Are there those who confuse an automobile with its driver? We laugh at such a question. Are there those who cannot distinguish the “known” from the act of their “knowing”? Our laughter quickly fades. For our answer, we do not have to go directly to the jungles and the caves; our enumeration could begin with famous names of science. People who wield the surgical instruments of their discipline with the subtlest precision start to beat about with primitive conceptual clubs as (...) soon as discussion hits upon questions concerning consciousness and its accurate investigation. (shrink)

We present an experimental test of the validity of the Pauli Exclusion Principle for electrons based on the concept put forward a few years ago by Ramberg and Snow. In this experiment we perform a very accurate search of X-rays from the Pauli-forbidden atomic transitions of electrons in the already filled 1S shells of copper atoms. Although the experiment has a simple structure, it poses deep conceptual and interpretational problems. Here we describe the experimental method and recent experimental results, which (...) we interpret as an upper limit for the probability to violate the Pauli Exclusion Principle. We present also future plans to upgrade the experimental apparatus using Silicon Drift Detectors. (shrink)

In this paper we describe an experimental test of the validity of the Pauli Exclusion Principle (for electrons) which is based on a straightforward idea put forward a few years ago by Ramberg and Snow (Phys. Lett. B 238:438, 1990). We perform a very accurate search of X-rays from the Pauli-forbidden atomic transitions of electrons in the already filled 1S shells of copper atoms. Although the experiment has a very simple structure, it poses deep conceptual and interpretational problems. Here we (...) describe the experimental method and recent experimental results, which we interpret in the framework of quon theory. We also present future plans to upgrade the experimental apparatus using Silicon Drift Detectors. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that there is an essential difference between social intelligence and creative intelligence, and that they have their foundation in human sexuality. For sex differences, we refer to the vast psychological, neurological, and cognitive science research where problem-solving, verbal skills, logical reasoning, and other topics are dealt with. Intelligence tests suggest that, on average, neither sex has more general intelligence than the other. Though people are equals in general intelligence, they are different in special forms of (...) intelligence such as social intelligence and creative intelligence, the former dominant in women, the latter dominant in men. The dominance of creative intelligence in men needs to be explained. The focus of our research is on the strictly anthropological aspects, and consequently our explanation for this fact is based on the male-female polarity in the mating systems. Sexual dimorphism does not only regard bodily differences but implies different forms of sex life. Sex researchers distinguish between two levels of sexual intercourse: procreative sex and recreational sex, and to these we would add “creative sex.” On all three levels, there is a behavioral difference between men and women, including the subjective experience. These differences are as well attributed to culture as genetically founded in nature. Sexual reproduction is only possible if females cooperate. Their biological inheritance makes females play a decisive role in mate choice. Recreational sex for the purpose of pleasure rather than reproduction results from female extended sexual activity. Creative sex, on the contrary, is a specifically male performance of sexuality. We identify creative sex with eroticism. Eroticism evolved through the transformation of the sexual drive into a mental state of expectation and fantasizing. Hence, sex differences (that nowadays are covered up by cultural egalitarianism) continue to be the evolutionary origin of the difference between social and creative intelligence. (shrink)

Are there those who confuse an automobile with its driver? We laugh at such a question. Are there those who cannot distinguish the “known” from the act of their “knowing”? Our laughter quickly fades. For our answer, we do not have to go directly to the jungles and the caves; our enumeration could begin with famous names of science. People who wield the surgical instruments of their discipline with the subtlest precision start to beat about with primitive conceptual clubs as (...) soon as discussion hits upon questions concerning consciousness and its accurate investigation. (shrink)

A surprising explosion of interest in J. G. Fichte's system of transcendental philosophy--the so-called Wissenschaftslehre or "Theory of Scientific Knowledge"--has occurred in recent decades. Whereas previous interest in Fichte centered primarily upon the early works which he published while in Jena and was concerned to establish his position on the mythical stairway stretching from the Critique of Pure Reason to the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, the most interesting recent work focuses upon his later, often unpublished, writings and makes large (...) claims concerning the originality and contemporary relevance of the WL. Despite a blizzard of new monographs and essays, a general overview of Fichte's entire work from the perspective of current research has been lacking. This lack is now remedied with the publication of this new Introduction to Fichte's thought by a noted exponent of the prevailing "Munich school" of Fichte interpreters, Joachim Widmann, who is best known for his highly original and rigorously formal study of Fichte's spring 1804 lectures on the WL. (shrink)

A surprising explosion of interest in J. G. Fichte's system of transcendental philosophy--the so-called Wissenschaftslehre or "Theory of Scientific Knowledge"--has occurred in recent decades. Whereas previous interest in Fichte centered primarily upon the early works which he published while in Jena and was concerned to establish his position on the mythical stairway stretching from the Critique of Pure Reason to the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, the most interesting recent work focuses upon his later, often unpublished, writings and makes large (...) claims concerning the originality and contemporary relevance of the WL. Despite a blizzard of new monographs and essays, a general overview of Fichte's entire work from the perspective of current research has been lacking. This lack is now remedied with the publication of this new Introduction to Fichte's thought by a noted exponent of the prevailing "Munich school" of Fichte interpreters, Joachim Widmann, who is best known for his highly original and rigorously formal study of Fichte's spring 1804 lectures on the WL. (shrink)

In September 1886, the poet and critic Josef Victor Widmann penned a review of BGE titled "Nietzsche's Dangerous Book,"1 observing that a keen sense of danger pervaded the work.2 Nietzsche, who often felt misunderstood and wrongfully attacked, responded enthusiastically to Widmann on June 28, 1887: Mainly, I have to thankfully inform you, after a year's time no less, that your review has been by far the most "intelligent" one that this uncongenial book has received until now. Poets are, (...) after all, "divinatory" beings: in the end, such a book of riddles will much sooner be deciphered and "cracked open" by a poet, than by a philosopher and "specialist."3 Indeed, Widmann identified a motif that runs not only... (shrink)

Nell'estate del 1886 Nietzche cura a proprie spese, da Sils-Maria, in Engadina, la pubblicazione di Al di là del bene e del male. Tra le recensioni che più entusiasmarono il filosofo tedesco vi fu quella di Joseph Widmann, pubblicata su 'Der Bund' di Berna, il quale paragonò il libro a quei carri che, inalberando bandiera nera come segno di pericolo, trasportavano la dinamite attraverso le quiete valli svizzere passando per il tunnel del San Gottardo. Nietzsche comincia la sua guerra, (...) dopo una guerriglia condotta a colpi di aforismi, contro tutti i pregiudizi morali e filosofici, contro l'illusionismo magico di parole e concetti. Un attacco che diventa più organico e sistematico, e che con la stessa intensità poetica segue il dionisiaco abbraccio alla vita selvaggia dell Zarathustra. (shrink)

This volume sets the agenda for future work on time and chance, which are central to theemerging sub-field of metaphysics of science.

The purpose of this article is to find out to what demand of philosophical and scientific thinking is culturology a response, treating culturology from two aspects: as a set of approaches to culture and as a school subject in the system of education. The task is not to define the subject boundaries of some science . I am interested in the "metaphysical location" of the interest in culture, in the lacuna of man's understanding of the world and of himself it (...) seeks to fill. (shrink)

Developing an intellectualist account of skill, Stanley and Williamson define skill as a kind of disposition to action-guiding knowledge. The present paper challenges their definition of skill. While we don’t dispute that skill may consist of a cognitive, a dispositional, and an action-guiding component, we argue that Stanley and Williamson’s account of each component is problematic. In the first section, we argue, against Stanley and Williamson, that the cognitive component of skill is not a case of propositional knowledge-wh, which is (...) typically indexical. In the second section, we seek to show that Stanley and Williamson face difficulties in arguing for a generic claim about skill as a kind of disposition, and they fail to defend intellectualism about skill based on the dispositional account. In the third section we argue that Stanley and Williamson need a more detailed account of the action-guiding aspect of skill to avoid several difficulties, including a threat of a regress. We close with some lessons for the debate over intellectualism and anti-intellectualism about skill. (shrink)

Mysticism ; Islamic philosophy ; Sufism.

In this paper, we examine Maduabuchi Dukor’s article titled “Divination: A Science or An Art?”, where he endeavours to demonstrate the character and nature of African science as well as explores the issue whether some practices in Africa can be accorded a scientific status. These tasks to explore and demonstrate the scientific nature of African practices led Maduabuchi Dukor to focus on divination as his working example; and specifically identified Ifa divination. In sum, Maduabuchi Dukor argues that African (Ifa) divination (...) is or can be made a science through formalization and quantification. The main thrust of his argument is that with the aid of formalization and quantification, divination as practiced in Africa can qualify as a science. Our contention as regards this exercise by Maduabuchi Dukor runs from the beginning of the article through to the end of it. That is, our critique of the article concerns some suppositions employed to build up the argument that supports the claim that (Ifa) divination is a scientific enterprise. In other words, the premises and the conclusion so provided, we argue, are full of contestations; and it is these contestations that we showcased in this paper. It is important to make it clear that our contention has nothing to do with the thinking of Maduabuchi Dukor that Ifa divination is a science or can be made to be so; rather, our contention is the suppositions that he deployed to articulate his thought. (shrink)

La admirable riqueza cultural y artística del Renacimiento esconde una desoladora miseria y aquella "edad de la abundancia" contrasta con una inmensa pobreza. Lejos de ser una broma o una pesadilla, la celebrada Utopía de Tomás Moro fue antes que nada un desafío insoslayable, pues proponía que ninguna sociedad merece tal nombre si tolera la miseria de un solo pobre. Rico y pobre explora la cuestión en ese libro de 1516 y en otros del escritor londinense para concluir con un (...) esbozo de su vida a la luz de la pobreza como virtud indispensable y libertadora. He aquí un hombre afortunado que no fue indiferente ante el infortunio de tantos y que vio en la humanitas la virtud por excelencia que lleva a una constante atención y cuidado del prójimo. Inspirado por un cambio de actitud en su época, así como por su fe cristiana y la mejor tradición estoica, mostró una robusta preocupación sobre el tema subrayando el valor social que debe tener toda riqueza, tanto a nivel estatal como individual, destacando la grave obligación cívica de los ricos y la necesidad que tienen todos, ricos y pobres, de empeñarse en la práctica de cierto desprendimiento y generosidad si no quieren mermar su propia humanidad y fallecer en su avaricia. La percepción de la miseria había cambiado de tal manera que su remedio ya no podía estar en una u otra limosna en plazas e iglesias, sino en la acción bien pensada y perentoria de todo gobierno que se tenga por justo. Sir Tomás Moro, privilegiado desde la cuna y seguro en su trabajo profesional, vio la pobreza de tantos como un desastre social, pero uno que, al mismo tiempo, debería llevar a todo ser humano a ver en el desprendimiento y generosidad una excelencia o virtud que alumbra la "otra" libertad, y tan íntima y valiosa que en su caso brilló aun en la prisión y ante el horror de una muerte injusta y atroz." -- Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Epistrofē, ili, Fenomen "vozvrashchenii︠a︡" v pervoĭ evropeĭskoĭ kulʹture -- "Osevye veka" evropeĭskoĭ istorii -- Logika istorii -- Istina i istorii︠a︡ -- Evropeĭskiĭ istorizm (nekotorye aspekty problemy).

Muzykalʹnai︠a︡ ėstetika i kulʹturologii︠a︡ -- Istorii︠a︡ muzyki -- Istorii︠a︡, teorii︠a︡ muzykalʹnogo ispolnitelʹstva -- Tradit︠s︡ionnai︠a︡ kulʹtura.

Objective: To explore the experiences of people with a “terminal illness”, focusing on the patients’ perspective of euthanasia and assisted suicide.Method: A qualitative study using narrative interviews was conducted throughout the UK. The views of the 18 people who discussed euthanasia and assisted suicide were explored. These were drawn from a maximum variation sample, who said that they had a “terminal” illness, malignant or non-malignant.Results: That UK law should be changed to allow assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia was felt strongly (...) by most people. Those who had seen others die were particularly convinced that this should be a right. Some had multiple reasons, including pain and anticipated pain, fear of indignity, loss of control and cognitive impairment. Those who did not want to be a burden also had other reasons for wanting euthanasia. Suicide was contemplated by a few, who would have preferred a change in the law to allow them to end their lives with medical help and in the company of family or friends. The few who opposed a change in UK law, or who felt ambivalent, focused on involuntary euthanasia, cited religious reasons or worried that new legislation might be open to abuse.Conclusion: Qualitative research conducted on people who know they are nearing death is an important addition to the international debate on euthanasia and assisted suicide. Those who had seen others die were particularly convinced that the law should be changed to allow assisted death. (shrink)

How do people learn multisensory, or amodal, representations, and what consequences do these representations have for perceptual performance? We address this question by performing a rational analysis of the problem of learning multisensory representations. This analysis makes use of a Bayesian nonparametric model that acquires latent multisensory features that optimally explain the unisensory features arising in individual sensory modalities. The model qualitatively accounts for several important aspects of multisensory perception: (a) it integrates information from multiple sensory sources in such a (...) way that it leads to superior performances in, for example, categorization tasks; (b) its performances suggest that multisensory training leads to better learning than unisensory training, even when testing is conducted in unisensory conditions; (c) its multisensory representations are modality invariant; and (d) it predicts ‘‘missing” sensory representations in modalities when the input to those modalities is absent. Our rational analysis indicates that all of these aspects emerge as part of the optimal solution to the problem of learning to represent complex multisensory environments. (shrink)