Cette traduction inedite de l'oeuvre principale d'Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) apporte des contributions fondamentales a divers champs de la connaissance. Disciple de Husserl, Reinach propose une interpretation du monde social qui engage la phenomenologie sur le terrain des actes sociaux et des experiences individuelles qui les accompagnent, afin d'isoler les structures a priori qui sont au principe meme du droit positif. Le travail de Reinach s'inscrit egalement dans un champ d'analyse philosophique et linguistique centre sur les enonces dits performatifs, baptises (...) tels par Austin quelques decennies plustard. (shrink)

Womit beschäftigt sich die medizinische Wissenschaft? Ich verstehe ja natürlich nichts davon, aber sie beschäftigt sich doch mit dem Menschen. Und die Juristerei, die Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung? Auch mit dem Menschen.

Adolf von Harnack auf schloss Elmau, von J. Müller.--Briefe Adolf von Harnacs an Johannes Müller.--Leben und erkennen, von A. Harnack.

It is a central tenet of ethical intuitionism as defended by W. D. Ross and others that moral theory should reflect the convictions of mature moral agents. Hence, intuitionism is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to our well-considered moral judgments. After arguing for this claim, I discuss whether intuitionists offer an empirically adequate account of our moral obligations. I do this by applying recent empirical research by John Mikhail that is based on the idea of a universal moral (...) grammar to a number of claims implicit in W. D. Ross’s normative theory. I argue that the results at least partly vindicate intuitionism. (shrink)

'Moral Particularism' is a view that questions the role of principles in ethics. Jonathan Dancy, the most eminent particularist, argues that principles which claim that it is right or wrong to do a certain thing in all situations cannot adequately account for the role context plays in moral deliberation. The aim of this dissertation is to critically evaluate the theory of Moral Particularism. The first section discusses various positions opposed to particularism. It considers the emergence of particularism as a response (...) to Hare's Theory of Universalizability and Ross's Theory of Prima Facie Duty. The dissertation then moves on to examine the view that context-sensitivity does not support particularism. The second part of this dissertation analyses Dancy's theory in closer detail. It begins with a clarification of Dancy's conception of principles and is followed by a consideration of the evolution of particularism over time. The plausibility of the various versions of this theory are then compared. The third part of the dissertation looks at criticism of particularism by others apart from Dancy. It argues that context-sensitivity can only ground particularism as an epistemic, and not as a metaphysical theory. Furthermore, it discusses whether thick ethical concepts can ground principles. The dissertation concludes by asserting that whilst the claims of particularism are true, they are no serious threat to traditional moral theories. (shrink)

This paper offers a refutation of P. Duhem's thesis that the falsifiability of an isolated empirical hypothesis H as an explanans is unavoidably inconclusive. Its central contentions are the following: 1. No general features of the logic of falsifiability can assure, for every isolated empirical hypothesis H and independently of the domain to which it pertains, that H can always be preserved as an explanans of any empirical findings O whatever by some modification of the auxiliary assumptions A in conjunction (...) with which H functions as an explanans. For Duhem cannot guarantee on any general logical grounds the deducibility of O from an explanans constituted by the conjunction of H and some revised non-trivial version R of A: the existence of the required set R of collateral assumptions must be demonstrated for each particular case. 2. The categorical form of the Duhemian thesis is not only a non-sequitur but actually false. This is shown by adducing the testing of physical geometry as a counterexample to Duhem in the form of a rebuttal to A. Einstein's geometrical articulation of Duhem's thesis. 3. The possibility of a quasi a priori choice of a physical geometry in the sense of Duhem must be clearly distinguished from the feasibility of a conventional adoption of such a geometry in the sense of H. Poincare. And the legitimacy of the latter cannot be invoked to save the Duhemian thesis from refutation by the foregoing considerations. (shrink)

Born a slave, but later earning his freedom and founding a school for teaching Stoicism to the sons of Roman noblemen, Epictetus has been a popular source of Stoic philosophy for centuries. Originally published in 1894 by the German scholar Adolf Bonhoeffer and here translated into English for the first time, this work remains the most systematic and detailed study of Epictetus' ethics. The basis, content, and acquisition of virtue are methodically described, while important related points in Stoic ethics (...) are discussed in an extensive appendix. Epictetus is compared throughout with the other late Stoics, Cicero, the early Stoics, and Christian moral thought. This approach shows that Stoic ethics continues to have great practical and pedagogical value. (shrink)

According to some cosmologists, the big bang cosmogony and even the (now largely defunct) steady-state theory pose a scientifically insoluble problem of matter-energy creation. But I argue that the genuine problem of the origin of matter-energy or of the universe has been fallaciously transmuted into the pseudo-problem of creation by an external cause. A fortiori, it emerges that the initial "true" and "false" vacuum states of quantum cosmology do not vindicate biblical divine creation ex nihilo at all.

Prompted by the "Panel Discussion of Grünbaum's Philosophy of Science" (Philosophy of Science 36, December, 1969) and other recent literature, this essay ranges over major issues in the philosophy of space, time and space-time as well as over problems in the logic of ascertaining the falsity of a scientific hypothesis. The author's philosophy of geometry has recently been challenged along three main distinct lines as follows: (i) The Panel article by G. J. Massey calls for a more precise and more (...) coherent account of the Riemannian conception of an intrinsic as opposed to an extrinsic metric, which the author has invoked as his basis for the distinction between non-conventional and convention-laden ascriptions of metrical equality and inequality; (ii) the latter distinction has been claimed to suffer from the liabilities of the so-called "standard conception" of scientific theories [36]; and (iii) pursuant to H. Putnam's "An Examination of Grünbaum's Philosophy of Geometry" [56], J. Earman [16, 17] and R. Swinburne [65] have contended that the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic metrics is scientifically unilluminating, and that the associated distinction between non-conventional and convention-laden metrical comparisons does not have the kind of relevance to extant scientific theories that the author has claimed for it. The essay consists of two installments. The present installment, comprising the Introduction and Part A, is devoted to the clarification, correction and further development of the author's prior writings on the philosophy of geometry. Its main objective is constructive elaboration rather than offering polemics. But rebuttals to Earman, [16, 17], Swinburne [65] and Demopoulos [13] are included, because their inclusion conduced to clarity in giving the new exposition. Part B is to appear in a subsequent issue and will be devoted to replies to critiques contained in the Panel Discussion and in other recent literature. It will range over issues in the philosophy of geometry and in the logic of ascertaining the falsity of a scientific hypothesis. By way of merely elliptical anticipation of much more precise statements given in Part A, section 3(ii), the Introduction dissociates the notion of convention-ladenness developed in Part A from the quite different notion integral to the so-called "standard conception" of scientific theories. Thereby, the Introduction prepares the ground for seeing, as a corollary to Part A, section 3(ii), that the notion advocated in the present essay has nothing to fear from the following fact, noted by C. G. Hempel ([36]; cf. also his 1970 Carus Lectures): "even though a sentence may originally be introduced as true by stipulation, it soon joins the club of all other member-statements of the theory and becomes subject to revision in response to further empirical findings and theoretical developments." Part A, which begins with a fairly detailed table of contents, endeavors to meet the aforementioned three-fold challenge to the author's philosophy of geometry. Massey's call for the provision of clear and detailed characterizations of intrinsic and extrinsic metrics is answered with the invaluable aid rendered personally by Massey himself. These characterizations are shown to permit a precise explication of the portions of Riemann's Inaugural Dissertation relevant to (1) Riemann's brilliant anticipation of Einstein's dynamical conception of physical geometry, and (2) the author's philosophical characterization of the metrics and geometries of space, time, and space-time {section 2(c)}. A byproduct of the analysis is to raise two major philosophical doubts concerning Clifford's sketch of a so-called "space-theory of matter" as elaborated in J. A. Wheeler's relativistic geometrodynamics. That theory's vision of understanding matter as a manifestation of empty curved space is questioned in regard to (1) the existence of an intra-geometrodynamic basis for individuating the metrically homogeneous world points of its space-time manifold {section 1(a)}, and (2) the compatibility of the theory with the Riemannian metrical philosophy apparently espoused by its proponents {section 2(c)(i)}. (shrink)

The last decade has witnessed the beginnings of a remarkable convergence of Husserlian phenonenology and analytic philosophy of language, and the present volumes provide original and important texts of the phenomenological philosophy of language. Powerfully influenced by the writings of the early Husserl, Reinach fashioned Husserl’s ideas into a rigorous analytical methodology of his own, which he applied in particular to problems in logic and the theory of knowledge, and to the philosophies of law and psychology. The central role of (...) the concept of state of affairs in Reinach’s philosophy will bring to mind immediately the formal ontology of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Reinach’s most significant contribution, however, is contained in his The a priori foundations of civil law (1913), above all in the detailed analysis of the a priori structure of the act of promising. This amounts to an elaborate phenomenological theory of speech acts which anticipates, and in some respects goes beyond, the later theories of Austin and Searle. The present edition is in two volumes. Volume 1, which includes a biographical and thematic introduction by the editors, contains critical editions of those pieces published by Reinach himself. Volume II is a collection of all those items in Reinach’s surviving Nachlass which are in publishable form, including a number of important pieces not hitherto obtainable on such themes as ethical predicates, speech acts (“soziale Akte”), perception and the theory of number, together with a comprehensive sketch of the problems in the theory of knowledge, logic and ethics. Appended to this is a text-critical apparatus which also contains extensive discussions of the origins and sources of the materials in question. (shrink)

It is a commonplace in the analytic geometry of physical space-time that an extended straight line segment, having positive length, is treated as “consisting of” unextended points, each of which has zero length. Analogously, time intervals of positive duration are resolved into instants, each of which has zero duration.

Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to foundationalism, some moral beliefs can be known without inferential justification; instead, all that is required is a proper understanding of the beliefs in question. In an influential criticism against this view, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that certain psychological facts undermine the reliability of moral intuitions. He claims that foundationalists would have to show that non-inferentially justified beliefs are not subject to those defeaters, but this would already constitute (...) a form of inference and hence undermine the possibility of noninferential justification. The goal of my paper is to defend foundationalism against Sinnott-Armstrong’s criticism. After presenting his challenge, I first argue that the most promising objection to it fails. This objection makes the case that defeater-defeaters are not part of the justification, but merely preserve the justification which the original claim provides. I object to this argument by distinguishing between weak and robust defeaters; only weak defeaters, I argue, fall outside the scope of justification, and it is an open question whether Sinnott-Armstrong’s defeaters fall into that category. This leads the way to my own criticism of Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge: foundationalists in moral epistemology are entitled to the use of defeater-defeaters as part of the justification for moral beliefs as long as those defeater-defeaters themselves do not entail moral claims. Therefore, Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge does not undermine foundationalism. (shrink)

Adolf Hölzel war nicht nur ein Kunstpädagoge von ungeheurer Bedeutung, sondern auch ein Pionier in der theoretischen Bestimmung der ungegenständlichen Kunst: 'Absolute Malerei' ist der Begriff, den Adolf Hölzel prägte. In zahlreichen Aufsätzen und auf 4000 überlieferten Schriftblättern aus dem sogenannten 'kunsttheoretischen Nachlass' entwickelt Adolf Hölzel seine Theorie, die allein an den Mitteln orientiert ist, die ein Bild konstituieren - unabhängig davon, ob etwas Gegenständliches dargestellt wird oder nicht. Denn jedes Bild ist, so Adolf Hölzel, allein (...) ein abstraktes Gebilde von Linien, Formen und Farben. Seine kunsttheoretischen Schriften sind nun kommentiert und in chronologischer Reihenfolge erstmals zugänglich, inklusive seiner zentralen Aufsätze und Schriften, bisher unpublizierter Manuskripte und ausgewählter Briefe des vielleicht wichtigsten Kunstpädagogen des 20. Jahrhunderts. (shrink)

O texto a seguir corresponde ao §3, pp. 705–718, do livro “Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechts” (“Os Fundamentos a priori do Direito Civil”), originalmente publicado em 1913 no Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, pp. 685–847. A numeração inserida entre colchetes no corpo do texto, destacada em negrito, refere-se à paginação desta edição. As palavras destacadas em negrito pelos tradutores remetem a um glossário que acompanha a presente tradução. Os itálicos, porém, são do próprio Reinach. A marca de intercalação (...) “ ” foi usada para introduzir expressões que estão apenas implícitas no texto original. Existem ainda as seguintes reedições desse livro: 1921 Gesammelte Schriften. Halle, Niemeyer, pp. 166–350. 1953 Zur Phänomenologie des Rechts. Munich: Kose t, 215 pp. 1989 Sämtliche Werke, vol. 1: Die Werke. Munique: Philosophia, 1989, pp. 141–278. (shrink)

With respect to the reproach by habermas and ricoeur that freud will fall prey to a "scientistic self-misunderstanding" i submit that it was not freud, but these hermeneuticians themselves, who forced the clinical theory of psychoanalysis onto the procrustean bed of a philosophical ideology demonstrably alien to it. as against the generic "disavowal" of causal attributions advocated by some hermeneuticians, i maintain that it is a nihilistic, if not frivolous, trivialization of freud's entire clinical theory. far from serving as a (...) new citadel for psychoanalytic apologetics, the embrace of such hermeneuticians is, i submit, the kiss of death for the legacy that was to be saved. (edited). (shrink)

In Axel Honneths Recht der Freiheit (RF) dienen persönliche Beziehungen, zu welchen Honneth neben Familien- und Liebesbeziehungen auch die Freundschaft zählt, der Verwirklichung einer „besondere[n], schwer zu charakterisierende[n] Form von Freiheit“ (RF 233). Diese Behauptung fügt sich ein in die Kernthese des Rechts der Freiheit. Demnach vermochte es die „Freiheit im Sinne der Autonomie des Einzelnen“ innerhalb unzähliger „Vorstellung[en] vom Guten“ als einzige, die moderne Gesellschaft nachhaltig zu prägen, wohingegen alle anderen Werte, die in der Moderne wirkmächtig geworden sind, als (...) „Facette[n] der konstitutive[n] Idee der individuellen Autonomie“ (RF 35) verstanden werden müssen. Wir argumentieren, dass Honneths Erörterung des Werts von Freundschaft in dreierlei Hinsicht sein Ziel verfehlt: Erstens zwingt sie Honneth zu einer radikalen Beschneidung des Freundschaftsbegriffs, indem er einen überzogenen Kontrast zwischen antiken und modernen Konzeptionen von Freundschaft zeichnet. Zweitens marginalisiert Honneth mit seiner Betrachtung andere Axiologien der Freundschaft, welche dieser gewichtige instrumentelle, konstitutive und finale Werte zuweisen. Drittens scheint selbst eine schwächer angelegte These, die den Wert, den Freundschaften für die individuelle Freiheit haben, auf die Stellung eines primus inter pares zurückstuft, immer noch den zentralen Wert, den Freundschaften für uns haben sollten, zu verfehlen. Dadurch wird Honneths Kernthese von der Exklusivität des Wertes der Freiheit für unsere Gesellschaft in Frage gestellt. (shrink)

Auch wenn eine umfassende Darstellung und Einordnung der Epoche, in der sich die Philosophie gerade befindet, der Nachwelt vorbehalten bleibt, so ist bereits absehbar, dass die häufig als »analytische Philosophie« bezeichnete Strömung, die mit dem 20. Jahrhundert einsetzt und sich bis in die Gegenwart erstreckt, zumindest in der normativen Ethik wohl kaum als eine Einheit betrachtet werden wird. Dafür fehlt es an inhaltlicher Übereinstimmung, sind doch die von Thomas Hurka als »Achterbahnfahrt« (Hurka 2004, S. 246) bezeichneten letzten 120 Jahre von (...) Strömungen geprägt, die häufig sowohl die Methodologie als auch die grundlegenden Annahmen der jeweils vorherigen Abschnitte verwerfen. Die ersten Jahrzehnte der Moralphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts waren von Positionen gekennzeichnet, die sich trotz aller Verschiedenheit unter dem Dach des Intuitionismus vereinen lassen. Für diese Positionen nahmen normative Themen eine zentrale Stellung ein, und die Frage danach, worin unsere grundlegenden Pflichten bestehen, wurden häufig mit einer »Intuition« genannten Erkenntnisform beantworten. Der Nonkognitivismus, für den die Frage, was wir tun sollen, nicht von der Philosophie beantwortet werden kann, prägte dagegen den Zeitraum von 1930 bis 1950. Es dauerte bis zu den 1970er Jahren, ehe wieder ein verstärktes Interesse an der Ethik aufkam. Die abgebrochenen Diskussionen und verwaisten Positionen wurden freilich nicht einfach fortgeführt, sondern unter anderen Gesichtspunkten betrachtet, was Inhalt und Methode betrifft – hier hat sich insbesondere das von John Rawls in der Moralphilosophie populär gemachte »Überlegungsgleichgewicht« als maßgeblich erwiesen. (shrink)

"Well over one half of this brilliant new Monograph constitutes a major sequel to Professor Grunbaum's highly influential 1984 book The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique, which was labeled "magisterial" by Frank J. Sulloway, and "the most important book ever written on Freud's status as a scientist" by J. Allan Hobson. The importance of the present Monograph lies in the extent to which the author now goes beyond that earlier volume to offer new original ideas on fundamental themes." "Validation (...) in the Clinical Theory of Psycho-analysis: A Study in the Philosophy of Psycho-analysis contains Adolf Grunbaum's new basic critique of the psychoanalytic theory of transference in its role of an etiologic theory; it turns out that etiologic transference interpretations rest on fallacious causal inferences from so-called "meaning connections" between mental states: moreover, just these unsound inferences are the stock-in-trade of the "hermeneutic" reconstruction of psychoanalysis, which charges Freud with a "scientistic self-misunderstanding."" "This volume joins the issue with Marshall Edelson's defenses of the investigative viability of the single-subject case study method. As a spin-off from the import of the serious placebo challenge to psychoanalysis, this Monograph presents the author's widely recognized new account of the placebo concept across all of medicine and psychotherapy. Whereas Foundations of Psychoanalysis objected that Freud's dream theory was evidentially ill-founded, the burden of the present book is to give two new basic reasons for presuming the theory to be false. It also develops the import of the author's appraisal of psychoanalytic theory for the scrutiny of Freud's triadic psychology of religious belief in theism." "Since Sir Karl Popper's most detailed charge of pseudoscience against psychoanalysis in 1983 could not be examined for inclusion in the 1984 book, the present monograph shows in what ways it is wide of the mark as an incoherent diagnosis of the scientific liabilities of psychoanalytic theory. In addition, four important papers that had antedated Foundations by a few years and were scattered over diverse publications have been updated and integrated with the other chapters herein."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

In Axel Honneths Recht der Freiheit (RF) dienen persönliche Beziehungen, zu welchen Honneth neben Familien- und Liebesbeziehungen auch die Freundschaft zählt, der Verwirklichung einer „besondere[n], schwer zu charakterisierende[n] Form von Freiheit“ (RF 233). Diese Behauptung fügt sich ein in die Kernthese des Rechts der Freiheit. Demnach vermochte es die „Freiheit im Sinne der Autonomie des Einzelnen“ innerhalb unzähliger „Vorstellung[en] vom Guten“ als einzige, die moderne Gesellschaft nachhaltig zu prägen, wohingegen alle anderen Werte, die in der Moderne wirkmächtig geworden sind, als (...) „Facette[n] der konstitutive[n] Idee der individuellen Autonomie“ (RF 35) verstanden werden müssen. -/- 454 -/- Wir argumentieren, dass Honneths Erörterung des Werts von Freundschaft in dreierlei Hinsicht sein Ziel verfehlt: Erstens zwingt sie Honneth zu einer radikalen Beschneidung des Freundschaftsbegriffs, indem er einen überzogenen Kontrast zwischen antiken und modernen Konzeptionen von Freundschaft zeichnet. Zweitens marginalisiert Honneth mit seiner Betrachtung andere Axiologien der Freundschaft, welche dieser gewichtige instrumentelle, konstitutive und finale Werte zuweisen. Drittens scheint selbst eine schwächer angelegte These, die den Wert, den Freundschaften für die individuelle Freiheit haben, auf die Stellung eines primus inter pares zurückstuft, immer noch den zentralen Wert, den Freundschaften für uns haben sollten, zu verfehlen. Dadurch wird Honneths Kernthese von der Exklusivität des Wertes der Freiheit für unsere Gesellschaft in Frage gestellt. (shrink)

Das »Richtige und das Gute« (1930), das ethische Hauptwerk W. D. Ross’, enthält eine Vielzahl wichtiger moralphilosophischer Thesen und Argumente, die bis in die Gegenwart kontrovers diskutiert werden. Im Mittelpunkt steht seine pluralistische Deontologie, der zufolge sich die richtige Handlung aus einer Abwägung der in der jeweiligen Situation relevanten und unableitbaren Prima-facie-Pflichten ergibt, von denen nur ein Teil auf die Optimierung der Handlungsfolgen bezogen ist. Diese Deontologie wurde zu einem modernen Klassiker unter den normativen ethischen Theorien. Darüber hinaus stellt Ross’ (...) These, dass moralische Intuitionen eine Quelle selbstevidenten Wissens sein können, einen wichtigen Referenzpunkt in Debatten um den erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentalismus dar. Auch für die Handlungstheorie liefert Ross einflussreiche Argumente, wenn er die Ansicht vertritt, dass Pflichten nie ein bestimmtes Motiv des Handelnden zum Gegenstand haben können. Eine zentrale Stellung nimmt für Ross die Güterlehre ein, in welcher er von vier Grundgütern, Tugend, Wissen, Lust und Gerechtigkeit, ausgeht. Wurde Ross in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts im damaligen Großbritannien als ein herausragender Ethiker – einer der bedeutendsten des Jahrhunderts, auf Augenhöhe mit G.E. Moore – angesehen, wandelte sich das Meinungsbild in den folgenden Jahrzehnten unter dem Einfluss besonders des Logischen Positivismus und der Philosophie Wittgensteins. In den letzten Jahrzehnten ist jedoch wieder ein wachsendes Interesse an Ross’ Ethik festzustellen. Dabei wird »Das Richtige und das Gute« bisweilen sogar mit der »Nikomachischen Ethik«, Kants »Grundlegung« und Humes »Untersuchung über die Prinzipien der Moral« verglichen. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper defines a new modal logic based theory for non-monotonic reasoning. This logic expresses notions about hypotheses and known information. These notions are defined in the framework of the modal system τ. A translation of default logic in terms of hypothesis theory is given with which it is possible to fully characterize default logic by giving a necessary and sufficient criterion for the existence and the non-existence of extensions. Moreover several problems relating to non-monotonic reasoning are discussed (and (...) solutions are presented), such as case analysis, multiple extensions and contraposition. (shrink)