The purpose of this article is to discuss the connection between Arendt and Merleau-Ponty’s political thought based on the relation between the contingency of action and the spatiality of conflict. Even though the shared concern for developing a phenomenology of action institutes a common ground between their theories, I intend to show that there are significant philosophical differences when it comes to their understanding of conflict and the space in which it unfolds. Although both authors approach the question of action (...) by decentering the subject and by rejecting the notion of an objective and “egocentered” space, the way in which history and the social sphere inform their elucidation of the spatiality of conflict reveals a mismatch between Arendt’s plurality and Merleau-Ponty’s coexistence. I argue that this mismatch holds important consequences as to what each of them understands by political action. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to discuss the connection between Arendt and Merleau-Ponty’s political thought based on the relation between the contingency of action and the spatiality of conflict. Even though the shared concern for developing a phenomenology of action institutes a common ground between their theories, I intend to show that there are significant philosophical differences when it comes to their understanding of conflict and the space in which it unfolds. Although both authors approach the question of action (...) by decentering the subject and by rejecting the notion of an objective and “egocentered” space, the way in which history and the social sphere inform their elucidation of the spatiality of conflict reveals a mismatch between Arendt’s plurality and Merleau-Ponty’s coexistence. I argue that this mismatch holds important consequences as to what each of them understands by political action. (shrink)

Este artículo propone una interpretación de la lectura que Claude Lefort realiza de la obra de Merleau-Ponty, centrándose en su comprensión de los desplazamientos del autor tanto en sus estudios sobre la percepción como en sus escritos políticos. Se explora, primero, la reflexión de Lefort sobre el pasaje de la fenomenología de la percepción al esbozo de una nueva ontología en el itinerario filosófico de Merleau-Ponty, para luego examinar su lectura crítica de la variación de la posición del autor respecto (...) al marxismo. Finalmente, se indaga cómo comprende Lefort la conexión entre ambas trayectorias, buscando esclarecer el sentido de la interrogación filosófica en su interpretación de estos desplazamientos. (shrink)

En este artículo, discuto el decisionismo dictatorial de Donoso Cortés, teniendo en cuenta dos hipótesis. En la primera de estas se sostiene que la decisión dictatorial en la filosofía política de Donoso es inseparable de una concepción teológica dogmática. En otras palabras, su reflexión política sobre la dictadura tiene como fundamento una serie de supuestos católicos incuestionados. En la segunda hipótesis se sugiere que es justamente este fundamento católico, que se expresa en una filosofía de la historia pesimista, la que (...) puede llegar a hacer irrelevante la necesidad de la decisión. (shrink)

In this article I explore the problem of the transition from violence to politics in Hannah Arendt’s thought from the perspective of her reflections on the question of war. My purpose is to show, in the first place, that the concept of “development” is inadequate to understand, in Arendtian terms, the passage from violence to politics and, secondly, to suggest an alternative understanding of this passage through the analysis of Arendt’s interpretation of the Greek and Roman treatment of the Trojan (...) War. I indicate, in this way, that instead of addressing the transition as derivation or conversion, Arendt highlights the role of interruption and discontinuity in the transition from violence to politics. (shrink)

En esta introducción, enunciamos algunas de las preguntas principales que surgen de la reflexión sobre los lugares del conflicto en la filosofía política. Apoyándonos en los artículos del dossier, nos centramos, por un lado, en las interrogaciones referidas al topos de la política, en particular, en los rasgos distintivos de los espacios de conflictividad, sus condiciones, configuraciones y riesgos. Por otro lado, en los desafíos que imponen al pensamiento filosófico la elección de ciertos lugares concretos del conflicto o la preferencia (...) por determinadas escenas de antagonismo. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo busca interrogar el sentido de lo político en el pensamiento de Karl Marx a partir de la lectura de Carl Schmitt. Aunque, por un lado, el jurista alemán considera que el marxismo subsume los problemas políticos bajo cuestiones económicas, por otro lado, destaca que Marx pensó lo político a partir de la agudización del antagonismo y de la dictadura del proletariado. Sin embargo, para Schmitt, estos dos elementos de lo político en Marx están construidos sobre la base (...) de la lógica hegeliana de la historia. En este texto se discute esta herencia hegeliana en el pensamiento político marxiano y se sugiere una alternativa para pensar la política a partir del “materialismo práctico”, en el cual se acentúa la acción contingente que emerge en medio de la coexistencia humana.: This article aims to examining the meaning of the political in Karl Marx’s thought from the perspective of Carl Schmitt’s interpretation. While on one hand the German jurist considers that Marxism subsumes political problems under economical issues, on the other hand he stresses that Marx thought politics through the deepening of the antagonism and dictatorship of the proletariat. However, for Schmitt, these two elements of the political in Marx are built based on the Hegelian logic of history. In this paper, I discuss this Hegelian legacy in Marx’s political thought and suggest an alternative to think politics appealing to “practical materialism”, in which contingent action that stems from human coexistence is accentuated. (shrink)

This study focuses on the application of multicriteria decision-making techniques, specifically the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), to identify corporate socialresponsibility information which both companies and stakeholders consider relevant and material. This work explains how the AHP methodology was applied in the selection of material indicators in corporate social responsibility reporting, the interpretation of these indicators and their relative importance. The results of this study are summarized in 60 indicators distributed in four areas: environment, economy, corporate governance and social. As this (...) last area contains the greatest number of indicators, it was divided into four sub-areas (human resources, human rights, product responsibility and society). (shrink)

RESUMEN El pensamiento y las prácticas sociales de los atenienses de la Época Clásica se hallaban jerarquizados en favor de los varones, que se consideraban superiores naturalmente y con capacidad y derecho a gobernar en la polis y en la casa. Se muestra cómo el Agamenón de Esquilo cuestiona la naturalización de esta superioridad mediante el personaje de Clitemnestra, quien actúa, piensa y habla como varón, y muestra que matar a un familiar, cambiar de pareja, luchar por el mando se (...) justificaban si lo realizaba Agamenón. ¿Por qué se condenaban estas acciones cuando eran llevadas a cabo por Clitemnestra? ABSTRACT The thought and social practices of Athenians during the Classical period were hierarchized in favor of males, who were considered naturally superior and endowed with the capacity and right to rule the polis and the home. The article shows how Aeschylus' Agamemnon questions the naturalization of that superiority through the character of Clytemnestra, who acts, thinks, and speaks like a man, and shows that killing a family member, changing partners, and fighting for power were justified if Agamemnon did those things. Why were such actions condemned if Clytemnestra carried them out? (shrink)

Putnam and others have argued that semantic externalism extends to artifactual kind words such as “pencil” or “doorstop”. I first show that, even with natural kinds, externalism applies to words for ground level kinds. The issue then arises of which categories of artifacts should be identified as kinds in the relevant, restricted sense. I argue that, though there are natural taxonomies of artifactual categories at least some of which have well-defined ground levels, even words for such kinds do not appear (...) to have externalist semantics, as they do not support ignorance or error arguments. Some think that membership to any kind is determined by objective features. Against this, I argue that the makers’ productive intentions are often crucial in selecting which pattern of features counts as constitutive of a kind. Though externalists may insist that membership to a kind is ultimately determined by sharing objective features, the resulting version of externalism can hardly be distinguished from internalism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Examples, Stories, and Subjects in Don Quixote and the HeptameronTimothy HamptonI developed a rare and perhaps unique taste. Plutarch became my favorite reading. The pleasure that I took in reading and rereading him endlessly cured me somewhat from reading novels. Ceaselessly occupied with Rome and Athens, living, so to speak, with their great men.... I thought myself Greek or Roman.Rousseau, ConfessionsThe first part of Don Quixote reaches its rambunctious (...) climax when the Don’s neighbors, the curate and the barber, lock him in an ox cart and triumphantly wheel him back to his village. At one point during the journey home Don Quixote engages in a long and famous debate with the Canon of Toledo about the dangers of reading. The Canon attempts to convince Don Quixote to renounce both knight errantry and his passion for romances of chivalry. He also makes the following recommendation:If you are still obsessed by books of adventures and chivalry, read the book of Judges in Holy Scripture, where you will find great and genuine exploits that are as heroic as they are true. Lusitania had its Viriathus, Rome had its Caesar, Carthage its Hannibal, Greece its Alexander, Castille its Count Fernán González, Valencia its Cid, Andalusia its Gonzalo Fernández, Extremadura its Diego García de Paredes, Jérez its Garci Pérez de Vargas, Toledo its Garcilaso, Seville its Manuel de Léon: their doughty deeds will entertain, instruct, delight and amaze the highest intellects that read them. This reading will truly be worthy of your own excellent mind, my dear [End Page 597] Don Quixote, from which you will rise learned in history, enamored of virtue, instructed in goodness, bettered in manners, valiant without rashness, bold without vacillation, and all this to the honor of God, your own profit, and the glory of La Mancha, from where, as I have learned, you derive your birth and origin. 1The Canon proposes to replace one literary genre with another; he condemns the reading of romance and promotes the reading of history. In the process he presumes to substitute one type of exemplarity with another—an exchange that links Don Quixote’s imagination to his status as a political subject. For he suggests that by occupying himself with real exemplars, instead of the perfect knights of romance, Don Quixote will not only turn from a loco back into a cuerdo. He will also be made into a good citizen. The Canon offers a model of reading that links historical truth, moral amelioration, and political subjectivity. The context of this recommendation—a program of reading offered by a representative of authority to a man in a cage—stresses the relationship between reading and imprisonment, between particular uses of language and particular forms of subjection. If he reads the right kinds of exemplary stories, the Canon infers, Don Quixote will lose his desire to practice the profession of chivalry. No longer will he have to be restrained. Instead, he will live within the bounds of reason, inside the borders of mediocritas. History, as Rousseau suggests in my epigraph to this essay, can cure one of the bad habits induced by too much fiction.Yet no less striking in the Canon’s speech is the way he articulates this connection between good citizenship and good books. He links his list of exemplars to a list of geographical and political spaces: Hannibal and Carthage, Garcilaso de la Vega and Toledo, and so on. By associating heroic figures with countries, he underscores the central importance of exemplary images in the definition of group identity. One of the characteristics of the example that makes it so important in early modern intellectual life is that exemplarity defines a point at which group identity interacts with individual identity. The promotion of heroic images is, to be sure, a central feature in techniques of self-fashioning, as defined in humanist discourse from the time of Petrarch. Yet it is no less important in the definition of grouphood, from Erasmus’s exhortation to Christians to imitate the exemplary virtue of Abraham, to the iconography of patriotism. If there is a crisis of the example, then one way... (shrink)

Different notions of analysis have been both theorized and put to use in early analytic philosophy. Two of them stand out: connective analysis and analysis as paraphrase. The latter played a central role in the development of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine and beyond. With the advent of formal semantics of natural language in the 1970s, paraphrase came to be characterizable as translation into a formal “target language”. While I claim that the method cannot achieve its original philosophical aims, (...) I insist that, in spite of them, it is far from being a theoretically empty operation and that it lives on in some contemporary philosophical enterprises. (shrink)

There are two prevalent accounts of semantic normativity: the prescriptive account, which can be found in some of Wittgenstein’s remarks, and the regularity account, which may have been Sellars’s view and is nowadays defended by some antinormativists. On the former account, meanings are norms that govern the use of words; on the latter, they are regularities of use which, in themselves, do not engender any prescriptions. I argue that only the prescriptive view can account for certain platitudes about meaning, which (...) motivate the very idea of semantic normativity. After some preliminary clarifications about the form that alleged semantic norms should take in order to be prima facie plausible, I argue—against some antinormativists—that whatever normativity is involved in the meaning of words cannot be brought back to a general norm of truth as distinct from specifically semantic norms, for semantic norms already involve a norm of truth. Next, I examine what I take to be the strongest objection to semantic normativity, namely the identification of meaning with use: as use is just a bunch of facts, it cannot be attributed any normative import. Nowadays, this view has been defended by Paul Horwich. After criticizing Horwich’s claim that meaning, though not normative in itself, has unmediated normative implications, I propose a different view of the relation between use and meaning, on which meaning is not quite identical with use but is grounded on use. I propose as a model the idea of a hyperconformist social system: a system in which customs, and only customs, generate norms. I suggest that language is such a system, and describe two reasons why it is plausible for language to work like that. Finally, I analyze statements of meaning on the model of Ruth Millikan “pushmi-pullyu” representations, i.e. as having both descriptive and normative import. I point out that, however, there are exceptions to meaning’s being grounded on use, as there are cases in which semantic norms are dictated by authorities of several kinds. Lastly, I briefly discuss the suggestion that meaning supervenes on use, showing that, aside from its inherent difficulties, it does not explain why meaning would supervene on use. (shrink)

Ernesto Laclau es un reconocido teórico político precursor del postmarxismo. Si bien reside en Inglaterra hace varios lustros, su vinculación con Argentina y América Latina sigue siendo muy importante. Su libro Hegemony and Socialist Strategy de 1985 (aparecido en español en 1987 con el título Hegemonía y Estrategia Socialista) co-escrito con Chantal Mouffe tuvo un gran impacto en el pensamiento de la intelectualidad de izquierda identificada con un proyecto de radicalización de los ideales ..

We study the possible values of the cofinality invariant for various Borel ideals on the natural numbers. We introduce the notions of a fragmented and gradually fragmented ideal and prove a dichotomy for fragmented ideals. We show that every gradually fragmented ideal has cofinality consistently strictly smaller than the cardinal invariant and produce a model where there are uncountably many pairwise distinct cofinalities of gradually fragmented ideals.

Understanding evolution beyond a gene-centered vision is a fertile ground for new questions and approaches. However, in this systemic perspective, we take issue with the necessity of the concept of information. Through the example of brain and language evolution, we propose the autonomous systems theory as a more biologically relevant framework for the evolutionary perspective offered by Jablonka & Lamb (J&L).

Si on analyse le concept de vie dans la seconde version de L'amour et dans L'esprit du christianisme, on voit s'amorcer une métaphysique de l'amour comme synthèse et suprême manifestation de la vie ; mais l'amour y représente une élévation sur les niveaux de la loi et une réflexion d'ordre éthique et religieux. On y trouve également une réflexion sur les rapports de l'amour avec la « belle religion » par rapport à l'unité de la vie. Dans L'esprit du christianisme, (...) la vie apparaît comme un principe plus élevé que l'amour. If one analyzes the concept of life in Hegel's second version of Love and in The Spirit of Christianity one witnesses the surge of a metaphysics of love as synthesis and supreme manifestation of life ; but love also represents in this text a higher level above law and a new pondering of an ethical and religous order. One can also find a new approach on the relationships between love and the « beautiful religion » as linked with the unity of life. In The Spirit of Christianity, life appears as a higher principle than love. (shrink)

When involved in a disagreement, a common reaction is to tell oneself that, given that the information about one’s own epistemic standing is clearly superior in both amount and quality to the information about one’s opponent’s epistemic standing, one is justified in one’s confidence that one’s view is correct. In line with this natural reaction to disagreement, some contributors to the debate on its epistemic significance have claimed that one can stick to one’s guns by relying in part on information (...) about one’s first-order evidence and the functioning of one’s cognitive capacities. In this article, I argue that such a manoeuvre to settle controversies encounters the problem that both disputants can make use of it, the problem that one may be wrong about one’s current conscious experience, and the problem that it is a live possibility that many of one’s beliefs are the product of epistemically distorting factors. I also argue that, even if we grant that personal information is reliable, when it comes to real-life rather than idealized disagreements, the extent of the unpossessed information about one’s opponent’s epistemic standing provides a reason for doubting that personal information can function as a symmetry breaker. (shrink)

Hambre de filosofía, a través de la metáfora de un menú filosófico, pone el foco en los despreciados y estigmatizados, invitándonos a los lectores a sumarnos al compromiso de la cooperación desde una perspectiva experiencial y aplicada de la Filosofía.

Epistemologies have power. They have the power not only to transform worlds, but to create them. And the worlds that they create can be better or worse. For many people, the worlds they create are predictably and reliably deadly. Epistemologies can turn sacred land into ‘resources’ to be bought, sold, exploited, and exhausted. They can turn people into ‘labor’ in much the same way. They can not only disappear acts of violence but render them unnamable and unrecognizable within their conceptual (...) architectures. Settler systems of epistemic and conceptual resources and the relations among them are constructed to preclude certain forms of knowledge. This is not an accident; it is a central goal of colonial violence. Colonization and land dispossession would not be possible without the violent disruption of Indigenous knowledge systems and ongoing organized attempts to disrupt their survival. Violently disrupting the relationships of people to land is as much an epistemic project as it is a material one, and these two projects are inherently linked. The task of theorizing epistemic oppression is not only about epistemic oppression. Epistemic oppression is a story that gives language to a phenomenon in order to get past it, to carry on with the maintaining and reviving the forms of Indigenous and diasporic knowledge that colonialism has worked tirelessly to corrupt and silence. (shrink)