There may be few works of philosophy that accurately integrate dialectical and rhetorical aspects such as Contra Academicos, to the point that it becomes difficult at times to separate these two discursive techniques. This, despite the tension that Augustine points out between, on the one hand, his impulse to move away from the vanity of the rhetoric he learned in his youth, and, on the other, its convenience in achieving the persuasion of his audience. Regarding rhetoric, there are two (...) moments in which it is clearly recognizable in the work: 1) Direct references to “persuasion” and to technical elements specific to oratory; and 2) The implementation of a rhetorical discourse, in this case necessary and not accidental, to complete the argument. In this article, I analyze both aspects systematically, in order to investigate the reasons why this Augustinian dialogue invokes, to achieve its objective, both dialectic and rhetoric. (shrink)

Saint Augustin parvient-il à réfuter le scepticisme académicien dans le Contra Academicos? Une lecture attentive du premier dialogue philosophique d’Augustin laisse apercevoir une compréhension profonde de la nature du scepticisme académicien par le jeune Augustin. Le Contra Academicos propose une stratégie de réfutation du scepticisme à plusieurs niveaux : il s’agit, d’une part, de réfuter un à un les arguments sceptiques exposés dans les Academica de Cicéron afin de ne pas laisser croire aux esprits faibles que ces arguments (...) pourraient être définitifs. Mais Augustin a compris que le scepticisme est bien plutôt confirmé par une telle réfutation. Il faut donc proposer aussi des moyens de dépasser le scepticisme dans son intention philosophique en en proposant une réduction psychologique : le choix philosophique du scepticisme est alors interprété comme un mouvement de désespoir dans la vérité. Enfin, il faut donner les moyens de surmonter le scepticisme en montrant comment l’accès à la vérité est conditionné par la foi. L’étude de cette stratégie complexe de réponse au scepticisme montre ainsi que les principaux arguments contre le scepticisme développés dans la suite de l’œuvre d’Augustin trouvent leur origine dans ce débat avec Cicéron et les Académiciens. (shrink)

Saint Augustin parvient-il à réfuter le scepticisme académicien dans le Contra Academicos ? Une lecture attentive du premier dialogue philosophique d’Augustin laisse apercevoir une compréhension profonde de la nature du scepticisme académicien par le jeune Augustin. Le Contra Academicos propose une stratégie de réfutation du scepticisme à plusieurs niveaux : il s’agit, d’une part, de réfuter un à un les arguments sceptiques exposés dans les Academica de Cicéron afin de ne pas laisser croire aux esprits faibles que ces (...) arguments pourraient être définitifs. Mais Augustin a compris que le scepticisme est bien plutôt confirmé par une telle réfutation. Il faut donc proposer aussi des moyens de dépasser le scepticisme dans son intention philosophique en en proposant une réduction psychologique : le choix philosophique du scepticisme est alors interprété comme un mouvement de désespoir dans la vérité. Enfin, il faut donner les moyens de surmonter le scepticisme en montrant comment l’accès à la vérité est conditionné par la foi. L’étude de cette stratégie complexe de réponse au scepticisme montre ainsi que les principaux arguments contre le scepticisme développés dans la suite de l’œuvre d’Augustin trouvent leur origine dans ce débat avec Cicéron et les Académiciens. (shrink)

Die Reihe Patristische Texte und Studien publiziert seit 1963 Forschungsergebnisse, die durch die Patristische Kommission, heute ein Gemeinschaftsunternehmen aller deutschen Akademien der Wissenschaften, koordiniert werden. In ihr erscheinen Editionen, Kommentare und Monographien zu den Schriften und Lehren der Kirchenväter.

Augustine was aware of objections to the idea of educational progress, and nowhere is this more acute than in his treatment of academic skepticism. While much attention has been paid to Augustine’s theory of knowledge within the Contra Academicos, too often overlooked is the specifically moral significance that he attaches to the skeptic’s critique of knowledge. I argue that Augustine’s chief criticism in this dialogue is not directed against an erroneous epistemology, although he does provide a refutation of that. (...) Rather, itis against the disastrous educational and moral implications that follow from the skeptic’s views. Along the way I show how this interpretation helps to explain some of the novel structural features of the dialogue and allows us more securely to situate its argument against Augustine’s other key early reflections on the limits of knowledge. (shrink)

『아카데미학파 반박』은 초기 사상의 기준점 역할을 할 뿐만 아니라 아우구스티누스가 앞으로 수행할 철학적 작업의 원리를 설명한다는 점에서 중요성이 있다. 아우구스티누스의 초기 저작은 무엇보다 키케로의 사상 및 저작들에서 많은 영향을 받았다. 최소한 초기 사상에 국한해서 본다면 아우구스티누스 사상에 대한 키케로의 영향은 플라톤을 버금간다고 할 수 있다. 특히 아우구스티누스가『아카데미학파 반박』에서 논의하는 아카데미학파 회의주의는 키케로가 『아카데미학파』에서 연구한 내용을 차용한 것이다. 또한 『아카데미학파 반박』은 『아카데미학파』의 형식에 따라 대화체로 구성되었다. 따라서 『아카데미학파』와 『아카데미학파 반박』이 맺고 있는 상호관계는 아우구스티누스의 초기 저작들의 정확한 성격이 무엇인지에 관하여 실마리를 던져줄 (...) 수 있을 것이다. 아우구스티누스는 『아카데미학파 반박』에서 종교적 권위를 내세우기 이전에 플로티노스와 키케로가 보여준 변증적 논쟁이라는 방법을 전용함으로써 자신의 철학에 학문적 정당성을 부여한다. 아우구스티누스가 『아카데미학파 반박』에서 플로티노스의 형이상학뿐만 아니라, 키케로의 철학을 도입한다는 사실을 인정하는 것은 아우구스티누스 저작 전반에 대한 새로운 해석의 길을 열 것이다. (shrink)

The objective of this article was to address the Augustinian call to philosophical life. In discussion with academic skepticism, Saint Augustine exhorts his friend Romanian to search for wisdom and, for this, to also dismiss distrust and excessive confidence in reason, since he argues both against the skeptical position, or despair of finding the truth, and dogmatism or the assurance of having definitely found the truth. In fact, Saint Augustine points out the difficulty of taking knowledge for granted and, therefore, (...) does not rule out skepticism, but rather incorporates it as the initial phase of knowing and as an antidote to the naivety of giving absolute scope to the human faculty of human knowing. In the perspective of this balance, Saint Augustine exhorts Romanian to finish deciding to lead a philosophical life. To travel this path, in continuity with his Neoplatonic readings, he considers beauty as a guide: spiritual beauty is accessed by passing through the cosmic; the contemplating soul, insofar as it corresponds to what is contemplated, can thus reach the ascending path of its own transformation. The method of accessing the texts is philological, that is, it seeks at the same time to decipher the letter of the philosophical plot and to establish a contextual understanding of it. A method of this nature is inseparable from the conceptual framework; indeed, the formation of a philosophical knowledge, which tries to find the limits of the understanding of revelation, puts the person in tension of perfection, that is, it guides them towards their own transcendence. (shrink)

아우구스티누스의 철학적 여정은 아카데미학파로 대표되는 고대의 회의주의에 대한 논박으로 시작하고 발전한다. 아카데미학파는 스토아주의가 자연적 영역에 대한 감관지각의 관계를 통해서 앎의 통일성을 소유했다고 주장하는 것에 문제를 제기하고, 이 통일성이 하나의 환영이라는 것을 입증하는 데 역량을 집중하여 다양한 논의를 양산했다. 아카데미학파는 감관지각의 불완전성을 논의함으로써 인간이 사물의 본성에 대한 앎을 가질 수 없다고 주장했다. 또한 이를 바탕으로 진리를 발견할 수는 없지만 진리를 추구할 수는 있다는 상대주의적 입장으로 나아간다. 아우구스티누스는 아카데미학파의 주장에 반박하고자 『콘트라 아카데미코스』를 중심으로 여러 저작에서 아카데미학파의 감관지각 이론에 대해 비판하면서 자신의 감관지각 (...) 이론을 정립한다. 아우구스티누스는 『콘트라 아카데미코스』에서 감관지각에 대한 아카데미학파의 회의적 질문, 즉“어떻게 이 세계가 존재한다는 것을 아는가. 만약 감관들이 오류를 범할 수 있다면?”, “만약 당신이 잠들어 있을 때에도 당신이 보는 것이 이 세계인가?”라는 명제를 소개한다. 그리고 이에 대해 아우구스티누스는 자기에게 외현하는 것은 그 자체로는 참이지만, 그것을 보이는 그대로 존재한다고 여겨 함부로 동의할 때에만 오류라고 답한다. 또한 그는 유사 세상이라는 사실이 곧 감관지각이 거짓이라는 사실을 입증해 주는 것은 아니며, 아무리 꿈속이라고 할지라도 그것을 인식하는 감관의 활동은 정상적일 수 있다는 논의를 편다. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo estudia la transformación de las bases del escepticismo antiguo en el pensamiento agustiniano; para presentar el proceso se parte de la crisis que supuso la ruptura con experiencia maniquea, se distingue su preocupación y consideración sobre el modo y los límites del conocimiento y se analiza la función de la imagen mítica de Proteo en Contra Académicos; esta imagen permite ponderar la capacidad de la representación mítica como contrafuerte del carácter discursivo del saber humano. Mediante (...) este recurso, san Agustín afirma que la razón no puede quedar aislada de otros modos complementarios de comprensión, hace propio el núcleo de la actitud escéptica y amplía la noción de racionalidad para la filosofía cristiana.This paper studies the transformation of the foundations of ancient skepticism in Augustinian thought; to present the process we start from the crisis that led to the break with Manichaean experience, we distinguished their concern and consideration about the mode and limits of knowledge and analyzed the function of Proteo's mythical image in Contra academicos; this image allows us to weigh the capacity of mythical representation as a buttress of the discursive character of human knowledge. Through this resource, St. Augustine affirms that reason cannot be isolated from other complementary modes of understanding, appropriates the core of the skeptical attitude and broadens the notion of rationality for Christian philosophy. (shrink)

The paper has two main parts. First, I introduce the eudaimonistic setting of the epistemological discussions in book one and – very briefly – and make a few points about book two. Second, in an analysis of book three, I show how Augustine relieves a tension which was present between the conclusions of books one and two and how the relief of that tension culminates in a critique of the skeptic’s eudaimonistic claims more so than their epistemological ones.

아우구스티누스는 『콘트라 아카데미코스』에서 당대 인식론과 교육사상에 부정적 역할을 했던 아카데미학파의 논증을 반박하면서 ‘실재와 진리에 대한 부정’과 ‘진리를 파악할 수 있는 다양한 방식이 존재한다는 문제의식’, 그리고 여기서 파생되는 ‘종교와 종교교육의 필요성에 대한 문제’ 등을 숙고한다. 아우구스티누스는 삶의 목적은 행복이고, 행복은 진리획득을 통해 가능하다고 본다. 그리고 진리와 실재에 대한 확고함이 없다면 총체적이고 전인적인 지식도 불가능하고, 필연적으로 그러한 것을 배우거나 교육하는 일도 불가능하다고 주장한다. 아우구스티누스가 보기에 대상의 통합성을 아는 것이 행복해지는 것이며, 이것을 아는 것은 인간의 모든 이성적 활동의 궁극적 목적이다. 아우구스티누스는 사람이 행복을 (...) 추구하는 것은 당연한 순리이며, 행복을 얻기 위해서는 진리를 추구하고 진리 안에 거하는 것이 필수적이라는 전제를 갖고 있다. 여기에 더해 아우구스티누스는 진리 인식과 진리 교육의 중요성을 넘어 다양한 진리 획득 방식을 제시한다. 그는 자연학과 논리학적 앎을 비롯해 수학적 앎과 감각인상을 통한 앎을 통해 진리가 인식될 수 있음을 증명한다. 아우구스티누스는 여기에 더해 명증적 앎의 새로운 방식인 종교적 앎에 대해 소개한다. 여기서 아우구스티누스는 키케로를 인용하여 권위에 의한 앎에 대해 논의하는데, 그가 보기에 권위자가 확실히 신뢰할 수 있는 존재자라면 그 권위에서 출발한 앎은 불완전한 앎을 가진 존재들에게는 그 무엇보다 확실한 앎이 될 수 있다. 아우구스티누스가 진리획득의 방식을 다양하게 상정하면서, 그중 인간이 진리나 실재에 도달하는 가장 중요한 방식으로서 종교를 상정하는 이유가 여기에 있다. (shrink)

O propósito deste artigo é o de examinar o ceticismo sobre a moral e as leis tal como abordado e respondido por Guy de Brués nos seus Diálogos contra os Novos Acadêmicos (1557). Proponho que, para uma apreciação adequada desse tema, é preciso distinguir dois níveis em que essa filosofia se apresenta na obra: aquele em que ela é exposta na fala dos personagens incumbidos de defendê-la (sustentando diferentes versões da tese de que “tudo é opinião”) e aquele que (...) é discernível através de alguns pontos de acordo ao longo das discussões, no qual revela-se antes uma afinidade entre os interlocutores com a Nova Academia. Esta situação aparentemente paradoxal pode ser melhor compreendida se cotejamos os Diálogos com a declamatio paradoxal ou o diálogo filosófico de matriz ciceroniana. De modo mais geral, sugerimos que o papel da filosofia da Nova Academia, especialmente em sua dimensão moral e política, é maior do que usualmenre reconhecido na redescoberta do ceticismo na França do século XVI. (shrink)

This is my first published paper, written over a decade ago. I can't remember exactly what I argued in it, but I can assure you that the follow up paper "Epistemology and Eudaimonism in Augustine's Contra Academicos" is better.

Desde 2019, está em pauta no Brasil a discussão sobre o Ensino de Filosofia como campo de conhecimento ou subárea de pesquisa. Trata-se de um debate que envolve, até o momento, o mapeamento das produções bibliográficas sobre o tema, a discussão sobre o estatuto epistemológico do campo e, igualmente, sobre os aspectos político-institucionais envolvidos no processo de busca de cidadania filosófica para a subárea em questão. O presente artigo propõe problematizar o campo do Ensino de Filosofia a partir de uma (...) nova perspectiva, a saber: quais as objeções usualmente feitas à institucionalização da subárea de pesquisa em voga? De modo resumido, as referidas objeções concentram-se em: advogar contra o caráter filosófico do campo; defender a crivo acadêmico-científico natureza estritamente profissional da subárea; alertar para uma maior fragmentação do conhecimento; recear que o Ensino de Filosofia se torne refém do crivo acadêmico-científico, relegando a sua dimensão formativa – seu potencial experiencial, estético e político – a um segundo plano. A reconstituição dos argumentos que apresentam senões ao reconhecimento institucional do campo de conhecimento Ensino de Filosofia será a base para problematizações – em uma tentativa de, a partir de contra-argumentos, dar (ainda) maior complexidade ao debate. (shrink)

El artículo intenta mostrar las contradicciones en que incurre el académico con su afirmación: “Nada es verdad, todo vale”; el santo argumenta que esta tesis escéptica derrumba tanto el saber como el obrar y pone en peligro la convivencia de la humanidad. Se concluye probando que un argumento contra los académicos es la amistad y el habitar místicamente el mundo.

Nos preguntamos acerca del denominado “retorno” de la filosofía política, sobre su notable florecimiento en los actuales escenarios académicos, no para compendiar sus desarrollos y contenidos, sino como fenómeno: algo que sucede al interior de la filosofía y las ciencias humanas, y que se da junto a una retracción del contenido salvífico de la política y en condiciones de escasa posibilidad de reto al sistema. Analizar el medio en que se han producido estos desplazamientos (como lo es el debate (...) del liberalismo norteamericano y su eco en la filosofía europea), acaso permita vislumbrar otros significados –mucho menos edificantes– de la filosofía rehabilitada, que la mantienen cautiva del proceso de relegitimación autoritaria del nuevo orden mundial. Con ello, quizás el ejercicio nos permita acercarnos a una posición desde la cual avizorar qué filosofía, finalmente, soporta volver. (shrink)

: In Contra Academicos 3.11.24, Augustine responds to skepticism about the existence of the external world by arguing that what appears to be the world — as he terms things, the "quasi-earth" and "quasi-sky" — cannot be doubted. While some (e.g., M. Burnyeat and G. Matthews) interpret this passage as a subjectivist response to global skepticism, it is here argued that Augustine's debt to Epicurean epistemology and theology, especially as presented in Cicero's De Natura Deorum 1.25.69 - 1.26.74, provides (...) the basis for a much more plausible, realist interpretation of Augustine's argument. (shrink)

In his Contra Academicos, Augustine offers one of the most detailed responses to scepticism to have come down to us from antiquity. In this paper, I examine Augustine’s defence of the existence of infallible knowledge in Contra Academicos 3. I challenge a number of established views (including those of Myles Burnyeat, Gareth Matthews, and Christopher Kirwan) concerning the nature and merit of Augustine’s defence of knowledge and propose a new understanding of Augustine’s response to scepticism (including his semantic (...) response to external world scepticism) and several important elements of Augustine’s thought concerning signification, cognition, and object-directed thought. I argue that once we properly understand Augustine’s views about these issues, his arguments in defence of knowledge are more interesting and more successful than usually thought. (shrink)

Los orígenes del patriarcado se remontan a los comienzos del pensamiento filosófico, por no mencionar el religioso, y los cuestionamientos a esa noción vienen tomando cada vez más impulso a lo largo del mundo en los últimos años. Un reflejo académico de ese movimiento es la relectura crítica de los clásicos de la filosofía a la luz del avance de los feminismos y las consideraciones de género. Juliana Udi brinda en su introducción a Patriarca un análisis exhaustivo de un clásico (...) de la filosofía política seguido de una traducción elegante y cuidadosamente anotada. Con ello intenta un regreso a las fuentes modernas del patriarcado político para identificar sus fundamentos teóricos y su contexto histórico, pero también para discutir desde una perspectiva de género su persistencia social en nuestros días. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Academic Skepticism in Early Modern PhilosophyJosé R. Maia NetoAncient skepticism was more influential in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than it had ever been before. Thanks to the groundwork of Charles B. Schmitt and Richard H. Popkin on the influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy and to the extensive research that followed their lead, skepticism is now recognized as having played a major role in the rise (...) of modern thought. 1There were two ancient skeptical schools, Academic skepticism and Pyrrhon-ism. Were both equally influential? Until the sixteenth century, Pyrrhonism was scarcely known. Only a few copies of Sextus’s books (the only surviving primary source of ancient Pyrrhonism) have been discovered in medieval libraries. By contrast the main source of Academic skepticism, Cicero’s Aca-demica, was occasionally referred to by medieval authors and was the object of some commentaries and criticism in the Renaissance. 2 Academic skepticism was preserved from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance not only through Cicero’s Academica, but also through Lactantius’s Divinae Institutiones and [End Page 199] Augustine’s Contra Academicos. 3 This situation changed when Sextus’s works were translated to latin and published in 1562 and 1569. Sextus presents a much more complete and detailed account and defense of ancient skepticism than that of Cicero’s Academica. Sextus presents Pyrrhonism as a coherent form of skepticism and Academic skepticism as a kind of negative dogmatism. 4 It was thus natural that the ancient skepticism that fascinated some (and troubled so many) early modern thinkers was mostly Pyrrhonian. Because of the publication of Sextus’s works, according to Schmitt, the increasing influence of Cicero’s Academica in the Renaissance was halted. Sextus’s Hypotyposes and Adversus Mathematicos took the place of Cicero’s Academica and drastically increased the influence of ancient skepticism. 5 The skeptical crisis at the dawn of modern philosophy is called “pyrrhonienne” not “academicienne.”While the appearance of Sextus’s works in Latin turned him and Pyrrhonism into the main source and influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy, further research on the history of skepticism in the period has shown that the role of Cicero’s Academica and of Academic skepticism in general continued to be considerable. First, Cicero’s works were important items in the university curricula. Although Cicero’s works of rhetoric and morals were those more read, the students could certainly learn about Academic skepticism through at least some of them. Second, many editions of De Natura Deorum, a work of Cicero’s in which Academic skepticism is quite central, were published during the seventeenth century. Third, features of Academic skepticism, exhibited above all in Cicero’s Academica, are basic to the skepticism revived in the late Renaissance by Montaigne and Charron; were related to the new science in the first half of the seventeenth century by Gassendi; were used in the anti-Cartesian reaction of the late seventeenth century by Rapin, Huet, Bayle, and above all Foucher; and were radicalized in the eighteenth century by Hume. Despite the Academic features of Montaigne’s, Charron’s, and Gassendi’s skepticisms, it does seem that from the publication of Sextus’s works to the mid-seventeenth century, Academic skepticism was secondary to Pyrrhonism. But the appearance of Descartes and the development of Cartesianism in the second half of the seventeenth century set conditions for a complete revamping of Academic skepticism, bringing about what Schmitt thought was precluded by the appearance of Sextus in the modern scene, namely, a “full flowering of the Academica as a work to inspire new directions of philosophical thought.” 6 [End Page 200]Montaigne’s Apologie pour Raimond Sebond is rightly considered the first major result of the revival of ancient Pyrrhonism in modern thought. 7 Montaigne never cites the name of Sextus nor acknowledges his source and, by contrast, fills his Apology with passages from Cicero on the Academic skeptics. It is clear, however, that Montaigne follows closely Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism in the central part of the Apology where he gives a detailed and sympathetic exposition of ancient skepticism.After dwelling on the evils and problems arising from knowledge and science, Montaigne... (shrink)

Skepticism plays an eminent roll in Augustine’s life and thinking. His work Contra Academicos ought to show that scepticism has to be overcome and that truth is cognizable. His early dialog ›Soliloquia‹ is almost ignored in this context; nevertheless particularly this unfinished work tries to define the term ›truth‹ as precisely as possible, but proceeds in a way that seems to characterize its author as Sceptic.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Academic Skepticism in Early Modern PhilosophyJosé R. Maia NetoAncient skepticism was more influential in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than it had ever been before. Thanks to the groundwork of Charles B. Schmitt and Richard H. Popkin on the influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy and to the extensive research that followed their lead, skepticism is now recognized as having played a major role in the rise (...) of modern thought. 1There were two ancient skeptical schools, Academic skepticism and Pyrrhon-ism. Were both equally influential? Until the sixteenth century, Pyrrhonism was scarcely known. Only a few copies of Sextus’s books (the only surviving primary source of ancient Pyrrhonism) have been discovered in medieval libraries. By contrast the main source of Academic skepticism, Cicero’s Aca-demica, was occasionally referred to by medieval authors and was the object of some commentaries and criticism in the Renaissance. 2 Academic skepticism was preserved from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance not only through Cicero’s Academica, but also through Lactantius’s Divinae Institutiones and [End Page 199] Augustine’s Contra Academicos. 3 This situation changed when Sextus’s works were translated to latin and published in 1562 and 1569. Sextus presents a much more complete and detailed account and defense of ancient skepticism than that of Cicero’s Academica. Sextus presents Pyrrhonism as a coherent form of skepticism and Academic skepticism as a kind of negative dogmatism. 4 It was thus natural that the ancient skepticism that fascinated some (and troubled so many) early modern thinkers was mostly Pyrrhonian. Because of the publication of Sextus’s works, according to Schmitt, the increasing influence of Cicero’s Academica in the Renaissance was halted. Sextus’s Hypotyposes and Adversus Mathematicos took the place of Cicero’s Academica and drastically increased the influence of ancient skepticism. 5 The skeptical crisis at the dawn of modern philosophy is called “pyrrhonienne” not “academicienne.”While the appearance of Sextus’s works in Latin turned him and Pyrrhonism into the main source and influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy, further research on the history of skepticism in the period has shown that the role of Cicero’s Academica and of Academic skepticism in general continued to be considerable. First, Cicero’s works were important items in the university curricula. Although Cicero’s works of rhetoric and morals were those more read, the students could certainly learn about Academic skepticism through at least some of them. Second, many editions of De Natura Deorum, a work of Cicero’s in which Academic skepticism is quite central, were published during the seventeenth century. Third, features of Academic skepticism, exhibited above all in Cicero’s Academica, are basic to the skepticism revived in the late Renaissance by Montaigne and Charron; were related to the new science in the first half of the seventeenth century by Gassendi; were used in the anti-Cartesian reaction of the late seventeenth century by Rapin, Huet, Bayle, and above all Foucher; and were radicalized in the eighteenth century by Hume. Despite the Academic features of Montaigne’s, Charron’s, and Gassendi’s skepticisms, it does seem that from the publication of Sextus’s works to the mid-seventeenth century, Academic skepticism was secondary to Pyrrhonism. But the appearance of Descartes and the development of Cartesianism in the second half of the seventeenth century set conditions for a complete revamping of Academic skepticism, bringing about what Schmitt thought was precluded by the appearance of Sextus in the modern scene, namely, a “full flowering of the Academica as a work to inspire new directions of philosophical thought.” 6 [End Page 200]Montaigne’s Apologie pour Raimond Sebond is rightly considered the first major result of the revival of ancient Pyrrhonism in modern thought. 7 Montaigne never cites the name of Sextus nor acknowledges his source and, by contrast, fills his Apology with passages from Cicero on the Academic skeptics. It is clear, however, that Montaigne follows closely Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism in the central part of the Apology where he gives a detailed and sympathetic exposition of ancient skepticism.After dwelling on the evils and problems arising from knowledge and science, Montaigne... (shrink)

The philosophy for children (P4C) and public philosophy movements seek to extend philosophy to traditionally marginalized groups. Yet public perceptions of philosophy as an elite activity provide an obstacle to this work. Such perceptions rest, in part, on further assumptions about what philosophy is and how it is conducted. To address these concerns, I look to the early philosophical dialogues of Augustine of Hippo (Contra Academicos, De beata vita, De ordine, Soliloquia), which present an experimental philosophical community composed of (...) teenagers, illiterate adults, and Augustine’s own mother. I begin with the question, “who can do philosophy?” and walk through the dialogues’ discussion of race, gender, educational background, age, and class. I then turn to teaching techniques on display in the dialogues’ discussions, which flesh out what philosophical study looks like for nonelite students. I close by using my own experience of teaching nonelite students to reflect on how Augustine’s experimental philosophical community can help reframe thinking about P4C and public philosophy today. (shrink)

"Der vorliegende Band hebt sich aus der wachsenden Zahl der Publikationen zur Spatantike und namentlich zur spatantiken Philosophie schon durch die Originalitat des behandelten Themas hervor, das eine Forschungsluecke schlieat. Die Beitrage von Wissenschaftlern verschiedener europaischer Nationen, die als Spezialisten fuer die Spatantike gelten konnen, bieten sowohl einzeln als auch in der Zusammenstellung einen echten Forschungsfortschritt." Plekos "a a valuable contribution. The volume also shows, as the product of predominantly young scholars, that the future of scholarship in the area of (...) ancient and Patristic philosophy is in good hands." Vigiliae Chritianae Inhalt: S. Follinger: Philosophische Theorien in Arnobius' apologetischer Argumentation J. Althoff: Zur Epikurrezeption bei Laktanz C. Riedweg: Philosophische Argumentationsstrukturen in Julians Contra Galilaeos D. J. O'Meara: Epicurus Neoplatonicus R. Thiel: Stoische Ethik im neuplatonischen System (Simplikios' Kommentar zu Epiktets Enchiridion) M. Erler: Hellenistische Philosophie im Platonismus der Spatantike M. Bettetini: Ai limiti della materia, tra neoplatonismo e cristianesimo K. Schlapbach: Ciceronisches und Neuplatonisches in den Proomien von Augustin, Contra Academicos 1 und 2 S. Harwardt: Die Gluecksfrage der Stoa in Augustins De beata vita C. Horn: Augustinus ueber Tugend, Moralitat und das hochste Gut T. Fuhrer: Zum wahrnehmungstheoretischen Hintergrund von Augustins Glaubensbegriff C. Oser-Grote: Virtus Romana und Virtus Christiana - ein romischer Wertbegriff bei Prudentius J. Opsomer / C. Steel: Proclus' Doctrine on the Origin of Evil K. Pollmann: Fiktionalitat in der Philosophie des Hellenismus und in der Spatantike U. Eigler: Strukturen und Voraussetzungen zum Erhalt von philosophischem Wissen in der Spatantike Stellenregister. (shrink)

One cannot understand the literary form of a dialogue without understanding its philosophical project and vice versa. This dissertation seeks to establish how Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues work as dialogues. Each of these works, Contra Academicos, De beata vita and De ordine, pursues two streams of inquiry: one dialectical, one self-reflexive. The first uses aporetic debates to identify problems with individuals' current beliefs. The second reflects on the act of debate as an instance of rational activity and through this draws (...) attention to features of human rationality. The goal of all this is to change how the inquirer thinks about himself, to bring him to see some final theory as plausible ( probabile). We find all the elements of this method in earlier authors: aporia in Plato, self-reflection in Plotinus, plausible conclusions in Cicero. But in Augustine these are fused into a system, one which structures all seven of his dialogues. This study situates Augustine against this philosophical tradition and provides a fresh start for future work on his texts. Chapter 1 argues that standing scholarly debates have imposed an unhelpful set of concerns on the dialogues. Chapters 2 through 4 set out the basic literary and philosophical project of each dialogue. Chapter 5 argues that the three dialogues, taken as a set, are programmatic for a particular kind of philosophical undertaking, one which can be traced through Augustine's subsequent works. (shrink)

El artículo aborda la refutación agustiniana del escepticismo, según se recoge en dos parábolas estudiadas con detalle en Contra Academicos. Señalando sus ideas y el influjo de Virgilio y Cicerón.

El humanismo contemporáneo se enfrenta al relativismo epistemológico. Si no hay una noción clara de verdad, tampoco puede haberla de la verdad del ser humano. Buscando en la tradición filosófica, nos proponemos indagar en la obra de tres referentes para el tema de la verdad: Platón, San Agustín y San Anselmo. A los tres les une un aire de familia; a la evidente relación entre San Agustín y San Anselmo se le une el hecho de que ambos bebieron de las (...) fuentes de Platón y que Platón además fue el primer filósofo pagano en impactar significativamente en la teología cristiana. El Protágoras de Platón, el Contra Académicos de San Agustín y el De veritate de San Anselmo son tres obras unidas por una misma intención temática: la búsqueda de la verdad en todos los ámbitos de la existencia frente al desafío relativista; y por una misma forma literaria: el diálogo. Así pues, tres diálogos de tres maestros hablando sobre la verdad pueden ser una magnífica ocasión para oponer un dique a las habladurías, la curiosidad y la ambigüedad en la reflexión referida al ser humano. (shrink)

Skepticism is regularly a target for the _apraxia_ challenge, namely, that skepticism robs us of the cognitive means for life (or at least the life well-lived). Skeptics have replied to the _apraxia_ challenge in various manners, and anti-skeptics have then answered with objections to these skeptical replies. St. Augustine’s crossroads case in _Contra Academicos_ is one such second-stage pragmatic anti-skepticism, one targeting Academic probabilism in particular. This dialectical assessment challenges Augustine’s case as inappropriately comparing the possible errors and their costs (...) in the crossroads decision, but this assessment opens Academics to a potentially devastating dilemma for their probabilism. (shrink)

This article examines Augustine’s thought conceming the relationship between sensation and knowledge in his early dialogues. A special focus is on Augustine’s concept of cognitio per sensum. First, I determine Augustine’s epistemological starting point by examining his thought as it appears in Contra Académicos (386). Second, I study the relationship between sensation and knowledge in De quantitate animae (387-388) and observe the development in Augustine’s thought concerning sense-perception. Finally, I analyse Augustine’s concept of cognitio per sensum, which occurs (...) in De quantitate animae, and make some important observations about the relationship between sensation and knowledge in Augustine’s early thought. In this regard Augustine’s possible influences are also considered. The conclusion of this article is that although Augustine had adopted a version of Platonic epistemology that is very critical toward sense-perception, his considerations in De quantitate animae, especially regarding cognitio per sensum, point towards a more harmonious relationship between the two than his Platonic epistemology in Contra Academicos would lead us to think. (shrink)

Para comprender íntegramente los diálogos redactados por San Agustín en la villa de Casicíaco, se hace necesario e imprescindibleentender previamente cómo se relacionan con las obras filosóficas que -ya anteriormente- había escrito Marco Tulio Cicerón. Así, podemos apreciar que el Contra Academicos agustiniano constituye una clara respuesta al Academica ciceroniano, o también el De beata vita al De finibus y Tusculanae disputationes. Asimismo, su De ordine lo será a la trilogía de obras que el Arpinate elabora sobre la providencia: (...) De natura deorum, De divinatione y De fato. Por otra parte, numerosos autores también señalan sus Soliloquios como un “nuevo diálogo de Casicíaco”, en donde el maestro de Hipona y la razón establecen una “edificante y sólida conversación”. Sin embargo, no está pensado para constituir una respuesta a ningún escrito ciceroniano en concreto. (shrink)

The epistemological views of medieval philosophers Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and William of Ockham are considered in turn. First, Augustine’s refutation of skepticism from the Contra Academicos and his positive account of knowing Divine Ideas from the De Magistro are outlined, after which there is a brief discussion of his Vital Attention theory of sensation. Second, Aquinas’s account of self-evident propositions, sensation, concept formation, knowledge of singulars, and self-knowledge from the Summa Theologiae is covered. Third, Ockham’s picture of scientific knowledge (...) from his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics is followed by an examination of his theories concerning evidentness, intuitive cognition, and abstractive cognition from his Ordinatio. (shrink)