Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica (2014)
| Authors |
|
| Abstract |
State of the art paper on the problem of induction: how to justify the conclusion that ‘all Fs are Gs’ from the premise that ‘all observed Fs are Gs’. The most prominent theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, such as: inductivism, reliabilism, perspective of laws of nature, rationalism, falsificationism, the material theory of induction and probabilistic approaches, according to Carnap, Reichenbach and Bayesianism. In the end, we discuss the new problem of induction of Goodman, raised by the grue predicate.
|
| Keywords | Bayesianism Grue Hume Induction Probability |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Options |
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
|
Download options
PhilArchive copy
External links
(no proxy) Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver..
- Configure custom resolver
References found in this work BETA
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation.John Leslie Mackie - 1974 - Oxford, England: Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Truth and Probability.Frank Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.
View all 81 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Bayesianism and the Traditional Problem of Induction.Samir Okasha - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):181-194.
" The New Riddle of Induction" and Testing of Qualities.Lukas Bielik - 2011 - Filozofia 66 (8):746-754.
Induction, Grue Emeralds and Lady Macbeth's Fallacy.Arthur Rubinstein - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):37-49.
Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue.Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (1):33-47.
Emeralds Are No Chameleons — Why “Grue” is Not Projectible for Induction.Rainer Gottlob - 1995 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (2):259 - 268.
Qualities, Universals, Kinds, and the New Riddle of Induction.F. Thomas Burke - 2002 - In F. Thomas Burke, D. Micah Hester & Robert B. Talisse (eds.), Dewey's Logical Theory: New Studies and Interpretations. Vanderbilt University Press.
Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction.Robert Kowalenko - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):549-552.
An Epistemic Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction.Rosemarie Rheinwald - 1993 - Synthese 95 (1):55 - 76.
Logic of Induction: A Dead Horse? Some Thoughts on the Logical Foundations of Probability.Ricardo Sousa Silvestre - 2007 - Princípios 14 (22):43-78.
The Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green and How It Undoes the New Riddle of Induction.John D. Norton - unknown
Plantinga e a justificação Bayesiana de crenças.Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal - 2012 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 57 (2):15-25.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2016-09-04
Total views
1,391 ( #3,730 of 2,499,672 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
159 ( #3,790 of 2,499,672 )
2016-09-04
Total views
1,391 ( #3,730 of 2,499,672 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
159 ( #3,790 of 2,499,672 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
