The problem of objectivity

Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (2):203-220 (1995)
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Abstract

Since Descartes, epistemology has been based on first person knowledge. We must begin, according to the usual story, with what is most certain: knowledge of our own sensations and thoughts. In one way or another we then progress, if we can, to knowledge of an objective external world. There is then the final, tenuous, step to knowledge of other minds. I shall argue for a total revision of this picture. All propositional thought, whether positive or skeptical, whether of the inner or of the outer, requires possession of the concept of objective truth, and this concept is accessible only to those creatures that are in communication with others. Knowledge of other minds is thus basic to all thought. But such knowledge requires and assumes knowledge of a shared world of objects in a common time and space. Thus the acquisition of knowledge is not based on a progression from the subjective to the objective; it emerges holistically, and is interpersonalfrom the start

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Citations of this work

Davidson’s Meta-Normative Naturalism.Robert Myers - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (2):47-58.
What is radical interpretation? Davidson, Fodor, and the naturalization of philosophy.Robert Sinclair - 2002 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):161-184.
Quantum holism and the philosophy of mind.Michael Esfeld - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1):23-38.

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