In the framework of judgment aggregation, we assume that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and that both Independence (formula-wise aggregation) and Unanimity Preservation hold for them. Whether premiss-based aggregation thus defined is compatible with conclusion-based aggregation, as defined by Unanimity Preservation on the non-premisses, depends on how the premisses are logically connected, both among themselves and with other formulas. We state necessary and sufficient conditions under which the combination of both approaches leads to dictatorship (...) (resp. oligarchy), either just on the premisses or on the whole agenda. This framework is inspired by the doctrinal paradox of legal theory and arguably relevant to this field as well as political science and political economy. When the set of premisses coincides with the whole agenda, a limiting case of our assumptions, we obtain several existing results in judgment aggregation theory. (shrink)

At some point in the Incessu Animalium, Aristotle appeals to some geometrical claims in order to explain why animal progression necessarily involves the bending (of the limbs), and this appeal to geometrical claims might be taking as violating the recommendation to avoid “kind-crossing” (as found in the Posterior Analytic). But a very unclear notion of kind-crossing has been assumed in most debates. I will argue that kind-crossing in the Posterior Analytics does not mean any employment of premises from a discipline (...) other than that to which the explanandum belongs. Kind-crossing was meant to cover a specific sort of employment of premises from a different discipline, namely, the case in which premises from a discipline X are taken as the most important explanatory factor that delivers the fullest appropriate explanation of an explanandum within discipline Y. If this is so, the employment of geometrical premises in the Incessu Animalium is not an instance of the prohibited kind-crossing, but something that is in line with the theory of the Posterior Analytics. (shrink)

Identifying the missing or unstated premisses of arguments is important, because their logical quality depends on them. Textbook authors regard enthymematic syllogisms (e.g., "Elvis is a man, so Elvis is mortal") as having an unstated premiss - the major premiss (e.g., "All men are mortal"). They are said to be such because these syllogisms become formally valid when the major premiss is added (i.e., it is a gap-filler). I argue that unstated major premises are not gap-fillers: they (...) support a part of the argument that is already given implicitly - the inference claim ("If the premisses are true then the conclusion is true"). As such, their logical status is the same as that of an unstated proposition that supports the minor premiss, which is not part of the argument. Therefore, the so-called "major premiss" is not an unstated premiss of the enthymeme. (shrink)

Dans la première partie du Théétète de Platon, Socrate propose un tableau des mouvements donnant naissance aux sensations individuelles. Dans le dialogue, ce tableau joue un rôle essentiel pour établir la première définition de la connaissance ( epistēmē ), ainsi que pour la réfuter. La question principale de mon analyse concerne la direction des mouvements de la sensation ( aisthēsis ) et du senti ( aisthēton ) au moment décisif de la génération d’une sensation particulière. J’étudie plus particulièrement les emplois (...) de la préposition πρός, construite avec le génitif en 156d-e et 159d-e. Interpréter correctement cet élément de la description contribue à rendre considérablement plus intelligible le tableau dessiné par Socrate, ainsi que la critique qu’il lui adresse par la suite. (shrink)

The contemporary development of socialist economy is featured not only by high dynamics, but also by essential structural and qualitative changes. The economic policy and the socialist planning in particular tendtowards optimalization of economic growth, then to engage for its proper directions, structure and rythmicality. The every year growing national product ought to be, as it is possible, most suitable and useful for implementation of threefold objective: 1° the better satisfaction with the necessities of population, 2° the quicker modernization of (...) the national economy, and 3° the effective development of the foreign trade as well as the international cooperation.The superiority of a set of social criteria is becoming the general assumption of economic policy. A vision of the future human being and the mature society is determining prospective objectives and aims of the development as well is indicating ways and means for their realization by economic policy.The economic growth is not objective by itself, but has to serve for a comprehensive social advancement. At the same time the factors of social advancement advantageously impact the labour productivity and otherwisethey perform a role of additional stimulatives of the economic growth.The objectives of social advancement should be realized gradually basing on staging patterns of systematic raise of the living standards of the population. A hierarchy and a sequence of satisfaction with the both individual and collective necessities demand a skillful application of the criteria of the economic and social choice. We are using here the principle of social and economic rationality.Hence the factors of social advancement, involving the scientific and technical progress, belang to the fundumatel elements of the present economic and social policy. At the same time objectives and means of modern economic and social advancement are here strictly interlaced. (shrink)

In Sophistical Refutations 8 Aristotle claims that every sophistical refutation depends on a false belief which is implicitly held by the victim of the fallacy and can normally be elicited from him as an explicit additional premiss. In this case the fallacious argument will be turned into a valid one, albeit with a false premiss. The paper discusses the nature of the FVP and tries to discover how it works when it tacitly causes the false appearance of a (...) fallacious argument. (shrink)

The causal argument for physicalism is anayzed and it's key premise--the causal closure of physics--is found wanting. Therefore, a hidden premise must be added to the argument to gain its conclusion, but the hidden premise is indistinguishable from the conclusion of the causal argument. Therefore, it begs the question on physicalism.

In this paper, we deal with a relationship among the law of excluded middle, the double negation elimination and the independence of premiss rule ) for intuitionistic predicate logic. After giving a general machinery, we give, as corollaries, several examples of extensions of \ and \ which are closed under \ but do not derive the independence of premiss axiom.

Contemporary Western thought might be somehow characterized by the interaction of theology and humanities, and their refusal to the one-dimension subject. The reason why Slavoj Žižek tries to fight for “the Christian legacy” and “the perverse core of Christianity”— with “structure,” “narrative,” “symbolic order” and other conceptual tools normally used in literary studies—is believed to be a rediscovery of the role of Christianity and theology as the archetype for rendering truth and value system instead of a religious experience merely. And (...) so, the argument of identity and meaning-generation might be rephrased in a different framework. This paper intends to trace Žižek’s works theologically and reinterpret its potentiality in Chinese context. (shrink)

The application of the maximum entropy principle to determine probabilities on finite domains is well-understood. Its application to infinite domains still lacks a well-studied comprehensive approach. There are two different strategies for applying the maximum entropy principle on first-order predicate languages: applying it to finite sublanguages and taking a limit; comparing finite entropies of probability functions defined on the language as a whole. The entropy-limit conjecture roughly says that these two strategies result in the same probabilities. While the conjecture is (...) known to hold for monadic languages as well as for premiss sentences containing only existential or only universal quantifiers, its status for premiss sentences of greater quantifier complexity is, in general, unknown. I here show that the first approach fails to provide a sensible answer for some \-premiss sentences. I discuss implications of this failure for the first strategy and consequences for the entropy-limit conjecture. (shrink)

The application of the maximum entropy principle to determine probabilities on finite domains is well-understood. Its application to infinite domains still lacks a well-studied comprehensive approach. There are two different strategies for applying the maximum entropy principle on first-order predicate languages: applying it to finite sublanguages and taking a limit; comparing finite entropies of probability functions defined on the language as a whole. The entropy-limit conjecture roughly says that these two strategies result in the same probabilities. While the conjecture is (...) known to hold for monadic languages as well as for premiss sentences containing only existential or only universal quantifiers, its status for premiss sentences of greater quantifier complexity is, in general, unknown. I here show that the first approach fails to provide a sensible answer for some \-premiss sentences. I discuss implications of this failure for the first strategy and consequences for the entropy-limit conjecture. (shrink)

Aristotle assesses as valid three first figure syllogisms, each of which contains at least one premiss expressing a de re contingency. In fact, all three of these moods (namely, Barbara-QQQ, Barbara-XQM, and Barbara-LQM) are invalid. Utilizing the concept of ampliation, this paper shows how the mood Barbara-QQQ must be refined if it is to be deemed valid. It can then become clear as to how Barbara-XQM and Barbara-LQM can be disambiguated and ultimately validated. In treating all three moods, some (...) theses from S4 will be exploited in the context of distinguishing de dicto and de re modes of attributing possibility and necessity. Various Aristotelian propositional forms and rules of inference, including argumentation by ecthesis, will shape the presentation. The viability of Aristotle’s views on the convertibility of universal negative apodeictic propositions will emerge as decisive in evaluating the success of his modal syllogistic. (shrink)

Aristotle assesses as valid three first figure syllogisms, each of which contains at least one premiss expressing a de re contingency. In fact, all three of these moods (namely, Barbara-QQQ, Barbara-XQM, and Barbara-LQM) are invalid. Utilizing the concept of ampliation, this paper shows how the mood Barbara-QQQ must be refined if it is to be deemed valid. It can then become clear as to how Barbara-XQM and Barbara-LQM can be disambiguated and ultimately validated. In treating all three moods, some (...) theses from S4 will be exploited in the context of distinguishing de dicto and de re modes of attributing possibility and necessity. Various Aristotelian propositional forms and rules of inference, including argumentation by ecthesis, will shape the presentation. The viability of Aristotle’s views on the convertibility of universal negative apodeictic propositions will emerge as decisive in evaluating the success of his modal syllogistic. (shrink)

In this note, we prove that certain theories of (many‐sorted) intuitionistic predicate logic are closed under the independence of premiss rule (IPR). As corollaries, we show that and extended by some non‐classical axioms and non‐constructive axioms are closed under IPR.

After some motivating remarks in Section 1, in Section 2 we show how to replace an axiomatic basis for any one of a broad range of sentential logics having finitely many axiom schemes and Modus Ponens as the sole proper rule, by a basis with the same axiom schemes and finitely many one-premiss rules. Section 3 mentions some questions arising from this replacement procedure , explores another such procedure, and discusses some aspects of the consequence relations associated with the (...) different axiomatizations in play. Several open problems are mentioned. An appendix briefly treats the issue of a similar ‘at most one-premiss rules’ reformulation of proof systems with sequent-to-sequent rules. (shrink)

Denne artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i et skille mellom samfunnsstrukturer som avgrenser legers skjønnsmessige utfoldelse på den ene siden, og profesjonens tilrettelegging for kultiveringen av erkjennelsesmessige ferdigheter på den annen. Ved å videreføre H. Grimen og A. Molanders anvendelse av S.E. Toulmins modell for praktisk resonnering i en klinisk kontekst redegjør jeg for legeskjønnets multidimensjonale, epistemiske struktur. Gjennomgangen viser hvordan skjønnsanvendelse i legerollen kan analyseres i henhold til en fagteknisk, en distributiv og en relasjonell dimensjon. Mot denne bakgrunnen diskuterer jeg så (...) spenninger som oppstår i skjæringspunktet mellom strukturering og kultivering av skjønnets ulike dimensjoner. Diskusjonen tydeliggjør at den medisinske profesjonen ikke kan betraktes som en selvtilstrekkelig premissleverandør når det gjelder å sikre adekvat kultivering av medlemmenes skjønnsutøvelse i en klinisk kontekst. Ved å synliggjøre og vektlegge de relevante profesjonseksterne bidragene i profesjonens pågående selvregulering kan befolkningens berettigete tillit til profesjonen styrkes ytterligere.Nøkkelord: strukturelt skjønn, epistemisk skjønn, profesjon, selvregulering, tillitEnglish summary: In Between Structures of Society and Profession: On Delimitation, Cultivation and Premises for Adequately Exercising Judgment in the Role as PhysicianThe point of departure of this article is a distinction between societal structures that delimit the discretion of the physician on the one hand and the profession's arrangements for the cultivation of the physician's judgment on the other. By developing H. Grimen and A. Molander's application of S.E. Toulmin's model for practical reasoning in a clinical context, the multi-dimensional epistemic structure of the physician's judgment in terms of technical, distributive, and relational judgment is accounted for. Against this backdrop, tensions emerging in the intersection between delimitation and cultivation of professional judgment in its various dimensions are discussed. The discussion clarifies that the medical profession is not a self-sufficient provider when it comes to ensuring an adequate cultivation of its members' judgment in a clinical context. It is argued that by emphasising and implementing the relevant external contributions to the profession's ongoing self-regulation, the public's justified trust in the medical profession can be strengthened. (shrink)