Confrontado com o estado de natureza em que se encontravam as relações entre os Estados, Kant tentou pensar uma juridisção capaz de pôr fim a esse estado de guerra. O artigo começa por estabelecer as modalidades da cidadania em Kant, para, em seguida, mostrar de que modo o filósofo de Königsberg funda o direito político. Verificase, porém, que, dado o carácter irresistível do poder do soberano, é necessário conceber um direito das gentes em ordem a diminuir o risco de (...) conflito entre os Estados. Ora frente às aporias que levanta o conceito de Estado dos povos, a única solução é constituir uma aliança entre Estados, limitada a uma coordenação defensiva. O artigo mostra ainda de que modo, em ordem a superar esta insuficiência, Kant recorre ao conceito de cidadão do mundo, capaz de operar uma síntese entre a reciprocidade dos indivíduos e a reciprocidade dos Estados, o que implica que só o direito cosmopolítico se afirma como condição de um estado universal de paz. /// Confronted with the natural state in which he found the relations among the States, Kant tried to think of a jurisdiction capable of ending that state of war. The article establishes in the first place the types of citizen described by Kant in order to subsequently ground political law. Nevertheless, considering the irresistible character of the sovereign's power, it is necessary to conceive a right of nations to diminish the risk of conflict. The only solution for the aporias that the concept of State raises is to build an alliance between States, limited to a defensive coordination. To overcome this deficiency, Kant resorts to the concept of world citizen, a concept capable of operating a synthesis between the reciprocities among individuals and the reciprocities among States, which implies that only cosmopolitical right stands as condition of a universal state of peace. (shrink)

O objetivo é apresentar, do ponto de vista filosófico, a relação existente entre o cosmopolitismo kantiano e a figura do refugiado à luz do Direito à Hospitalidade. Orienta-se pelo procedimento da pesquisa bibliográfica. Apresenta o ideal filosófico de Kant para a instituição da Paz Perpétua com ênfase no Direito Cosmopolita. Demonstra a correspondência entre Direito Cosmopolita, Direitos Humanos e Direito Natural. Analisa o refugiado sob a perspectiva filosófica. Viabiliza o diálogo entre o cosmopolitismo e o refugiado. Por fim, conclui que (...) há um entrelaçamento teórico e filosófico entre o refugiado e o Direito Cosmopolita baseando-se na concepção da cidadania universal. (shrink)

Os princípios e objetivos fundamentais da Constituição Federal de 1988 serviram de bases para que os Direitos Humanos ocupassem grande relevância na sociedade Brasileira. Assim, esses direitos se alargaram internacionalmente através da Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos e demais documentos positivados para resguardar essa evolução histórica. Atualmente ocupam grande espaço na sociedade e são de responsabilidade do Estado, que deve propagá-los através de Políticas Publicas eficientes. A máxima kantiana sobre a liberdade trás estreita relação com os direitos fundamentais abrangidos (...) em nossa constituição federal, servindo como base para a criação do nosso ordenamento jurídico no que diz respeito aos direitos humanos, mais precisamente quanto aos princípios da dignidade da pessoa humana e cidadania. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta reflexões sobre as dificuldades e os desafios da educação diante da questão dos direitos humanos. São apresentados alguns aspectos fundamentais para reflexão: o princípio de universalidade dos direitos humanos e o papel da filosofia no esclarecimento da experiência ética e da cidadania. Apresentamos algumas concepções necessárias para a conquista do conceito de humanidade através da convivência ética e pacífica. A reflexão sobre os direitos humanos como uma forma de apresentar modos de pensar as relações entre o (...) universal e o individual a partir da diversidade. (shrink)

O presente texto é uma exposição do Direito Abstrato da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel. O seu objetivo é ressaltar o sentido do ter, conteúdo do Direito Abstrato, como pressuposto para a moralidade, isto é, para o ser livre. A argumentação consiste em lembrar que a liberdade não se restringe a discursos e interesses individuais, mas em criar as condições necessárias para que uma vida seja livre. Assim, o processo dialético dos momentos da concretização da liberdade será de fato um (...) modo de relação social onde o fundamento do direito será a personalidade em geral, na sua relação com as coisas, esfera da legalidade. Tal esfera será também, na sua concretude, um pressuposto para a moralidade. Um miserável não pode ser livre, pois, segundo Hegel, o direito de ter é um direito universal e não somente de alguns particulares. Desse modo, o Direito para Hegel é a ideia da efetivação da liberdade que compreende o direito de ter, o direito de ser livre e o direito de ter e ser livre, que constitui o direito de cidadania. Entretanto, o que justifica esta análise na atualidade é exatamente o não cumprimento deste direito de ter, numa sociedade moralmente antagônica, cujo tecido continua criando a riqueza e a miséria. Neste artigo comentamos somente o direito de ter nas suas explicitações: a personalidade, a possessão, a propriedade, o contrato, a injustiça e a violência. (shrink)

A educação em direitos humanos é essencial para o desenvolvimento pleno da personalidade, para a consolidação da cidadania e para promover a cultura da solidariedade, constituindo um dos principais desafios contemporâneos. Aqui reside o papel fundamental das instituições públicas e privadas, na medida em que as mesmas são desafiadas a criar, promover e fortalecer a cultura dos direitos humanos nos seus espaços de convivência. O texto adota como metodologia a análise de bibliografia especializada. Nessa direção, investiga-se os principais instrumentos (...) normativos e diretivos da sociedade brasileira, tais como a Constituição Federal, a Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação, a Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos e outros documentos que tratam da educação e dos direitos humanos, com o objetivo de extrair algumas implicações para a práxis religiosa. O percurso inicia analisando o texto constitucional que estabelece a educação como direito de todos, bem como seus respectivos objetivos; na sequência, a partir da Declaração Universal de 1948, faz-se uma reflexão sobre a educação em direitos humanos e sua importância para a consolidação da cidadania; ao concluir, o autor apresenta as implicações da educação em direitos humanos no contexto religioso brasileiro: a educação em direitos humanos promove a liberdade e a igualdade; promove uma educação comprometida com o desenvolvimento humano e com a cultura da solidariedade; e promove a amizade entre as diferentes religiões. (shrink)

La demanda mapuche nos obliga a pensar en un “sujeto incardinado” que sostiene ciertas reivindicaciones propiamente modernas en su reclamo por reconocimiento de la diferencia, al mismo tiempo que desafía la noción de ciudadanía universal y sostiene una demanda anclada territorialmente y basada en un discurso emancipatorio de derechos. En efecto, nos reenfoca en la constitución de una identidad colectiva que es efecto –por una parte– de una exclusión y de un reconocimiento erróneo y –por otra parte– de un (...) entorno global que hace más visibles los fragmentos no anudados, como su contracara. Finalmente, nos enfrentan a la demanda universal de derecho a la vida significativa. Se propone pensar la identidad desde una perspectiva des-esencializada que enfatice –por una parte- el rol del lenguaje en la estructuración de las relaciones sociales y –por otra- la relevancia de lo no-narrativizado del campo social. (shrink)

En los círculos ortodoxos kantianos suelen disculparse las incoherencias del maestro diciendo que era un "hijo de su tiempo". Ciertamente, en su época aún se excluía en toda Europa a las mujeres de la ciudadanía activa, privándolas de ser sujetos políticos y, con ello, sujetos éticos, de derecho, e incluso, históricos. Pero también es verdad que en ese momento está emergiendo un movimiento en defensa de la igualdad de género (querelle des femmes), en el que lamentablemente Kant no participa. En (...) el presente artículo, tras un preámbulo histórico en el que se confronta al Kant crítico con sus predecesores y coetáneos en lo tocante al tema de la igualdad de las mujeres, se defiende la tesis de que la verdadera moralidad no es pensable sin una idea de universalidad real o, lo que viene a ser lo mismo, de igualdad de género, porque solo a partir de ella es pensable la individualidad y la autonomía. Orthodox Kantian circles tend to excuse the philosopher's inconsistencies by saying that he was a "child of his time". It is true that in his time women throughout Europe were excluded from active citizenship, depriving them of the right to be political and, consequently, ethical and even historical subjects. But it is also true that in that same period a movement was emerging in defense of gender equality (querelle des femmes), in which Kant regrettably did not participate. After a historical introduction that contrasts the critical Kant with his predecessors and contemporaries regarding the issue of women's equality, the article goes on to defend the thesis that true morality is unthinkable without an idea of genuine universality, that is, without gender equality, since only on that basis can individuality and autonomy be thought. Nos círculos ortodoxos kantianos, as incoerências do mestre ao dizer que era um "filho de seu tempo" costumam ser desculpadas. Certamente, em sua época ainda se excluía em toda a Europa as mulheres da cidadania ativa e privava-as de serem sujeitos políticos e, com isso, sujeitos éticos, de direito, e inclusive, históricos. Mas também é verdade que, nesse momento, está emergindo um movimento em defesa da igualdade de gênero (querelle des femmes), do qual lamentavelmente Kant não participa. No presente artigo, após um preâmbulo histórico no qual se confronta o Kant crítico com seus predecessores e coetâneos no que tange ao tema da igualdade das mulheres, defende-se a tese de que a verdadeira moralidade não é pensável sem uma ideia de universidade real ou, o que vem a ser a mesma coisa, de igualdade de gênero, porque só a partir dela é pensável a individualidade e a autonomia. (shrink)

v. 1. Nominalism and realism.--v. 2. A theory of universals.

The primary purpose of this book is to depict the main features of the classical problem of universals in order to provide a better understand ing of the various suggestions made by the moderns towards the solution of that problem. The work is not historical; however, since knowledge of the history of the problem is essential for understanding the import of the new approach, references are given to classical theories and interpretations are offered without any pretension that they are either (...) exhaustive or final. I have tried to argue that the problem, though often appearing in metaphysical guise, is, in fact, part of the more general problem of semantics, i.e., the relation between words and the world. The medieval theory that universals are the meaning of general words is linked here with a recent theory that the meaning of a word is explainable in terms of its function and not in terms of its putative denotation. What comes of this fusion is this: that if the medieval theory that universals are the meaning of general words is in any way credible, then to know the meaning of such words requires close attention to their functions on the ground that words in general do not mirror the world, rather they are tools used to change it. (shrink)

In this short text, a distinguished philosopher turns his attention to one of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical problems of all: How it is that we are able to sort and classify different things as being of the same natural class? Professor Armstrong carefully sets out six major theories—ancient, modern, and contemporary—and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each. Recognizing that there are no final victories or defeats in metaphysics, Armstrong nonetheless defends a traditional account of universals as the (...) most satisfactory theory we have.This study is written for advanced students, but as Armstrong goes considerably beyond his earlier work on this topic, it will interest professional scholars as well. Carefully plotted and clearly written, Universals is both a paradigm of exposition and a case study on the value of careful analysis of fundamental issues in philosophy. (shrink)

Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent, there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible universals. In this paper, I shall argue that there is useful work indiscernible universals can do, and so there might be reason to postulate indiscernible universals. In particular, I shall argue that postulating indiscernible universals can allow (...) a theory of universals to identify particulars with bundles of universals, and that postulating indiscernible universals can allow a theory of universals to develop an account of the resemblance of quantitative universals that avoids the objections that Armstrong’s account faces. Finally, I shall respond to some objections and I shall undermine the criterion of distinction between particulars and universals that says that the distinction between particulars and universals lies in that while there can be indiscernible particulars, there cannot be indiscernible universals. (shrink)

Hasan Akkanat, Universals in Classical Period of Islamic Philosophy [Klasik Dönem İslam Felsefesinde Tümeller], 498 pp.

One of the great successes of the application of generalized quantifiers to natural language has been the ability to formulate robust semantic universals. When such a universal is attested, the question arises as to the source of the universal. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that many semantic universals arise because expressions satisfying the universal are easier to learn than those that do not. While the idea that learnability explains universals is not new, explicit accounts of (...) learning that can make good on this hypothesis are few and far between. We propose a model of learning — back-propagation through a recurrent neural network — which can make good on this promise. In particular, we discuss the universals of monotonicity, quantity, and conservativity and perform computational experiments of training such a network to learn to verify quantifiers. Our results are able to explain monotonicity and quantity quite well. We suggest that conservativity may have a different source than the other universals. (shrink)

Things are particulars and their qualities are universals, but do universals have an existence distinct from the particular things describable by those terms? And what must be their nature if they do? This book provides a careful and assured survey of the central issues of debate surrounding universals, in particular those issues that have been a crucial part of the emergence of contemporary analytic ontology. The book begins with a taxonomy of extreme nominalist, moderate nominalist, and realist positions on properties, (...) and outlines the way each handles the phenomena of predication, resemblance, and abstract reference. The debate about properties and philosophical naturalism is also examined. Different forms of extreme nominalism, moderate nominalism, and minimalist realism are critiqued. Later chapters defend a traditional realist view of universals and examine the objections to realism from various infinite regresses, the difficulties in stating identity conditions for properties, and problems with realist accounts of knowledge of abstract objects. In addition, the debate between Platonists and Aristotelians is examined alongside a discussion of the relationship between properties and an adequate theory of existence. The book's final chapter explores the problem of individuating particulars. The book makes accessible a difficult topic without blunting the sophistication of argument required by a more advanced readership. (shrink)

Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent, there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible universals. In this paper, I shall argue that there is useful work indiscernible universals can do, and so there might be reason to postulate indiscernible universals. In particular, I shall argue that postulating indiscernible universals can allow (...) a theory of universals to identify particulars with bundles of universals, and that postulating indiscernible universals can allow a theory of universals to develop an account of the resemblance of quantitative universals that avoids the objections that Armstrong’s account faces. Finally, I shall respond to some objections and I shall undermine the criterion of distinction between particulars and universals that says that the distinction between particulars and universals lies in that while there can be indiscernible particulars, there cannot be indiscernible universals. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there are universals. I begin (Sect. 1) by proposing a sufficient condition for a thing’s being a universal. I then argue (Sect. 2) that some truths exist necessarily. Finally, I argue (Sects. 3 and 4) that these truths are structured entities having constituents that meet the proposed sufficient condition for being universals.

Proponents of the dispositional theory of properties typically claim that their view is not one that offers a realist, governing conception of laws. My first aim is to show that, contrary to this claim, if one commits to dispositionalism then one does not automatically give up on a robust, realist theory of laws. This is because dispositionalism can readily be developed within a Platonic framework of universals. Second, I argue that there are good reasons for realist dispositionalists to favour a (...) Platonic view. This is because the alternative Aristotelian version of dispositionalism, on which universals are immanent entities, is unstable for various reasons. My final aim is to address a common criticism facing Platonic theories of laws, which is the problem of how external entities can play an explanatory role where the world’s law-like patterns of behaviour are concerned. I argue that the Platonists’ response to the one over many problem can help to shed light on this matter, and a possible solution is sketched, one which makes use of the notions of essence, constitution and ontological dependence. (shrink)

Universals have traditionally thought to obey the identity of indiscernibles, that is, it has traditionally been thought that there can be no perfectly similar universals. But at least in the conception of universals as immanent, there is nothing that rules out there being indiscernible universals. In this paper, I shall argue that there is useful work indiscernible universals can do, and so there might be reason to postulate indiscernible universals. In particular, I shall argue that postulating indiscernible universals can allow (...) a theory of universals to identify particulars with bundles of universals, and that postulating indiscernible universals can allow a theory of universals to develop an account of the resemblance of quantitative universals that avoids the objections that Armstrong’s account faces. Finally, I shall respond to some objections and I shall undermine the criterion of distinction between particulars and universals that says that the distinction between particulars and universals lies in that while there can be indiscernible particulars, there cannot be indiscernible universals. (shrink)

Both philosophers of perception and analytic metaphysicians apply the tropes/universals distinction when considering the ontological status of visual properties. One way of arguing in favor of the trope interpretation of visual properties is to claim that the way in which we visually experience properties makes it plausible to characterize them as tropes. In this paper, I argue for a different position, namely that the way in which we visually experience properties provides a serious challenge for the trope interpretation, but not (...) for an interpretation in terms of universals. More specifically, I claim that the trope interpretations of visual properties have problems accounting for the fact that ordinary, veridical visual experiences can present the properties of two objects as strictly similar. (shrink)

Structural universals are a kind of complex universal. They have been put to work in a variety of philosophical theories but are plagued with problems concerning their compositional nature. In this article, we will discuss the following questions. What are structural universals? Why believe in them? Can we give a consistent account of their compositional nature? What are the costs of doing so?

Universals: Loux, M. J. The existence of universals. Russell, B. The world of universals. Quine, W. V. O. On what there is. Pears, D. F. Universals. Strawson, P. F. Particular and general. Wolterstorff, N. Qualities. Bambrough, R. Universals and family resemblances. Donagan, A. Universals and metaphysical realism. Sellars, W. Abstract entities. Wolterstorff, N. On the nature of universals.--Particulars: Loux, M. J. Particulars and their individuation. Black. M. The identity of indiscernibles. Ayer, A. J. The identity of indiscernibles. O'Connor, D. J. (...) The identity of indiscernibles. Allaire, E. B. Bare particulars. Chappell, V. C. Particulars re-clothed. Allaire, E. B. Another look at bare particulars. Meiland, J. W. Do relations individuate? Long, D. C. Particulars and their qualities. Copi, I. Essence and accident. Chandler, H. S. Essence and accident. Plantinga, A. World and essence. (shrink)

David Lewis famously argued against structural universals since they allegedly required what he called a composition “sui generis” that differed from standard mereological com¬position. In this paper it is shown that, although traditional Boolean mereology does not describe parthood and composition in its full generality, a better and more comprehensive theory is provided by the foundational theory of categories. In this category-theoretical framework a theory of structural universals can be formulated that overcomes the conceptual difficulties that Lewis and his followers (...) regarded as unsurmountable. As a concrete example of structural universals groups are considered in some detail. (shrink)

Presented here is an argument for the existence of universals. Like Church's translation- test argument, the argument turns on considerations from intensional logic. But whereas Church's argument turns on the fine-grained informational content of intensional sentences, this argument turns on the distinctive logical features of 'that'-clauses embedded within modal contexts. And unlike Church's argument, this argument applies against truth-conditions nominalism and also against conceptualism and in re realism. So if the argument is successful, it serves as a defense of full (...) ante rem realism. The argument emphasizes the need for a unified treatment of intensional statements -- modal statements as well as statements of assertion and belief. The larger philosophical moral will be that ante rem universals are uniquely suited to carry a certain kind of modal information. Linguistic entities, mind-dependent universals, and instance-dependent universals are incapable of serving that function. (shrink)

The world contains objective causal relations and universals, both of which are intimately connected. If these claims are true, they must have far-reaching consequences, breathing new life into the theory of empirical knowledge and reinforcing epistemological realism. Without causes and universals, Professor Fales argues, realism is defeated, and idealism or scepticism wins. Fales begins with a detailed analysis of David Hume's argument that we have no direct experience of necessary connections between events, concluding that Hume was mistaken on this fundamental (...) point. Then, adopting the view of Armstrong and others that causation is grounded in a second-order relation between universals, he explores a range of topics for which the resulting analysis of causation has systematic implications. In particular, causal identity conditions for physical universals are proposed, which generate a new argument for Platonism. The nature of space and time is discussed, with arguments against backward causation and for the view that space and time can exist independently of matter or causal process. Many of Professor Fales's conclusions seem to run counter to received opinion among contemporary empiricists. Yet his method is classically empiricist in spirit, and a chief motive for these metaphysical explorations is epistemological. The final chapters investigate the perennial question of whether an empiricist, internalist and foundational epistemology can support scientific realism. (shrink)

There is substantial controversy about the nature of both particulars and properties. Some philosophers think that the categories of particular and property are fundamental, that at least some of the things in both are in no way derived from or dependent on things in another category. These philosophers are Realists about both particulars and properties. Nominalists think of particulars as fundamental and of properties as non‐fundamental, with the latter being derived from the former. This chapter explores why someone might go (...) in for Realism about properties. If one insists that universals are just properties that could be exemplified by more than one thing, Class and Resemblance Nominalism turn out to be committed to universals. Ostrich Nominalism is much larger qualitatively, since UP‐Realism has only two fundamental kinds, whereas Ostrich Nominalism has n fundamental kinds. Ostrich Nominalists must posit a very large number of metaphysically fundamental sorts of things: spheres, cubes, blue things, red things, etc. (shrink)

According to strong immanent realism, proposed for instance by David M. Armstrong, universals are concrete, located in their instances. E.J. Lowe and Douglas Ehring have presented arguments to the effect that strong immanent realism is incoherent. Cody Gilmore has defended strong immanent realism against the charge of incoherence. Gilmore’s argument has thus far remained unanswered. We argue that Gilmore’s response to the charge of incoherence is an ad hoc move without support independent of strong immanent realism itself. We conclude that (...) strong immanent realism remains under the threat of incoherence posed by Lowe and Ehring. (shrink)

Armstrong holds that a law of nature is a certain sort of structural universal which, in turn, fixes causal relations between particular states of affairs. His claim that these nomic structural universals explain causal relations commits him to saying that such universals are irreducible, not supervenient upon the particular causal relations they fix. However, Armstrong also wants to avoid Plato’s view that a universal can exist without being instantiated, a view which he regards as incompatible with naturalism. This (...) construal of naturalism forces Armstrong to say that universals are abstractions from a certain class of particulars; they are abstractions from first-order states of affairs, to be more precise. It is here argued that these two tendencies in Armstrong cannot be reconciled: To say that universals are abstractions from first-order states of affairs is not compatible with saying that universals fix causal relations between particulars. Causal relations are themselves states of affairs of a sort, and Armstrong’s claim that a law is a kind of structural universal is best understood as the view that any given law logically supervenes on its corresponding causal relations. The result is an inconsistency, Armstrong having to say that laws do not supervene on particular causal relations while also being committed to the view that they do so supervene. The inconsistency is perhaps best resolved by denying that universals are abstractions from states of affairs. (shrink)

Renford Bambrough; XII—Universals and Family Resemblances, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 61, Issue 1, 1 June 1961, Pages 207–222, https://doi.

Talk of linguistic universals has given cognitive scientists the impression that languages are all built to a common pattern. In fact, there are vanishingly few universals of language in the direct sense that all languages exhibit them. Instead, diversity can be found at almost every level of linguistic organization. This fundamentally changes the object of enquiry from a cognitive science perspective. This target article summarizes decades of cross-linguistic work by typologists and descriptive linguists, showing just how few and unprofound the (...) universal characteristics of language are, once we honestly confront the diversity offered to us by the world's 6,000 to 8,000 languages. After surveying the various uses of “universal,” we illustrate the ways languages vary radically in sound, meaning, and syntactic organization, and then we examine in more detail the core grammatical machinery of recursion, constituency, and grammatical relations. Although there are significant recurrent patterns in organization, these are better explained as stable engineering solutions satisfying multiple design constraints, reflecting both cultural-historical factors and the constraints of human cognition.Linguistic diversity then becomes the crucial datum for cognitive science: we are the only species with a communication system that is fundamentally variable at all levels. Recognizing the true extent of structural diversity in human language opens up exciting new research directions for cognitive scientists, offering thousands of different natural experiments given by different languages, with new opportunities for dialogue with biological paradigms concerned with change and diversity, and confronting us with the extraordinary plasticity of the highest human skills. (shrink)

We discuss a well-known puzzle about the lexicalization of logical operators in natural language, in particular connectives and quantifiers. Of the many logically possible operators, only few appear in the lexicon of natural languages: the connectives in English, for example, are conjunction _and_, disjunction _or_, and negated disjunction _nor_; the lexical quantifiers are _all, some_ and _no_. The logically possible nand (negated conjunction) and Nall (negated universal) are not expressed by lexical entries in English, nor in any natural language. (...) Moreover, the lexicalized operators are all upward or downward monotone, an observation known as the Monotonicity Universal. We propose a logical explanation of lexical gaps and of the Monotonicity Universal, based on the dynamic behaviour of connectives and quantifiers. We define update potentials for logical operators as procedures to modify the context, under the assumption that an update by \( \phi \) depends on the logical form of \( \phi \) and on the speech act performed: assertion or rejection. We conjecture that the adequacy of update potentials determines the limits of lexicalizability for logical operators in natural language. Finally, we show that on this framework the Monotonicity Universal follows from the logical properties of the updates that correspond to each operator. (shrink)

Are there any universal entities? Or is the world populated only by particular things? The problem of universals is one of the most fascinating and enduring topics in the history of metaphysics, with roots in ancient and medieval philosophy. This collection of new essays provides an innovative overview of the contemporary debate on universals. Rather than focusing exclusively on the traditional opposition between realism and nominalism, the contributors explore the complexity of the debate and illustrate a broad range of (...) positions within both the realist and the nominalist camps. Realism is viewed through the lens of the distinction between constituent and relational ontologies, while nominalism is reconstructed in light of the controversy over the notion of trope. The result is a fresh picture of contemporary metaphysics, in which traditional strategies of dealing with the problem of universals are both reaffirmed and called into question. (shrink)

What all contemporary so-called aristotelian realists have in common has been identified by David Armstrong as the principle of instantiation. This principle has been put forward in different versions, but all of them have the following simple consequence in common: uninstantiated universals do not exist. Such entities are for the lotus-eating Platonist to countenance, but not for any sort of moderate realist. I shall argue that this principle, in any guise, is not the best way to differentiate aristotelianism from Platonism. (...) In its place, I shall suggest that the best way to differentiate the two versions of realism from each other is by means of a far more powerful idea: naturalism. And the surprising conclusion given this means of differentiation will be that contrary to the usual proclamations, Platonism will be the more naturalistic theory, whereas aristotelianism will come to be seen for what it really is, namely, non-naturalistic. (shrink)

This collection of articles and review essays, including many hard to find pieces, comprises the most important and fundamental studies of Indian logic and linguistics ever undertaken. Frits Staal is concerned with four basic questions: Are there universals of logic that transcend culture and time? Are there universals of language and linguistics? What is the nature of Indian logic? And what is the nature of Indian linguistics? By addressing these questions, Staal demonstrates that, contrary to the general assumption among Western (...) philosophers, the classical philosophers of India were rationalists, attentive to arguments. They were in this respect unlike contemporary Western thinkers inspired by existentialism or hermeneutics, and like the ancient Chinese, Greeks, and many medieval European schoolmen, only--as Staal says--more so. Universals establishes that Asia's contributions are not only compatible with what has been produced in the West, but a necessary ingredient and an essential component of any future human science. (shrink)

Rudolph Agricola’s De inventione dialectica has rightly been regarded as the most original and influential textbook on argumentation, reading, writing, and communication in the Renaissance. At the heart of his treatment are the topics ( loci ), such as definition, genus, species, place, whole, parts, similars, and so on. While their function in Agricola’s system is argumentative and rhetorical, the roots of the topics are metaphysical, as Agricola himself explicitly acknowledges. It has led scholars to characterize Agricola as a realist (...) or even an extreme realist. This article studies two little treatises on universals by Agricola that throw further light on his realism. It is suggested that they could be viewed as an early step in his long-term project of revising and re-organizing the systems of topics as he encountered them in Aristotle, Cicero, and Boethius. The article offers a close analysis of the treatises, suggesting that Agricola’s realism owes a (general) debt to the school of the Scotists. In both earlier and later work Agricola emphasizes the common aspects of things that enable us to categorize and talk about things without denying their fundamental unicity and individuality. An edition of Agricola’s second treatise on universals—a reply to a critic—is added. (shrink)

This paper raises a problem for the pair of views that universals are immanent in their instantiations and that these instantiations, or states of affairs, are somehow constructed from the instantiated universals. It is argued that the pair is inconsistent. The first view implies that universals are prior to states of affairs, whereas the second view implies that states of affairs are prior to universals. This paper does not attempt to solve this problem, but rather to formulate it precisely. That (...) promises to illuminate how to solve the problem if it can be solved, or why it cannot be solved if it is unsolvable. (shrink)

The Aristotelian view of universals, according to which each universal generically depends for its existence on its instantiations, has recently come under attack by a series of ground-theoretic arguments. The last such arguments, presented by Raven, promises to offer several significant improvements over its predecessors, such as avoiding commitment to the transitivity of ground and offering new reasons for the metaphysical priority of universals over their instantiations. In this paper, we argue that Raven's argument does not effectively avoid said (...) commitment and that Raven's new reasons fail. Moreover, we present a novel ground-theoretic interpretation of the Aristotelian view, referred to as strong immanence, and introduce a new argument against the Aristotelian view, intended to sidestep any commitment to the transitivity of ground. (shrink)

I provide an argument against the Aristotelian view of universals, according to which universals depend for their existence on their exemplifiers. The argument consists in a set of five jointly inconsistent assumptions. As such, the argument can be used to argue in favour of other conclusions, such as that exemplification is no relation or that plausible principles concerning ontological dependence or grounding do not hold.

Conceptual primitives and semantic universals are the cornerstones of a semantic theory which Anna Wierzbicka has been developing for many years. Semantics: Primes and Universals is a major synthesis of her work, presenting a full and systematic exposition of that theory in a non-technical and readable way. It delineates a full set of universal concepts, as they have emerged from large-scale investigations across a wide range of languages undertaken by the author and her colleagues. On the basis of empirical (...) cross-linguistic studies it vindicates the old notion of the "psychic unity of mankind", while at the same time offering a framework for the rigorous description of different languages and cultures. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that there are both particulars and universals. Many of these philosophers, in turn, believe that universals are immanent. On this view, universals are wholly located where their instances are located. Both Douglas Ehring and E.J. Lowe have argued that immanent universals do not exist on the grounds that nothing can be wholly located in multiple places simultaneously without contradiction. In this paper, I focus on Lowe’s argument, which has received far less attention in the literature. Using the (...) theory of location found in Josh Parsons (2007), I show how Lowe’s argument against immanent universals can be resisted. (shrink)