Bradley’s Regress

Philosophy Compass 7 (11):794-807 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Ever since F. H. Bradley first formulated his famous regress argument philosophers have been hard at work trying to refute it. The argument fails, it has been suggested, either because its conclusion just does not follow from its premises, or it fails because one or more of its premises should be given up. In this paper, the Bradleyan argument, as well as some of the many and varied reactions it has received, is scrutinized.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Relations and Truthmaking.Fraser MacBride - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):161-179.
Propositions united.Benjamin Schnieder - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):289-301.
Once More: Bradleyan Regresses.Benjamin Schnieder - 2013 - In Herbert Hochberg & Kevin Mulligan (eds.), Relations and predicates. Lancaster, LA: Ontos Verlag. pp. 219-256.
Bradley’s Regress and Relation-Instances.William Vallicella - 2004 - Modern Schoolman 81 (3):159-183.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-10-13

Downloads
278 (#70,094)

6 months
20 (#125,481)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Anna-Sofia Maurin
University of Gothenburg

Citations of this work

Modal Idealism.David Builes - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.
Regress, unity, facts, and propositions.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1225-1247.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.Peter Strawson - 1959 - London, England: Routledge. Edited by Wenfang Wang.
Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 48 references / Add more references