The article presents Hönigswalds version of transcendental philosophy, putting focus on the mediation of epistemological principles and empirical states of affairs. It is shown, that Hönigswald provides an original account of transcendental philosophy, that goes far beyond the common ones, that we know from the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism.

In this text I argue that a phenomenological conception of reality cannot simply consider ‚reality’ to be a feature of the objects of our experience, nor can ‚reality’ be understood as a somehow subconscious experience of resistance, as Max Schelers notion of a „primary resistance“ tries to show. In opposition to these insufficient conceptions I suggest – following some husserlian inspirations – that the notion of ‚reality’ is to be understood as a elementary feature of our experience of objects – (...) not of the objects of our experience. Is this perspective accepted, a minimal ‚realism’ appears as a presupposition of the concept of intentionality. (shrink)