Recent fMRI studies have shown that functional networks can be extracted even from resting state data, the so called “resting state networks” (RSNs) by applying independent component analysis (ICA). However, compared to fMRI, EEG and MEG have much higher temporal resolution and provide a direct estimation of cortical activity. To date, MEG studies have applied ICA for separate frequency bands only, disregarding cross-frequency couplings. In this study, we aimed to detect EEG-RSNs and their interactions in all frequency bands. We applied (...) low resolution brain electromagnetic tomography-ICA (LORETA-ICA) to resting-state EEG data in 80 healthy subjects using five frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha, beta and gamma band) and found five RSNs in alpha, beta and gamma frequency bands. Next, taking into account these frequency properties, five RSNs were identified; 1) the visual network, 2) dual-process of visual perception network, characterized by a negative correlation between the right ventral visual pathway (VVP) and left posterior dorsal visual pathway (DVP), 3) self-referential processing network, characterized by a positive correlation between the medial PFC and right VVP, 4) dual-process of memory perception network, functionally related to a negative correlation between the left VVP and the precuneus and 5) sensorimotor network. To detect aging-related changes of these five RSNs, the subjects were divided into three age groups: younger, middle aged, and elderly group, and Student's t test with Bonferroni correction on each coefficient of five independent components were performed. We found a significant attenuation in dual-process of visual perception network in elderly relative to middle aged subjects. Overall findings indicate that LORETA-ICA with EEG data can precisely identify five RSNs in their intrinsic frequency bands, and correct correlations and aging-related changes between and within RSNs. (shrink)

Intuitionistic logic formalises the foundational ideas of L.E.J. Brouwer’s mathematical programme of intuitionism. It is one of the earliest non-classical logics, and the difference between classical and intuitionistic logic may be interpreted to lie in the law of the excluded middle, which asserts that either a proposition is true or its negation is true. This principle is deemed unacceptable from the constructive point of view, in whose understanding the law means that there is an effective procedure to determine the truth (...) of all propositions. This understanding of the distinction between the two logics supports the view that negation plays a vital role in the formulation of intuitionistic logic.Nonetheless, the formalisation of negation in intuitionistic logic has not been universally accepted, and many alternative accounts of negation have been proposed. Some seek to weaken or strengthen the negation, and others actively supporting negative inferences that are impossible with it.This thesis follows this tradition and investigates various aspects of negation in intuitionistic logic. Firstly, we look at a problem proposed by H. Ishihara, which asks how effectively one can conserve the deducibility of classical theorems into intuitionistic logic, by assuming atomic classes of non-constructive principles. The classes given in this section improve a previous class given by K. Ishii in two respects: (a) instead of a single class for the law of the excluded middle, two classes are given in terms of weaker principles, allowing a finer analysis and (b) the conservation now extends to a subsystem of intuitionistic logic called Glivenko’s logic. This section also discusses the extension of Ishihara’s problem to minimal logic.Secondly, we study the relationship between two frameworks for weak constructive negation, the approach of D. Vakarelov on one hand and the framework of subminimal negation by A. Colacito, D. de Jongh, and A. L. Vargas on the other hand. We capture a version of Vakarelov’s logic with the semantics of the latter framework, and clarify the relationship between the two semantics. This also provides proof-theoretic insights, which results in the formulation of a cut-free sequent calculus for the aforementioned system.Thirdly, we investigate the ways to unify the formalisations of some logics with contra-intuitionistic inferences. The enquiry concerns paraconsistent logics by R. Sylvan and A. B. Gordienko, as well as the logic of co-negation by G. Priest and of empirical negation by M. De and H. Omori. We take Sylvan’s system as basic, and formulate the frame conditions of the defining axioms of the other systems. The conditions are then used to obtain cut-free labelled sequent calculi for the systems.Finally, we consider L. Humberstone’s actuality operator for intuitionistic logic, which can be seen as the dualisation of a contra-intuitionistic negation. A compete axiomatisation of intuitionistic logic with actuality operator is given, and comparisons are made for some related operators.Abstract prepared by Satoru Niki.E-mail:[email protected]. (shrink)

Mencius, who lived in the 4th century B.C., is second only to Confucius in importance in the Confucian tradition. The _Mencius_ consists of sayings of Mencius and conversations he had with his contemporaries. When read side by side with the _Analects_, the _Mencius_ throws a great deal of light on the teachings of ConfuciusMencius developed many of the ideas of Confucius and at the same time discussed problems not touched upon by Confucius. He drew out the implications of Confucius' moral (...) principles and reinterpreted them for the conditions of his time. As the fullest of the four great Confucian texts, the _Mencius_ has been the required reading amongst Chinese scholars for two thousand years, and it still throws considerable light on the character of the Chinese people. (shrink)

In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...) rigorously this-worldly account of the most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership in analytical philosophy. (shrink)

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) poses an increasing threat to patient care and population health and there is a growing need for novel therapies to tackle AMR. Bacteriophage (phage) therapy is a re-emerging antimicrobial strategy with the potential to transform how bacterial infections are treated in patients and populations. Currently, in the UK, phages can be used as unlicensed medicinal products on a ‘named-patient’ basis. We make an ethical case for why it is crucially important for the UK to invest in Good (...) Manufacturing Practice (GMP) for both ongoing unlicensed and future licensed phage therapy. Access to phages produced to GMP (GMP phages) will ensure effective patient care and better outcomes as well as health systems benefits. The UK also has the potential to become a global leader in the timely and cost-efficient manufacturing and supply of a therapy that meets internationally recognised standards. (shrink)

The effects in a quantum-mechanical system form a partial algebra and a partially ordered set which is the prototypical example of the effect algebras discussed in this paper. The relationships among effect algebras and such structures as orthoalgebras and orthomodular posets are investigated, as are morphisms and group- valued measures (or charges) on effect algebras. It is proved that there is a universal group for every effect algebra, as well as a universal vector space over an arbitrary field.

Since Descartes, epistemology has been based on first person knowledge. We must begin, according to the usual story, with what is most certain: knowledge of our own sensations and thoughts. In one way or another we then progress, if we can, to knowledge of an objective external world. There is then the final, tenuous, step to knowledge of other minds. I shall argue for a total revision of this picture. All propositional thought, whether positive or skeptical, whether of the inner (...) or of the outer, requires possession of the concept of objective truth, and this concept is accessible only to those creatures that are in communication with others. Knowledge of other minds is thus basic to all thought. But such knowledge requires and assumes knowledge of a shared world of objects in a common time and space. Thus the acquisition of knowledge is not based on a progression from the subjective to the objective; it emerges holistically, and is interpersonalfrom the start. (shrink)

I argue that Kant’s theory of art meets the challenge of strong non-perceptual art, an idea I extrapolate from James Shelley’s account of non-perceptual art. I endorse the spirit of Shelley’s account, but argue that his examples fail to support his case because he does not distinguish between strong and weak non-perceptual art. The former has no perceptible properties relevant to its appreciation as art; the latter is not exhausted by appreciation of those perceptible properties it does have. I show (...) this by comparing Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain and Robert Barry’s All the things I know. For Kant, appreciating art aesthetically as art requires: (1) awareness that it is art and (2) responsiveness to the ideas presented. Taken together, this allows Kant to accommodate strong non-perceptual art. I consider three challenges to this view: (a) Kant is committed to a representational theory of art; (b) Kant is committed to a restrictive formalism about aesthetic judgements of art; (c) Kant’s understanding of aesthetic pleasure commits him to a perceptual theory of art. I reply that: (i) this is grounded in empirical generalizations external to Kant’s theory; (ii) Kant’s strong formalist views are at odds with his account of ‘subjective purposiveness’, and the latter has priority; (iii) Kant is offering a general theory of art, which must accommodate both literature and strong non-perceptual art. (shrink)

Vendler’s :161–173, 1979) puzzle about imagination is that the sentences ‘Imagine swimming in that water’ and ‘Imagine yourself swimming in that water’ seem at once semantically different and semantically the same. They seem semantically different, since the first requires you to imagine ’from the inside’, while the second allows you to imagine ’from the outside.’ They seem semantically the same, since despite superficial dissimilarity, there is good reason to think that they are syntactically and lexically identical. This paper sets out (...) the puzzle and offers a novel solution. Our proposal is that, just as there is knowledge-wh, there is also imagining-wh and that the inside/outside distinction Vendler points to is properly understood as a distinction within imagining-wh. In particular, to imagine swimming from the inside is to imagine what it feels like to swim, while to imagine swimming from the outside is to imagine what it looks like to swim. We show that this proposal is well grounded in both the semantics and syntax of ‘imagine.’ We also argue it makes better sense than its rivals of the data Vendler found so puzzling. (shrink)

“To be” or “to be found”? Some contributions relative to this modern variant of Hamlet's question are presented here. They aim at better apprehending the differences between the points of view of the physicists who consider that present-day quantum measurement theories do reach their objective and those who deny they do. It is pointed out that these two groups have different interpretations of the verbs “to be” and “to have” and of the criterion for truth. These differences are made explicit. (...) A notion of “empirical reality” is constructed within the representation of which the physicists of the first named group can consistently uphold their claim. A detailed way of sharpening this definition so as to make empirical reality free of nonlocal actions at a distance is also described. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss the general significance of order in physics, as a first step toward the development of new notions of order. We begin with a brief historical discussion of the notions of order underlying ancient Greek views, and then go on to show how these changed in key ways with the rise of classical physics. This leads to a broader view of the significance of order, which helps to indicate what is to be meant by a change (...) of our general notions of order in physics. We then go into relativity and quantum theory, showing how these developments actually did bring in further new notions of order, which are however inconsistent and otherwise inadequate in certain ways. Finally, using these inconsistencies and inadequacies as clues or indications for yet a further new concept of order, we make some proposals for novel directions of inquiry (to be discussed in some detail in later papers) which could lead to theories as different from relativity and quantum theory as these are from classical physics. (shrink)

Background While there are many guidelines on how to make ethical decisions at the end of life, there is little evidence regarding the quality of this sort of ethical guidelines. Objectives First, this study aims to demonstrate the conceptual transferability of the Appraisal of Guidelines for Research and Evaluation (AGREE) instrument for the quality assessment of ethical guidelines. Second, it aims to illustrate the status quo of the quality of guidelines on end-of-life decision-making by using the AGREE instrument in a (...) first practice test. Method The transferability of the AGREE instrument on the quality assessment of ethical guidelines is demonstrated by conceptual analysis. Guidelines on end-of-life decisions in medicine are identified through a systematic search in MEDLINE (from June 1999 to June 2009). The quality of all included guidelines was assessed with a slightly modified AGREE instrument. Results Of 103 guidelines identified, 34 were included as relevant. The majority of the guidelines analysed in this study were assessed as qualitatively insufficient in five out of six AGREE quality domains. A few guidelines demonstrated, however, that a high level of quality in accordance with the AGREE requirements is possible. Conclusion This review concludes that the quality of many ethical guidelines should and can be improved in all quality domains specified by the AGREE instrument. Furthermore, conceptual analysis indicates that a slightly modified AGREE instrument is transferable to the comprehensive evaluation of the quality of ethical guidelines. Nevertheless, future research is needed to improve the assessment of the presentation of the guidelines' normative basis. (shrink)

Originally published in 1936, this book presents the ancient Greek text of the paraphrases and quotations of Zeno's philosophical arguments, together with a facing-page English translation and editorial commentary. Detailed notes are incorporated throughout and a bibliography is also included. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in Zeno and ancient philosophy.

The subject of the present inquiry is the approach-to-the-truth research, which started with the publication of Sir Karl Popper's Conjectures and Refutations. In the decade before this publication, Popper fiercely attacked the ideas of Rudolf Carnap about confirmation and induction; and ten years later, in the famous tenth chapter of Conjectures he introduced his own ideas about scientific progress and verisimilitude. Abhorring inductivism for its apprecia tion of logical weakness rather than strength, Popper tried to show that fallibilism could serve (...) the purpose of approach to the truth. To substantiate this idea he formalized the common sense intuition about preferences, that is: B is to be preferred to A if B has more advantages andfewer drawbacks than A. In 1974, however, David Millerand Pavel Tichy proved that Popper's formal explication could not be used to compare false theories. Subsequently, many researchers proposed alternatives or tried to improve Popper's original definition. (shrink)

Objective—To determine the prevalence of, and attitudes towards, observed and personal research misconduct among newly appointed medical consultants. Design—Questionnaire study.Setting—Mersey region, United Kingdom.Participants—Medical consultants appointed between Jan 1995 and Jan 2000 in seven different hospital trusts (from lists provided by each hospital's personnel department). Main outcome measures—Reported observed misconduct, reported past personal misconduct and reported possible future misconduct.Results—One hundred and ninety-four replies were received (a response rate of 63.6%); 55.7% of respondents had observed some form of research misconduct; 5.7% of (...) respondents admitted to past personal misconduct; 18% of respondents were either willing to commit or unsure about possible future research misconduct. Only 17% of the respondents reported having received any training in research ethics. Anaesthetists reported a lower incidence of observed research misconduct (33.3%) than the rest of the respondents (61.5%) (p<0.05). Conclusion—There is a higher prevalence of observed and possible future misconduct among newly appointed consultants in the UK than in the comparable study of biomedical trainees in California. Although there is a need for more extensive studies, this survey suggests that there is a real and potential problem of research misconduct in the UK. (shrink)

SummaryThe crux of Quine's argument against synonymy— and therewith for a version of pragmatism, and independent/y against mentalism — is his challenge to the other side to explain the behavioural difference between the disposition to employ two predicates, say, interchangeably because of habitually “believing“ them coextensive, and the disposition to do so because of “meaning” the same by each. Since synonymy is taught behaviourally, the distinction in question must make a difference behaviourally, but not necessarily one explainable wholly non‐mentalistically. The (...) distinction is drawn in terms of what would extinguish the disposition. The resultant concept of cognitive synonymy is then used to clarify the difference between trivial and non‐trivial necessary truth, and explain how logical deduction by tautological steps can lead to new knowledge.RésuméLe noeud de I'argumentation de Quine contre la synonymie— et donc pour une version de pragmatisme et indépendamment contre le mentalisme — réside dans le défi lancéà la partie adverse d'expliquer en termes de comportement la différence entre d'une part la disposition à utiliser deux prédicats de façon »interchangeable« parce qu'on les »tcroit« habituellement coextensifs, et d'autre part la disposition à le faire parce que l'un et l'autre »signifiant« la même chose. Puisque la synonymie est prise dans un sens comportemental, cette distinction doit se manifester par une différence de comportement, mais n'est pas nécessairement totalement explicable sans recourir au mental. La distinction est faite en considérant ce qui supprimerait la disposition à les utiliser de façon interchangeable. Le concept de “lsynonymie cognitive” qui se dégage de cette analyse est ensuite utilisé pour clarifier la différence entre des várités nécessaires triviales et non triviales et pour expliquer comment une deduction logique par pas tautologiques peut conduire à des connaissances nouvelles.ZusammenfassungDer entscheidende Punkt in Quines Argument gegen die Synonymitrtt— und damit für eine bestimmte Version des Pragmatismus und unabhängig davon gegen den Mentalismus — ist seine Aufforderung, den verhaltensmässigen Unterschied zu erklaen zwischen einerseits der Disposition, zwei Prädikate in austauschbarer Weise zu verwenden, weil man sie gewohnheitsmässig für Koextensiv hält, und andererseits der Disposition, dies zu tun, weil sie gleiche »Bedeutung« haben. Da die Synonymitlit behaviouristisch gelehrt und gelernt wird, muss die zur Diskussion stehende Unterscheidung verhaltensmässig einen Unterschied ausmachen, welcher jedoch nicht notwendigerweise ganz in nicht‐mentalistischer Termen erklärbar ist. Die Unterscheidung wird in Termen formuliert die die Disposition aufheben warden. Der Begriff der kognitiven Synonyrnitlft. der daraus resultiert, wird dann verwendet, urn den Unterschied zwischen trivialen und nicht‐trivialen notwendigen Wahrheiten zu erläutern und um zu erkläen, wie eine logische Deduktion durch tautologische Schritte zu neuem Wissen führen kann. (shrink)

Recent studies in semantics of modal and superintuitionistic predicate logics provided many examples of incompleteness, especially for Kripke semantics. So there is a problem: to find an appropriate possible- world semantics which is equivalent to Kripke semantics at the propositional level and which is strong enough to prove general completeness results. The present paper introduces a new semantics of Kripke metaframes' generalizing some earlier notions. The main innovation is in considering "n"-tuples of individuals as abstract "n"-dimensional vectors', together with some (...) transformations of these vectors. Soundness of the semantics is proved to be equivalent to some non- logical properties of metaframes; and thus we describe the maximal semantics of Kripke- type. (shrink)

A model of spontaneous collapse of fermionic degrees of freedom in a quantum field is presented which has the advantages that it explicitly maintains energy conservation and gives results in agreement with an existing numerical method for calculating quantum state evolution, namely the quantum trajectories model.

This article suggests that Chomsky’s notorious ‘London’ argument against semantics looks much more plausible that it is usually interpreted as being when seen in the light of something apparently remote from its concerns, viz., David Lewis’s distinction between natural and non-natural properties.

Piron's axioms for a realistically interpreted quantum mechanics are analyzed in detail within the context of a formal mathematical structure expressed in the conventional set-theoretic idiom of mathematics. As a result, some of the serious misconceptions that have encouraged recent criticisms of Piron's axioms are exposed.

"Deductivism" is the thesis that all logic is deductive. Stove lays out the arguments for the existence of non-deductive logic.

We discuss Einstein's ideas on the need for a theory that is both objective and local and also his suggestion for realizing such a theory through nonlinear field equations. We go on to analyze the nonlocality implied by the quantum theory, especially in terms of the experiment of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. We then suggest an objective local field model along Einstein's lines, which might explain quantum nonlocality as a coordination of the properties of pulse-like solutions of the nonlinear equations (...) that would represent particles. Finally, we discuss the implications of our model for Bell's inequality. (shrink)

In 1982, Jonsen, Siegler and Winslade published Clinical Ethics, in which they described the “four quadrants” approach, a new method of analysing clinical ethics cases. Although the book is now in its 6th edition, a literature search has revealed only one academic paper demonstrating the method at work. This paper is an attempt to start filling this gap. As a way of describing and testing the approach, I apply the four quadrants method to a detailed clinical ethics case. The analysis (...) is interspersed with reflections on the method itself. It is hoped that this experiment will encourage ethicists and clinicians to devote more attention to this neglected approach. (shrink)

Most contributions to the current debate about the consideration and application of empirical information in ethics scholarship deal with epistemological issues such as the role and the meaning of empirical research in ethical reasoning. Despite the increased publication of empirical data in ethics literature we still lack systematic analyses and conceptual frameworks that would help us to understand the rarely discussed methodological and practical problems in appraising empirical research. This paper demonstrates the need for critical appraisal and its crucial methodological (...) role in the application of empirical information in ethical reasoning. Furthermore, it systematically examines the criteria and the appropriate appraisal of empirical research and the associated challenges by highlighting current problems in empirical ethics literature. These problems reveal the following challenges for a critical and responsible consideration of empirical information in ethical reasoning: (i) training in the basic skills of locating and communicating empirical data from the relevant studies; (ii) training in basic knowledge of how to critically appraise empirical (qualitative and quantitative) research and its results; (iii) determination of quality standards for empirical ethics research; (iv) adequate reporting of the methodology and results of empirical ethics research in scientific journals. (shrink)

We approach the relationship between classical and quantum theories in a new way, which allows both to be expressed in the same mathematical language, in terms of a matrix algebra in a phase space. This makes clear not only the similarities of the two theories, but also certain essential differences, and lays a foundation for understanding their relationship. We use the Wigner-Moyal transformation as a change of representation in phase space, and we avoid the problem of “negative probabilities” by regarding (...) the solutions of our equations as constants of the motion, rather than as statistical weight factors. We show a close relationship of our work to that of Prigogine and his group. We bring in a new nonnegative probability function, and we propose extensions of the theory to cover thermodynamic processes involving entropy changes, as well as the usual reversible processes. (shrink)

John Locke holds that matter is solid, the soul thinks, and for all we know the soul may be a material substance divinely endowed with a power to think. Though he openly admits to nothing stronger than the bare possibility of thinking matter, Locke grants that what thinks in us occupies a definite spatial location to the exclusion of other souls. Solidity is the quality that prevents other things from occupying a spatial location. Locke’s general criterion for identity is spatiotemporal (...) exclusion of other things of the same kind. To meet these conditions for identity, souls must be solid. Although Locke refuses to declare that souls really are material things, taking the solidity of souls to be a condition for their identity is consistent with the following of Locke’s other important commitments: nominalism about the essences by which substances are classified, agnosticism about the underlying reality of what supports such “nominal essences,” and the identity of persons is distinct from the identity of any substance. Locke ignores the implication that souls are solid because the solidity of souls is irrelevant to those three aims. Nevertheless he could allow for the solidity of souls without giving up on any of his other important and explicitly held commitments. There is therefore no need for Locke’s commentators to refrain from employing solidity in their accounts of Locke’s general criterion for identity from fear of attributing to Locke the position that souls would be solid. (shrink)

We obtain a general relativistic unification of gravitation and electromagnetism by simply(1) restricting the metric so that it admits an orthonormal tetrad representation in which the spacelike vectors are curl-free, and(2) identifying the timelike vector as the potential for an electromagnetic field whose only sources are singularities. It follows that: (A) The energy density is everywhere nonnegative, (B) the space is flat if and only if the electromagnetic field vanishes, (C) the vector potential (through which all curvature enters) admits no (...) invariant algebraic decomposition, and satisfies the covariant Lorentz condition identically, (D) the theory is free of “prior geometry,” (E) the electromagnetic self-energy of a spherically symmetric point charge equalsMC 2 , (F) particles deviate from geodesic motion according to the Lorentz force law with radiative reaction, and (G) particles with all electromagnetic multipole structures are included. (shrink)

La doctrine du ‘contrat social’ a fait récemment une réapparition dans l'ouvrage A Theory of Justice de John Rawls. D'un avis unanime, chacun reconnaît l'importance de ce livre. Et cependant son contenu est objet de critiques divergentes. Le présent article est conçu comme une modeste contribution aux débats en cours. Après une rapide esquisse des idées maîtresses de Rawls, l'auteur dresse un bilan synoptique des conceptions du contrat social de Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau et Kant. Sont mis en évidence : 1° (...) le fait que ces quatre philosophes parlent d'un droit naturel immuable 2° le fait que, tout en étant révolutionnaires sur le plan des idées politiques, ils ne sont pas parvenus à déceler les problèmes sociaux. Rawls a intégré l'inspiration socialiste -la préoccupation de la justice sociale -dans la théorie du contrat social. Il insiste sur le dialogue impartial, base de la recherche des principes de justice politique et sociale. Son ouvrage souffre néanmoins d'une profonde incohérence. Rawls s'est tourné vers la tradition du contrat social pour sortir de l'utilitarisme, sa pensée est en effet dirigée par une inspiration toute différente. Pourtant, dans sa déduction des principes de justice, il retombe dans l'utilitarisme qu'il voulait éviter. L'ambiguïté qui en résulte le place dans l'impossibilité de répondre valablement à une critique venue de divers côtés. (shrink)

L'intention fondamentale de la métaphysique de l'Ecole peut-elle encore être reprise dans le contexte de la philosophie actuelle ? Cette intention est double. D'abord elle vise à parler de la réalité elle-même ou du réel tel qu'il est en soi. Ensuite elle prétend découvrir quelque chose concernant le fondement ultime de cette réalité. La phénoménologie semble condamner cette entreprise à un échec inévitable en prétendant que le réel ne se manifeste que dans la rencontre de l'homme avec lui. Ce que (...) nous connaissons portera donc toujours l'empreinte de notre présence et ne sera donc jamais le réel en lui-même. Heidegger ne semble pas moins nous éloigner de l'ancien problème de la métaphysique. Dans son intention de l'approfondir, il semble plutôt en écarter le problème pour le remplacer par un autre. Sa méditation porte en effet sur la lumière originelle -toujours oubliée -dans laquelle le monde se révèle à nous, mais il ne semble pas en arriver à réfléchir sur ce qui devient visible grâce à cette lumière. Il semble pourtant que, tant l'idée de rencontre que celle de lumière originelle élimine si peu l'affirmation du réel lui-même, qu'elles le supposent plutôt, aussi longtemps qu'on veut éviter l'idéalisme le plus radical. Or, c'est sur le sens de cette affirmation implicite et sur le réel visé par elle que la métaphysique de l'Ecole veut réfléchir. Mais un second obstacle risque de faire échouer cette tentative. Le réel n'est-il pas individuel, temporel, irréductible ? N'est-ce pas dès lors impossible d'en parler, puisque notre langue n'est faite que de concepts généraux et intemporels ? A cette question, on peut d'abord répondre que tout notre appareil de concepts généraux est soutenu par un moment de contact avec le réel lui-même. Seulement ceci ne semble pas encore nous avancer beaucoup. En effet, cette saisie intuitive n'est-elle pas condamnée à rester implicite et muette ? Une issue à ce problème nous semble possible en poursuivant la ligne de réflexion de l'ancienne théorie de l'illumination. C'est en réfléchissant sur les caractéristiques de la vérité telle qu'elle nous est accessible, que nous pourrions arriver à dire quelque chose du concret lui-même. En effet, il se manifeste à nous comme étant inséré dans la totalité du réel qui nous est ouverte dans une sorte d'ouverture antécédente et constitutive de notre existence. Or ces deux aspects, qu'on ne saurait nier sans totalement exclure l'homme du royaume de la vérité, semblent postuler la Présence Totale de l'Origine dans la moindre parcelle du réel. Cette présence devient consciente et éclairante dans l'existence humaine. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: In light of the construal of sensorimotor theory offered by the target article, this commentary examines the role the theory should admit for internal representation.

In this essay, I claim that certain passages in Book IV of Benedict de Spinoza’s Ethics suggest a novel version of what is known as metaethical constructivism. The constructivist interpretation emerges in the course of attempting to resolve a tension between Spinoza’s apparent ethical egoism and some remarks he makes about the efficacy of collaborating with the right partners when attempting to promote our individual self-interest . Though Spinoza maintains that individuals necessarily aim to promote their self-interest, I argue that (...) Spinoza has an atypical conception of self that allows the interests of other people to be partially constitutive of one's own self-interest. In this way, Spinoza can account for the rationality of concern for the interests of others . This interpretation attributes to Spinoza a form of constructivism that differs in important ways from contemporary Humean and Kantian constructivisms and which can in principle be detached from Spinoza’s particular metaphysical commitments in order to yield a third general category of constructivist view . Though my treatment is necessarily brief, it is my hope that it can serve both to motivate a constructivist reading of Spinoza and, perhaps even more crucially, to suggest a Spinozistic variety of constructivism as a live theoretical option in metaethics. (shrink)

Part of the work for this paper was done during the tenure of a fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. I am grateful for financial support provided by the National Science Foundation, Grant #BNS-8011494, and for the assistance of the staff of the Center. I also want to thank David Bloor, Stephen Downes, David Hull and Andy Pickering for offering good advice and criticism, some of which I have heeded.

In [Ono 1987] H. Ono put the question about axiomatizing the intermediate predicate logicLFin characterized by the class of all finite Kripke frames. It was established in [ Skvortsov 1988] thatLFin is not recursively axiomatizable. One can easily show that for any finite posetM, the predicate logic characterized byM is recursively axiomatizable, and its axiomatization can be constructed effectively fromM. Namely, the set of formulas belonging to this logic is recursively enumerable, since it is embeddable in the two-sorted classical predicate (...) calculusCPC 2. Thus the logicLFin is II 2 0 -arithmetical.Here we give a more explicit II 2 0 -description ofLFin: it is presented as the intersection of a denumerable sequence of finitely axiomatizable Kripke-complete logics. Namely, we give an axiomatization of the logicLB n P m + characterized by the class of all posets of the finite height m and the finite branching n. A finite axiomatization of the predicate logicLP m + characterized by the class of all posets of the height m is known from [Yokota 1989]. We prove thatLB n P m + =,B n being the propositional axiom of the branching n. (shrink)

Several recent papers which purport to substantiate or negate arguments in favor of certain theories of absolute space have been based on fallacious principles. In this paper we discuss three related instances, indicating where misconceptions have arisen. We establish, contrary to popular belief, that the classical Lorentz ether theory accounts for all the experimental evidence which supports the special theory of relativity. We demonstrate that the ether theory predicts the null results obtained from pulsar timing and Mössbauer experiments. We conclude (...) that a measurement of the one-way velocity of light has physical meaning within the context of the Lorentz theory, and argue that an adequately designed experiment to measure the one-way velocity of light should be attempted. (shrink)