Philosophical Studies 150 (3):373-389 (2010)
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| Abstract |
In this paper, I argue that there are universals. I begin (Sect. 1) by proposing a sufficient condition for a thing’s being a universal. I then argue (Sect. 2) that some truths exist necessarily. Finally, I argue (Sects. 3 and 4) that these truths are structured entities having constituents that meet the proposed sufficient condition for being universals.
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| Keywords | Universals Possible worlds Modality Propositions Realism Nominalism |
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| DOI | 10.1007/s11098-009-9417-3 |
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References found in this work BETA
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Properties.Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Theory of Truthmaking: Metaphysics, Ontology, and Reality.Jamin Asay - 2020 - Cambridge University Press.
View all 19 citations / Add more citations
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