Equity was first established as a terminus technicus by Aristotle, but the word was initially shaped by Plato in his Statesman. Aristotle considers equity as a necessary criterion of the interpretation of human action, i.e., the ultimate, the particular moral situation, given that law is general, and every moral agent makes different moral choices, since man exhibits a multiplicity of purposes as a being and every person acts on the basis of a variety of moral perspectives and values. Therefore, the (...) task of every judge is to trace the moral choice made by a moral agent, as well as to interpret the law and attribute justice, since, as it is attested, law may be deficient, whereas this does not necessarily apply to justice itself. (shrink)

El Himno a san Demetrio (nº 71) de Romano Melodo presenta en su desenlace de la historia del martirio un excursus sin relación alguna con la leyenda del santo y las versiones de su hagiografía que traslada a los fieles oyentes un sentir eminentemente antiherético, en concreto, antimaniqueísta. En este artículo se propone una traducción a la lengua castellana de dicho fragmento griego y se analiza la digresión por parte del autor del texto hímnico, tratando de arrojar luz sobre el (...) contexto de producción y ejecución del kontákion en honor del santo tesalonicense. (shrink)

The literature on deep brain stimulation (DBS) and adaptive DBS (aDBS) raises concerns that these technologies may affect personality, mood, and behavior. We conducted semi-structured interviews with researchers (n = 23) involved in developing next-generation DBS systems, exploring their perspectives on ethics and policy topics including whether DBS/aDBS can cause such changes. The majority of researchers reported being aware of personality, mood, or behavioral (PMB) changes in recipients of DBS/aDBS. Researchers offered varying estimates of the frequency of PMB changes. A (...) smaller majority reported changes in personality specifically. Some expressed reservations about the scientific status of the term ‘personality,’ while others used it freely. Most researchers discussed negative PMB changes, but a majority said that DBS/aDBS can also result in positive changes. Several researchers viewed positive PMB changes as part of the therapeutic goal in psychiatric applications of DBS/aDBS. Finally, several discussed potential causes of PMB changes other than the device itself. (shrink)

Cet article démontre que le spectre d’une « intermédialité » ou d’une « transversalité » esthétique entre les arts verbaux et les arts « silencieux » est la source d’une angoisse profonde et la cause d’une polémique tenace dans la poétique gréco-romaine. À la ressemblance du discours aux arts « spatiaux » est attribuée continûment la corruption de vérité référentielle dans la littérature. Néanmoins, comme les interventions canoniques sur la question du visuel de Plutarque, Démétrios et Quintilien dans la littérature (...) le révèleront, ce rejet témoigne d’une inquiétude déplacée. Dans la capacité d’assouvir le monde temporel à l’œil de l’esprit au moyen de l’artifice, les arts spatiaux forment le miroir où le poétique reconnaît et refoule l’inventivité ontologique au cœur de la discursivité. Le fait que le dix-neuvième siècle marque la fin de la polémique classique contre la transversalité esthétique n’est pas contingent : la modernité esthétique est déterminée non seulement par une conciliation entre les arts mais également par une prise de possession consciente du potentiel ontologique du discours. (shrink)

Courts and jurors sometimes refuse to assign liability to defendants on the basis of statistics alone, despite their apparent reliability. I argue that this refusal is best understood as a recognition of defendants’ right to security. Understood as a robust good in Philip Pettit’s sense, security requires that someone risking harm to others’ protected interests adopt a disposition of concern that controls against wrongfully harming them. Since trials risk harm, the state must adopt such a disposition. Statistics leave open the (...) possibility of innocence and so wrongful harm in a way that the state cannot ignore; if it does use such statistics, it makes defendants wrongfully insecure. This explanation of the problem of bare statistical evidence is especially apt because security grounds the right to a fair trial and judicial procedural rights more generally. (shrink)

Decision-making capacityDecision-making capacity for pediatric patients can be difficult to determine and is influenced by a myriad of developmental considerations. This chapter begins with a discussion concerning the nature of decision-makingDecision-making and what constitutes competency. The “rule of sevensRule of sevens” frameworkFramework is then used to explicate pertinent developmental milestonesMilestones for children, dividing pediatric developmentDevelopment into 0–7, 7–14, and 14+ years of age. In particular, the authors highlight the most important cognitiveCognitive, socialSocial, andSocial emotionalemotionalEmotional considerations in each of these periods (...) and how they pertain to a child’s ability to make important medical decisions. (shrink)

En este artículo, se examinará la visión de Foucault del cuerpo y el surgimiento del cuerpo como un elemento indispensable del poder político. Por lo tanto, se discutirá cómo se objetiva la organización en períodos de poder disciplinario y regulatorio. En el contexto de la regulación del poder, trataremos de mostrar qué dinámica básica corresponde el alma, que es la prisión del cuerpo, al poder y al cuerpo. En ambos períodos, vemos que el poder elie el cuerpo como espacio. El (...) cuerpo representa el cuerpo de la sociedad y funciona como tal. En el estudio, se examinará la captura del alma como un elemento que afecta, moldea, cambia y transforma el cuerpo en la comprensión del poder regulador después del poder disciplinario. En última instancia, dado que este esfuerzo da como resultado la producción de nuevas dinámicas de poder, se intentará mostrar en un contexto crítico que el poder no permite ningún cambio, transformación y mejora de individuos y criminales a quienes percibe como cuerpos. (shrink)

Constituent power is an idea with a long tradition in modern political thought but has been largely abandoned since the middle of the twentieth century. Here I offer a new account of constituent power that avoids problems of the classical account, including the paradox of constitutionalism, and clarifies how individuals contribute to creating their shared political order. I argue that constituent power should be understood as an individual power-with: the agential power to constitute a legal order with others. Our individual, (...) banal acts of law-abidingness each partially effect the collective outcome. We generally exercise constituent power unconsciously and automatically, guiding our actions to succeed as defined by law and relying on the legal system to take up our contributions and effectively combine them with others. (shrink)

_The purpose _of this article is to find out whether philosophical and anthropological studies of human nature affect the legitimization of decisions about human life and death, using the example of a philosophical analysis of the problem of euthanasia. _Theoretical__ basis._ Philosophically and anthropologically based situational analysis in bioethics is chosen as the research methodology, which reveals the legitimation of euthanasia as a complex and highly responsible moral decision, which should be based on both the consideration of all the patient’s (...) special circumstances and the competent and adequate application of fundamental knowledge about the human being. _Originality._ From a philosophical point of view, it would be correct to legalize euthanasia, but under the condition of significantly limiting the cases of its application, clearly defining the conditions for its provision and strict control over its implementation. It is morally unacceptable to justify either murder or torture, so euthanasia appears as an attempt to avoid both at the same time. _Conclusions._ Specific solutions to practical problems often indicate the necessary direction for solving theoretical difficulties. Thus, making proper moral decisions about euthanasia requires reliance on fundamental knowledge about human beings, but at the same time it provides arguments "for" and "against" artificial termination of life. The basic principles of bioethics – autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and respect for the dignity of human life – serve as criteria for making balanced ethical decisions both in theory and in practice. These principles should be complemented by a coherent ethical, legal and philosophical position on euthanasia, which is achieved through legitimation procedures. Decisive for making a decision on euthanasia should be the strong desire of the patient himself. (shrink)

Avicenna holds that since God has existed from all eternity and is immutable and impassible, he cannot come to have an attribute or feature that he has not had from all eternity. He also claims for the simultaneous causation. A puzzle arises when we consider God’s creating this world. If God is immutable and impassible, then his attributes associated with his creating this world are unchanging. So, God must have been creating the world from all eternity. But then God’s creative (...) act, one might object, seems to be no different from a matter of natural necessity. This is a threat to divine freedom, for God would then have no choice concerning his creative action. Anthony Ruffus and Jon McGinnis argue that this puzzle can be solved in such a way that Avicenna can consistently affirm divine freedom along with divine simplicity. They suggest that Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s interpretation might help to show that it is false that Avicenna’s God cannot choose absolutely. For it is still open to him to choose either to create eternally or to refrain from creating anything at all. Ruffus and McGinnis argue that since creating or not creating anything at all do not correspond to two distinct concepts, Avicenna’s account of divine simplicity, which denies any multiplicity in divine mind, is safeguarded along with divine freedom. I claim that God’s omnirationality requiring that he always acts for reasons is a serious threat to such an interpretation. (shrink)

Morocco; Andalusia (Spain); intellectual life; philosophy; history.

In this chapter, a new type Hyper groups are defined, corresponding basic properties and examples for new type Hyper groups are given and proved. Moreover, new type Hypergroups groups and are compared to hyper groups and groups. New type Hyper groups are shown to have a more general structure according to Hyper groups and groups. Also, new type SuperHyper groups are defined, corresponding basic properties and examples for new type SuperHyper are given and proved. Furthermore, we defined neutro-new type SuperHyper (...) groups. (shrink)

Juzʼ 1. al-Falsafah al-Yūnānīyah minṬālīs ilá Aflāṭūn al-Ṭabʻah 2. 1965 -- juzʼ 2. Arisṭū. 1966 -- juzʼ 6. al-Falsafah al-ḥadīthah. al-Ṭabʻah 1. 1969 --.

In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, Valentini searches for a unifying principle that underlies whatever genuine obligations we might have to obey the norms of any and all social practices, ranging from line queueing norms, through offsides rules in soccer, to obligations not to break the law. I argue that this search is driven, and distorted, by a commitment to what Bernard Williams labeled the ‘morality system’. Once we see this, we should question the value of the unifying project. Most (...) social norms can be considered on their own terms, as part of a rich and variegated ethical life, without subsuming them under the question of whether others’ moral rights are at stake. Similarly, political obligation needs to be understood in relation to the practical activity of politics, not as an abstract moral quandary. (shrink)

Articles on Jaina philosophy and Jaina literature.

La 4e de couv. indique : "Le présent ouvrage, rassemblement de textes écrits entre 1942 et 1951, retrace le parcours de l'auteur du point de vue de la phénoménologie à celui du matérialisme dialectique.".

Purpose. With the consideration of anthropological tendencies in modern science, the purpose of the article is to analyze the problem of the subject of cognition, philosophical-psychological rationale for the need to complement it by the concept of "the researcher’s personality". Theoretical basis. The authors rely on post-non-classical methodological tools and basic principles of complexity theory, as well as theoretical provisions of epistemological constructivism, the results of theoretical and empirical psychological studies. In them, authors revealed psychological features of the potential of (...) self-realization of a person prone to innovation and research activities and transfessionalism, including the resources and reserves of the researcher’s personality. Originality. The concept of the subject of cognition is expanded by the concept of "researcher’s personality" and derivative concepts that describe the dynamics of self-harmonization of originative co-generative strengths and opportunities of self-realization of an enlightened person, reveal the degree of correlation in the cognition of the subjective and objective dimensions of his life. It is substantiated that further analysis of the problem of anthropologization of science requires appropriate onto-epistemological grounds that reveals the unity of cognition-education-skill as an essential characteristic of the maturity of the researcher’s personality of scientific knowledge. Conclusions. In the context of anthropological shifts in modern science, the philosophical-psychological analysis of the problem of the subject of cognition is actualized. The psychological research proves the advisability of using the "researcher’s personality" concept as a basic one for understanding the formation of an enlightened human-creator, capable of auto-eco-organization, self-transcendence, and syzygy with the Universe at different levels of innovational research activity. The self-realization of the researcher-personality is a way-search for the authenticity of the multiform unity of life, the personal meaning of scientific truth, and the self-harmonization of the originative co-generative co-determinative strengths in the knowledge of an enlightened person. Including the concept of the subject of cognition in the ontology of the unity of difference-multidimensional poly-essential autopoetic integrity, the anthropologization of science is intended to revive the ancient idea in the unity of truth, education and skill of a scientist, defining the ideal of a modern human-transfessional. (shrink)

This book, the first of its kind, puts forward a novel, unified cognitive account of skeptical doubt. Historically, most philosophers have tried to tackle this difficult topic by directly arguing that skeptical doubt is false. But N. Ángel Pinillos does something different. He begins by trying to uncover the hidden mental rule which, for better or worse, motivates our skeptical inclinations. He then gives an account of the broader cognitive purpose of having and applying this rule. Based on these ideas, (...) he shows how we can give a new response to the traditional problem of global skepticism. He also argues that philosophical skepticism is not just something that comes up during philosophical reflection, as David Hume, Charles Sanders Peirce and other philosophers have urged. Instead, it is of great practical significance. The rule which produces skepticism may itself be operative in certain pathologies such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, in creative endeavors, and in conspiratorial thinking. The rule can also explain some of our reluctance to trust statistical evidence, especially in legal settings. More broadly, this volume aims to breathe new life into a classic problem in philosophy by tackling it from a new perspective and exploring new areas of application. The book will be of interest to philosophers, psychologists and anyone interested in the human capacity to doubt and to question our beliefs. (shrink)

I argue that, although Aristotle himself does not say it in so many words, the Phaedrus has a deep influence on the three books of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. I also show that this influence is not only negative, as some scholars believe, but that Aristotle draws and expands on some of the results and propositions of the Phaedrus. After demonstrating how influential the Phaedrus is for the Rhetoric, I return in my conclusion to the difference between the two works.

1. Omdöme och verklighet.--2. Omdömet.--3. Filosofiens uppgift och metod.--4. Kunskapsläran under antiken (utom Aristoteles)--5. Aristoteles' kunskapslära.--6. Kunskapsläran från antiken till Kant.--7. Kants kunskapslära.--8. Några rektningar i nyare kunskapslara.--9. Om erinringen.