Full aptness is the most important concept in performance-based virtue epistemology. The structure of full aptness, in epistemology and elsewhere, is bi-levelled. At the first level, we evaluate beliefs, like performances, on the basis of whether they are successful, competent, and apt – viz., successful because competent. But the fact that aptness itself can be fragile – as it is when an apt performance could easily have been inapt – points to a higher zone of quality beyond mere aptness. To (...) break in to this zone, one must not merely perform aptly but also in doing so safeguard in skilled ways against certain risks to inaptness. But how must this be done, exactly? This paper has two central aims. First, I challenge the credentials of mainstream thinking about full-aptness by raising some new and serious problems for the view. I then propose a novel account of full aptness – what I call de minimis normativism – which keeps all the advantages of the canonical view, avoids its problems entirely, and offers some additional payoffs. (shrink)

A de minimis risk is defined as a risk that is so small that it may be legitimately ignored when making a decision. While ignoring small risks is common in our day-to-day decision making, attempts to introduce the notion of a de minimis risk into the framework of decision theory have run up against a series of well-known difficulties. In this paper, I will develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of overcoming two major obstacles to (...) the modelling of de minimis risk. The key move is to introduce, into decision theory, a non-probabilistic conception of risk known as normic risk. (shrink)

According to the class of de minimis decision principles, risks can be ignored (or at least treated very differently from other risks) if the risk is sufficiently small. In this article, we argue that a de minimis threshold has no place in a normative theory of decision making, because the application of the principle will either recommend ignoring risks that should not be ignored (e.g., the sure death of a person) or it cannot be used by ordinary bounded (...) and information-constrained agents. (shrink)

De minimis defenses are an understudied aspect of law, appearing in legal practice more often than in legal theory but rarely garnering any type of extensive analysis in either. This has led to an unfortunate state of affairs in which one term is applied to a set of practices that are, at best, only loosely connected. Using Paul Robinson’s system of defense types, this paper will illustrate the various roles and functions the de minimis defense plays in our (...) legal system. In doing so, it will highlight the dangers of viewing the defense as monolithic and suggest that our terminology surrounding de minimis ought to be revised due to the differing justifications that support the application of each de minimis type. (shrink)

The Model Penal Code’s ‘De Minimis’ provisions (§ 2.12) cover different kinds of case in which, for reasons of equity, a prosecution should be dismissed. An exploration of these different cases illuminates some general issues about the structure of the criminal process, and about the processes of criminalization. These include the significance of the difference between dismissing a case and acquitting the defendant, and of the distinction between offences and defences; whether criminal offences should always be so defined that (...) they specify at least a pro tanto wrong, or may sometimes legitimately specify only a prima facie wrong – and whether this is consistent with the presumption of innocence; what kinds of conduct we can properly be expected to answer for in a criminal court; and the proper division of responsibilities between legislatures, prosecutors and courts in determining what kinds of conduct are to be defined and treated as criminal wrongs. (shrink)

In this article the authors reflect on regulations which have been developed to protect research subjects and data in research which uses human subjects. They suggest that regulations related to informed consent and privacy protection are burdensome in research which uses human subjects. They argue that a new category of research risk must be established which informs research subjects of the level of risk that they will be exposed to by participating in the research.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 3, Page 46-48, March 2012.

The de minimis principle states that some risks are so trivial that they can be ignored or treated categorically differently from non-trivial risks. Lundgren and Stefánsson criticize the de minimis principle, arguing that it either has to be applied locally or globally and that problems arise whichever application is chosen. Aven and Seif respond to Lundgren and Stefánsson’s argument and defend the de minimis principle as a “meaningful and useful perspective for handling risk in practice.” The response (...) highlights some aspects of the argument in Lundgren and Stefánsson that needs clarification, which is what we do in this note. (shrink)

Indices and orderings are developed for evaluating alternative strategies in the management of risk. They reflect the goals of reducing individual and collective risks, of increasing equity, and of assigning priority to the reduction and to the equity of high risks. Individual risk is defined as the level of exposure to a danger. In particular the role of a lower negligibility level is investigated. A class of indices is proposed which involves two parameters, a negligibility level and a parameter of (...) inequality aversion, and several interpretations of the indices are discussed. We provide a set of eight axioms which are necessary and sufficient for this class of indices, and we present an approach to deal with partial information on the parameters. (shrink)

In this article the authors reflect on regulations which have been developed to protect research subjects and data in research which uses human subjects. They suggest that regulations related to informed consent and privacy protection are burdensome in research which uses human subjects. They argue that a new category of research risk must be established which informs research subjects of the level of risk that they will be exposed to by participating in the research.

Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de minimis principle into an expected utility-based decision theoretical framework. According to the de minimis principle some risks are so small (falling below a threshold) that they can be ignored. While this threshold standardly is defined in terms of some probability, the normic conception of de minimis defines this threshold in (...) terms of abnormality. In this article, we present three independent arguments against the normic de minimis expected utility theory, focusing on its reliance on the de minimis principle. (shrink)

De minimis defenses are an understudied aspect of law, appearing in legal practice more often than in legal theory but rarely garnering any type of extensive analysis in either. This has led to an unfortunate state of affairs in which one term is applied to a set of practices that are, at best, only loosely connected. Using Paul Robinson’s system of defense types, this paper will illustrate the various roles and functions the de minimis defense plays in our (...) legal system. In doing so, it will highlight the dangers of viewing the defense as monolithic and suggest that our terminology surrounding de minimis ought to be revised due to the differing justifications that support the application of each de minimis type. (shrink)

In risk management, de minimis risk is the idea that risks that are sufficiently small, in terms of probabilities, ought to be disregarded. In the context of the distinction between disregarding a risk and accepting it, this paper examines one suggested way of determining how small risks ought to be disregarded, specifically, the natural-occurrence view of de minimis, which has been proposed by Alvin M. Weinberg, among others. It is based on the idea that “natural” background levels of (...) risk should be used as benchmarks and de minimis levels should be derived from those levels. This approach fails even if the doubtful distinction between what is natural and what is not can be upheld. (shrink)

A moral requirement R1 is said to be lexically prior to a moral requirement R2 just in case we are morally obliged to uphold R1 at the expense of R2 – no matter how many times R2 must be violated thereby. While lexical priority is a feature of many ethical theories, and arguably a part of common sense morality, attempts to model it within the framework of decision theory have led to a series of problems – a fact which is (...) sometimes spun as a ‘decision theoretic critique’ of lexical priority. In this paper, I develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of modelling lexical priority while avoiding all extant problems. This will involve introducing several new ingredients into the standard decision theoretic framework, including multidimensional utilities, de minimis risks, and the means to represent two different conceptions of risk. (shrink)

À un regard superficiel et peu averti, cet ouvrage pourrait sembler ressortir au genre du « presque tout sur presque rien » : un élément extrêmement pointu et technique de la doctrine épicurienne, la théorie des minima, devient l’objet d’une enquête qui, en 354 pages, va en épuiser toutes les dimensions : textuelle, doxo­graphique, conceptuelle, systématique, historique, exégétique, etc. Mais il est en­tendu, en réalité, que le problème des elachista ne constitue en rien un détail de l’histoi...

In a recent paper in this journal, Carter and Peterson raise two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for anyone aspiring to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle trades on an application of epistemic contextualism to the precautionary principle; the second puzzle concerns the compatibility of the precautionary principle with the de minimis rule. In this note, I argue that neither puzzle should worry defenders of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle can be shown to be an instance of (...) the familiar but conceptually harmless challenge of adjudicating between relevant interests to reach assessments of threats when applying the precautionary principle. The second puzzle can be shown to rely on a subtle but crucial misrepresentation of the relevant probabilities at play when applying the precautionary principle. (shrink)

En 1684 le tout nouveau periodique edite a Leipzig, les Acta Eruditorum, publie le texte fondateur du calcul leibnizien: Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis. Ce n'etait pas le premier article de Leibniz dans cette revue et ce ne sera pas le dernier. De 1682 a 1713 s'echelonnent des publications, aujourd'hui classiques, sur l'Isochrone, la Chainette, la Brachystochrone, etc. Ce volume en reunit vingt-six, en majorite traduites pour la premiere fois en langue francaise. Leur selection fut essentiellement guidee par (...) la volonte de mettre a la portee du lecteur les principaux ecrits mathematiques de Leibniz consacres au calcul differentiel et integral. Outre les resultats scientifiques, on decouvrira dans ces textes l'interet epistemologique de Leibniz pour l'invention, la methode, l'histoire et son souci d'une ethique de la recherche. (shrink)

In this paper we present two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for one who aspires to defend some plausible version of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by de minimis.

Does criminal liability require an act? -- Motive and criminal liability -- The costs to criminal theory of supposing that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility -- Transferred intent -- The nature and justifiability of nonconsummate offenses -- Strict liability, justice, and proportionality -- The sequential principle of relative culpability -- Willful ignorance, knowledge, and the equal culpability thesis : a study of the significance of the principle of legality -- Rapes without rapists : consent and reasonable mistake -- Mistake of (...) law and culpability -- On the supposed priority of justification to excuse -- Partial defenses -- The "but everybody does that!" defense -- The de minimis "defense" to criminal liability -- Why punish the deserving -- Malum prohibitum and retributivism -- Already punished enough. (shrink)

The gap between the number of organs available for transplant and the number of individuals who need transplanted organs continues to increase. At the same time, thousands of transplantable organs are needlessly overlooked every year for the single reason that they come from individuals who were declared dead according to cardio pulmonary criteria. Expanding the donor population to individuals who die uncontrolled cardiac deaths will reduce this disparity, but only if organ preservation efforts are utilized. Concern about potential legal liability (...) for temporary preservation of organs pending a search for family members appears to be one of the impediments to wider use of donation in cases of uncontrolled cardiac death in states without statutes explicitly authorizing such action. However, we think that the risk of liability for organ preservation under these circumstances is de minimis, and that concerns about legal impediments to preservation should yield to the ethical imperative of undertaking it. (shrink)

A transformative decision rule transforms a given decision probleminto another by altering the structure of the initial problem,either by changing the framing or by modifying the probability orvalue assignments. Examples of decision rules belonging to thisclass are the principle of insufficient reason, Isaac Levi'scondition of E-admissibility, the de minimis rule, andthe precautionary principle. In this paper some foundationalissues concerning transformative decision rules are investigated,and a couple of formal properties of this class of rules areproved.

The purpose of the present thesis is to apply philosophical methods to the ongoing debate of the precautionary principle, in order to illuminate this debate. The thesis consists of an Introduction and five papers. Paper I con-cerns an objection to the method of conceptual analysis, the Charge from Psychology. After a brief characterisation of conceptual analysis, I argue that the Charge from Psychology is misdirected. In Paper II, the method of conceptual analysis is applied to the concept of precaution which (...) is ana-lysed in terms of precautionary actions. The purpose is explicatory. A definition involving three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions is proposed, and the implications of this analysis for the debate on the pre-cautionary principle are discussed. Paper III attempts to provide an ana-lytical apparatus which may be used for finding improved formulations of the precautionary principle. The approach is lexicographical. Several exist-ing and possible formulations of the precautionary principle are examined, and four common elements and a common structure of the precautionary principle are identified. It is suggested that the analytical apparatus pre-sented can be used in negotiations of the precautionary principle. Paper IV questions the soundness of some arguments against the precautionary prin-ciple. Five common arguments are discussed and rejected. In Paper V, two of these arguments are further discussed. I argue that an attempt at rejec-tion of the precautionary principle delivered by John Harris and Søren Holm is unwarranted, because their arguments against it are based on in-terpretations of the precautionary principle that ignore context. Paper VI deals with the idea of de minimis risk. After a discussion of the distinction between disregarding a risk and accepting it, I examine one way of deter-mining how small a risk ought to be in order to be disregarded, namely the use of natural risk levels as benchmarks. I argue that this approach fails, even if the distinction between what is natural and what is not natural can be upheld. (shrink)

A challenge faced by defenders of the precautionary principle is to clarify when the evidence that a harmful event might occur suffices to regard this prospect as a real possibility. Plausible versions of the principle must articulate some epistemic threshold, or de minimis requirement, which specifies when precautionary measures are justified. Critics have argued that formulating such a threshold is problematic in the context of the precautionary principle. First, this is because the precautionary principle appears to be ambiguous about (...) the distinction between risk and uncertainty: should the principle merely be invoked when evidential probabilities are absent, or also when probabilities have low epistemic credentials? Secondly, defenders of the precautionary principle face an aggregation puzzle: in judging whether or not the de minimis requirement has been met, how should first-order evidential probabilities and their second-order epistemic standing be aggregated? This article argues that the ambiguity can be resolved, and the epistemological puzzle can be solved. Focusing on decisions in the context of climate uncertainty, I advance a version of the precautionary principle that serves as a plausible decision rule, to be adopted in situations where its main alternative—cost–benefit analysis—does not deliver. (shrink)

This is a response to ten critiques of my 2018 book The Realm of Criminal Law, by Stephen Bero and Alex Sarch, Kim Ferzan, Stuart Green, Doug Husak, Nicola Lacey, Sandra Mayson, Victor Tadros, Patrick Tomlin, Alec Walen, and Gideon Yaffe. I take the opportunity to explain the main aims and themes of the book, to clarify some of its arguments, and to note some of the ways in which those arguments need expansion, development, or revision. Topics discussed include: the (...) usefulness and limits of ‘rational reconstruction’ as a method of normative theorising; public wrongs and the scope of the criminal law; the idea of civil order as central to a political theory of criminal law; wrongness constraints on criminalization; mala prohibita and regulatory offences; the ‘De Minimis’ principle; and criminal law ‘abolitionism’. (shrink)

Con Del sentimiento trágico de la vida y La agonía del cristianismo, Unamuno se nos revela como uno de los más grandes pensadores de nuestro tiempo. En estos textos, radicalmente filosóficos, situando en el centro de su investigación al “hombre concreto”, al “hombre de carne y hueso”, don Miguel viene a prefigurar –anunciándola- toda la filosofía de la existencia. Un iluminador estudio de Antonio Sánchez Barbudo viene a situar y arrojar nueva luz sobre los libros que comenta y precede, enriqueciendo (...) así una edición imprescindible. (shrink)

O silêncio e a invisibilidade são as palavras que melhor representam a história da mulher no decorrer de muitos séculos. Desde a antiguidade, as mulheres foram impedidas de falar, e até nos dias atuais, infelizmente, pouco se valoriza o discurso feminino. Em diversas sociedades, o direito a expressar-se é severamente combatido, punido com rigor. A essas mulheres, vilipendiadas em seus direitos, resta um único espaço: o da subalternidade. Nesse contexto de subalternidade, habitando o espaço prisional marginal, fazer uso da palavra (...) e apropriar-se do direito à fala é um ato de coragem e de rebeldia. O presente artigo analisa o testemunho de uma mulher em situação de prisão que, até chegar ali, teve quase todos os seus direitos humanos profanados. A narrativa destaca suas experiências e traz à luz suas memórias e a maneira como dialoga com o passado. A partir da cela da prisão, a mulher produz o seu discurso, elabora o seu balbucio, que embora abafado, ultrapassa as grades e os altos muros. É através do poder de sua voz que ela reivindica o direito à fala, o direito de recontar-se, de falar de si. Neste artigo, analisamos, sob a perspectiva dos Estudos Culturais, a história narrada por VB1, uma mulher negra que cumpre pena em regime fechado. A partir desta análise, propomos uma reflexão sobre o espaço prisional, o direito à fala e o papel da memória nesse processo. Teremos como referências teóricas as identidades culturais em tempos de pós-modernidade com Stuart Hall, as reflexões sobre memória individual e coletiva de Maurice Halbwachs, estudos acerca da subalternidade com Hugo Achugar e Gayatri Spivak, espaço fronteiriço e memórias subalternas com Edgar Nolasco, reflexões sobre o papel da mulher propostas por Michele Perrot, entre outros. Palavras-chave: Subalternidade. Memorialística. Prisão. (shrink)

Durante a formação, estudantes são constantemente expostos a estressores que, se persistentes, podem ocasionar a Síndrome de Burnout (SB). Considerando a importância dessa demanda, este estudo teve como objetivo identificar diferenças nas dimensões da SB em relação ao ano e turno em estudantes de Ps..

In September 1931, a panel discussion was convened at Central Hall Westminsteron the subject of the ‘Evolution of the Universe’, at the centenary meeting of theBritish Association for the Advancement of Science. Center stage was what todo about the evolving universe being younger than the stars, evidently a paradoxin the relativistic study of the evolving universe, at the time. Here, we discusstwo diametrically opposed reactions to the paradox, which were each broadcastat the meeting by Lemaˆıtre and de Sitter, respectively. As (...) we argue, that bothcould be projected to the public as viable reflects an unsettled question at thefoundations of the then-nascent discipline: what is the role for considerationsof scale in relativistic cosmology? (shrink)

This article raises the issue of the foundation of ethics in the situation of the pluralism of modern and contemporary society. Then , two types of answers to these problems are analyzed: comunitarism as the identitary ethics of an 'ourselves', and contractualism as the ethics of the partners' interests, which present themselves as rival theories in opposition to the universalism of kantian morality. It is however shown , how Kant himself had already worked at different levels of human integration with (...) both models: that of social contract and that of ethical community, and had articulated them in his system. The universal principle of morality , on the other hand, places itself at the meta-level of the profound grammar of the ethos of communities and contracts . Finally, it is observed that Kant´s fundamental ethical texts have not explicitly dealt with the hermeneutical problem of moral judgment in contexts of action. However, some passages of the Grundlegung are analyzed, as well as the Second Part of the Critique of Practical Reason, in which we find precise indications on this issue. It is maintained, that the observed lack of treatment may be bridged by means of widening the scope of the doctrine of reflexive judgment of aesthetic taste of the Third Critique's first part, which appears relevant, not for the foundation of the principle of morality, but for its application, i.e., for moral life.Este artículo plantea el problema de la fundamentación de la ética en la situación del pluralismo de la sociedad moderna y contemporánea. Se analizan luego dos tipos de respuesta a este problema: el comunitarismo como la ética identitaria de un nosotros, y el contractualismo como la ética de los intereses de los socios, los cuales se presentan como teorías rivales frente al universalismo de la moralidad kantiana. Se muestra sin embargo cómo el propio Kant había trabajado ya en distintos planos de la integración humana con los dos modelos del contrato social y de la comunidad ética, y los había articulado en su sistema. El principio universal de la moralidad se ubica en cambio en el meta-nivel de la gramática profunda del ethos de las comunidades y de los contratos . Se observa finalmente que los textos éticos fundamentales de Kant no han tratado de manera explícita el problema hermenéutico del juicio moral en los contextos de acción. Se analizan no obstante algunos pasajes de la Grundlegung y la Segunda Parte de la Crítica de la Razón Práctica, en los que hay indicaciones precisas sobre este problema. Se sostiene que la observada laguna se puede sortear mediante la ampliación de los alcances de la doctrina del juicio reflexivo del gusto estético de la primera parte de la Tercera Crítica, la cual parece relevante, no para la fundación del principio de la moralidad, pero sí para su aplicación, es decir: para la vida moral. (shrink)

Este texto tem dois objetivos principais: apresentar o conceito de “lei natural” e aquilo que seria a sua expressão como “lei escrita” e, depois, reinterpretar este conceito a partir de uma perspectiva nietzschiana. Para alcançar este duplo objetivo urge, pois, em primeiro lugar, traçar, nas suas grandes linhas, as vicissitudes que atravessou a teoria da “lei natural” ao longo da tradição #losó#ca até a sua culminância naquelas correntes do direito natural, típicas dos tempos modernos. Convém também assinalar que este conceito (...) encerra no seu bojo, como derivações, as noções de necessidade, de #nalidade e providência. Eis por que, para interpretá-lo e criticá-lo, são utilizadas algumas intui- ções e análises de Nietzsche que, ao longo de sua obra, não cessa de se referir, direta ou indiretamente, a estas questões e, também, àquela de acaso. Não se trata, portanto, de simplesmente apresentar uma crítica de Nietzsche aos conceitos de “lei natural” e “lei escrita”, mas, principalmente, de examiná-los à luz de seu pensamento. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é refletir acerca da valorização dos cabelos crespos em crianças enquanto resistência estético-política a partir das relações entre os conceitos de infância, afrofuturismo, cabelo crespo e sankofa. O artigo se fundamenta epistemologicamente em algumas perspectivas teóricas interdisciplinares e afrocentradas; e a metodologia se baseou na observação participante em marchas e encontros de valorização da estética negra entre 2014 e 2019 em nove capitais do Brasil. Com base neste arcabouço teórico-metodológico, a infância foi situada como ponto de (...) partida para se pensar as relações étnico-raciais em diáspora, a fim de vislumbrar novas produções epistemológicas, estéticas e políticas que se distanciem das elaborações subjetivas coloniais. Abrindo caminhos e possibilidades, reconectar-se com o passado sustentado por memórias, histórias e estéticas da cultura africana é também ter a condição de alterar o futuro. Sendo assim, este pensamento pode conduzir à construção de possíveis roteiros para reparação social e convergência de práticas alicerçadas por valores e sentidos estéticos africanos. (shrink)

Neste artigo pretendemos discutir a noção de construção da mente consciente a partir da perspectiva de Antonio Damásio. Para isso, centraremos nossa análise em Self comes to Mind. Em um primeiro momento é necessário delimitarmos o conceito de consciência na visão de Damásio, visando, com isso, a evitarmos equivocidades, na medida em que há várias definições de consciência. Acreditamos que, para uma melhor compreensão acerca do surgimento da mente consciente, é necessário levarmos em consideração os processos evolutivos aos quais o (...) homem está sujeito. A consciência é, pois, fruto de um desenvolvimento evolutivo já bem estabelecido pela ciência. Compreender o desenvolvimento evolutivo do self se torna tarefa de suma importância, na medida em que Damásio estrutura sua compreensão de mente consciente a partir do papel desempenhado pelo self na tarefa de agregar conteúdos mentais. Para Damásio, a origem da mente está associada ao momento em que um processo do self é adicionado a um processo mental básico. Quando não ocorre um self na mente, esta mente não é propriamente consciente, o que significa dizer que é o self que garante consciência a uma mente. Isso quer dizer que precisaremos discutir de forma clara e distinta o conceito de self e seus estágios, para que finalmente possamos entender os passos delimitados por Damásio para discutir a construção da mente consciente. (shrink)

ATIVIDADE CURRICULAR EM COMUNIDADE E SOCIEDADE E OS POVOS TRADICIONAIS: EXPERIÊNCIA DE CAMPO DO CURSO DE DIREITO DA UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DA BAHIA.

Quelle est la tâche – plutôt que la contribution – de la philosophie à l’égard du langage? Dans cet article, il s’agit de revisiter la réponse de Paul Ricœur à cette question, à partir de son texte “Philosophie et langage.” Ricœur assigne à la philosophie la tâche de se réapproprier la triple médiation langagière: “chemin” du langage vers monde, “chemin” du langage vers le sujet et “chemin” du langage vers la communauté humaine. Partant de l’expérience concrète des sujets parlants, Ricœur (...) s’oppose à la clôture systémique présupposée par la conception structuraliste du langage, qui suspend la fonction de la référence dans la relation de signification. À partir d’une conception élargie de la référence – qui inclut la fonction poétique du langage –, le philosophe dégage de la notion de “monde du texte” la dimension ontologique constitutive du langage: dans sa fonction poétique, en effet, le langage révèle, selon lui, les possibilités multiples de notre mode d’existence. Nous montrons enfin que c’est à travers la notion d’attestation que Ricœur établit une connexion entre la réouverture de la triple médiation du langage et l’élaboration de cette nouvelle ontologie. (shrink)

O artigo apresenta resultados de uma pesquisa que busca conhecer saberes e práticas de estudantes indígenas e quilombolas em uma universidade brasileira por meio da análise de narrativas na perspectiva fenomenológica-hermenêutica. Dois aspectos centrais foram identificados em seus relatos: diferenças entre modelos vivenciados na educação básica e no ensino superior; preconceitos sofridos por serem quilombolas ou indígenas. As histórias dos/as estudantes remetem a situações vividas individualmente durante o processo de formação e/ou a situações que dizem respeito a um grupo, uma (...) etnia; revelam, ainda, que os contextos dos quais são oriundos/as têm sido alvo de descaso e desvalorização. (shrink)

Este artigo aborda o processo de legitimação da umbanda, uma religião afro-brasileira, presente hoje em todo Brasil e mesmo no exterior. Diferentes intérpretes apontam que essa religião surgiu no Sudeste brasileiro nas primeiras décadas do século XX. As práticas nominadas “macumba” e associadas aos negros podem ser pensadas como a origem da umbanda. O estigma do feitiço, atrelado às práticas religiosas afro-brasileiras desde o Brasil colônia, também foi a ela transposto. No intuito de afirmá-la como religião, alguns grupos buscaram uma (...) aproximação com o espiritismo kardecista, visando um certo “embranquecimento” de suas práticas e definindo-a como “genuinamente” brasileira. Outros grupos preferiram enaltecer sua herança africana. Este artigo focaliza, assim, as vias escolhidas por diferentes grupos, especialmente, na primeira metade do século XX, para afirmar como religião práticas antes consideradas feitiço. Para tanto, apresento uma leitura crítica da literatura que aborda a conformação da umbanda, bem como seu processo de legitimação enquanto religião. Além disso, analiso textos produzidos pelos próprios umbandistas. (shrink)