Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

The history of the theory of general relativity presents unique features. After its discovery, the theory was immediately confirmed and rapidly changed established notions of space and time. The further implications of general relativity, however, remained largely unexplored until the mid 1950s, when it came into focus as a physical theory and gradually returned to the mainstream of physics. This essay presents a historiographical framework for assessing the history of general relativity by taking into account in an integrated narrative intellectual (...) developments, epistemological problems, and technological advances; the characteristics of post–World War II and Cold War science; and newly emerging institutional settings. It argues that such a framework can help us understand this renaissance of general relativity as a result of two main factors: the recognition of the untapped potential of general relativity and an explicit effort at community building, which allowed this formerly disparate and dispersed field to benefit from the postwar changes in the scientific landscape. (shrink)

In this article, we offer a detailed study of two important episodes in the early history of high-energy physics, namely the development of the Chew and the Nambu-Jona-Lasinio models. Our study reveals that both models resulted from the combination of an old Hamiltonian, which had been introduced by earlier researchers, and two new approximation methods developed by Chew and by Nambu and Jona-Lasinio. These new approximation methods, furthermore, were the key component behind the models’ success. We take this historical investigation (...) to support two philosophical theses about the manner in which scientific modelling operates in high-energy physics. Both of these theses run counter to a view that is commonly accepted among philosophers of science: the view that all approximations can be embedded within an equivalent idealized system, and that whatever role the former might play in scientific modelling is therefore parasitic on the much more substantial work performed by the latter. Our first thesis, which we call “Distinctness,” states that approximation methods constitute an independent category of theoretical output from idealized systems. We thus believe that approximations and idealized systems constitute two independent types of objects, both of which are essential to the practice of modelling. Our second, more radical thesis is called “Content Determination.” Our claim here is that approximation methods can in fact be essential to assigning determinate physical content to the idealized systems with which they jointly operate. As we show, this is due to the fact that quantum field theory allows for a very thin characterization of idealized systems only, making the use of approximations necessary to supply additional content. We conclude the paper with a few reflections about the manner in which our two theses can be used to articulate David Kaiser’s views on the “vanishing of scientific theory” in physics after WWII. (shrink)

We show, that given two fundamental theses of Kripke, no statement of the form ‘‘a=b’ is necessarily true’, is true, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid designators.

The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to (...) assume that Aristotle grounded his argument on this implication rather than on what we call the force of truth. (shrink)

We suggest that the classical version of the consequence argument contending that freedom and determinism are incompatible subtly misstates the core intuition, which is that if a true conditional and a true antecedent are jointly beyond our control, then so is the consequent. We show however that the improved version no less than the classical implies fatalism.Interestingly, the reasoning, that yields fatalism, undermines a direct argument for the soundness of the improved version. But if fatalism is sound, then trivially, so (...) is the new version. We shall however argue that the new version cannot be sound. A weaker version is proved sound but its domain of application excludes the most intuitive paradigm cases.We share van Inwagen's thought that his “‘N’is a very interesting operator” and debate some of its features. Our results, if sound, suggest that the consequence argument in terms of ensurable and non‐ensurable truth may not be the right way to approach issues of determinism and freedom. (shrink)

We suggest that the classical version of the consequence argument contending that freedom and determinism are incompatible subtly misstates the core intuition, which is that if a true conditional and a true antecedent are jointly beyond our control, then so is the consequent. We show however that the improved version no less than the classical implies fatalism.Interestingly, the reasoning, that yields fatalism, undermines a direct argument for the soundness of the improved version. But if fatalism is sound, then trivially, so (...) is the new version. We shall however argue that the new version cannot be sound. A weaker version is proved sound but its domain of application excludes the most intuitive paradigm cases.We share van Inwagen's thought that his “‘N’is a very interesting operator” and debate some of its features. Our results, if sound, suggest that the consequence argument in terms of ensurable and non‐ensurable truth may not be the right way to approach issues of determinism and freedom. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

Alex Blum ABSTRACT: We show, that given two fundamental theses of Kripke, no statement of the form ‘‘a=b’ is necessarily true’, is true, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are distinct rigid designators. Download PDF.

The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.”Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to (...) assume that Aristotle grounded his argument on this implication rather than on what we call the force of truth. (shrink)

We show that the thesis that identity is necessary is equivalent to the thesis that everything is necessarily what it is. Hence the challenges facing either, faces them both.

We contend that since what is true cannot be false, foreknowledge is transparently incompatible with free will. We argue that what is crucial to the conflict is the role of truth in foreknowledge and that the identity of the one who foreknows is irrelevant.

We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle unknowable.

This paper studies the notion of virtuality in the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory of 1924. We situate the virtual entities of BKS within the tradition of the correspondence principle and the radiation theory of the Bohr model. We show how, in this context, virtual oscillators emerged as classical substitute radiators and were used to describe the otherwise elusive quantum transitions. They played an effective role in the quantum theory of radiation while remaining categorically distinct and ontologically separated from the quantum world of (...) the Bohr model. The notion of virtuality thus differs markedly from its counterpart in quantum mechanics or QFT. (shrink)

We show how second order logic incompleteness follows from incompleteness of arithmetic, as proved by Gödel.

In 'The Structure of Science' Nagel contends that a deductive explanation of the occurrence of an individual event must contain at least one instantial statement as a premiss (Nagel, 1961, p. 31). I shall defend a version of his contention.

In a 1936 manuscript submitted to the Physical Review, Albert Einstein and Nathan Rosen famously claimed that gravitational waves do not exist. It has generally been assumed that there was a conceptual error underlying this fallacious claim. It will be shown, through a detailed study of the extant referee report, that this claim was probably only the result of a calculational error, the accidental use of a pathological coordinate transformation.

It is argued that the constraints placed on the non-law premisses of a D–N explanation are irrelevant to their function and will not salvage the deductive requirement from triviality.

Alex Blum ABSTRACT: We intend to show that Aristotle’s contention that future tense contingent statements are neither true nor false leads to inconsistency. Download PDF.

We intend to show that Aristotle’s contention that future tense contingent statements are neither true nor false leads to inconsistency.

We contend that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We suggest that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two. We end by rounding out, hope-fully, some left over corners of serious concern to the (...) theist. (shrink)