Work on representing women's voices in ethics has produced a vision of moral understanding profoundly subversive of the traditional philosophical conception of moral knowledge. 1 explicate this alternative moral “epistemology,” identify how it challenges the prevailing view, and indicate some of its resources for a liberatory feminist critique of philosophical ethics.

This article argues that the meaning of σύνεσις in the classical period has been inadequately understood, and consequently its historical significance has likely been misplaced. The traditional view is that the word possessed two basic meanings. First and foremost, σύνεσις meant a general ability to understand. Second and less frequently, it meant moral conscience or some such ability to judge the morality of human choice and action. However, by considering anew the attestations of σύνεσις and its grammatically related forms, it (...) will be shown that σύνεσις never meant moral conscience, but instead often denoted a hermeneutic virtue by which we interpret the deeper significance of things said and done. (shrink)

We commonly hear it said that a work of art must be understood “on its own terms,” and that phrase is used in other contexts as well; people, especially people very different from ourselves, are said to have to be understood on their own terms. But what is the meaning of the expression “on its/their own terms?” Note that we do not say of every possible object of understanding that it must be understood on its own terms. The statement, (...) “Chemistry must be understood on its own terms,” sounds odd. The “on its own terms” appears to lack point. It invites the retort, “Good grief, on what other terms had you expected to understand it?!” We seem to be brought to this: where the exhortation “understand it on its own terms” is to be used in reference to some object, there must be some reasonable way of understanding that object alternative to understanding it on its own terms. We may ask the child its own childish reasons why it keeps clobbering little sister (“She took my dolly!”), or we may account for its actions in terms the child does not comprehend (“sibling rivalry”). We may on occasion even do the same sort of thing with adults, perhaps giving a reason out of Freud for something done by a person who never heard of Freud or psychoanalysis. But naturally, distinctions between “their terms” and “our terms” become of extreme importance when we attempt to understand the peoples of other cultures. In such cases there literally are different systems of terms, that is, different languages, within which we must make sense of activities. (shrink)

The paper makes three points about the role of double dissociation in cognitive neuropsychology. First, arguments from double dissociation to separate modules work by inference to the best, not the only possible, explanation. Second, in the development of computational cognitive neuropsychology, the contribution of connectionist cognitive science has been to broaden the range of potential explanations of double dissociation. As a result, the competition between explanations, and the characteristic features of the assessment of theories against the criteria of probability and (...) explanatory value, are more visible. Third, cognitive neuropsychology is a division of cognitive psychology but the practice of cognitive neuropsychology proceeds on assumptions that go beyond the subject matter of cognitive psychology. Given such assumptions, neuroscientific findings about lesion location may enhance the value of double dissociation in shifting the balance of support between cognitive theories. (shrink)

This paper offers a descriptive account of the transition in evolutionary ethics with reference to some major works from ethics, sociobiology, moral psychology, and primatology. The causes and nature of the transition are discussed by making a distinction between traditional and recent trends in evolutionary ethics enabling us to understand the significance of contemporary evolutionary ethics. The study is gradually directed toward a crucial question of ethics that is the place of reason in morality and what evolutionary ethics implies for (...) Kantian ethics in the question of reason. Many advocates of evolutionary ethics and evolutionary moral psychology claim that reason plays no role or plays a very insignificant role in morality. Such assertion often leads to a rejection of Kantian ethics in particular and cognitivism in general. In this backdrop, the scope of reconciling evolutionary ethics with Kantian ethics as proposed by Frederick Rauscher is analyzed. This paper is thus an attempt to expose the significance of evolutionary ethics with reference to the relation of reason and morality. (shrink)

Every day we experience relationships with artefacts, which describe material objects made by humans in order to reach a goal and exploit the human feature to plan ahead. Artefacts bring together cognitive evolution and technical enhancement. Although artefacts are conceived as technical, we are now facing a relationship with Information Technology artefacts. IT artefacts include both hardware and software, as a two-sided entity. The definition of IT artefact corresponds with the Saussurean linguistic sign: a two-sided entity constituted by the signifier (...) and the signified. I claim that IT artefacts share this ontological trait with the linguistic sign. I will show that IT artefacts are the result of design and planning, while language—which is an institution—is not the fabrication of one human but linked to collective human activity. (shrink)

Summarizing this century's major debates over realism and the rationality of scientific knowledge, Joseph Rouse believes that these disputes oversimplify the ...

I wish to discuss the constitutive conditions ‐ and aporias ‐ of the representations of the other in philosophy, sociology and cultural studies. In so doing, I show that crucial to the problem of ‘tolerance’ is the answer to such questions as: How do we represent the stranger and the other? How does this representation come into being? How can it ‐ in given instances ‐ be changed? I shall suggest that the arts may play a decisive role in this (...) process.In this paper I shall attempt to outline a double thesis: (a) the philosophical theory of the experience of something other requires the challenge of ethnology as the science of the stranger; and (b) conversely, however, ethnology itself requires a theory of cultural strangeness, which although always presupposed is never developed. I shall pursue this thesis in three stages. In the first section, I shall say something about the philosophical study of the other and its latent affinity with ethnology. In the second section, I shall take some key terms from the current dispute within ethnology over methodology, and attempt to show that the experience of something other (alien) requires a medium to express, or rather to describe, this experience. This problem of ethnographic depiction and description, lying between science and art; and the suggested solutions to this problem, developed particularly by postmodern American cultural‐anthropology, namely an aesthetisization without art, leads to the third section of this paper. This provokes the following question: what does art ‐ that moment which remains hidden within the contemporary ethnological discussion ‐ have to offer to our understanding of the (cultural) other? Further, we may ask, as paradoxical as it may at first sound, whether it is precisely from art, perhaps indeed only from art, that the way is to be found leading towards that which hasn't yet been problematized in all these contemporary intercultural debates: an ethic of intercultural understanding as the most important precondition for intercultural tolerance or toleration. (shrink)

Metaethical—or, more generally, metanormative— realism faces a serious epistemological challenge. Realists owe us—very roughly speaking—an account of how it is that we can have epistemic access to the normative truths about which they are realists. This much is, it seems, uncontroversial among metaethicists, myself included. But this is as far as the agreement goes, for it is not clear—nor uncontroversial—how best to understand the challenge, what the best realist way of coping with it is, and how successful this attempt is. (...) In this paper I try, first, to present the challenge in its strongest version, and second, to show how realists—indeed, robust realists—can cope with it. The strongest version of the challenge is, I argue, that of explaining the correlation between our normative beliefs and the independent normative truths. And I suggest an evolutionary explanation as a way of solving it. (shrink)

This research investigates the development of transferable - "adaptive" expertise. The study contrasts problem-solving performance of two kinds of experts (business consultants and restaurant managers) on novel problems at the intersection of their two domains, as well as a group of novices (non-business undergraduates). Despite a lack of restaurant experience, consultants performed better than restaurant managers and undergraduates, even though the problems concerned a restaurant. Process measures suggest this was due to the use of more theoretical reasoning. Analyses show this (...) resulted from differences in work experience and not other factors (e.g., education). We discuss aspects of experience that might be responsible for development of theoretical understanding and, thus, expertise that transfers to novel problems. One possible explanation, consistent with existing research from multiple approaches, is that to transfer to novel problems, experience must include substantive variability. The social context of learning may also play a role. (shrink)

The phenomenon known as matching bias consists of a tendency to see cases as relevant in logical reasoning tasks when the lexical content of a case matches that of a propositional rule, normally a conditional, which applies to that case. Matching is demonstrated by use of the negations paradigm that is by using conditionals in which the presence and absence of negative components is systematically varied. The phenomenon was first published in 1972 and the present paper reviews the history of (...) research and theorising on the problem in the subsequent 25 years. Theories of matching bias considered include those based on several broad frameworks including the heuristic-analytic theory, the mental models theory, the theory of optimal data selection, and relevance theory as well as the specific processing-negations account. The ability of these theories to account for a range of phenomena is considered, including the effects of linguistic form, realistic content, and explicit negation on the matching bias effect. Of particular importance are recent findings showing that the bias is observable on a wider range of linguistic forms than has generally been thought, and that it is almost entirely dependent on the use of implicit negation in the logical cases to which rules are applied. The reasons for the general suppression of matching when realistic content is used are, however, unclear and a need for further research is identified here. It is concluded that matching bias is a highly robust effect which is closely connected with the problem of understanding implicit negation. Most of the theories in the literature are unable to account for at least some of the major phenomena discovered in research on the bias. The accounts that fare best are those that posit local effects of negation, including the heuristic-analytic and processing negations theories. (shrink)

B‐cell acute lymphoblastic leukaemia (B‐ALL) is a clonal malignant disease originated in a single cell and characterized by the accumulation of blast cells that are phenotypically reminiscent of normal stages of B‐cell differentiation. B‐ALL origin has been a subject of continuing discussion, given the fact that human disease is diagnosed at late stages and cannot be monitored during its natural evolution from its cell of origin, although most B‐ALLs probably start off with chromosomal changes in haematopoietic stem cells. However, the (...) cells responsible for maintaining the disease appear to differ between the different types of B‐ALLs and this remains an intriguing and exciting topic of research, since these cells have been posited to be responsible for resistance to conventional therapies, recurrence and dissemination. During the last years this problem has been addressed primarily by transplantation of purified subpopulations of human B‐ALL cells into immunodeficient mice. The results from these different reconstitution experiments and their interpretations are compared in this review in the context of normal B‐cell developmental plasticity. While the results from different research groups might appear mutually exclusive, we discuss how they could be reconciled with the biology of normal B‐cells and propose research avenues for addressing these issues in the future. (shrink)

Objective: To examine lay persons’ ability to identify methods of random allocation and their acceptability of using methods of random allocation in a clinical trial context.Design: Leaflets containing hypothetical medical, non-medical, and clinical trial scenarios involving random allocation, using material from guidelines for trial information leaflets.Setting and participants: Adults attending further education colleges , covering a wide range of ages, occupations, and levels of education.Main measures: Judgements of whether each of five methods of allocation to two groups was random in (...) a medical or non-medical scenario. Judgements of whether these allocation methods were acceptable in a randomised clinical trial scenario, with or without a scientific justification for randomisation.Results: The majority of our group of participants judged correctly that allowing people their preference was not random, and that the following were random: using a computer with no information about the individual , tossing a coin, drawing a name out of a hat. Judgements were split over allocating people in turn . Judgements were no different in medical and non-medical scenarios. Few of the correctly identified random methods were judged to be acceptable in a clinical trial scenario. Inclusion of a scientific justification for randomising significantly increased the acceptability of only one random method: allocation by computer.Conclusions: Current UK guidelines’ recommended description of random allocation by computer seems warranted. However, while potential trial participants may understand what random allocation means, they may find it unacceptable unless offered an acceptable justification for its use. (shrink)

Comparative thanatologists study the responses to the dead and the dying in nonhuman animals. Despite the wide variety of thanatological behaviours that have been documented in several different species, comparative thanatologists assume that the concept of death is very difficult to acquire and will be a rare cognitive feat once we move past the human species. In this paper, we argue that this assumption is based on two forms of anthropocentrism: an intellectual anthropocentrism, which leads to an over-intellectualisation of the (...) CoD, and an emotional anthropocentrism, which yields an excessive focus on grief as a reaction to death. Contrary to what these two forms of anthropocentrism suggest, we argue that the CoD requires relatively little cognitive complexity and that it can emerge independently from mourning behaviour. Moreover, if we turn towards the natural world, we can see that the minimal cognitive requirements for a CoD are in fact met by many nonhuman species and there are multiple learning pathways and opportunities for animals in the wild to develop a CoD. This allows us to conclude that the CoD will be relatively easy to acquire and, so, we can expect it to be fairly common in nature. (shrink)

Admixture, the genetic exchange between differentiated populations appears to be common in the history of species, but has not yet been comparatively studied across mammals. This limits the understanding of its mechanisms and potential role in mammalian evolution. The authors want to summarize the current knowledge on admixture in non‐human primates, and suggest that it is important to establish a comparative framework for this phenomenon in humans. Genetic observations in domesticated mammals and their wild counterparts are discussed, and a (...) brief global overview on other clades is presented. Based on this, some of the consequences of gene flow, including incompatibilities and their genomic footprint, as well as adaptive introgression are discussed, and suggestions for a functional genomics approach are made. It is proposed that the field is moving beyond descriptive observations in single species, to a comprehensive analysis of admixture and its impact. Admixture is becoming an integral part of mammalian evolution. (shrink)

Admixture, the genetic exchange between differentiated populations appears to be common in the history of species, but has not yet been comparatively studied across mammals. This limits the understanding of its mechanisms and potential role in mammalian evolution. The authors want to summarize the current knowledge on admixture in non‐human primates, and suggest that it is important to establish a comparative framework for this phenomenon in humans. Genetic observations in domesticated mammals and their wild counterparts are discussed, and a (...) brief global overview on other clades is presented. Based on this, some of the consequences of gene flow, including incompatibilities and their genomic footprint, as well as adaptive introgression are discussed, and suggestions for a functional genomics approach are made. It is proposed that the field is moving beyond descriptive observations in single species, to a comprehensive analysis of admixture and its impact. Admixture is becoming an integral part of mammalian evolution. (shrink)

Introduction: Electroconvulsive therapy is a commonly used brain stimulation treatment for treatment-resistant or severe depression. This study was planned to find the effects of ECT on brain connectivity by conducting a systematic review and coordinate-based meta-analysis of the studies performing resting state fMRI in patients with depression receiving ECT.Methods: We systematically searched the databases published up to July 31, 2020, for studies in patients having depression that compared resting-state functional connectivity before and after a course of pulse wave ECT. Meta-analysis (...) was performed using the activation likelihood estimation method after extracting details about coordinates, voxel size, and method for correction of multiple comparisons corresponding to the significant clusters and the respective rsFC analysis measure with its method of extraction.Results: Among 41 articles selected for full-text review, 31 articles were included in the systematic review. Among them, 13 articles were included in the meta-analysis, and a total of 73 foci of 21 experiments were examined using activation likelihood estimation in 10 sets. Using the cluster-level interference method, one voxel-wise analysis with the measure of amplitude of low frequency fluctuations and one seed-voxel analysis with the right hippocampus showed a significant reduction in the left cingulate gyrus and a significant increase in the right hippocampus with the right parahippocampal gyrus, respectively. Another analysis with the studies implementing network-wise resting state functional connectivity showed a significant increase in bilateral posterior cingulate cortex. There was considerable variability as well as a few key deficits in the preprocessing and analysis of the neuroimages and the reporting of results in the included studies. Due to lesser studies, we could not do further analysis to address the neuroimaging variability and subject-related differences.Conclusion: The brain regions noted in this meta-analysis are reasonably specific and distinguished, and they had significant changes in resting state functional connectivity after a course of ECT for depression. More studies with better neuroimaging standards should be conducted in the future to confirm these results in different subgroups of depression and with varied aspects of ECT. (shrink)

Understanding Animal Welfare, 2nd Edition is revised and expanded to incorporate new research and developments in animal welfare. Updated with greater accessibility in mind, the reader is guided through animal welfare in its cultural and historical context, methods of study, and applications in practice and policy. Drawing examples from farm, companion, laboratory and zoo animals, the text provides an up-to-date overview of research and its applications, while also tracing how concepts and methods have evolved over time. Originally intended for (...) scientists and professionals, Understanding Animal Welfare has also found a home in undergraduate classrooms. It is now the essential text for students, practitioners, veterinarians, and researchers in animal welfare and related fields. (shrink)

Is understanding the same as or at least a species of knowledge? This question has to be answered with respect to each of three types of understanding and of knowledge. I argue that understanding-why and objectual understanding are not reducible to one another and neither identical with nor a species of the corresponding or any other type of knowledge. My discussion reveals important characteristics of these two types of understanding and has consequences for propositional (...) class='Hi'>understanding. (shrink)

Can the understanding/acceptance principle help us to decide between alternative normative theories? There is little evidence that this principle can successfully be applied; there are no strong normative statements in Stanovich & West's target article. There is also no evidence for success of rational norms when applied to real life decisions.

This chapter contains section titled: Discussion.

People have always tried to make predictions; they are necessary and useful, but very often they commit obvious errors, which have negative consequences on decision-making. Prediction errors are in some cases, not few, unavoidable, because the world itself is unpredictable, subject to chance (or randomness in mathematics). Chance is a property of nature. The causes of random events are physically determined, but so numerous and complex that they (the events) are unpredictable. Science is not about certainty. Human knowledge itself is (...) not certain. We can only have provisional truths. Therefore, we must manage to reach a state of accommodation with uncertainty and unpredictability. The complexity of natural phenomena generates events that we cannot control through theoretical modeling precisely because of the ignorance of the causal mechanisms, which exist in their privacy but have not (yet) been revealed by the data and observations at our disposal. We have, on the one hand, life experience taken over and assimilated and established in society and, on the other hand, experience gained from real life. Norm and chance follow each other rather chaotically. The duration of validity of a norm and the moment of occurrence of the random event are unpredictable. However, norms and events coexist in our consciousness. Order and predictability are born (formed and exist) from rules; chance and unpredictability are born from the lack of rules. The highest truths, recognized as such by society cannot be transposed into the life of society only by the force of reason. It is imperative that they are reinforced and embedded in the social behavior of all citizens. Rules are needed. Without rules there is no freedom. (shrink)

This paper provides a short overview of how Oakeshott identifies the functions and limits of government, with reliance primarily on two texts. The first one from “Lectures on the History of Political” thought distinguishes nomocratic and teleocratic ways of governing. Oakeshott describes the two forms in a detached fashion, and indirectly hints at his preference for nomocratic rule. The second text is Oakeshott’s essay “On Being Conservative”, where Oakeshott gives a sceptical and critical description of human nature. The paper argues (...) that this account of human nature should be seen as the basis, on which a nomocratic rule can be defended. It will be argued, that the two texts should be read together, if we want to get a reasoned overview of Oakeshott’s criticism of contemporary forms of government, and of his reasons to choose nomocratic rule instead of the teleocratic one. It will be argued that a complex political philosophy based on these two pillars will be provided by Oakeshott’s late book On Human Conduct. (shrink)

In the realm of meaning, what territory belongs to pragmatics, and what to semantics? The paper defends the primacy of semantics; it is semanticist rather than pragmaticist. The vehicle of content is primarily semantic, and is run by its ‘semantic engine’ so to speak. But what about problematic examples? Some authors proposes an extreme pan-semanticist answer: their semantic content is complete, since it relies on the convention pointing to what speaker “has in mind”. The semantic vehicle is complete, pragmatics offers (...) just lining and paint. The opposite extreme is Bach’s proposal that semantics encompasses only the “skeleton”, often not truth-conditional.The present paper defends an intermediate semanticist position: semantic content provides the guidance to truth-conditions, the rest is pragmatics. Call this “the guidance view”. In terms of vehicle metaphor, semantic content provides and directs the main force, it is the powertrain of the vehicle. The paper assumes that anaphora is semantic, shows that anaphora guides the hearer in determining the truth-conditional content, and argues that most problematic cases are anaphora-like: this concludes the defense of our guidance view. (shrink)

This article presents a comparative study of the experiences of young adults on a spiritual quest in cultural and religious contexts where they have not yet been properly studied, that is Lutheran Finland, Roman Catholic Poland and Orthodox Russia. The study seeks to contribute to the further refinement of the concept of spiritual quest in order to enhance its utility and applicability across different cultural and religious contexts. The analysis revealed several aspects inherent in spiritual quest but which can be (...) variously experienced and manifested in different constellations. This article shows that although each individual might deliver their own logic of ‘being on a quest’, separate cases can be compared on the basis of the concept of the seekership habitus, as presented in this study. The chosen framework of individualization on the one hand and the concept of seekership habitus on the other helps to reveal the duality of the phenomenon of spiritual quest, which is somewhat overlooked in scholarly debates on the topic. (shrink)

The idea of is explored. It is claimed that there is something epistemically important about acquiring one's knowledge first-hand via active perception rather than second-hand via testimony. Moreover, it is claimed that this kind of active perceptual seeing it for oneself is importantly related to the kind of understanding that is acquired when one possesses a correct and appropriately detailed explanation of how cause and effect are related. In both cases we have a kind of seeing it for oneself (...) which serves what is claimed to be a fundamental good: intellectual autonomy. It is argued that this proposal leads to a distinctive view about the goal of inquiry as often being a certain kind of knowledge rather than knowledge simpliciter. Finally, it is claimed that treating intellectual autonomy as a fundamental good is entirely compatible with granting that there is an important social dimension to our epistemic practices. (shrink)

It is a truth universally known but not oft discussed that a journal article is often a fragment of a larger series of thoughts, or a longer piece of work. In entering into dialogue with Gaab and Bamboulis and Bortolotti, I will briefly describe the context of this paper, in the hopes that it will clarify my commitments and wider thinking on this area.This paper isolates one thread of my doctoral dissertation evaluating what I take to be two central theoretical (...) claims of CBT: first, that mental illness is related to patterns of thought with epistemic issues and secondly, that CBT works through rectifying these epistemic issues. In the broader work I argue that over time, because psychotherapy has... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Understanding First: Exploring Its Scope and Testing Its LimitsMarga Reimer, PhD (bio)I thoroughly enjoyed reading and reflecting on this provocative, engagingly written, and persuasively argued paper. My commentary focuses on the authors’ “understanding first” principle. I begin by exploring that principle’s scope by appeal to aesthetic analogues to the moral cases of Pete and Jacob; I then explore its limits by appeal to cases involving agents struggling (...) with maladaptive traits that are more self-destructive than antisocial.According to the authors, when attempting to eliminate or reduce a maladaptive trait, it is important that the agent begin with a non-moralizing understanding of that trait’s “root cause.” In this way, the agent avoids some of the epistemically distorting and otherwise counterproductive effects associated with an approach that begins with a moralizing assessment of the problematic trait. They can then proceed with a reason-based “dispensation” of that trait.The cases of Pete and Jacob make these points vivid and lend them considerable credence. Moreover, the authors’ “understanding first principle” arguably exemplifies a more general, and no less plausible, principle concerning the remediation of virtually any problem. Who would deny that an objective, non-normative, understanding of a problem’s “root cause” might be useful in addressing that problem? Who would deny that normativizing a problem before understanding its origin might prevent a deeper understanding of that problem and therewith its maximally effective “treatment”?One way to showcase the intuitiveness of the authors’ “understanding first” principle would be to explore the applicability of an analogous principle to problems beyond those involving “moral matters.” Problems involving aesthetics might prove particularly illuminating in this regard insofar as aesthetics, like morality, is inherently normative and yet it lies beyond the scope of morality proper. If an “understanding first” principle can be shown to be applicable to certain types of aesthetic problems, then the authors’ already strong case for the applicability of such a principle to certain types of moral problems would be further strengthened.In the cases of Pete and Jacob, the problems are unambiguously moral: the patently antisocial behaviors of these two individuals are paradigmatically “bad” and their premature assessment as [End Page 205] such can be epistemically distorting and otherwise counterproductive. Consider now analogous cases involving aesthetic problems. Pete and Lucie are getting ready for the holidays and are expecting family from out of town. But there are a couple of problems. Pete notices an “ugly” stain on the living room carpet and Lucie notices a subtle but decidedly “nasty” odor permeating the entire house. Neither Pete nor Lucie know where the stain came from, nor where the odor is coming from. But both the stain and the odor are “pretty gross” and so they need to “get rid of” them before family arrive. There’s no time for investigative work into “root causes.”Pete scrubs the stain until the portion of carpet beneath it is threadbare; Lucie buys three different deodorizers, all of which eliminate the odor but only temporarily. Had Pete and Lucie understood the root causes of the “ugly” stain and “nasty” smell, their treatments might have been different—and, importantly, more effective. The stain turned out to be caused by red wine, easily treatable without leaving a noticeable “bald spot.” The lingering odor was from an easily fixable plumbing problem, albeit one requiring more extensive (and costly) work.Pete and Lucie’s aesthetic evaluations (“ugly,” “nasty”), coupled with a lack of understanding of “root causes,” have predictable results: their control over some “pretty gross” problems is significantly diminished. Similarly, with respect to moral evaluations of maladaptive traits (“bad,” “wrong”) coupled with a lack of understanding of “root causes.” As the authors show, such evaluations can be epistemically distorting and otherwise counterproductive with the result that the agent’s control over the problematic trait is significantly reduced.Further aesthetic analogues are easy to develop and potentially even more revealing. Imagine that Pete and Lucie, who are expecting family later in the week, are experiencing symptoms, both respiratory and gastrointestinal, that are “kind of yucky.” As with the maladaptive traits of Pete and Jacob, the problematic traits in this case are literally “in” the agent (vs... (shrink)

Most incidences of dishonesty in research, financial investments that promote personal financial gain, and kickback scandals begin as conflicts of interest (COI). Research indicates that healthcare professionals who maintain COI relationships make less optimal and more expensive patient care choices. The discovery of COI relationships also negatively impact patient and public trust. Many disciplines are addressing this professional issue, but little work has been done towards understanding and applying this moral category within a nursing context. Do COIs occur in (...) nursing and are they problematic? What are the morally appropriate responses to COI for our discipline and for individual practicing nurses? In this paper I examine the nature of 'conflict of interest' as a general ethical category, its characteristics and its application to our discipline. Conflict of interest is an odd moral category that may actually or potentially result in immoral decisions. The moral justification for COI is grounded prime facie by the moral value of respect for persons and principle of fidelity from which trust is developed and maintained. In review of the historical development, there appears to be consensus on some qualities of COI that are presented. I conclude that making judgements about COI are challenging and often difficult to determine from a nursing perspective. Improving nurses' and professional organizations' awareness of COI and sharpening our ability to respond appropriately when COI arise can reduce potential harm and promote trust in those whom we serve. (shrink)

Over the past three decades, the Precautionary Principle has become popular in discussions of public policy, especially in relation to health and environmental policy. Though there are a number of different versions of the principle, the genesis of the idea is that it is better to be safe than sorry. In terms of public policy, proponents of the PP argue that being safe means that, if there is a possibility of harm from a new activity or novel technology, even if (...) the scientific evidence concerning the harm is absent or uncertain, precautionary actions should be taken. In one version or another, the PP has been incorporated into a number of laws and treaties. Yet arguments for the PP are unconvincing, the PP itself is vague and when enacted in law, results in arbitrary regulations that pose a threat to human welfare. As a result, the PP should be rejected as a basis for public policy. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I argue that understanding possesses unique epistemic value. I propose and defend a novel account of understanding that I call the management account of understanding, which is the view that an agent A understands a subject matter S just in case A has the ability to extract the relevant information and exploit it with the relevant cognitive capacities to answer questions in S. Since inquiry is the process of raising and answering questions, I argue (...) that without understanding, it would be impossible to engage in successful inquiry. I argue that understanding is indispensable for effective cognition and that it is irreducible to other epistemic categories, such as knowledge, justification, or rationality. Understanding is an irreducible component of epistemic excellence. In arguing for this account, I focus on the nature and requirements of cognition and pay less attention to intuitions about hypothetical cases, in contrast to previous approaches to understanding. I draw upon psychology and cognitive science, especially work on the frame problem, to demonstrate the importance (and difficulty) of finding relevant information and exploiting it in relevant ways to answer questions. One’s cognitive system must be organized in such a way that one has the ability to think the relevant thoughts in the relevant ways to answer the relevant questions. This reveals well-defined directions in which future research on understanding should move. In addition to proposing and defending the management account of understanding, I explore several features of understanding, including some interesting consequences of the management account. I argue that the management account and commonly used methods of measuring degrees of understanding imply that understanding can be based on false beliefs. I argue that the management account (and any account of understanding that implies understanding is an ability) implies that understanding can be acquired by luck. I also argue that understanding is ontologically prior to explanation: a good explanation is essentially an act that produces understanding in the relevant cognitive background. (shrink)

Suffering is often experienced by those who obey God, while happiness is experienced by those who do not know God. This study aims to re-examine theodicy about disasters and calamities and tries to provide alternative thoughts regarding the relationship between God, accidents and humans, based on the story of Job. This research methodology is a qualitative approach through library research, by reading books and journals and investigating related books. Hermeneutic principles are also used to understand the meaning of the signs (...) and symbols in the text. The results of this study indicate that the concept of anthropodicy stands as a complement to the idea of theodicy, which can help humans - especially believers - to understand the meaning of suffering and their vocation in a world full of uncertainty while still having faith in God, who is sovereign over all.Contribution: This article contributes to providing an understanding of anthropodicy from Job’s perspective, so that humans see suffering as God’s sovereignty and as something that God allows in order to see God’s omnipotence. (shrink)

The determination argument is supposed to show that a sentence's meaning is at least a truth‐condition. This argument is supposed to rest on innocent premises that even a deflationist about truth can accept. The argument comes in two versions: one is metaphysical and the other is epistemological. In this paper we will focus on the epistemological version. We will argue that the apparently innocent first premise of that version of the argument is not as innocent as it seems. If the (...) premise is understood in the sense required for the argument to go through then it should be rejected by a deflationist. (shrink)

What is the relevance of the history of philosophy to philosophy as such? This is not the question, what is the reason for studying the history of philosophy? This question is easy to answer. Philosophy is part of our culture, and the history of our culture is worth studying, if anything is. Nor is it the question, should academic institutions teach the history of philosophy as part of a philosophical education? It is widely accepted that students should be taught the (...) history of philosophy, even if philosophy itself is not considered an essentially historical discipline. An education in the history of philosophy is part of a broadly humanistic university education, and something of value for this reason alone, without it being necessary for anyone who actually pursues philosophy creatively and systematically to have to take history into account. (shrink)

The notion of proof is central to mathematics yet it is one of the most difficult aspects of the subject to teach and master. In particular, undergraduate mathematics students often experience difficulties in understanding and constructing proofs. Understanding Mathematical Proof describes the nature of mathematical proof, explores the various techniques that mathematicians adopt to prove their results, and offers advice and strategies for constructing proofs. It will improve students’ ability to understand proofs and construct correct proofs of their (...) own. The first chapter of the text introduces the kind of reasoning that mathematicians use when writing their proofs and gives some example proofs to set the scene. The book then describes basic logic to enable an understanding of the structure of both individual mathematical statements and whole mathematical proofs. It also explains the notions of sets and functions and dissects several proofs with a view to exposing some of the underlying features common to most mathematical proofs. The remainder of the book delves further into different types of proof, including direct proof, proof using contrapositive, proof by contradiction, and mathematical induction. The authors also discuss existence and uniqueness proofs and the role of counter examples. (shrink)