Grounding theorists insist that grounding and explanation are intimately related. This claim could be understood as saying either that grounding ‘inherits’ its properties from explanation or it could be interpreted as saying that grounding plays an important—possibly an indispensable—role in metaphysical explanation. Or both. I argue that saying that grounding ‘inherits’ its properties from explanation can only be justified if grounding is explanatory by nature, but that this view is untenable. We ought therefore to be ‘separatists’ and view grounding and (...) explanation as distinct. As it turns out, though, once grounding has been in this sense distinguished from the explanation it backs, the view that the role grounding plays in explanation justifies its introduction ends up in serious trouble. I conclude that the role grounding plays in explanation does not justify attributing to grounding whatever nature we think it has, and it most likely does not give us any special reason to think grounding exists. (shrink)

The treatise attempts to approach and deal with some of the most fundamental problems facing anyone who wishes to uphold some version of the so-called theory of tropes. Three assumptions serve as a basis for the investigation: tropes exist, only tropes exist, and a one-category trope-theory along these lines should be developed so that the tropes it postulates are able to serve as truth-makers for all kinds of atomic propositions. Provided that these assumptions are accepted, it is found that the (...) trope-theorist will have to deal with two important problems. First, some atomic propositions seem to require universal truth-makers. Second, some atomic propositions seem to require concrete truth-makers. As tropes are abstract particulars, it follows that the trope-theorist, in order to fulfil assumption, must provide an account of exactly how he or she could construct universality and concreteness from his or her basic stock of tropes. In the treatise such constructions are attempted and some basic problems with such constructions are revealed. Although these problems are serious enough it is argued that it is nevertheless possible to deal with these basic issues while staying squarely within the boundaries of a one-category trope-ontology. (shrink)

Trope theory is the view that the world is a world of abstract particular qualities. But if all there is are tropes, how do we account for the truth of propositions ostensibly made true by some concrete particular? A common answer is that concrete particulars are nothing but tropes in compresence. This answer seems vulnerable to an argument (first presented by F. H. Bradley) according to which any attempt to account for the nature of relations will end up either in (...) contradiction, nonsense, or will lead to a vicious infinite regress. I investigate Bradley’s argument and claim that it fails to prove what it sets out to. It fails, I argue, because it does not take all the different ways in which relation and relata may depend on one another into account. If relations are entities that are distinct from yet essentially dependent upon their relata, the Bradleyan problem is solved. We are then free to say that tropes in compresence are what make true propositions ostensibly made true by concrete particulars. (shrink)

Ever since F. H. Bradley first formulated his famous regress argument philosophers have been hard at work trying to refute it. The argument fails, it has been suggested, either because its conclusion just does not follow from its premises, or it fails because one or more of its premises should be given up. In this paper, the Bradleyan argument, as well as some of the many and varied reactions it has received, is scrutinized.

That there could be ontologically complex concrete particulars is self-evidently true. A reductio may however be formulated which contradicts this truth. In this paper I argue that all of the reasonable ways in which we might refute this reductio will require the existence of at least some tropes.

Changing values may give rise to intergenerational conflicts, like in the ongoing climate change and energy transition debate. This essay focuses on the interpretative question of how this value change can best be understood. To elucidate the interpretation of value change, two philosophical perspectives on value are introduced: Berlin’s value pluralism and Dworkin’s interpretivism. While both authors do not explicitly discuss value change, I argue that their perspectives can be used for interpreting value change in the case of climate change (...) and the energy transition. I claim that Berlin’s pluralistic account of value would understand the value change as an intergenerational conflict and therefore provide a too narrow and static ground for understanding ongoing value change. Instead, by exploring Dworkin’s standpoint in moral epistemology, this essay distills a more encompassing perspective on how values may relate, converge, overlap, and change, fulfilling their functions in the course of climate change and energy transition. This perspective is further detailed by taking inspiration from Shue’s work on the interpretation of equity in the climate change debate. I argue that the resulting perspective allows us to see value change as a gradual process rather than as a clash between generations and their values. (shrink)

Trope theory is the view that the world consists (wholly or partly) of particular qualities, or tropes. This admittedly thin core assumption leaves plenty of room for variation. Still, most trope theorists agree that their theory is best developed as a one-category theory according to which there is nothing but tropes. Most hold that ‘sameness of property’ should be explained in terms of resembling tropes. And most hold that concrete particulars are made up from tropes in compresence (for an overview, (...) including an introduction to some alternative versions of the view, cf. Maurin, 2014). D. M. Armstrong disagrees. He thinks the world is a world of immanent universals, the thin particulars in which those universals are instantiated, and the states of affairs that—thereby—exist. He holds that ‘sameness of property’ should be explained in terms of numerically identical universals or—if the resembling things are the universals themselves—in terms of partially identical universals. And he believes that concrete particulars are made up from ‘thin particulars’ in which a (sufficient) number of universals are instantiated. In spite of their disagreements, proponents of tropes owe Armstrong a debt of gratitude. First, for being one of the theory’s earliest, most serious, and—not least—most prominent, critics (Armstrong for the first time considers, and rejects, what he then labels ‘particularism’, in his 1978a). But also for being one of the theory’s most ardent champions. Already in his 1989a, Armstrong regrets his 1978-rejection of the view. Equivalence classes of exactly resembling tropes, he now admits, for most purposes “serve as an excellent substitute for universals” (Armstrong 1989a, 122). But then why isn’t Armstrong a trope theorist? In this paper, Armstrong’s main reasons for rejecting the trope view are critically scrutinized. All of them, it is maintained, fail to convince. If this argument is accepted, Armstrong seems to have no—or, at least, no good—reason for not accepting the existence of tropes. But, then, ought Armstrong to have been a trope theorist? If the ‘best’ version of the trope view turns out to be ontologically more parsimonious than Armstrong’s own theory of universals, then, yes. That there is a version of the trope view, a version that is not (or, at least not seriously) considered by Armstrong, that is ontologically more parsimonious than the universals view, is argued in the next section. Why none of Armstrong’s reasons for preferring universals to tropes manage to convince, is explained in the section after that. First, however, and in order to avoid a common misunderstanding of the trope view and, as a consequence, of why one ought to reject it, a few more words about the core-difference between tropes and universals, and about how this difference matters (as well as does not matter) to what—and how well—these theories explain. (shrink)

Companies increasingly deploy artificial intelligence technologies in their personnel recruiting and selection process to streamline it, making it faster and more efficient. AI applications can be found in various stages of recruiting, such as writing job ads, screening of applicant resumes, and analyzing video interviews via face recognition software. As these new technologies significantly impact people’s lives and careers but often trigger ethical concerns, the ethicality of these AI applications needs to be comprehensively understood. However, given the novelty of AI (...) applications in recruiting practice, the subject is still an emerging topic in academic literature. To inform and strengthen the foundation for future research, this paper systematically reviews the extant literature on the ethicality of AI-enabled recruiting to date. We identify 51 articles dealing with the topic, which we synthesize by mapping the ethical opportunities, risks, and ambiguities, as well as the proposed ways to mitigate ethical risks in practice. Based on this review, we identify gaps in the extant literature and point out moral questions that call for deeper exploration in future research. (shrink)

Paper responding to critique of Maurin (2002) presented by Herbert Hochberg in his “Relations, Properties and Particulars” (2004).

In this paper I argue that the infinite regress of resemblance is vicious in the guise it is given by Russell but that it is virtuous if generated in a (contemporary) trope theoretical framework. To explain why this is so I investigate the infinite regress argument. I find that there is but one interesting and substantial way in which the distinction between vicious and virtuous regresses can be understood: The Dependence Understanding. I argue, furthermore, that to be able to decide (...) whether an infinite regress exhibits a dependence pattern of a vicious or a virtuous kind, facts about the theoretical context in which it is generated become essential. It is precisely because of differences in context that he Russellian resemblance regress is vicious whereas its trope theoretical counterpart is not. (shrink)

Traditionally the domain of scientists, the history of science became an independent field of inquiry only in the twentieth century and mostly after the Second World War. This process of emancipation was accompanied by a historiographical departure from previous, ‘scientistic’ practices, a transformation often attributed to influences from sociology, philosophy and history. Similarly, the liberal humanists who controlled the Cambridge History of Science Committee after 1945 emphasized that their contribution lay in the special expertise they, as trained historians, brought to (...) the venture. However, the scientists who had founded the Committee in the 1930s had already advocated a sophisticated contextual approach: innovation in the history of science thus clearly came also from within the ranks of scientists who practised in the field. Moreover, unlike their scientist predecessors on the Cambridge Committee, the liberal humanists supported a positivistic protocol that has since been criticized for its failure to properly contextualize early modern science. Lastly, while celebrating the rise of modern science as an international achievement, the liberal humanists also emphasized the peculiar Englishness of the phenomenon. In this respect, too, their outlook had much in common with the practices from which they attempted to distance their project. (shrink)

Adults who stutter (AWS) have demonstrated atypical coordination of motor and sensory regions during speech production. Yet little is known of the speech-motor network in AWS in the brief time window preceding audible speech onset. The purpose of the current study was to characterize neural oscillations in the speech-motor network during preparation for and execution of overt speech production in AWS using magnetoencephalography (MEG). Twelve AWS and twelve age-matched controls were presented with 220 words, each word embedded in a carrier (...) phrase. Controls were presented with the same word list as their matched AWS participant. Neural oscillatory activity was localized using minimum-variance beamforming during two time periods of interest: speech preparation (prior to speech onset) and speech execution (following speech onset). Compared to controls, AWS showed stronger beta (15-25Hz) suppression in the speech preparation stage, followed by stronger beta synchronization in the bilateral mouth motor cortex. AWS also recruited the right mouth motor cortex significantly earlier in the speech preparation stage compared to controls. Exaggerated motor preparation is discussed in the context of reduced coordination in the speech-motor network of AWS. It is further proposed that exaggerated beta synchronization may reflect a more strongly inhibited motor system that requires a stronger beta suppression to disengage prior to speech initiation. These novel findings highlight critical differences in the speech-motor network of AWS that occur prior to speech onset and emphasize the need to investigate further the speech-motor assembly in the stuttering population. (shrink)

In this paper I critically investigate an unorthodox attempt to metaphysically explain in virtue of what there are states of affairs. This is a suggestion according to which states of affairs exist thanks to, rather than, as is the common view, in spite of, the infinite regress their metaphysical explanation seems to engender. I argue that, no matter in which form it is defended, or in which theoretical framework it is set, this suggestion cannot provide us with the explanation we (...) crave. (shrink)

For the history of science the 1940s were a transformative decade, when salient scholars like Herbert Butterfield or Alexandre Koyré set out to shape postwar culture by promoting new standards for understanding science. Some years ago I placed these developments in a tradition of enduring arts–science tensions and the contemporary notion that previous, “scientistic”, historical practices needed to be confronted with disinterested codes of historical craft. Here, I want to further explore the ideological dimensions of the processes through which the (...) academic study of science became institutionalized. Butterfield’s generation of science historians moulded perception of science in highly specific ways. Whereas the scientist-historians of the 1930s put scientific innovation into its socio-economic contexts, postwar accounts portrayed the birth of modern science as an intellectual revolution. Anti-Marxism formed a defining feature of the process by which the image of scientific work as a disinterested journey of the mind came to be institutionalized. Rather than spelling the end of ideology, appointments processes in the early Cold War years reveal disagreement about what science was to be invariably coextensive with dissent about social and political order. Rather than testifying to irreconcilable conflicts between interestedness and historical craft, the work of both the 1930s and 40s speaks of surprisingly productive relations between the two.Author Keywords: Author Keywords: Hessen; Bernal; Pagel; Needham; Butterfield; Cold War; Cambridge. (shrink)

The article deals with the influence of organizational ethics program components on managerial ethical behavior. The main aim was to establish which EP components are perceived as valuable and useful to foster the ethical behavior of managers. Moreover, we also aimed to investigate the role of ethics training in this context and to explore whether it can potentially increase managers’ trust in EP components as effective tools for the promotion of ethical behavior. The article advances the EP theory in several (...) ways. It offers novel insights into both business ethics and EP development in the specific cultural and social circumstances of a former socialist country in the Central and Eastern European region, Slovakia. It shows that codes of ethics and related reporting and control mechanisms are perceived as the most effective EP components to shape managerial ethical behavior. Furthermore, based on empirical evidence, and to some extent contrary to prior theory, the article unveils three EP functions, namely the ‘compliance with group norms,’ the ‘ethics education through collective discussion,’ and the ‘counselling and resolving of ethical issues’ at workplace. In addition, the article shows that ethics trainings can help to boost the trust of managers toward EP components and might be conceptualized as a precursor for an effectively functioning EP. (shrink)

Eklund vs. Bradley : Regress, Relation, Explanation.

Recently, there has been much talk of impact investing. Around the world, specialized intermediaries have appeared, mainstream financial players and governments have become involved, renowned universities have included impact investing courses in their curriculum, and a myriad of practitioner contributions have been published. Despite all this activity, conceptual clarity remains an issue: The absence of a uniform definition, the interchangeable use of alternative terms and unclear boundaries to related concepts such as socially responsible investment are being criticized. This article aims (...) to contribute to a better understanding of impact investing, which could help foster this specific investment style and guide further academic research. To do so, it investigates a large number of academic and practitioner works, highlighting areas of similarity and inconsistency on three levels: definitional, terminological, and strategic. Our research shows that, on a general level, heterogeneity—especially definitional and strategic—is less pronounced than expected. Yet, our research also reveals critical issues that need to be clarified to advance the field and increase its credibility. First and foremost, this includes the characteristics required of impact investees, notably whether they need to be organizations that prioritize their non-financial mission over the business side. Our results indicate that there may be different schools of thoughts concerning this matter. (shrink)

If lay theories associate moral intuitions with deeply held values, people should feel uncomfortable relying on deliberative thinking when judging violations of personal taboos. In two preliminary studies, participants with siblings of the opposite sex were particularly troubled when evaluating a sibling incest scenario under instructions to think slowly and rationally, or when the scenario was presented in a hard-to-read font forcing them to employ deliberative processing. This suggests that we may be intuitive intuitionists, and opens the door for investigations (...) of people’s preferred modes of moral judgment. (shrink)

According to Johansson (2009: 22) an infinite regress is vicious just in case “what comes first [in the regress-order] is for its definition dependent on what comes afterwards.” Given a few qualifications (to be spelled out below (section 3)), I agree. Again according to Johansson (ibid.), one of the consequences of accepting this way of distinguishing vicious from benign regresses is that the so-called Russellian Resemblance Regress (RRR), if generated in a one-category trope-theoretical framework, is vicious and that, therefore, the (...) existence of tropes only makes sense if trope-theory is understood (minimally) as a two-category theory which accepts, besides the existence of tropes, also the existence of at least one universal: resemblance.1 I disagree. But how can that be? How can Johansson and I agree about what distinguishes a vicious from a benign regress, yet disagree about which regresses are vicious and which are benign? In this paper I attempt to answer that question by first setting out and defending the sense of viciousness which both Johansson and I accept, only to then argue that to be able to determine if a particular regress is vicious in this sense, more than features intrinsic to the regress itself must be taken into account. This is why, although the RRR as originally set out by Russell is vicious, the seemingly identical resemblance regress which ensues in a one-category (standard) trope-theoretical context is not (provided, that is, that we accept certain views about how the nature of tropes relates to the resemblance between tropes, and given that we set our theory in a truthmaker theoretical framework – all of which are standard assumptions for proponents of (the standard-version of) the trope-theory).2. (shrink)

Is democracy necessarily bound to territorial spaces and boundaries, or can democratic processes and institutions dispense with territorial ties? To answer this question, which arises, for example, in debates about democracy beyond the state, this article reconstructs conceptions of territory influential in democratic theory, as well as in recent debates on transnational citizenship and territorial rights. It establishes the container-space, social-space, and place conceptions of territory, and negotiates a nuanced and multi-dimensional understanding of territorial spaces and boundaries and their relations (...) to democracy. Based on this conception, democracy does not necessarily depend on (a) territory. Neither, however, should this connection be dismissed lightly. Instead, proponents of both the preservation and the loosening of ties between democracy and territory need to answer two distinct, yet complementary questions concerning (1) the justification of territorial spaces and boundaries as social spaces, and (2) the functions they fulfil as container spaces. Exclusive place conceptions of territory, however, are not consistent with the proposed understanding of territory. In the final part, this article negotiates institutional perspectives for plural democratic spaces and boundaries by briefly reviewing theoretical sketches on democracy beyond the state, as well as developing constellations of nested political spaces within the European context. (shrink)

Wie verändern sich Mensch und Körper durch Technik? Und welches Menschenverständnis vertritt der Transhumanismus? Anna Puzio befasst sich in der ersten philosophischen Studie zur Anthropologie des Transhumanismus mit führenden Personen des Feldes, u. a. mit Nick Bostrom, David Pearce und Natasha Vita-More. Neben Körperoptimierung und Medizintechnologien beleuchtet sie auch Alltagstechnologien wie Wearables. Dabei entwickelt sie einen neuen Ansatz zur Technikanthropologie und ein neues inklusives Menschen- und Körperverständnis im Anschluss an Donna Haraway und den Kritischen Posthumanismus im amerikanischen Raum.

This paper considers the relationship between institutions and the “sexual imaginary,” understood as the set of affective and imaginative resources that produce certain forms of sexual subjectivity. Drawing on the work of Cornelius Castoriadis and Moira Gatens, I argue that institutions play an important role in shaping sexual imaginaries. Historically, institutions have been sites in which unjust sexual norms have been reinforced and legitimized. I analyse the growing trend of consent education at Australian universities to explore how institutions may also (...) represent potential sites for contesting and reimagining these norms. Feminist critiques of consent suggest that consent education may in fact reproduce a narrow and conservative vision of sexuality, one that aligns with the neoliberal politics of the contemporary university. This paper contributes to these critiques by exploring how both the neoliberal university and consent theory are premised on a distorted vision of the subject as a rational, disembodied being. I argue that transforming dominant sexual imaginaries requires recognizing and interrogating both how desire permeates institutional spaces and the role of desire in ethical sexual relations. (shrink)

Technologien haben schon lange Eingang in unseren Alltag gefunden und transformieren zahlreiche Lebensbereiche wie Politik, Wirtschaft, Bildung, Gesundheit und Pflege. Mittels Social Media pflegen wir zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen und kommunizieren miteinander, wir haben Apps zum Schlafen oder für die Ernährung und in der Medizin werden Technologien in den Körper implantiert oder zur Untersuchung des Körpers verwendet. Wearables, wie z. B. die Smart Watch, werden direkt am Körper getragen und müssen kaum noch abgenommen werden. Smart Watches messen den Puls und Herzschlag, zählen (...) unsere Schritte, melden sich, wenn man wieder aufstehen sollte und erfassen den Schlafrhythmus. Wir schlagen Wissen bei Wikipedia nach und lernen interaktiv über Smart Boards in der Schule. Über digitale Tools lässt sich das orts- und zeitunabhängige Zusammenarbeiten organisieren. Wie verändert sich das Menschsein in einer solchen technisierten Welt? Wie verändern sich die menschliche Lebenswelt, Handeln, Verantwortungsstrukturen und Identitätskonzepte? Puzio, Anna/Rutzmoser, Carolin/Endres, Eva-Maria: Menschsein in einer technisierten Welt – Einleitende Bemerkungen zu einer interdisziplinären Auseinandersetzung mit der digitalen Transformation. In: Endres, Eva-Maria/Puzio, Anna/Rutzmoser, Carolin (Hg.): Menschsein in einer technisierten Welt. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Menschen im Zeichen der digitalen Transformation. Wiesbaden 2022. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to critically reflect on the Polish transformation taking place in the interpretation of business law in the form of legal clarifications that can be qualified as a soft law guidance. The article attempts to address the following questions: does the new Polish legal framework offer really novel approaches to the interpretation of business law and/or its tools? What are the peculiarities that characterize the new instrument for the interpretation of business law in the form (...) of legal clarifications? What are the pros and cons of legal clarifications? What is the potential practical importance of the introduced interpretation tool, in particular in the context of certain previously existing tools for the interpretation of legal texts? To this end, first, the article sheds light into types of the interpretation of legal texts as well as soft law guidance. Second, it analyses the distinctive features of legal clarifications. Third, it contains the concise comparison of legal clarifications to certain previously existing instruments. In the last part before the conclusion, the topic required an attempt at an assessment. The point of the analysis in this article was both descriptive and normative. (shrink)

The aim of the present study was to describe and explore the perception of ethical guidelines and their role in ethical competence-building among Swedish physicians and research nurses. Twelve informants were interviewed in depth. The results demonstrated that the informants had a critical attitude towards ethical guidelines and claimed to make little use of them in practical moral judgements. Ethical competence was seen primarily as character-building, related to virtues such as being empathic, honest and loyal to patients. Ethical competence was (...) assumed to be learned through good examples, role models and practical experience, while ethical guidelines were not perceived as valuable in this process. In order to improve the staff's familiarity with and the usability of ethical guidelines, the workplace needs to provide opportunities for ethical dialogues. In such discussions, argumentation can improve, virtues can be developed and guidelines can be usefully invoked. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, virtual and augmented reality, (semi-)autonomous ve- hicles, autoregulatory weapon systems, enhancement, reproductive technologies and human- oid robotics – these technologies (and many others) are no longer speculative visions of the future; they have already found their way into our lives or are on the verge of a breakthrough. These rapid technological developments awaken a need for orientation: what distinguishes hu- man from machine and human intelligence from artificial intelligence, how far should the body be allowed to (...) be changed and what are the dangers and opportunities presented by these technologies? Many of these questions are also addressed to theology. For example, questions about the image of humanity, the understanding of creation, the ethics of technological body interventions or the moral status of robots. What does theology have to say about these technological developments? It is the right time for theology to scientifically explore tech- nologization and AI and to formulate answers. As technology changes the various areas of human life, society and the world around us, the places and topics of theology are also undergoing transformation. Puzio, Anna: Theology Meets AI: Examining Perspectives, Tasks, and Theses on the Intersection of Technology and Religion. In: Puzio, Anna/Kunkel, Nicole/Klinge, Hendrik (Hg.): Alexa, How Do You Feel About Religion? Theological Approaches to Technology and Artificial Intelligence (Theology and AI 1). Darmstadt: wbg 2023, S. 29–41. DOI: 10.53186/1030373. (shrink)

Wie verändern sich Mensch und Körper durch Technik? Und welches Menschenverständnis vertritt der Transhumanismus? Anna Puzio befasst sich in der ersten philosophischen Studie zur Anthropologie des Transhumanismus mit führenden Personen des Feldes, u. a. mit Nick Bostrom, David Pearce und Natasha Vita-More. Neben Körperoptimierung und Medizintechnologien beleuchtet sie auch Alltagstechnologien wie Wearables. Dabei entwickelt sie einen neuen Ansatz zur Technikanthropologie und ein neues inklusives Menschen- und Körperverständnis im Anschluss an Donna Haraway und den Kritischen Posthumanismus im amerikanischen Raum.

New technological developments have fundamentally transformed human life. Throughout this process, fundamental questions about human beings have once again been posed. The paper examines how technological change affects understandings of human beings and their bodies, thereby requiring new approaches to anthropology. First, Section 2 illustrates how the use of technology has changed the understanding of human beings and their bodies. A new connection between the human being or the body and technology has emerged. Section 3 then moves onto considering the (...) increasing blurring of the boundaries between organisms and machines, showing how the understanding of humans and bodies is constantly being renegotiated in relation to machines. Based on this, Section 4 explores how the understanding of the human being and the body can be redesigned in the context of modern technology. To this end, approaches for a contemporary anthropology can be derived from critical posthumanism. Section 5 addresses concrete practice and examines the construction of identity in social media platforms such as Instagram. The paper argues that technological processes and social media are places where theology is constructed and appeals for a responsible theological co-creation of these places. It advocates that technology offers the opportunity to question traditional anthropological concepts and to renegotiate understandings of the human being and the body. -- Puzio, Anna: Digital and Technological Identities – In Whose Image? A philosophical-theological approach to identity construction in social media and technology. In: Cursor (2021). (shrink)

Definition of the problemThe medical-ethical principle of beneficence is directed towards the well-being of patients. In clinical practice, the focus is often on the relief of pain, the elimination of symptoms and the restoration of bodily functioning. However, the significance of these health-related aspects for the overall well-being of patients also depends on individual values, desires, and life plans.ArgumentationAn overemphasis on the subjective perspective of patients on their well-being would admittedly lead to a strong substantial convergence of the two medical-ethical (...) principles of beneficence and respect for autonomy. In addition, it would not be compatible with some of the guiding principles of the medical profession. A mere objective perspective on patient well-being conversely carries the danger of imposing values on individual patients that they do not share. Consequently, actions that are intended to benefit patients instead harm them.ConclusionThrough a more detailed analysis of the relationship between health-related and overall well-being, this paper shows that health is only a relative value in our overall well-being. Basic health-related goods like a sound cardiovascular system or fully functioning lungs have special standing because they are seen as valuable independently of individual preferences and life plans, which means they are of objective value. (shrink)

Die folgende Untersuchung nimmt eine informationsethische und anthropologische Perspektive ein und legt einen Schwerpunkt auf die Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien (IKT) im Gesundheitsbereich. Zunächst beschreiben und problematisieren wir das Feld der Informationsethik, das im Wesentlichen heute als Ethik von umfassenden, digitalen Computersystemen als informationsprozessierenden Maschinen verstanden wird (Kap. 2). Im zweiten, anthropologischen Schritt untersuchen wir, wie informationelle Gesundheitstechnologien das menschliche Selbstverständnis beeinflussen (Kap. 3). Dies leitet über zur ethischen Fragestellung, die Überwachung, Kontrolle und Autonomie als Brennpunkte des Gesundheitsbereichs fokussiert (Kap. 4). (...) Zuletzt geben wir als Ausblick einige Hinweise, wie eine dezidiert theologische Perspektive auf die Herausforderungen aussehen kann (Kap. 5). -- Puzio, Anna/Filipovic, Alexander: Personen als Informationsbündel? Informationsethische Perspektiven auf den Gesundheitsbereich. In: Fritz, Alexis/Mandry, Christof/Proft, Ingo/Schuster, Josef (Hg.): Mensch-Maschine-Interaktion. Anthropologische und ethische Herausforderungen neuer Entwicklungen im Gesundheitsbereich (Jahrbuch für Moraltheologie, 5). Freiburg: Herder 2021, S. 89–114. (shrink)

The revisionary metaphysician seemingly faces a seriously unfortunate dilemma where she is forced to choose between the Scylla of too little regimentation and the Charbydes of too much. Many take this to be an impossible dilemma, and regard it as a reductio against the revisionary framework itself. In this paper, I argue that the dilemma is not necessarily impossible. To be justified, ontological theorising must be regimented just enough. To escape the dilemma, therefore, the revisionary metaphysician must, to be able (...) to answer the question: -/- Why should one hold that the world is a world of tropes? -/- first answer another question: -/- Can revisionary theorising be regimented just enough? -/- I will address both these questions in the order here indicated. I will suggest that the now popular truthmaker theory might, if added to a revisionary framework, offer the resources necessary to obtain just the right amount of regimentation for its revisionary ontological conclusions to be justified. The world is a world of tropes if (minimally) tropes can fulfil their truthmaking function. That tropes can fulfil their truthmaking function only tells us that the world could be a world of tropes, it does not tell us why we should prefer a theory of tropes as truthmakers to a theory of, say, states of affairs, however. I therefore end the paper with a discussion of the limits of theory comparison in revisionary ontology. (shrink)

Donald Davidson claims that, by studying the most general aspects of natural language, we will also be studying the most general aspects of reality.In particular, this means that, through the application of a systematic truththeory to natural language, we will be able to reveal its basic structure, its true logical form. Once this logical form has been spelled out, we will be able to determine the finite stock of important constituents of which sentences are built, and also the specific roles (...) these “atoms” play in the relevant structure. Since the structure of language can be said to “mirror” the structure of reality, this also means that we can now say something about the basic constituents of the world. We will be able to tell which kinds of entities exist and which do not. If, by spelling out the logical form, we find that there is a sentence (or several sentences) committing us to the existence of a certain (kind of) object (i.e. a sentence where an object (of this kind)serves as the value of a quantified variable) and, if we know the sentence to be true, then we have good reason to suppose that there is an object (of that kind) rather than not. This will hold given that there is no other way of spelling out the logical form of the sentence in question that is compatible with the nonexistence of that (kind of) object. So what exists is what, according to the (complete) theory, functions as values of the quantified variables, once thelogical form, the basic structure, of all the sentences of the language has been spelled out. Davidson has claimed that what all this quantificational structure will demand from ontology is the existence of objects and particular events. This should be taken somewhat at faith. In order to reach valid conclusions concerning the logical form of natural language, Davidson would have to examine allof its true sentences, and state allof their truth conditions, which he has not done. For practical reasons he has only been able to look at small segments of language, to consider how they normally function, to attempt to exhibit their logical structure by looking at entailment-relations, etc., and it is from this that he has drawn his ontological conclusions. In this paper, I concentrate on some of the likely consequences of the adoption of this method of reaching ontological conclusions. In particular, I will try to show that Davidson’s own way of arguing for the existence of events can be applied to cases where he seemingly would have to commit himself to the existence of properties too. To demonstrate this, I begin by considering whether the fact that Davidson spells out the logical form of natural language in first-order logic raises a serious objection to my claim or not. I then proceed by making a case for properties using an argument based on what Davidson has to say about the existence of events. What I will try to show is that, if Davidson is to be true to his general method of reaching conclusions regarding existence, which he claims to be, then he must go where this method leads him. This means that he has to keep his mind open as to the kinds of entities he should or should not allow. Finally, assuming that I have shown properties to be one of the different kinds of entities that a Davidsonian would have to allow, I conclude the paper by indicating what the consequence(s) of this may be. (shrink)

Although the subject matter of this Element is properties, do not expect in-depth introductions to the various views on properties 'on the market'. Instead, here that subject matter is treated meta-philosophically. Rather than ask and try to answer a question like do properties exist? this Element asks what reasons one might have for thinking that properties exist, what counts as solving that problems, as well as how we ought to proceed when trying to find out if properties exist. As it (...) turns out, these questions and their answers are all intricately intertwined. Theory comparison and theory evaluation is in other words tricky. Do properties exist? After reading this Element all we can say is therefore this: that depends. (shrink)

This paper investigates the One over Many, first as it was first introduced by Plato. Here, it is argued, the One over Many can be understood in at least two senses, both different from, but in a sense included in, the sense in which the One-over-Many is regarded as an argument for the existence of universals. In both of these senses, it is argued, it is possible to accept the One-over-Many while denying the existence of universals.This established, I examine the (...) argument from the One-over-Many as given within the framework of Armstrong’s theory of universals. Within this framework there is another thesis of great import, that of scientific realism. I will try to show that there exists a problematic tension, if not an outright contradiction, between this thesis and that of the argument from the One-over-Many. It seems that, as soon as you accept a scientific realism, the support provided by the argument from the One-over-Many dissolves, or, vice versa, if you claim support from the argument the results of your scientific realism seem to be contradicted. I will argue that the way to resolve this tension is to give up the argument from the One-over-Many. In particular, this will results in a weakening of Armstrong’s case for the existence of universals. In general, discussing the argument from the One-over-Many brings to the fore a feature common to all senses given to the One-over-Many, and thereby a feature affecting all theories of properties (since all theories of properties in one sense or another refer on the One-over-Many). (shrink)

The 12 chapters cover 6 questions: I. What is the relationship between memory and imagination? II. Do memory traces have content? III. What is the nature of mnemonic confabulation? IV. What is the function of episodic memory? V. Do non-human animals have episodic memory? VI. Does episodic memory give us knowledge of the past?