De concordia, el último tratado escrito por Anselmo constituye un hito privilegiado en la ontogénesis de su pensamiento. Intentaré delinear en De concordia aquellos aspectos de su macroestructura que juzgo importantes y que pertenecen a ese proceso genético: a) la obra se inscribe —junto con Monologion y Cur deus homo— en la ontogénesis del pensamiento anselmiano en tanto pensamiento especulativo; b) este carácter especulativo está asociado íntimamente al lenguaje a través de la noción nihil; c) la articulación entre libertad y (...) necesidad cuanto el desdoblamiento del centro de DC, son subsidiarios del antedicho carácter especulativo. (shrink)

This is the first dedicated commentary to Sextus Empiricus’ treatise _Against the Arithmeticians_, dealing with crucial issues in the history of the sceptical, Platonic and Pythagorean traditions and in the ancient philosophy of mathematics.

Arithmetic deals with numbers: but what is the nature of their existence, of their parts, and of their relationship with countable items? These questions nourished a lively debate between the Platonico-Pythagorean tradition (trying to answer them) and the Pyrrhonian tradition (trying to show that these answers were unsatisfactory). The debate lies at the heart of Sextus Empiricus' Against the Arithmeticians. The present book aims at facing the remarkable historical and philosophical questions raised by Sextus' treatise by offering a new translation (...) of it and the first dedicated commentary to it. (shrink)

This paper investigates Hegel’s account of the animal organism as it is presented in the Philosophy of Nature, with a special focus on its normative implications. I argue that the notion of “organisation” is fundamental to Hegel’s theory of animal normativity. The paper starts by showing how a Hegelian approach takes up the scientific image of organism and assigns a basic explanatory role to the notion of “organisation” in its understanding living beings. Moving from this premise, the paper turns to (...) the group of accounts in contemporary theoretical biology known as “organisational accounts”, which offer a widely debated strategy for naturalizing teleology and normativity in organisms. As recent scholarship recognizes, these accounts explicitly rely on insights from Kant and Post-Kantianism. I make the historical and conceptual argument that Hegel’s view of the organism shares several basic commitments with OAs, especially regarding the notion of “organisational closure”. I assess the account of normativity that such accounts advance and its implications for how we approach Hegel. Finally, I argue that the notion of “organisation” is more fundamental to Hegel’s theory of animal normativity than the Aristotelian notion of “Gattung” or “species”, which by contrast appears derivative – at least in the Philosophy of Nature and the Lectures – and does not play the central role in his account maintained by some scholars. (shrink)

This article investigates Hegel's later theory of perception and cognition, identifying and analysing its general assumptions about the relation among the mind's activities. These often unremarked upon assumptions, I claim, continue to underwrite recent interpretive controversies. I demonstrate how a correct understanding of such assumptions points us toward an alternative interpretation of Hegel's model of the mind. I argue that this new model changes how we understand (a) Hegel's later notion of ‘non-conceptual content’ and (b) his distinction between human and (...) animal minds—two areas that constitute the fault line dividing interpretations of late Hegel. To isolate the relevant assumptions, I use Matthew Boyle's influential conceptual distinction between ‘additive’ and ‘transformative’ models of rationality. I demonstrate that Hegel himself addresses the basic issues characterizing this distinction and clarify how approaching his work in these terms presents considerable interpretative and conceptual advantages, including allowing us to defend the position that Hegel adopts a ‘transformative’ framework of mind. To support this argument, this paper closely analyses Hegel's treatment of sensation (Empfindung), which has not yet been systematically addressed by scholars. I show how sensation can be best understood as part of Hegel's later ‘transformative’ framework for cognition. I also show how this framework can be extended to other parts of Hegel's theory. (shrink)

It has been argued that non-relativistic quantum mechanics is the best hunting ground for genuine examples of metaphysical indeterminacy. Approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy can be divided into two families: meta-level and object-level accounts. It has been shown :27–245, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400903097786; Skow in Philosophical Quarterly 60:851–858, 2010) that the most popular version of the meta-level accounts, namely the metaphysical supervaluationism proposed by Barnes and Williams, fails to deal with quantum indeterminacy. Such a fact has been taken by many as a challenge (...) to adapt supervaluationism to quantum cases. In this paper, I will focus on the very last of these attempts, i.e. the situation semantics account proposed by Darby and Pickup. After having shown where quantum indeterminacy arises and having surveyed the assumptions endorsed by the participants of the debate, I turn to Darby and Pickup’s proposal. I argue that, despite the machinery introduced, their account still fails to account for quantum indeterminacy. After considering some possible counterarguments, I suggest in the conclusion that one can plausibly extend the argument to those meta-level approaches that treat quantum indeterminacy as worldly indecision. (shrink)

In recent years, so-called organizational accounts (OA) have emerged in theoretical biology as a powerful, viable strategy for naturalizing teleology and normativity. In the wake of the theoretical tradition of autopoiesis and biological autonomy, OA notably propose a new meaning for the notion of “organization,” which they claim to be capable, among other things, of grounding objective and observer-independent normative teleological ascriptions. In this paper, I focus on this last claim, asking “How are ‘organization’ and ‘normativity’ conceptually connected?” The basic (...) insight mobilized by the OA framework to answer this question is most often expressed as a counterfactual argument regarding the “conditions of existence” of organized entities. In this paper, I show that careful scrutiny of this core OA argument reveals a substantial shortcoming. To make this point, I first analyze how the OA framework positions the idea of “conditions of existence” via the notions of “dependence”, “constraint,” and “closure.” Second, I consider various possible interpretations of the OA counterfactual argument grounding norms. I conclude that the implications of this argument do not enable OA to deliver what they promise, i.e., a straightforward link between organization and norms. I argue that a different strategy is needed to capture the basic organizational intuition about biological normativitiy and suggest that a stipulative route might be better suitable to that end. (shrink)

A common assumption in non-relativistic quantum mechanics is that self-adjoint operators mathematically represent properties of quantum systems. Focusing on spin, we argue that a natural view considers observables as determinable properties and their eigenvalues as their corresponding determinates. We provide a taxonomy of the different views that one can hold, once it is accepted that spin can be modelled with the determinable-determinate relation. In particular, we present the two main families of views, dubbed Spin Monism and Pluralism, and we show (...) that the current literature does not take a stance between the two. Then we put forward two arguments in favour of the former. Finally, we present a new account of Spin Monism, that is absent in current literature; such a view is worth discussing, or so we contend, because several compelling considerations support it, and it opens new ways of thinking about the ontology of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

This paper reconstructs and defends a Sellarsian approach to “sensation” that allows us to avoid mythological conceptions of it. Part I reconstructs and isolates Sellars’s argument for “sensation,” situating his adverbial interpretation of the notion within his broader theory of perception. Part II positions Sellars’s views vis-à-vis current conversations on adverbalism. In particular, it focuses on the Many Property Problem, which is traditionally considered the main obstacle to adverbialism. After reconstructing Sellars’s response to this problem, I demonstrate that his position (...) is compatible with some current strategies to solving it and can be developed along similar lines. Finally, part III addresses how a Sellarsian adverbial approach productively accounts for the phenomenal properties of experience often understood to fall under the notion of “sensation”. The paper therefore shows how isolating Sellars’s argument can yield a non-problematic conception of sensation. Indeed, the argument on which I focus offers a form of direct realism compatible with recent forms of “new adverbialism”. Although my view remains Sellarsian, to defend it I maintain that some Sellarsian claims about sensation should be resisted as not logically entailed by his argument. (shrink)

We use speech shadowing to create situations wherein people converse in person with a human whose words are determined by a conversational agent computer program. Speech shadowing involves a person (the shadower) repeating vocal stimuli originating from a separate communication source in real-time. Humans shadowing for conversational agent sources (e.g., chat bots) become hybrid agents ("echoborgs") capable of face-to-face interlocution. We report three studies that investigated people’s experiences interacting with echoborgs and the extent to which echoborgs pass as autonomous humans. (...) First, participants in a Turing Test spoke with a chat bot via either a text interface or an echoborg. Human shadowing did not improve the chat bot’s chance of passing but did increase interrogators’ ratings of how human-like the chat bot seemed. In our second study, participants had to decide whether their interlocutor produced words generated by a chat bot or simply pretended to be one. Compared to those who engaged a text interface, participants who engaged an echoborg were more likely to perceive their interlocutor as pretending to be a chat bot. In our third study, participants were naïve to the fact that their interlocutor produced words generated by a chat bot. Unlike those who engaged a text interface, the vast majority of participants who engaged an echoborg neither sensed nor suspected a robotic interaction. These findings have implications for android science, the Turing Test paradigm, and human-computer interaction. The human body, as the delivery mechanism of communication, fundamentally alters the social psychological dynamics of interactions with machine intelligence. (shrink)

This new critical guide to Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit aims to orient readers in the text as well as to “present and assess the state of art in understanding and evaluating” it. This is no easy task. One reason why is the multiple meanings Geist takes on in the text and the variety of topics Hegel addresses, which range from embodiment to the unconscious, from cognitive psychology to bodily expressions, from race, madness, and habit to practical philosophy. Indeed, for Hegel (...) morality, the state, art, religion, and philosophy all belong to the spiritual domain, and this makes the Philosophy of Spirit, as Hegel himself acknowledges, “the sublimest and most difficult” part of his system (Encyclopedia of the... (shrink)

This paper explores Sellars’ and Hegel’s treatment of ‘sensation’ – a notion that plays a central role in the reflections of both authors but which has garnered little scholarly attention. To disentangle the issues surrounding the notion and elaborate its role, function, and fate in their thought, I begin with a methodological question: what kind of philosophical argument leads Sellars and Hegel to introduce the concept of ‘sensation’ into their systems? Distinguishing between their two argumentative approaches, I maintain that Hegel (...) offers what I broadly label a ‘transcendental’ argument for ‘sensation,’ which he presents in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and in the corresponding Lectures, whereas Sellars introduces the notion of sensation for what I term empirically ‘explanatory’ reasons. Next, I closely analyze Hegel’s and Sellars’ theories of sensation to produce a textually supported and conceptually coherent reading of their views on the notion. To clarify my methodological distinction and its stakes in Hegel’s and Sellars’ I will reference Lewis’ notion of the given. (shrink)

Cet article s’interroge sur ce qu’est l’ἀριθμητική τέχνη visée par Sextus dans le Contre les arithméticiens. Après avoir rappelé brièvement le contenu de M IV, on examine la nature de cette discipline. Une fois clarifiée la question de savoir en quoi consistait l’ἀριθμητική τέχνη dans l’Antiquité – et donc ce que visait Sextus dans M IV –, on examine son rapport avec les autres disciplines critiquées par Sextus dans le Contre les Professeurs. Cette enquête mène à mettre en lumière une (...) importante présupposition implicite dans l’attitude de Sextus à l’égard des sciences. (shrink)

This edited volume systematically addresses the connection between Wilfrid Sellars and the history of modern philosophy, exploring both the content and method of this relationship. It intends both to analyze Sellars’s position in relation to singular thinkers of the modern tradition, and to inquire into Sellars’s understanding of philosophy as a field in reflective and constructive conversation with its past. The chapters in Part I cover Sellars’s interpretation and use of Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant and Hegel. Part II features essays (...) on his relationship with Peirce, Frege, Carnap, Wittgenstein, American pragmatism, behaviorism and American realism, particularly his father, Roy Wood. Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy features original contributions by many of the most renowned Sellars scholars throughout the world. It offers an exhaustive survey of Sellars’s views on the historical antecedents and metaphilosophical aspects of his thought. (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed the publication of numerous articles that draw a critical alignment between ethics and caring. In essence, this theme suggests that caring is a moral pursuit centred on the beneficent attention of one person shown to another. Yet, if such language is to have real poignancy, it must be geared towards an inclusive agenda that meets the needs of all within the community. Research evidence suggests that this is not always the case, especially in terms of the (...) care offered to members of minority ethnic groups. This article will focus on the findings of a qualitative research study that explored the expectations and perceived experiences of nursing care among members of the Pakistani community in Bradford, West Yorkshire, UK. The findings suggest that nurses should develop a more informed narrative that readily reflects the needs of the Pakistani community. (shrink)

Dans la première partie de son article « Une morale est-elle compatible avec le scepticisme? », Jules Vuillemin propose une interprétation du scepticisme de Pyrrhon d’Élis et s’interroge sur sa compatibilité avec une vie morale. La présente contribution s’attache à resituer la lecture de Vuillemin dans l’histoire du pyrrhonisme ainsi que dans les débats récents à son sujet, et à la discuter en la comparant au néo-pyrrhonisme de Sextus Empiricus. À suivre Vuillemin, Pyrrhon suspend son jugement par rapport à tout, (...) y compris ses impressions. Cette suspension universelle provoquerait une impassibilité totale et fournirait une ligne de conduite, mais serait assez difficile à adopter. Nous suggérons que suspendre son jugement sur ses propres impressions n’est pas difficile, mais impossible ; que la façon dont, selon Vuillemin, cette suspension fournirait au sceptique une ligne de conduite implique une contradiction ; et qu’il existe une autre façon d’expliquer comment le sceptique peut, dans certaines limites, maintenir une ligne de conduite. (shrink)

Le volume offre huit articles sur le scepticisme pyrrhonien. Les essais, de la plume de M. Bonazzi, T. O’Keefe, J. Warren, F. Grgić, H. Thorsrud, S. Marchand, D. E. Machuca et O. Bueno, sont tous en anglais. Précédés d’une préface, d’une notice sur les auteurs et d’une brève introduction, ils sont suivis d’index des noms propres, des passages et des sujets. Chaque contribution est munie d’une bibliographie. Les deux premiers articles sont consacrés à la section des Esquisses Pyrrhoniennes (PH...

Cet article propose une vue d’ensemble de la doctrine des Intermédiaires mathématiques (τὰ μεταξύ) qu’Aristote attribue à Platon dans sa Métaphysique, des objections qu’Aristote lui adresse et des questions philosophiques qu’elle soulève. Suivant Aristote, Platon avance que les vérités de la géométrie et de l’arithmétique ne peuvent pas porter sur des objets perceptibles ni sur des Formes, mais doivent porter sur une troisième classe d’entités intermédiaires entre les deux. Je soutiens que la critique d’Aristote la plus efficace de cette doctrine (...) montre que les raisons avancées en faveur de l’existence des Intermédiaires par les Platoniciens ne sont pas concluantes, mais ne peut pas montrer qu’ils n’existent pas. En m’appuyant sur quelques remarques de David Ross sur la démarche d’Aristote, je soutiens également que, s’il est vrai que le fait que toute science est caractérisée par des propositions de la forme « Tout F est G » n’implique pas qu’elle porte sur des entités intermédiaires, il peut y avoir des raisons pour accepter leur existence eu égard à une science mathématique en particulier, à savoir la géométrie. (shrink)

This collection of essays investigates the notions of life, living organisms, and human nature in Classical German Philosophy from a historical and conceptual perspective. Its 19 chapters move from the peculiarities of organic life to the peculiarities of the distinctly human life form and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of naturalistic accounts of life. In light of the growing interest in nature within current philosophical debates, the book provides an overview of what the philosophical epoch of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Humboldt, (...) the Romantics, Hegel, and others can contribute to our understanding of life today. The collection of essays represents a plurality of approaches that reflects the pluralism of the tradition itself – highlighting the liveliness and polyphonic nature of the issues at stake and the ways in which they were approached in post-Kantian thought.In combining historical and philosophical investigation, the collection constitutes a unique resource for scholars and graduate students working in various areas related to the study of nature in philosophy, contemporary theories of science, and the humanities more generally. (shrink)

Alchourrón y Bulygin sostienen que el derecho positivo, además de normas, contiene definiciones, que ponen de manifiesto un aparato conceptual a través del cual pensamos la realidad. A partir de esta afirmación argumentaré que hay un aspecto del derecho al que la teoría jurídica no ha prestado la atención que merece: la red de conceptos o categorías a través de la cual el derecho piensa, estructura, esquematiza o imagina la realidad. Sobre la base de una visión pluralista, sostengo que el (...) derecho moderno contiene una red conceptual singular, diferente a la construida por la ciencia y a la que está implícita en la vida cotidiana, aun cuando pueda receptar aspectos de una y otra. Dicho en el léxico de Quine, el derecho incluye criterios propios de objetivación e individuación, es decir, una ontología propia. En ese camino propongo algunas distinciones generales que pueden ser útiles para la descripción del derecho: definiciones expresas e implícitas por un lado; aparatos conceptuales derivados y aparatos conceptuales singulares del derecho, por el otro. La argumentación revela asimismo la relevancia y singularidad de categorías jurídicas muy básicas, como las de persona y cosa. (shrink)

En 2004, la famille de Jules Vuillemin lègue aux Archives Henri-Poincaré un fonds constitué par les ouvrages, les tirés à part et les manuscrits du célèbre philosophe français, décédé aux Fourgs le 16 janvier 2001. Dans le cadre de la conservation et de la valorisation de ce fonds très riche, les Archives Henri-Poincaré organisent chaque année, au mois de décembre, une journée d’études autour d’un texte ou d’un aspect de la pensée de Jules Vuillemin, afin de d...

Je remercie Stéphane Marchand : ses objections me fournissent l’occasion d’éclaircir certains points capitaux de mon livre et de mon interprétation de Sextus Empiricus. Scepticisme et langage veut affronter la question de savoir si le sceptique pyrrhonien décrit par Sextus peut maîtriser une langue. Après avoir identifié le pyrrhonien à un sceptique radical, un individu dépourvu de croyances, je m’efforce de lui assurer la possibilité de parler en proposant plusieurs façons d’expliquer son co...

An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it’s justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible with recognizing the (...) inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

_The thesis investigates metaphysical models of spin as a physical property instantiated by microphysical systems as described in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The thesis is dived into two parts. The first part concerns foundational issues in meta-metaphysics. In particular, the author defends a naturalized approach to metaphysics, according to which metaphysical investigations have to be motivated and supported by our current best scientific theories. Furthermore, it is argued that naturalized metaphysics is in tension with (standard presentations of) scientific realism, and possible (...) ways out from the tension are outlined. In the second part, the author investigates how spin has to be metaphysically modelled. After having introduced how spin is characterised in non-relativistic quantum mechanics and which approach to the metaphysics of quantum mechanics is assumed, it is argued that scientific realists must commit to spin’s existence as a physical property. Then, the author introduces the recent debate on quantum indeterminacy, and he presents new arguments against a widely shared approach to such indeterminacy. In the last part of the thesis, the author introduces an original characterisation of spin as a property through the determinable-determinate machinery. Such metaphysical machinery is instrumental to present a taxonomy of possible metaphysical models. Finally, a new and original view about spin is introduced and it is defended as a genuine contender in the debate which deserves more attention from the literature._. (shrink)

This paper presents a re-reading of Anselm’s Epistola de incarnatione verbi, examining it as a textual and doctrinal interpretation carried out by Anselm about the statements by Roscelin of Compiègne. It is marked by three moments: hearing, understanding and responding. Hearing is applied, on the one hand, to the literal text of the statement in the conditional version exposed in the Epistola de incarnatione verbi and in Letter 128; and, on the other hand, in the version in Letters 129 and (...) 136. Understanding requires the experience of those who believe in the Incarnate Word. The response refutes the Roscelin's thesis. (shrink)

En 2004, la famille de Jules Vuillemin lègue aux Archives Henri-Poincaré (Université de Lorraine) un fonds constitué par les ouvrages, les tirés à part et les manuscrits du célèbre philosophe français, décédé aux Fourgs (Doubs) le 16 janvier 2001. Dans le cadre de la conservation et de la valorisation de ce fonds très riche, les Archives Henri-Poincaré organisent chaque année, au mois de décembre, une journée d’études autour d’un texte ou d’un aspect de la pensée de Jules Vuillemin, afin de (...) d... (shrink)

Scientific realism is usually presented as if metaphysical realism (i.e. the thesis that there is a structured mind-independent external world) were one of its essential parts. This paper aims to examine how weak the metaphysical commitments endorsed by scientific realists could be. I will argue that scientific realism could be stated without accepting any form of metaphysical realism. Such a conclusion does not go as far as to try to combine scientific realism with metaphysical antirealism. Instead, it amounts to the (...) combination of the former with a weaker view, called quietism, which is agnostic on the existence of mind-independent structures. In Sect. 2, I will argue that the minimal claim that brings together every scientific realist view is devoid of any metaphysical commitment. In Sect. 3, I will define metaphysical realism and antirealism. Such work will be instrumental in providing a more precise statement of quietism. Finally (Sect. 4), I will argue that assuming quietism, it is still possible to make sense of the debate between scientific realists and antirealists. (shrink)

Scientific realism is usually presented as if metaphysical realism (i.e. the thesis that there is a structured mind-independent external world) were one of its essential parts. This paper aims to examine how weak the metaphysical commitments endorsed by scientific realists could be. I will argue that scientific realism could be stated without accepting any form of metaphysical realism. Such a conclusion does not go as far as to try to combine scientific realism with metaphysical antirealism. Instead, it amounts to the (...) combination of the former with a weaker view, called quietism, which is agnostic on the existence of mind-independent structures. In Sect. 2, I will argue that the minimal claim that brings together every scientific realist view is devoid of any metaphysical commitment. In Sect. 3, I will define metaphysical realism and antirealism. Such work will be instrumental in providing a more precise statement of quietism. Finally (Sect. 4), I will argue that assuming quietism, it is still possible to make sense of the debate between scientific realists and antirealists. (shrink)

The ageing of the population is one of the most significant social transformations that the twenty first century is showcasing and a challenge that impacts society at large. The elderly, inasmuch as everybody else, are confronted with continuous transformations that are induced by technology, although they seldom benefit from the opportunities that technology entails. The digital divide amongst various segments of the population is often age-related and due to different reasons, including biological, psychological, social and financial ones. There is an (...) ongoing reflection pertaining to the factors that hinders the full adoption of ICTs by the elderly and a question regarding what can be done to overcome their poor involvement in technology. This article, based on the results of a recent research, which has been conducted in Italy, aims at highlighting the importance of engaging the elderly in the use of technology as a key to building bridges between generations. (shrink)

The author aim is to explore the role Sellars has played in shaping the current discussion of Hegel.

In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues that although all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value, there are often differences in the value of lives. According to Regan, lives that have the highest value are lives which have more possible sources of satisfaction. Regan claims that the highest source of satisfaction, which is available to only rational beings, is the satisfaction associated with thinking impartially about moral choices. Since rational beings can bring impartial reasons to bear on decision making, (...) Regan maintains that they have an additional possible source of satisfaction that nonrational beings do not have and, consequently, the lives of rational beings turn out to have greater value.. (shrink)