para mencionar un simple aspecto de nuestras historias comunes, que Saul participó activamente en el proceso de elaboración de la propuesta de ambos números, en la lectura de gran parte del material, e incluso como réferi de algunos trabajos. Saul y Romina asistieron por Zoom a varias reuniones en el marco de los seminarios que generaron parte del material aquí publicado. Recuerdo la alegría de Saul, sus comentarios y la sorpresa de muchos de los participantes de ver aparecer en sus pantallas al filósofo más importante del mundo y uno de los más importantes de la historia. Para ellos quizás era Kripke, para mi ya era Saul. Nos hubiera gustado celebrar juntos. Podría haber sido en Buenos Aires o en Nueva York. Lamentablemente, ya no podrá ser. Aunque también es cierto que esta sección temática es una manera de volver a reunirnos y de expresar el profundo agradecimiento que todos los integrantes del BA-Logic tenemos por Saul. Te vamos a extrañar… Ya te estamos extrañando…. (shrink)

“On Why in Philosophy Examples Matter”. The purpose of the article is to show the need of using examples in philosophy, associating to them four functions: to illustrate, explain, argue and show. Among other assertions, we attempt to justify the following: a) Examples are, as well as illustrations, evidences; such that what may be seen as an act of didactic generosity may be considered properly as the response to an always possible demand. b) The introduction of philosophical concepts requires frequently (...) a mutual cooperation between definition and example; the need of the latter in conceptual explanation is condoned by a reflection on the following of rules. c) A certain overrating of the counterexample and underrating of the example are tokens of a notion of philosophy put here into question. d) In Wittgenstein and other authors, a little heeded function of some examples is detected: of showing an alternative way of viewing the matter, of re-describing ancient philosophical themes. Towards the end, the issue of the example is assumed –this time– as an example of a more general issue: that of the relation between rhetoric and philosophy. (shrink)