In the early 1980s, Paul V. Spade advanced the thesis that obligational reasoning was counterfactual reasoning, based upon his interpretation of the obligationes of Walter Burley, Richard Kilvington, and Roger Swyneshed. Eleonore Stump in a series of contemporary papers argued against Spade’s thesis with respect to Burley and Swyneshed, provisionally admitting it for Kilvington with the caveat that Kilvington’s theory is by no means clear or non-idiosyncratic. In this paper, we revisit the connection between counterfactual reasoning and obligationes, focusing on (...) one particular treatise, the anonymous early twelfth-century Obligationes Parisienses edited by L.M. de Rijk in the late 70s. We show that while positio in this treatise does not involve counterfactual reasoning, the species sit verum or rei veritas apparently does, and it is precisely this which distinguishes the two species in this treatise. (shrink)

The paper compares Comenius’ usage of the terms unum, verum and bonum in his metaphysical writings both with the expression of the image of the Trinity in De civitate dei by Aurelius Augustinus and with the concept of existence as three basic movements in the philosophical work of Jan Patočka. The purpose of the text is to show, despite the differences in historical periods, language and life experience, the possible similarity or connection of the vision that Augustine, Comenius and (...) Patočka mediate in their works. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Verum-factum and Practical Wisdom in the Early Writings of Giambattista VicoRobert C. MinerAs several contemporary writers have noted, Giambattista Vico defends the idea of practical knowledge, a type of knowledge that cannot be fully expressed by propositions and defies reductions to method. 1 The defense of practical knowledge, against Descartes and the rise of objectifying science, is most clearly articulated in a group of Vico’s early writings: the (...) oration De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1709), the metaphysical book De antiquissima Italorum sapientia ex linguae latinae originibus eruenda (1710), and two rejoinders (Prima and Seconda risposte) to critics of the De antiquissima. In these texts Vico criticizes Cartesian method in terms that remind us of Aristotle, or at least the Aristotle of the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. “If you were to import the geometrical method into practical life, you would do no more than exhaust yourself in becoming a rational lunatic” (A 7.5). 2This comment and many others like it seem to suggest that Vico is an “Aristotelian,” but any simple classification is problematic. In the same text in which Vico defends the Aristotelian topos he also announces that “the true and the made are convertible” (verum et factum convertuntur). The emphasis on the [End Page 53] role of “making” in truth seems incompatible with the Aristotelian idea of phronesis, whose knowledge is associated with praxis and cannot be reduced to techne. It would be simpler if Vico distinguished between a realm in which the verum-factum principle applied and one in which prudentia was supreme. However, Vico not only situates mathematics and experimental science within the metaphysical framework governed by verum-factum, but also implies strong connections between making and ethics. The prominence Vico assigns to making in all areas of human endeavor gives him a distinctly modern appearance in the fashion of Bacon, Galileo, and Hobbes.This gives rise to both hermeneutical and philosophical problems. Is Vico simply hesitating between the old and new? Does he coherently balance an Aristotelian perspective with the “modern” emphasis on artifice? 3 Perhaps Vico is caught in the middle of the querelle des anciens et modernes, somewhat like John Dunn’s version of Locke, a “tragic figure” who cannot reconcile his epistemological discoveries with a noninstrumentalist view of practical reason. 4 The purpose of this essay is to provide a sympathetic interpretation of Vico’s early writings on prudentia and its links to both verum-factum and rhetoric.Vico contra Rule-based EthicsThe denial that ethics is well understood as a matter of following or justifying general rules has become a commonplace among contemporary Aris-totelians and Wittgensteinians. 5 Against the Enlightenment ambition to construct a universally valid moral science, recent virtue ethics has emphasized the irreducibly contingent aspects of human life, aspects which resist the clutches of “method.” Although Descartes wrote little about morals directly, his influence can be detected in the ethical writings of Hobbes, Kant, Mill, and Sidgwick. These examples of modern moral philosophy presuppose the correctness of the Cartesian diagnosis of ancient and medieval writing on virtue. In the Discourse on Method Descartes compares previous moral teaching to “the most proud and magnificent palaces built on nothing but sand or mud.” 6 Descartes himself did not provide a rational justification of ethics, but he has had no shortage of successors who have tried to complete his foundational project. Jusnaturalism, Kantian deontology, and utilitarianism, as different as they are from one another, share the desire to ground ethics in principles as universal and certain as [End Page 54] those of mathematics. Each of these variants of post-Cartesian ethics claim to have discovered and justified such a principle or set of principles. Maxims deduced from the principle, if not the principle itself, will arguably enable moral agents to discover the right course of action in a particular situation.Vico did not live to witness the most articulate expressions of a Cartesian approach to ethics, but he did apprehend the shift in focus from prudence to method. In the De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, an oration delivered at the University of Naples in 1708 and published the following year, Vico criticizes approaches that locate... (shrink)

El articulo examina la aparente discrepancia en el pensamiento de Spinoza entre su teocentrismo epistemológico, según el cual todo es dudoso mientras desconocemos la existencia de Dios, y el principio verum index sui et falsi, según el cual la mera posesión de ideas verdaderas excluye toda incertidumbre. Lejos de contradecirse, estas dos afirmaciones constituyen en Spinoza dos aspectos correlativos del mismo planteamiento gnoseólogico. Se muestra así que la naturaleza divina no es ajena al intelecto humano y que este es (...) capaz de contemplar la realidad desde una perspectiva omnímoda, idéntica a la de Dios. (shrink)

This article deals with Kant’s intentions in adding § 12 of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Here, Kant remarks on the so-called transcendentals (unum, verum, bonum) in the metaphysical or ontological tradition. This article focuses on their trans-categorial character to clarify their role in the system formation of Kant’s three critiques. In order to clarify Kant’s difficult terminology in § 12, fragments from his reflections and transcripts of his lectures are analyzed. Furthermore, an examination of (...) Kant’s references to qualitative unity, plurality, and perfection reveals that these logical criteria of cognition in general help him to organize the content of the three critiques. (shrink)

This paper explores Thomas Aquinas’ and Richard Swinburne’s doctrines of simplicity in the context of their philosophical theologies. Both say that God is simple. However, Swinburne takes simplicity as a property of the theistic hypothesis, while for Aquinas simplicity is a property of God himself. For Swinburne, simpler theories are ceteris paribus more likely to be true; for Aquinas, simplicity and truth are properties of God which, in a certain way, coincide – because God is metaphysically simple. Notwithstanding their different (...) approaches, some unreckoned parallels between their thoughts are brought to light. (shrink)

Dentro de toda la obra de Vico subyace -a pesar de su tensión con Descartes y de sus pretensiones jurídicas y filológicas- una vigorosa preocupación por lo humano. Esta preocupación recorre desde la tesis del conocer por causas de la ciencia hasta la afirmación de la comprensión como forma específica del conocimiento histórico.In the whole work of Vico can be found -despite his tension with Descartes and his juridical and philological intentions- a strong concern for humanity. This concern is visible (...) from the thesis of scientific knowledge by causes to the statement of comprehension as the specific method of historical knowledge. (shrink)

Raccolta di saggi dedicati al Prof. Franco De Capitani.

Raccolta di saggi dedicati al Prof. Franco De Capitani.

"Of all creatures women be best, / Cuius contrarium verum est": Gendered Power in Selected Late Medieval and Early Modern Texts The aim of this paper is to examine images of the relationship between men and women in selected late medieval and early modern English texts. I will identify prevalent ideology of representation of women as well as typical imagery associated with them. I will in particular argue that men whose homosocial laughter performs a solidifying function of their community (...) seek to reiterate their superiority over women through seemingly playful and inclusive humour. I will attempt to show that what appears to be good-natured entertainment is actually a weapon used against women who, often accused of no sense of humour, are ridiculed and commanded to succumb to male authority. I will also discuss the triumphant tone of both poems and dramatic writings whose cheerful tone functions to marginalize women and to reinforce the misogynistic foundations of public life. (shrink)

Certain information-seeking yes/no (yn)-questions –e.g. Did Jorge really bring a present? and Doesn’t John drink?– convey an epistemic bias of the speaker. Two main approaches to biased yn-questions are compared: the VERUM approach and the Decision Theory approach. It is argued that, while Decision Theory can formally characterize the notion of “intent” of a question, VERUM is needed to derive the data.

Aunque Vico hace varias referencias a Hobbes creemos que en realidad nunca tuvo un estrecho conocimiento del filósofo inglés. Pensamos que no merece la pena realmente buscar similitudes o coincidencias generales en textos seleccionados. Pero sí creemos que sería interesante comparar ambas actitudes metodológicas, su esfuerzo común por establecer las bases de una ciencia civil invirtiendo la "jerarquía de la evidencia", esto es, llevando el nivel de la ciencia social a las matemáticas y trasladando las ciencias naturales al rango de (...) la hipótesis. (shrink)

Aunque Vico hace varias referencias a Hobbes creemos que en realidad nunca tuvo un estrecho conocimiento del filósofo inglés. Pensamos que no merece la pena realmente buscar similitudes o coincidencias generales en textos seleccionados. Pero sí creemos que sería interesante comparar ambas actitudes metodológicas, su esfuerzo común por establecer las bases de una ciencia civil invirtiendo la "jerarquía de la evidencia", esto es, llevando el nivel de la ciencia social a las matemáticas y trasladando las ciencias naturales al rango de (...) la hipótesis.Although Vico makes several references to Hobbes, we are of the opinion that he never really had a narrow knowledge of the English philosopher. We do not think it worth to lock for similarities through some selected passages or some general coincidences. But we do think it interesting to compare both methodological attitudes, their common efforts to establish the bases of a civil science by reversing the "jerarchy of evidence", that is, by bringing the level of social science to that of mathematics and shifting the natural sciences to the rank of hypothesis. (shrink)

This paper investigates Brentano's criticism of the correspondence theory of truth within the context of a discussion of his ontological assumptions. Brentano's interpretation of the formula Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus and of the principle ens et verum convertuntur is shown to fit into the history of these principles and into modern interpretations like that of Tarski.

This paper investigates Brentano's criticism of the correspondence theory of truth within the context of a discussion of his ontological assumptions. Brentano's interpretation of the formula Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus and of the principle ens et verum convertuntur is shown to fit into the history of these principles and into modern interpretations like that of Tarski.

The purpose of this review article is to offer a criticism of the interpretation of Duns Scotus’s conception of intelligible being that has been proposed by Michael Renemann in his book Gedanken als Wirkursachen. In the first place, the author shows that according to Scotus, for God “to produce a thing in intelligible being” and “to conceive a thing” amounts to altogether one and the same act. Esse intelligibile therefore does not have “priority of nature” with respect to “esse intellectum” (...) or “esse repraesentatum”, contrary to Renemann’s interpretation. The distinction between Scotus’s second and third “instants of nature” consists in something else, then: the relation of reason, of which Scotus says that it is produced in the third instant, is not the relation of being actually conceived (first, because actual intellection comes already in the second instant, and second, because divine intellection, being the measure of the conceived objects, is not relative bud absolute) but it is a relation of comparison, viz. of an image to its exemplar. Next, the author shows how a misreading of two passages of Scotus’s Ordinatio misled both the Vatican editors and Renemann to create the chimaera of “verum esse secundum quid”. By way of a conclusion the author argues that Scotus’s doctrine of “esse intelligibile” does not make him any less a direct realist than Suárez, his position being quite plausible even from the point of view of common sense. (shrink)

Ante la consideración general de que el principio verum/factum es una fórmula de implicación revolucionaria sólo con Vico, se pretende examinar la tesis del Quod Nihil Scitur de F. Sánchez, con objeto de mostrar que, lejos de ser una idea marginal e incidental, el principio se encuentra en la base de la teoría epistemológica del filósofo ibérico. De hecho, el presente trabajo intenta demostrar la formulación viquiana como una respuesta a la crisis escéptica que surgía de la teoría del (...) concimiento de Sánchez. Aceptando la premisa básica del escepticismo, Vico puso fin a la crisis escéptica.As to the general view of the verum/factum principle as a revolutionary formula of implication embodied in Vico’s Philosophy, this paper aims to examine the main thesis of F. Sánchez’s Quod Nihil Scitur in order to show that the principle, far from being a casual or incidental idea, lies on the bottom of his epistemological theory. In fact, this paper intends to present the vichian formula as a response to the esceptical crisis which came out from Sánchez’s very own theory of knowledge. Once the basic assumption of scepticism has been retorted, Vico brought to an end the sceptical crisis. (shrink)

Summary The paper discusses the question to what extent one can speak of a genus tapeinoticum in Luther, or of a communication of the properties of nature to nature that is both direct and symmetrical. The thesis is that in the 1540 s Luther significantly modifies his earlier rejection of the idea of a passibility of divine nature as such by means of the distinctions between ‘concretum’ and ‘abstractum’ as well as between ‘relativum’ and ‘absolutum’. The boundary between passibility and (...) impassibility does not run between the Son on the one hand and the Father and the Spirit on the other, but between the deus relativus and what might be called the ‘absolute-relative’ God. (shrink)

Con el objetivo de reivindicar la importancia de lo que de irrenunciable, esencial e histórico reside en el ethos jurídico, en este trabajo reflexionaremos sobre las virtudes que en la actualidad siguen presentando algunas tendencias filosófico-jurídicas. Aunque la oposición entre modelos iusnaturalistas y propuestas iuspositivistas se haya convertido en un eterno debate – desde donde algunos intentan escapar y donde otros buscan refugio –, intentaremos sostener la conveniencia de un posible patrón mixto, que definiremos discreto y templado, una arquitectura sensata (...) y respetuosa para el derecho del futuro, que es, en realidad, el derecho del presente. La fascinante relación entre las categorías viquianas del certo y del vero nos servirá como guía para rescatar una aproximación a lo jurídico que sepa combinar su innegable corte histórico-concreto, su calibrada carga metafísica y su indispensable formalidad procedimental. Todo ello, con el fin último de seguir apostando por lo que de humano reside en el derecho. (shrink)