Vergewisserungsprozesse, auch die des christlichen Glaubens, sind Zeicheninterpretationsprozesse. Diese These entwickelt Gesche Linde, indem sie die theoretische Inanspruchnahme des Zeichenbegriffs für das Gewißheitsproblem von der Antike bis hin zu Luther nachzeichnet. Schließlich rekonstruiert sie das zehntrichomische Zeichenklassifikationssystem des späten Peirce, das es erlaubt, alle Bewußtseinsprozesse, vom Fühlen über das Handeln bis hin zum Denken bzw. Sprachverstehen, als grundsätzlich identisch strukturierte Prozesse der Interpretation von Zeichen aufzufassen, ohne daß die Einsicht in diese seine eigene Strukturbedingung den christlichen Glauben zur Relativierung seines (...) Wahrheitsanspruches nötigen oder ihn seines Gewißheitscharakters berauben würde. (shrink)

Peirce's "Neglected Argument" uses more or less standard logical vocabulary, such as "argument," "retroduction," "premise," "conclusion," and "hypothesis." There cannot be any doubt, however, that the musement process as he characterizes it must be regarded as a semiotic process—that is, one that relates a sign to an object by way of forming an interpretant. This assumption follows from the simple observation that, according to Peirce, all processes of thought are semiotically structured. What is more, Peirce quite often uses the term (...) 'argument' for a specific class of sign—namely, one that distinctly indicates1 or represents2 its conclusion. In addition, three years before his 1908... (shrink)

Summary The paper discusses the question to what extent one can speak of a genus tapeinoticum in Luther, or of a communication of the properties of nature to nature that is both direct and symmetrical. The thesis is that in the 1540 s Luther significantly modifies his earlier rejection of the idea of a passibility of divine nature as such by means of the distinctions between ‘concretum’ and ‘abstractum’ as well as between ‘relativum’ and ‘absolutum’. The boundary between passibility and (...) impassibility does not run between the Son on the one hand and the Father and the Spirit on the other, but between the deus relativus and what might be called the ‘absolute-relative’ God. (shrink)