Gender, age, and culturally specific beliefs are often considered relevant to observed variation in social interactions. At present, however, the scientific literature is mixed with respect to the significance of these factors in guiding moral judgments. In this study, we explore the role of each of these factors in moral judgment by presenting the results of a web-based study of Eastern (i.e., Russia) and Western (i.e., USA, UK, Canada) subjects, male and female, and young and old. Participants ( n = (...) 659) responded to hypothetical moral scenarios describing situations where sacrificing one life resulted in saving five others. Though men and women from both types of cultures judged (1) harms caused by action as less permissible than harms caused by omission, (2) means-based harms as less permissible than side-effects, and (3) harms caused by contact as less permissible than by non-contact, men in both cultures delivered more utilitarian judgments (save the five, sacrifice one) than women. Moreover, men from Western cultures were more utilitarian than Russian men, with no differences observed for women. In both cultures, older participants delivered less utilitarian judgments than younger participants. These results suggest that certain core principles may mediate moral judgments across different societies, implying some degree of universality, while also allowing a limited range of variation due to sociocultural factors. (shrink)

The authors attempt to speculatively reconstruct the concept of the “So­viet computer game”. They propose to consider gaming practices associ­ated with computers as a derivative of the accepted ideological guidelines that accompany the Soviet project of machine modernization. Within this framework, the concept of the Soviet computer game appears as an unre­alized historical alternative to the normative game design that has devel­oped in countries with market economies. Despite the industry — or the electronic entertainment market — not having had the (...) time to be properly established in the USSR, there were a number of discursive attitudes re­garding the game as such, and the gaming function of computing devices in particular. Even early Soviet pedagogical theories assumed that “playing like a Soviet” involves performing activities structurally similar to labor, where the player becomes part of production. Later, cybernetic discourse, through game theory, indicated the possibility of formalizing any prag­matic activity as a game model; with the advancement of programming, the pragmatics of digital gaming as a way of educating and solving utili­tarian tasks was developed. Based on the memoir archive of Soviet cyber­netics, and publications in the late-Soviet press, the authors demonstrate that the Soviet computer game was not seen an entertainment product, but a representative model for solving problems in an algorithmic form. Thus, the article is not about specific games that could be called Soviet, but about the logic that guided and set the tone for the interpretation of certain computer-game phenomena in the USSR. (shrink)

At the risk of proving myself such a caviller, I want to ask a question which I have seldom heard raised, and which I have never seen discussed in anything that I have read about Berkeley. If I am right, it poses a problem for his immaterialism, not only different, but coming from a different direction, from those objections that are commonly levelled against him. If I am wrong, it will show how right Berkeley was to stress the difficulty of (...) using for one purpose our language which has become fashioned for another. At least, I hope that I shall not fail to be the ‘fair and ingenuous reader’for whom he asked. (shrink)

An assessment is made of Rudolf Otto's criticisms of Friedrich Schleiermacher's claim that religious feeling is to be interpreted as essentially involving a feeling of absolute dependence. Otto's criticisms are divided into two kinds. The first suggest that a feeling a dependence, even an absolute one, is the wrong sort of feeling to locate at the heart of religious consciousness. It is argued that this criticism is based on misinterpretations of Schleiermacher's view, which is in fact much closer to Otto's (...) than the latter appreciated. The second kind of criticism suggests that the feeling of absolute dependence cannot play the foundational role assigned to it by Schleiermacher, since it is itself a secondary response. It is argued not only that Otto provides no justification for this criticism, but that Otto's own position is incoherent unless Schleiermacher's view is accepted. (shrink)

The Problem of Perception offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of ...

A. D. M. Walker; III*—Gratefulness and Gratitude, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 39–56, https://doi.org/10.1093.

One of Hume's most well-known works and a masterpiece of philosophy, A Treatise of Human Nature is indubitably worth taking the time to read.

A. D. M. Walker; III*—Gratefulness and Gratitude, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 39–56, https://doi.org/10.1093.

Disjunctivism is the focus of a lively debate spanning the philosophy of perception, epistemology, and the philosophy of action. Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson present 17 specially written essays, which examine the different forms of disjunctivism and explore the connections between them.

Anselm of Canterbury, in his work Proslogion," originated the "ontological argument" for God's existence, famously arguing that "something than which nothing greater can be conceived," which he identifies with God, must actually exist, for otherwise something greater could indeed be conceived. Some commentators have claimed that although Anselm may not have been conscious of the fact, the Proslogion "as well as his Reply to Gaunilo" contains passages that constitute a second independent proof: a "modal ontological argument" that concerns the supposed (...) logical necessity of God's existence. Other commentators disagree, countering that the alleged second argument does not stand on its own but presupposes the conclusion of the first. Anselm's Other Argument "stakes an original claim in this debate, and takes it further. There is" a second a priori" argument in Anselm, A. D. Smith contends, but it is not the modal argument past scholars have identified. This second argument surfaces in a number of forms, though always turning on certain deep, interrelated metaphysical issues. It is this form of argument that in fact underlies several of the passages which have been misconstrued as statements of the modal argument. In a book that combines historical research with rigorous philosophical analysis, Smith discusses this argument in detail, finally defending a modification of it that is implicit in Anselm. This "other argument" bears a striking resemblance to one that Duns Scotus would later employ. (shrink)

This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.

An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingentThere are two main issues to address. the first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this (...) still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. the second is Fred Dretske's claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that (a) ‘non‐epistemic’perception can be understood only by employing the concept of ‘epistemic’perception; (b) that the former can occur only partially—i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and (c) that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition's concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with ‘doxastic’force. (shrink)

An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent.There are two main issues to address. The first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this (...) still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. The second is Fred Dretske’s claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that ‘non-epistemic’ perception can be understood only by employing the concept of ‘epistemic’ perception; that the former can occur only partially---i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition’s concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with ‘doxastic’ force. (shrink)

This paper, which has both a historical and a polemical aspect, investigates the view, dominant throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that the sense of sight is, originally, not phenomenally three-dimensional in character, and that we must come to interpret its properly two-dimensional data by reference to the sense of 'touch'. The principal argument for this claim, due to Berkeley, is examined and found wanting. The supposedly confirming findings concerning 'Molyneux subjects' are also investigated and are shown to be either (...) irrelevant or disconfirming. Recent investigations on infant and neonatal perception are discussed and are also found to be disconfirming. An innatist version of the theory is then considered and is shown to be undermined by the largely 'Gibsonian' character of early space-perception. Finally three recent arguments in favour of the theory - two from psychologists, one from a philosopher - are considered and answered. (shrink)

Um bei einer Wertung der Faktoren, die das Wachstum einer Population beeinflussen, zu einer richtigen Einsicht zu gelangen, empfiehlt es sich, nicht den relativen Wert dieser Faktoren in Bezug auf die in Rede stehende Insektenpopulation auszudrücken, sondern ihre absolute Grösse in Faktoreinheiten zum Ausdruck zu bringen — wie: Wärme in Grad Celsius, Luftfeuchtigkeit in Prozenten, Zahl der im Bevölkerungsmilieu vorgefundenen Raubinsekten oder Parasiten. Auf dieser Grundlage liessen sich Faktoren in folgender Weise aufteilen: Faktoren ersten Grades : Allgemeine Faktoren : Unabhängige (...) Faktoren : nicht mechanische Klimaeinflüsse , chemische Faktoren, Güte der Nahrung. Abhängige Faktoren : die internen Faktoren, die bei einer Zunahme der Dichtigkeit einen Rückgang des Zuwachses bewirken, mit Ausnahme des Kannibalismus, ferner die Menge der Nahrung. Selektive Faktoren : Unabhängige Faktoren : unersättliche Faktoren : mechanische Klimaeinflüsse, weitere mechanische Faktoren, Parasiten und Raubfeinde, die nicht mit töten aufhören, wenn sie gesättigt sind, insofern ihre Bevölkerungsdichte nicht durch die des fraglichen Insektes bedingt wird. ersättliche Faktoren: restliche Raubinsekten und Parasiten, insofern ihre Bevölkerungsdichte nicht durch die des fraglichen Insektes bedingt wird. Abhängige Faktoren : Kannibalismus. Wandelbare Faktoren : Raubinsekten und Parasiten, welche diesem Erfordernis entsprechen, pathogene Pilze und Bakterien. Faktoren zweiten Ranges . Faktoren des dritten Ranges .Afin d'obtenir une notion exacte de la valeur des facteurs qui influencent la croissance d'une population, il vaudra mieux ne pas exprimer ces facteurs en leur valeur relative quant à la population d'insectes en question, mais en unités de facteurs: degrés Celsius, pourcentage de l'humidité de l'air, nombre d'ennemis ou de parasites qui sont présents dans le milieu de la population. Sur cette base on pourra répartir les facteurs de la façon suivante: Facteurs du 1er ordre : Facteurs généraux : influences climatiques non mécaniques , facteurs chimiques, qualité de la nourriture. Facteurs dépendants : les facteurs internes qui font de sorte que la densité de la population diminue quand se présente une plus forte densité, en exceptant le cannibalisme, la quantité de nourriture. Facteurs selectifs ; seule une partie des individus est exposée à leur action; les animaux touchés sont mécaniquement endommagés et, dans la règle, tués. Facteurs indépendants : facteurs insatiables : des influences climatiques mécaniques, d'autres facteurs mécaniques, des parasites et des ennemis qui ne s'arrêtent pas de tuer quand ils sont rassasiés, pour autant que l'intensité de la population de l'insecte en question. facteurs rassasiables: autres ennemis et parasites pour autant que l'intensité de leur population ne se modifie pas sous l'influence de la densité de la population de l'insecte en question. Facteurs indépendants : cannibalisme. Facteurs modifiables : ennemis et parasites qui satisfont à cette exigence, champignons pathogènes, bactéries. Facteurs du 2ième ordre . Facteurs du 3iéme ordre. (shrink)