Plato's theory of knowledge and belief is an important topic in Platonic scholarship. There are at least two interpretations of Plato's theory of knowledge and belief. (a) The two worlds (or objects) interpretation (TW), and it has two versions: the degree of existence interpretation (DE) and the degree of reality interpretation (DR). According to DE, objects of knowledge fully exist, and objects of belief do not fully exist. According to DR, objects of knowledge are fully real, and (...) objects of belief are not fully real. The main claim of TW is: knowledge and belief range over different objects; knowl­edge ranges over Forms,·and belief ranges over the sensibles. This claim implies that we can have knowledge only of Forms, and belief only of the sensibles. The second interpretation of Plato's theory is b), the content interpretation. There are two versions of the content interpretation. First, there is the degrees of truth (DT) or individual truth version: Knowledge is set over truth, and belief is set over partial truth. Second, there is Fine's collective truth version (CT). The main claim of CT is that: knowledge collects truths (i.e., knowledge entails truth), and that belief collects truths and falsehoods (i.e., some beliefs are true and some are false). This claim implies that knowledge and belief are not always set over different things, i.e., we can have knowledge of the sensibles, and beliefs of Forms. TW is obviously incompatible with CT. It is surprising that little defense of TW has been given following Fine's objection to TW. In this paper, TW will be defended, and it will be argued that CT is not a correct reading of Plato. (shrink)

A new interpretation of quantum theory is proposed. It coincides in a number of points with the orthodox interpretation, the main difference being that the projection of the state vector can occur without the intervention of any observer.

One of the authors has recently propounded an SR model which shows, circumventing known no-go theorems, that an objective interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible. We consider here compound physical systems and show why the proofs of nonlocality of QM do not hold within the SR model, which is slightly simplified in this paper. We also discuss quantum measurement theory within this model, note that the objectification problem disappears since the measurement of any property simply reveals its unknown (...) value, and show that the projection postulate can be considered as an approximate law, valid FAPP. Finally, we provide an intuitive picture that justifies some unusual features of the SR model and proves its consistency. (shrink)

An SR model is presented that shows how an objective (noncontextual and local) interpretation of quantum mechanics can be constructed, which contradicts some well-established beliefs following from the standard interpretation of the theory and from known no-go theorems. The SR model is not a hidden variables theory in the standard sense, but it can be considered a hidden parameters theory which satisfies constraints that are weaker than those usually imposed on standard hidden variables theories. The SR model (...) is also extended in a natural way that shows how a broader theory embodying quantum mechanics can be envisaged which is realistic in a semantic sense, hence compatible with various “realistic” perspectives. (shrink)

Considering the Hegelian master–slave dichotomy over the exchange of the gaze, the paper focuses on the issue of vision and visibility, reinterpreted in Sartre’s phenomenological discussions in different ways. The Hegelian emphasis on recognition finds reflection in the treatment of vision as force expressed through visibility in Sartre and as an issue of self recognition in Lacan. Drawing the Hegelian tag with a comparative argument between Sartre and Lacan, the paper focuses on the different perspectives over the concept of gaze (...) or look. It argues that even sharing the same Hegelian legacy regarding the notion of gaze and recognition Sartre and Lacan differs to a considerable extent in their treatment of the impact of gaze. While emphasising more on the phenomenological-existential analysis of the issue of individual recognition Sartre presents gaze as a strong alienating force released from another powerful subject affecting the intersubjective power relation, Lacan, stands on a non-reciprocal relation between seeing and seen by making a difference between the eyes of the subject that looks at and the gaze which is on the side of the object without having any capacity to become a subject. The paper concentrates on these issues over a broader argument on Sartre’s concept of intersubjective gaze. (shrink)

Bewildering features of modern physics, such as relativistic space-time structure and the peculiarities of so-called quantum statistics, challenge traditional ways of conceiving of objects in space and time. Interpreting Bodies brings together essays by leading philosophers and scientists to provide a unique overview of the implications of such physical theories for questions about the nature of objects. The collection combines classic articles by Max Born, Werner Heisenberg, Hans Reichenbach, and Erwin Schrodinger with recent contributions, including several papers that have never (...) before been published. -/- The book focuses on the microphysical objects that are at the heart of quantum physics and addresses issues central to both the "foundational" and the philosophical debates about objects. Contributors explore three subjects in particular: how to identify a physical object as an individual, the notion of invariance with respect to determining what objects are or could be, and how to relate objective and measurable properties to a physical entity. The papers cover traditional philosophical topics, common-sense questions, and technical matters in a consistently clear and rigorous fashion, illuminating some of the most perplexing problems in modern physics and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

I assume there is no point in speaking of objective interpretation without explaining what it is about the nature of things that fits them for interpretation and how we may be said to know that particular interpretations do indeed fit interpretable things objectively. On that assumption I provide an argument, largely in accord with post‐Kantian themes, to show that a relativistic account of interpretation is not likely to be ruled out by any objectivism or by any (...) exceptionless rule of bivalence. I offer arguments to distinguish between, and account for, what I call interpretation in the “constituting” sense, which bears on the constructed nature of perception and the distinction between description and interpretation, and interpretation in the “ampliative” sense, which bears primarily on the distinctive properties of intrinsically interpretable things. By this strategy I show the sense in which the interpretation of physical phenomena under explanatory conditions invites epistemological forms of incommensurabilism and the Intentional properties of cultural phenomena provide metaphysical grounds for viable forms of relativistic interpretation. (shrink)

This volume collects twenty-one original essays that discuss Michael Krausz’s distinctive and provocative contribution to the theory of interpretation. At the beginning of the book Krausz offers a synoptic review of his central claims, and he concludes with a substantive essay that replies to scholars from the United States, England, Germany, India, Japan, and Australia. Krausz’s philosophical work centers around a distinction that divides interpreters of cultural achievements into two groups. Singularists assume that for any object of interpretation (...) only one single admissible interpretation can exist. Multiplists assume that for some objects of interpretation more than one interpretation is admissible. A central question concerns the ontological entanglements involved in interpretive activity. Domains of application include works of art and music, as well as literary, historical, legal and religious texts. Further topics include truth commissions, ethnocentrism and interpretations across cultures. (shrink)

According to the traditional presentation of Bohm's interpretation, we have immediate epistemic access to particle properties but not wavefunction properties, and mental states, pointer states, and ink patterns supervene on particle properties alone. I argue that these claims do not make physical sense, and I offer an alternative account that does.

The paper examines the relation between interpretation and the objects of interpretation, principally, but not exclusively, in the realm of art. Several theses are defended: that interpretation cannot proceed without prior determination of the kind of thing being interpreted; that the mode of interpretation is determined by the nature of its object; that interpretation, of a meaning‐determining rather than generic kind, focuses at the level of works, not descending to a bedrock of “mere objects”; that (...) because works and their appropriate mode of interpretation are constituted by convention‐bound practices, it follows that no clear line can be drawn between properties “in” a work and those “imputed to” it through interpretive procedures endorsed by the practice. The debate over constructivism or “imputationalism”– between Margolis and Krausz, on the one hand, and Stecker and Levinson, on the other – is engaged with an attempt to show a core of truth in each of the conflicting theories, once the right distinction between object, work, and interpretation is in place. (shrink)

This thought-provoking book explores the multifaceted phenomenon of objectivity and its relations to various aspects of the law and practical reasoning. Featuring contributions from an international group of researchers from differing legal contexts, it addresses topics relevant not only from a theoretical point of view but also themes directly connected with legal and judicial practice. Beginning with an introduction from the editors proposing a new account of the meaning of objectivity, the book is then divided into three broad themes illuminated (...) by this account. Chapters first address a range of problems linked to the relationship between objectivity and jurisprudence, before turning in the second part to an analysis of the functions of objectivity in legal interpretation. The final part then deals with the function of objectivity in practical reasoning. Offering a spectrum of scholarly insights within a coherent intellectual framework, this book will be a crucial read for scholars and graduate students of legal philosophy and legal theory. Its discussion of objectivity as it relates to legal practice and practical reasoning will also be of interest to practitioners such as judges, arbitrators and lawyers. (shrink)

Chapter 1 discusses John Dewey's pragmatism and his reasons for rejecting a picture of the world which disallows human interest, striving, and concerns. Chapter 2 discusses the work of Richard Rorty's anti-foundationalism and attempts to reconstruct philosophy as hermeneutics. Chapter 3 discusses the work of Helen Longino, Lynn Hankinson Nelson, and Sandra Harding all of whom represent feminist attempts to reconstruct a concept of objectivity which is answerable to feminist concerns and which is built around an epistemolgical framework which does (...) not depend on the conception of a thing-in-itself and which emphasizes the social nature of epistemology. Longino makes clear how objects of inquiry are characterized differently in the context of different research projects. Nelson addresses the connection between moral reasoning and scientific reasoning. Harding's version of feminist standpoint theory constructs a version of 'strong objectivity'. In Chapter 4 I turn to a discussion of interpretations of Nietzsche. I argue that we need not see Nietzsche as denying truth, and I suggest the promising metaphor of omniperspectvism, found in The Genealogy of Morals, as a framework for a new concept of objectivity. Chapter 5 draws on the work of Lorraine Code to discuss how omniperspectivism and a discourse of epistemological virtue can be combined to define a better conception of objectivity than the traditional concept which emphasizes value-neutrality and disinterestedness. The major tenets of this chapter are that moral reasoning and scientific reasoning inform each other, and that these discourses interact together in the process of coming to know the world and each other; that feminist insights into the functioning of sexism and racism in scientific research, reasoning, and theory construction must be taken seriously, and that a new objectivity must allow us to evaluate and critically analyze presuppositions; that we will inevitably have problems of exclusion and disagreement, but that this need not undermine objectivity but may, in some instances, actually enhance it. (shrink)

Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space or time or relations of cause and effect. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility of the knowledge of such objects, leading many philosophers to embrace nominalism, the doctrine that there are no such objects, and to embark on ambitious projects for interpreting mathematics so as to preserve the subject while eliminating its objects. This book cuts through a host of technicalities that have obscured previous (...) discussions of these projects, and presents clear, concise accounts of a dozen strategies for nominalistic interpretation of mathematics, thus equipping the reader to evaluate each and to compare different ones. The authors also offer critical discussion, rare in the literature, of the aims and claims of nominalistic interpretation, suggesting that it is significant in a very different way from that usually assumed. (shrink)

Many passages in Kant’s texts suggest that he is a phenomenalist about appearances, i.e., that appearances are only part of our mental content and do not exist outside our mind. In recent years, however, phenomenalist readings of Kant’s idealism have been of ill repute. Without wanting to make a positive case for phenomenalism, this paper attempts to rebut three particularly popular objections to any phenomenalist reading. In slogan form, they are 1) «There is only prima facie evidence», 2) «Kant is (...) an empirical realist», and 3) «Kant is not Berkeley». In response, I argue, first, that any strategy to explain the textual evidence for phenomenalism away fails. Second, I hold that Kant’s «empirical realism» is consistent with phenomenalism, as empirical realism does not mean that appearances exist outside our mind. Third, I will give a novel interpretation of Kant’s rejection of Berkeley’s idealism: Kant does not criticize him because he thinks Berkeley is a phenomenalist, but because his transcen dental realism renders all outer things, appearances and things in themselves alike, impossible. (shrink)

This article arises from selected issues on interpretation raised in a session entitled ‘Danto on Margolis/margolis on Danto’ at the Eastern Division meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics, April 25, 1989, at the University of Arts, Philadelphia. In Part I, principally for dialectical purposes, I recapitulate some of Arthur Danto’s and Joseph Margolis’s points in an attempt to idealize two opposing views: constructionist and realist. It should be said at the outset that the constructionist and realist positions need (...) not be opposed, as Margolis ramifies the matter in his extensive writings. Also, as Danto expounds in numerous places, his theory of art is anti-realist. Nevertheless, as regards the practice of art history and art criticism he is realist—at least as represented in the present exchange. So the idealizations of constructionism and realism here presented should be understood to range over designated concerns and should not be read as idealizations of these authors’ more developed positions as presented elsewhere. In Part II, I adjust the initial characterizations, offer some criticisms of each of these positions, and indicate some points at which there might be some promise for reconciliation between them. In Part III, I shall make some strategic suggestions to advance the discussion. (shrink)

Pekka Lahti is a prominent exponent of the renaissance of foundational studies in quantum mechanics that has taken place during the last few decades. Among other things, he and coworkers have drawn renewed attention to, and have analyzed with fresh mathematical rigor, the threat of inconsistency at the basis of quantum theory: ordinary measurement interactions, described within the mathematical formalism by Schrödinger-type equations of motion, seem to be unable to lead to the occurrence of definite measurement outcomes, whereas the same (...) formalism is interpreted in terms of probabilities of precisely such definite outcomes. Of course, it is essential here to be explicit about how definite measurement results (or definite properties in general) should be represented in the formalism. To this end Lahti et al. have introduced their objectification requirement that says that a system can be taken to possess a definite property if it is certain (in the sense of probability 1) that this property will be found upon measurement. As they have gone on to demonstrate, this requirement entails that in general definite outcomes cannot arise in unitary measuring processes.In this paper we investigate whether it is possible to escape from this deadlock. As we shall argue, there is a way out in which the objectification requirement is fully maintained. The key idea is to adapt the notion of objectivity itself, by introducing relational or perspectival properties. It seems that such a “relational perspective” offers prospects of overcoming some of the long-standing problems in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Originally published in 1986. This work remains of compelling interest to those concerned with the natural sciences and their social problems. It puts forward original and unorthodox ideas about the philosophy of and sociology of science, starting from the conviction that modern societies face deep problems arising from unresolved dilemmas about the meaning, content and technical applications of the theories of nature they employ. The book draws on insights developed within a variety of traditions to explore these problems, especially the (...) work of Edmund Husserl and modern critical theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Objectivity and InterpretationRobert SteckerAccording to Gregory Currie, literary interpretation suffers from a failure of objectivity. 1 He does not claim that the failure is complete, that it is not an objective matter in the least degree which interpretations of a literary work are acceptable, but he does claim that the degree of objectivity is at best small.I believe that literary interpretation is capable of a high (...) degree of objectivity in the sense Currie specifies as well as in other senses. However, the same standard of objectivity is not properly applied to all interpretations, because there are many different aims or interests with which interpretations are advanced, and the requirements of objectivity on acceptability vary with aim.Currie’s argument for objectivity failure should not be accepted. The most important reason for this is that it is based on a faulty conception of the enterprise of literary interpretation. However, the argument is also questionable on that conception.IBefore examining Currie’s argument, it is best to be clear about the objectivity in question. Just what has, or lacks objectivity, and what makes it more or less objective? I confess to being less than completely clear about Currie’s answer to this question. Let us say that it is judgments that are or are not objective, leaving it open for now which literary judgments are in question in Currie’s claim about objectivity failure. Objectivity depends on the possibility of intersubjective agreement or “agreement across points of view” as Currie puts it. Judgments of taste (e.g., “sushi is delicious”) are common candidates for judgments [End Page 48] that are not objective. We can suppose judgments of leftness are objective because we can all agree with my judgment that the book is to my left even if it is to other people’s right and would be to my right were I to reorient myself. Of course, that we can (should?) all agree doesn’t mean we always will. For various reasons, not all of which are relevant to objectivity, some may refuse to agree.According to Currie, objectivity comes in degrees, and nothing said so far indicates how we assign a degree of objectivity to a judgment. Extent of agreement or probability of reaching agreement might be invoked here, but these are not what Currie has in mind. In Currie’s view, degree of objectivity depends on the degree to which a judgment needs to be relativized before it is capable of getting agreement. There is something intuitive in this, but it is tricky to spell out the relevant criterion. Suppose the sushi lovers of Osaka can pretty much agree among themselves about what is good sushi. So can the sushi lovers of Kyoto. However, they cannot agree with each other. What is good sushi is relative to different groups of sushi lovers and their different standards, and that seems to make the goodness of some sushi a less objective matter than if there were one overarching standard. On the other hand, judgments of leftness are also capable of receiving agreement only when relativized to an individual and her orientation. Yet that does not undermine their objectivity. Similarly, to use an example of Currie’s, judgments of velocity need to be made relative to a frame of reference if they are to receive agreement, but that does not undermine their objectivity. Hence relativizing does not always undermine objectivity. Perhaps the relevant difference is something like this. There is no such thing as leftness not relativized to individual and orientation. There is no such thing as velocity not relativized to frame of reference. But perhaps there is such a thing as being a good F not relativized to group standards. This may not be so with sushi, but perhaps it is with carving knives or with stainless steel. In that case judgments of goodness that are independent of group standards, and hence capable of receiving agreement across groups, are more objective than those that are not. However, if all judgments of goodness are by their nature relative to group standards, the above reasoning suggests that such judgments are just as objective as judgments about velocity. That seems wrong... (shrink)

The paper offers an overview of, and critical comments on, Michael Krausz’s Limits of Rightness. It focuses on three key aspects of the book’s intellectual framework: the ideals of interpretation, the objects of interpretation, and the ontological commitments of interpretation. The paper discusses how exactly these aspects are related Krausz’s views on constructive realism, in particular its relation to objects of interpretation, become crucial. His comments on Paul Thom’s theory of interpretations provide a context for examining (...) the role of ‘construction’ in objects per se and in works of art and a tripartite distinction between object, work and interpretation is proposed. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion and critique of G. Harmon's interpretation of Ortega 's work, as set out in Harmon's "Guerrilla Metaphysics." I argue that while Harmon is right to point out Ortega 's critique of idealism, Ortega nevertheless remains a 'philosopher of access.' Ortega 's disagrees with the idealist i claim that we access reality through ideas, but agrees with the more basic point that philosophy ought to give an account of how we access reality.

The aesthetic theory of Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) revolves around the concept of allure, a nonliteral experience of an object’s displacement from its qualities that draws attention to a deeper reality. But applying allure to aesthetic interpretation is hampered in two ways. First, OOO necessarily moves between the constrained viewpoint of experience and a more global perspective. Yet mixing these “inside” and “outside” views can risk ambiguity. Second, the phenomenological difference between the parts and qualities of an object (...) must be clarified before Harman’s model of wholes and parts can be incorporated into OOO aesthetics. Addressing these two ambiguities will make it possible to further develop OOO’s resources for aesthetic commentary. For instance, one conclusion is that allure itself has two varieties: a tension between the object and its qualities (“allusion”) and a tension between the whole and its parts (“collusion”). These options parallel Harman’s twofold critique of reductionism. Another conclusion is that the literal needs an explanation within the framework of OOO insofar as it is a genuine feature of experience. (shrink)

The work of artists is to make works of art, and of theorists theoretical works. In our ordinary dealings with such things, elusive as ontologists may find them, we seem to know well enough in either instance how we should regard and handle them. Ontological questions are none the less raised: what species of entity may they be? It is a question, I confess, to which I could never respond with much enthusiasm. My own interest in art is more ordinary; (...) I care about paintings and poems, about what serves to make them good or bad, about how we should look at or read them. Yet it may prove after all that the two issues are not wholly unrelated. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to clarify the 'objective' and 'subjective' interpretations of Spinoza's position on the attributes of substance. It is argued that (a) the dispute between objectivists and subjectivists survives resolution of the question concerning correct translation of 'tanquam' in definition iv, Part I of the Ethics , (b) the objective interpretation, unlike the subjective one, requires rejection of the notion of 'absolute' identity, unless Spinoza's position is inconsistent, and (c) the subjective interpretation is (...) best characterized as holding that, although each attribute constitutes the essence of substance, there is only a (Suarezean) distinction of reasoned reason (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae) between the attributes, and between any attribute and God. (Spinoza will depart from Suarez, however, in holding that there can be a distinction of reasoned reason between A and B , when the concepts of and are adequate [or clear and distinct].) The dispute is thus held -to concern Spinoza's conception of identity, and the objectivity of the distinction between the attributes, not the objectivity of the attributes themselves. A partial defense of the subjective interpretation, when conceived in the above way, is then provided. (shrink)

A strikingly original work, Friends of Interpretable Objects re-anchors aesthetics in the object of attention even as it redefines the practice, processes, ...

Two arguments favoring propositionalist accounts of attitude sentences are being revisited: the Church-Langford translation argument and Thomason's argument against quotational theories of indirect discourse. None of them proves to be decisive, thus leaving the option of searching for a developed quotational alternative. Such an alternative is found in an interpreted logical form theory of attitude ascription. The theory differentiates elegantly among different attitudes but it fails to account for logical dependencies among them. It is argued, however, that the concept of (...) logical consequence does not well apply to dependencies among belief sentences and that the requirement to account for logical relations among such sentences should be relaxed. (shrink)

The work of artists is to make works of art, and of theorists theoretical works. In our ordinary dealings with such things, elusive as ontologists may find them, we seem to know well enough in either instance how we should regard and handle them. Ontological questions are none the less raised: what species of entity may they be? It is a question, I confess, to which I could never respond with much enthusiasm. My own interest in art is more ordinary; (...) I care about paintings and poems, about what serves to make them good or bad, about how we should look at or read them. Yet it may prove after all that the two issues are not wholly unrelated. (shrink)

J. L. Mackie famously argued that a commitment to non-existent objective values permeates ordinary moral thought and discourse. According to a standard interpretation, Mackie construed this commitment as a universal and indeed essential feature of moral judgments. In this paper I argue that we should rather ascribe to Mackie a form of semantic pluralism, according to which not all moral judgments involve the commitment to objective values. This interpretation not only makes better sense of what Mackie (...) actually says, but also renders his error theory immune to a powerful objection. (shrink)

We have met in this conference to discuss “critical pluralism.” It will be a conference or discussion if the participants present different conceptions of critical pluralism based on different conceptions of criticism. Pluralism will enter the discussion in two ways: in the plurality of statements, which will be easy to recognize, and in the plurality or identity of what the statements are about, which will be problematic. There are three possible conclusions to which the discussion may lead. Some of the (...) participants may argue that only one of the opposed statements is about criticism and that the others may be about the work, but do not treat it as a literary work; these participants may so deny the possibility of critical pluralism. Some may present different modes of critical interpretation of a literary work and argue that they are different interpretations of the same work; these participants may recognize no need to differentiate different aspects in the work to which they interpretations are relevant. Finally, some may argue that the different modes of criticism apply to different aspects of the work which should be named differently and be treated by different methods, and which should be considered distinct objects of interpretation.The variety of critical methods and the variety of objects to which those methods can be applied are apparent when the reflexive relations between the pluralism of the interpretation of books and the pluralism of the circumstances and the matters that condition and constitute books are examined in a paradigm of possible forms and matters related to each other paradoxically. Many of the recurrent pairs of terms joined and differentiated in the literature of criticism are related paradoxically. Richard McKeon was the editor of The Basic Works of Aristotle, coeditor of Peter Abailard, Sic et Non: A Critical Edition, and author of Thought, Action, and Passion. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are “Arts of Invention and Arts of Memory: Creation and Criticism” , “Canonic Books and Prohibited Books: Orthodoxy and Heresy in Religion and Culture” , and “Pride and Prejudice: Thought, Character, Argument, and Plot”. (shrink)

The central thesis of this essay is that the relation imagined to hold between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit corresponds quite closely with the triadic relationship that holds between object, sign, and interpretant, respectively, within C. S. Peirce’s conception of semiosis. Section 1 introduces Peirce’s conception of semiosis. Section 2 supports the main thesis through examination of descriptions of the Trinitarian relations in two classic Christian texts: The New Testament and The Catechism of the Catholic Church. Section 3 reviews (...) two alternative explanations of this surprising correlation: Andrew Robinson’s vestigia Trinitatis explanation and a naturalistic alternative. (shrink)

Hegel's system is not teleological. For a philosophy to be teleological, as I shall use the term, means that it takes the basic nature of the world itself or any foundational account of that world to be defined ultimately by final causality. Such a view has, of course, long stood as the dominant model for interpreting Hegel's system. This essay argues, to the contrary, that the accounts of Teleology and Life in the Science of Logic, and more precisely their analyses (...) of what Hegel calls there subjective purpose and objective purpose, actually demonstrate this conception of teleology to be profoundly mistaken.The conventional reading of these sections is that they argue for two related claims: (1) that the means-ends relationship of extrinsic purposiveness—subjective purpose—is made possible by the intrinsic self-organizing process of intrinsic purposiveness; and (2) that intrinsic purposiveness—objective purpose—takes the basic structure of an organism, a natural purpose (Naturzweck), as its model, a model defined by final causality. I show this to be a deeply flawed interpretation. Hegel certainly shows that extrinsic purposiveness entails intrinsic purposiveness, but he does not conceive of intrinsic purposiveness, objective purpose, in terms of the final causality inherent in the model of a natural purpose. Rather, the systematic account of logical life argues that the activity of life must be understood as genus and this as a process of self-differentiation where the immanent and necessary unfolding of determinate negation itself, and itself alone, engenders the development without possessing or relating itself to any antecedent content. Hence, this austere thesis, rather than any form of final causality, is, as Hegel puts it, the truth of teleology, the nature of the absolute idea, and, as a result, Hegel's system is shown, at its very core, not to be teleological. (shrink)

In a globalised world, healthcare professionals will inevitably find themselves caring for patients whose first language differs from their own. Drawing on experiences in Australia, this paper examines a specific problem that can arise in medical consultations using professional interpreters: whether the moral objections of interpreters should be accommodated as conscientious objections if and when their services are required in contexts where healthcare professionals have such entitlements, most notably in relation to consultations concerning termination of pregnancy and voluntary assisted dying. (...) We argue that existing statements of professional ethics suggest that interpreters should not be accorded such rights. The social organisation of healthcare and interpreting services in Australia may mean those who have serious objections to particular medical practices could provide their services in restricted healthcare contexts. Nevertheless, as a general rule, interpreters who have such objections should avoid working within healthcare. (shrink)

The author of the work proposes a philosophical and methodological interpretation of the mathematical objects, using the system triad of the main directions of substantiation of mathematics: the formalism of Hilbert, Brouwer’s intuitionism and Godel’s Platonism. The need for these directions in the concept of substantiation of mathematics from the point of view of the current state of the philosophy of mathematics is shown on the mathematical examples. The philosophical and methodological analysis of objects of mathematics has never been (...) unambiguous, therefore in this paper the results of studies of philosophers, logicians and mathematicians, in which the problem of substantiation is explicated in the context of trends in the development of mathematics, are used. Their professional view on philosophical characteristics of the objects of mathematics contributes to the identification of the unity of all mathematical knowledge maintaining the initial mathematical base of knowledge and revealing new ways of integrating the directions of substantiation in the philosophy of mathematics. The practical problem of substantiation of mathematics is realized through the elaboration of metatheoretical knowledge under the paradigm shift in the philosophy of mathematics to the productive direction from analysis to synthesis. (shrink)

After about a century since the first attempts by Bohr, the interpretation of quantum theory is still a field with many open questions.1 In this article a new interpretation of quantum theory is suggested, motivated by philosophical considerations. Based on the findings that the ’weirdness’ of quantum theory can be understood to derive from a vanishing distinguishability of indiscernible particles, and the observation that a similar vanishing distinguishability is found for bundle theories in philosophical ontology, the claim is (...) made that quantum theory can be interpreted in an intelligible way by positing a bundle-theoretic view of objective idealism instead of materialism as the underlying fundamental nature of reality. (shrink)

A proposal for an objective interpretation of probability is introduced and discussed: probabilities as deriving from ranges in suitably structured initial-state spaces. Roughly, the probability of an event on a chance trial is the proportion of initial states that lead to the event in question within the space of all possible initial states associated with this type of experiment, provided that the proportion is approximately the same in any not too small subregion of the space. This I would (...) like to call the “natural-range conception” of probability. Providing a substantial alternative to frequency or propensity accounts of probability in a deterministic setting, it is closely related to the so-called “method of arbitrary functions”. It is explicated, confronted with certain problems, and some ideas how these might be overcome are sketched and discussed. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to describe Whitehead’s specific interpretation of what was originally Plato’s concept of the "receptacle". Whitehead, in line with his own process philosophy, understands Plato’s concept of the "receptacle" as a personal unity that, in its structural character, expresses the general principle that determines the constitution of the whole of our reality. The author of this paper begins by briefly describing Plato’s concept of hypodoché. The author then goes on to present Whitehead’s specific (...) class='Hi'>interpretation of this concept, which allows him to elaborate the potential parallels between Whitehead’s interpretation of hypodoché and his concept of "eternal objects". Finally, the author attempts to find the answer to a fundamental philosophical question: what in reality corresponds to Whitehead’s concept of "eternal objects". He suggests that a possible answer may be found in the General Systems Theory of Ludwig von Bertalanffy. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to propose Charles Peirce's semiotic idealism as an acceptable middle way between skeptical anti-realism and contemporary mind independent realism. The present debate appears stagnant and entrenched in the rigid dualism of either scientific realism or relativism. It will be argued that this dualism constitutes a false dichotomy, and that idealism offers a coherent solution to this impasse. ;Much of the trouble engendering the present debate begins with the correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence theory (...) is habitually aligned with the claim that the referent of a true statement is mind-independent reality. In other words, even if there were no minds there to verify its truth, that statement would still be true and its referent would be real. ;The view of this work is that Peirce's idealism can acceptably qualify the correspondence theory by proposing an idealistic framework in which mind and reality are not seen as two opposing and alien entities. ;The dissertation contains six chapters. Chapter one begins with Peirce's critique of Cartesian and Modern epistemology. It rejects certain modern notions about intuitions, the locus of certitude, and raises general issues about methodology and argumentation. In chapter two, the critique of intuitions develops into an analysis and exposition of Peirce's semiotic, or theory of signs. This chapter pays special attention to Peirce's semiotic interpretation of mind and cognition. Chapter three is a continuation of Peirce's semiotic and unfolds his theory of Synechism, the evolutionary cosmology of a progressively and continually ordered reality. Chapter four helps the reader to place Peirce's theory by comparing it to other movements in 19th and 20th century idealism and realism. Chapter five continues in the same vein by considering Peirce's semiotic idealism as a viable middle way between contemporary mind-independent realism and skeptical anti-realism. Chapter six provides a brief summary and encapsulation of some major points of the work. (shrink)