Wittgenstein defiende que los problemas filosóficos son ilegítimos. Sin embargo, no resulta del todo claro qué se entiende en general por problema filosófico, cuál es, pues, su naturaleza. El presente artículo intenta elucidar la observación de Wittgenstein que sostiene que la forma de un problema filosófico se puede presentar con la expresión “Yo no sé salir del atolladero” (IF § 123). En el artículo se elige, a manera de ejemplo, el escándalo kantiano, que demanda que demostremos con el uso de (...) la razón que la proposición “hay objetos físicos” es verdadera. Sin renunciar al ejemplo, se explora en qué sentido la expresión de Wittgenstein caracteriza en buena medida la naturaleza misma de la dificultad filosófica. En el ejercicio se atienden recomendaciones formales del Tractatus, terapias desplegadas en Sobre la Certeza y el recurso de distinguir entre sentido primario y sentido secundario de una expresión insinuado en las Investigaciones Filosóficas. (shrink)

The Handbook of Bioethical Decisions Volume II addresses and analyzes the most important ethical concerns and moral quandaries related to scientific integrity and institutional ethics. It counts on two parts, Part One: Research Ethics, which addresses issues related to Scientific Integrity, Research Misconduct and Conducting Ethical Research, and Part Two: Institutional Ethics and Bioethics Committees, which explores Institutional Ethics issues, Ethics and Bioethics Committees’ roles and scopes, and Bioethical Issues in Institutional Ethics. Consequently, the Handbook, Vol. II, offers a remarkable (...) collection of works by outstanding international experts on institutional and research ethics, in order for bioethics practitioners to obtain better elements to address key issues related to integrity in research as well as to decision-making processes. In this fashion, this volume is a valuable resource for professionals working on different bioethical and biomedical fields, such as, ethics and bioethics committees, health care institutions, biomedical and pharmacological companies, and academic settings, among others. Chapter 26 is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com. (shrink)

This article builds on the hypothesis that theoretical approaches to philosophy of technology are currently stuck in a false alternative: either embrace the “empirical turn” or jump back into the determinism, pessimism, and general ignorance towards specific technologies that characterized the “humanities philosophy of technology.” A third path is however possible, which consists of articulating an empirical point of view with an interest in the symbolic dimension in which technologies and technological mediations are always already embedded. Bourdieu’s sociology of the (...) symbolic forms represents an important and mostly unexplored resource in this respect. In this article, we introduce the notion of technological capital and its tree states—objectified, institutionalized, and embodied. In the first section, we briefly account of the empirical turn in philosophy of technology. Specific attention is then devoted to postphenomenology. We depict three perspectives in postphenomenology: standard postphenomenology, in which one single human-technology-world relation at a time is considered; the attempt of some technological mediation theorists to articulate postphenomenology and actor-network theory ; the original effort in Ihde, which is currently practiced by a minority of postphenomenologists, to combine an interest for the empirical dimension of technological mediations with an attention to the social and cultural conditions of possibility in which these mediations are embedded. In the second section, we consider some recent critiques of the limits of the empirical turn in philosophy of technology, especially related to postphenomenology. Furthermore, we argue that Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology may benefit the philosophy of technology. One might say that according to a Bourdieusian perspective, technologies are, in their invention, implementation, and use, embedded in symbolically organized interactions among social actors or groups. The notion of technological capital is introduced. A specific attention is given to its embodied state, which is related to the habitus. Such concept suggests that, to rephrase the famous sentence by Heidegger, “the essence of technology is not totally technological.” In the conclusion, we consider three risks related to a Bourdieusian approach to technology: transparency, determinism, and absolutism. (shrink)

In this contribution, the author contends that the way in which Pieter Lemmens interprets the transcendental of technology, particularly through the work of Bernard Stiegler, is only one of the possible ways of understanding the transcendental of technology. His thesis is that there are many other transcendentals of technology besides technology itself. The task of a philosophy of technology beyond the empirical turn could precisely consist in exploring these multiple transcendentals of technology, along with their multiple relations. In the first (...) section, the author considers and criticizes the “empirical transcendentality” that characterizes most of the current philosophical approaches to technology, in particular when it comes to ethical issues. In the second section, he proposes to include Lemmens’ perspective in a more general theory about the transcendentals of technology. The transcendentals of technology include social symbolic forms, culture, language, media, and many other dimensions that philosophy of technology has not systematically explored yet. (shrink)

Focusing especially on Science and the Modern World, this article explores Whitehead's understanding of the social contexts and repercussions of mathematical and scientific abstraction. It investigates his remarks on the need to offset pernicious practices of abstraction in the context of a renewed concern with the link between conceptuality and materiality in social theory. Whitehead's inquiry into the problematic legacy of Galileo and scientific materialism is then contrasted with a different diagnosis of the abstractive maladies of modern society, the one (...) put forward under the Marxist rubric of `real abstraction'. While both stances allow us to explore the social repercussions of abstractive practices, it is argued that an understanding of the practically abstract character of capitalism permits us to identify the limits of Whitehead's pedagogical wish to reform our culture of abstraction. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has further intensified a crisis in the functions and the perception of the state. It has also revealed underlying contradictions in both mainstream and radical ideologies of the state. A desire for the state as guarantor of public welfare vies with fear of the state’s hypertrophic capacities for surveillance and control. Following a brief exploration of the intimate modern connection between plagues and the state, the article tries to map some of the ways in which the state (...) has been at stake in political and theoretical commentaries on the pandemic. Is an epidemiological politics from below, beyond the plague state, possible? Can recent emergency measures be seen as incomplete or inverted anticipations of a communist use of the state of exception? Or is the primacy of the political we are currently experiencing a mere fetish, indissociable from the rule of capital? (shrink)

Angelaki, Volume 16, Issue 3, Page 125-136, September 2011.

Most of the existing studies on Bourdieu and the digital regards the social and class distinctions in the use of digital technologies, thus presupposing a certain transparency of technologies themselves. Our proposal is to refer to this attitude as “Bourdieu outside the digital.” Yet in this paper, another perspective called “Bourdieu inside the digital” is developed, which moves the focus on the effects of some emerging technologies on social distinctions and discrimination. The main hypothesis is that algorithms of machine learning (...) are producers and reproducers of habitus. Although their results present a greater granularity with respect to the standard techniques of the past, these algorithms still reduce individuals to categories, general trends, classes, and behaviors. Such a reduction has flattening effects on the individuals’ self-understanding, especially in terms of identity and interaction with the social world. This is the phenomenon described in the article as the “personalization without personality,” whose consequences are both existential and social-political. This idea will be illustrated through qualitative and comparative analysis between the correspondence analysis and the multiple correspondence analysis used by Bourdieu in his works and some of those techniques that are performed today in big data analytics. (shrink)

There has been some concern m recent years that economic interests in the biotechnology area could, particularly through patenting, have a constricting influence on scientific research. Despite this concern, there have been no studies of this phenomenon beyond isolated cases. In this article we examine the evolution of the biomedical field of hybridoma/monoclonal antibody research with detailed examples of the three types of patent claims that have emerged there—basic claims, claims on application techniques, and claims on specific antibodies. We analyze (...) the impact of these claims and their legal histories on the free flow of scientific information and, the activity of scientific researchers. We conclude that such patent claims present severe restrictions for both, not only in the monoclonal area but in general, amounting to a subtle but significant shift in the political economy of science and technology. (shrink)

Il saggio si interroga sul rapporto tra immagine di libro e lettura, muovendo dalla constatazione che solo la trasformazione dei lettori in ambito umanistico (con il rifiuto della glossa) ha cambiato l’idea del libro diffusa nel Medioevo. Il nuovo disegno della pagina, di maggiore ordine e leggibilità, si è consolidato nei secoli, e la nuova immagine di libro è rimasta immutata, nonostante le innovazioni, nell’editoria moderna. Solo l’avvento delle nuove tecnologie digitali ha suggerito una nuova immagine, che, tuttavia, non è (...) ancora né pienamente definita né ben consolidata; alle posizioni di chi ha individuato il libro nuovo nella forma dell’ipertesto (letto anche sui vecchi pc), il saggio affianca le riflessioni di chi cerca l’immagine nuova nell’e-book letto su un e-reader, sottolineando tuttavia che si è solo agli inizi di una lunga trasformazione. This essay concerns the relationship between the image of the book and how it reads. It begins from the observation that only the change of the readers during the humanistic age has transformed the widespread perception of the book in the Middle Ages. The new layout of the page, neater and more readable, became well established in the following centuries, and that image of the book in the modern publishing industry has remained unchanged, in spite of innovations. New digital technologies have proposed a new image, that however is neither clearly defined nor well established. The essay underlines the observations of those who believe that the hypertext form is the new book, even readable on the old pc, and the observations of those that think of e-book as a new image, that can be read only on the e-reader. The essay ends with the idea that we are at the beginning of a long change. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p319 In Re-Thinking Science. Knowledge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty (2001) H. Nowotny, P. Scott, e M. Gibbons vindicate a “socially robust” scientific knowledge in accordance with the social needs of our time. Such a knowledge would not be just epistemically reliable; in addition, it would also fit the situations to which will be put to use, and take into account the consequences of its utilization. In the authors’ view, this new kind of science, which they call (...) “Mode 2 knowledge” in another book, would do justice to a society that is not restrained to receive or ask for scientific information, but also requires sharing in its production. Nowotny and her colleagues mention several epistemological changes which a “robust” knowledge would involve. In this paper I analyze some of those alleged changes. (shrink)

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Francis Bacon foi considerado por alguns pensadores o pai do método experimental. Outros filósofos o acusaram de advogar um empi-rismo naif. Em nosso artigo pretendemos identificar as peculiaridades do tipo de empirismo abraçado por Bacon. Os mais duros críticos de Bacon têm destacado sua retórica fatualista e têm dispensado pouca atenção à complexidade de um sistema metodológico que atribui papel crucial à evidência negativa. Negligenciam principalmente o real significado epis-temológico de sua proposta de uma indução eliminatória. Associando Bacon rigidamente a (...) uma espécie de empirismo justificacionista deixam de detectar importantes ingredientes falibilistas em sua obra. Por aspirar a identificar o que pode haver de falibilismo na obra de Bacon este artigo questionará a avaliação que Popper faz de Bacon ao apresentá-lo como o grande representante do empirismo ingênuo e dogmático. Por mais que sejam procedentes algumas das críticas que Popper dirige a Bacon, mos-traremos que sua leitura repete velhos clichês sobre o autor do Novum Organum.Some philosophers regard Francis Bacon as the father of ex-perimental method. Others accuse Bacon of defending a naïf empiricist theory of knowledge. In this article I try to identify the peculiarities of the empiricism supported by Bacon. Bacon’s most severe critics emphasize his factualist rhetoric, paying no sufficient attention to the complexity of a methodological system that attributes a crucial role to negative evidence. They neglect the real epistemological meaning of Bacon’s proposal of an eliminative induction. As a rule, such critics are unable to detect the important fallibilist features present in Bacon’s work because they tend to, uncritically, identify him with a kind of em-piricist justificationism. The purpose of this article is to investigate the possible fallibilist elements in Bacon’s writings. By so doing, I shall challenge Popper’s evaluation of Bacon’s philosophy of science. I dis-agree with Popper when he describes Bacon as a dogmatic and naïf empiricist. Although some of the criticisms Popper addresses to Bacon are well-founded, I will argue that the general reconstruction of Ba-con’s inductivism carried out by Popper is not fully defensible. (shrink)

Baseado no cogito cartesiano, mas também o submetendo a importantes reformulações, Husserl desenvolve o seu próprio conceito de subjetividade transcendental. Tais reformulações concernem, sobretudo, aos tópicos do tempo, da redução e da intersubjetividade. O presente artigo pretende apresentar e discutir como se vinculam tais temas, visando a contribuir na compreensão do estatuto do transcendental na fenomenologia husserliana. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Husserl. Subjetividade transcendental. Tempo. ABSTRACT Based on Cartesian cogito, but also submitting it to important reformations, Husserl develops his own concept of (...) transcendental subjectivity. These reformations concern especially the topics of time, reduction and intersubjectivity. This article intends to present and discuss the link of these themes, aiming contribute to the comprehension of the status of transcendental in husserlian phenomenology. KEY WORDS – Husserl. Transcendental subjectivity. Time. (shrink)

Assessing the scope of his own phenomenological project was always of philosophical concern to Husserl. Perhaps because of this, he has never ceased to reformulate his concepts and theories, aimed at an ever greater degree of depth. This interest by the limits of Husserlian phenomenology continues in the activity of his interpreters. This article intends to present and discuss some of these readings, trying to stress that the strategy of favouring ethical components to think the limits of Husserl’s phenomenology is (...) not a fruitful alternative. The discussion should favour ontological parameters, based in the approach of key concepts correctly selected, especially the concepts of infinite and living present. (shrink)

Giulio Preti’s third book, Praxis ed empirismo, appeared in 1957. The present paper, written on the occasion of 50 years since its publication, deals with its first chapter, in which the extraction of basic ideas of logical empiricism, pragmatism and historical materialism leads to a Program for a democratic culture pivoting on the role of scientific education. The main tenets of this Program are listed and the resulting role of philosophy, as “philosophy of culture”, is analysed and discussed.

The internet changes our ways of both knowing and thinking. A person who has grown up using the internet, whether for school or simply to play videogames, tends to extend and reproduce the same model of knowing in other instances. The internet replaces a linear and centralized model with a circular and diffused framework for self-learning that presents certain familiar limits: it demands speed or, at least, not pausing. The internet user is omnivorous, in a rush, and develops a memory (...) that is limited to the short term. However, there are some positive aspects of circular learning that should be emphasized: the possibility of constructing personal paths, comparing different opinions, innovating, overcoming old disciplinary divisions, surmounting the drawbacks of linear learning that often lead to uncritical and purely molecular thinking. La Rete modifica sia il modo di conoscere che di pensare. Una mente cresciuta sulla Rete, facendo ricerche per la scuola, o semplicemente giocando, tende a riprodurre anche in altre occasioni lo stesso modello di conoscenza. A un modello lineare la Rete sostituisce un modello circolare e diffuso di autoapprendimento che presenta alcuni noti limiti: richiede di correre, o per lo meno richiede di non fermarsi. L’utente della Rete è onnivoro e ha fretta e matura una memoria chiusa nel breve termine. Ci sono tuttavia aspetti positivi dell'apprendimento circolare che vanno sottolineati: la possibilità di costruirsi propri percorsi, sondare diverse opinioni, innovare, superare vecchie partizioni disciplinari, superando i difetti dell'apprendimento lineare che molto spesso induce a un pensiero acritico e premente molecolare. (shrink)

El propósito de este trabajo es presentar una recons­trucción de cómo se articulan las nociones de finalidad y naturaleza en la física de Aristóteles, así como de la relación que guardan estos principios con la substan­cia eterna e inmóvil que introduce el filósofo griego en _Metaph_. XII. Como es bien sabido, hay un espectro amplio de lecturas acerca de la postura aristotélica sobre el particular, las cuales responden a distintas valoraciones de los argumentos que aparecen en los pasajes que el (...) filósofo griego dedica al estudio de estos temas. La lectura que se defenderá en el presente texto podría describirse como minimalista. (shrink)

Alain Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, Translated, Edited and withan Introduction by Norman Madarasz ISBN - 9780791442197Alain Badiou, Deleuze. The Clamor of Being, Translated and with aPreface by Louise Burchill ISBN - 9780816631391.

The main argument of this article is based on a functional disanalogy, between what I will call ‘international humanity-based law’, constituted by human rights and criminal law, and the domestic rule of law. If we adopt a functionalist approach, the attention has to be focused both on Rule of Law’s pragmatical objective – a reasonable stability – and on its means – formalism and legality, for dealing with indeterminacy. Do international key players share such values, embedded in the Rule of (...) Law’s political project? Does humanity-based international law fulfil the requirements of the Rule of Law? The conclusion of this work is that institutions and mechanism to which usually legal scholars refer when stating that a legal order is a Rule of Law, are almost absent in humanity-based international law. That implies that radical indeterminacy is, in humanity issues, a too strong obstacle for achieving the ideal of the Rule of Law. (shrink)