This volume of essays is an important introduction to the thought of one of the twentieth century's most significant yet underappreciated philosophers, Richard McKeon. The originator of philosophical pluralism, McKeon made extraordinary contributions to philosophy, to international relations, and to theory-formation in the communication arts, aesthetics, the organization of knowledge, and the practical sciences. This collection, which includes a philosophical autobiography as well as the out-of-print title essay "Freedom and History" and a previously unpublished essay on "Philosophic Semantics and Philosophic (...) Inquiry," is a testimony to the range and systematic power of McKeon's thinking for the social sciences and the humanities. (shrink)

As a philosopher, Richard McKeon spent his career developing Pragmatism in a new key, specifically by tracing the ways in which philosophic problems arise in fields other than philosophy—across the natural and social sciences and aesthetics—and showed the ways in which any problem, pushed back to its beginning or taken to its end, is a philosophic problem. The roots of this book, On Knowing—The Social Sciences, are traced to McKeon’s classes where he blended philosophy with physics, ethics, politics, history, and (...) aesthetics. This volume—the second in a series—leaves behind natural science themes to embrace freedom, power, and history, which, McKeon argues, lay out the whole field of human action. The authors McKeon considers—Hobbes, Machiavelli, Spinoza, Kant, and J. S. Mill—show brilliantly how philosophic methods work in action, via analyses that do not merely reduce or deconstruct meaning, but enhance those texts by reconnecting them to the active history of philosophy and to problems of ethics, politics, and history. The waves of modernism and post-modernism are receding. Philosophic pluralism is now available, fully formulated, in McKeon’s work, spreading from the humanities to the social sciences. (shrink)

This first volume of an ambitious three-volume work covers philosophic theory through McKeon's writings on first philosophy (metaphysics) and the methods and principles of the sciences.

The arts of poetry and the arts of criticism are uncovered and studied in their products, in poems and in judgments. Poetry and criticism, however, the making and judging of poems, are processes. The study of literature as a product - existing poems and existing interpretations and appreciations of poetry - develops a body of knowledge which is sometimes called "poetic sciences." The recognition and use of poetic and critical processes - producing and judging poems which did not previously exist, (...) and uncovering and analyzing aspects of existing poems which were not previously discerned or appreciated - develop things and values by use of arts which are sometimes called "heuristic arts." Knowledge or science is used in the processes of deliberate or artful making; art or criticism is used in the production of things or knowledge of things, natural or artificial. Knowledge is a product of inquiry; criticism is a process of judgment; the two are joined - knowledge of things and use of knowledge - in critical inquiries or critiques of judgment. Richard McKeon is Charles F. Grey Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Greek at the University of Chicago; he was a member of the U.S. delegations to the first three General Conferences of UNESCO and served as U.S. counselor to UNESCO. His numerous publications include The Philosophy of Spinoza, Freedom and History, and Thought, Action, and Passion; he also has edited The Basic Works of Aristotle and coedited the forthcoming critical edition of Abailard's Sic et Non. His contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Canonic Books and Prohibited Books: Orthodoxy and Heresy in Religion and Culture" and Pride and Prejudice: Thought, Character, Argument, and Plot". (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEs werden zwei Begriffe, «Prozess» und «Funktion», besprochen, welche in der heutigen Philosophie zu Grundbegriffen zweier, miteinander unvereinbarer philosophischer Systeme geworden sind, die sich beide auf die Wissenschaft stützen. In dieser hingegen werden die beiden genannten Begriffe nicht als einander ausschliessend angesehen, sondern funktionieren als Leitbegriffe zweier nebeneinder stehenden Hypothesen, welche zu verschiedenen Methoden der Forschung führen. Im ersten Teil des vorliegenden Aufsatzes wird der Begriff «Prozess» im Hinblick auf die gegenwärtige Physik untersucht und vier Grundstellungen unterschieden, die sich in (...) der Relativitätstheorie Whiteheads, in der Einsteinschen einheitlichen Feldtheorie, in der mit dieser unvereinbaren Auffassung der führenden Quantenphysiker und dem Bridgmanschen Operationismus ausprägen. Im zweiten Teil wird der Begriff «Funktion» im Hinblick auf die heutige Biologie erörtert. Die beiden oben erwähnten philosophischen Systeme zeigen aber, dass philosophisch Funktionen als Prozesse und umgekehrt Prozesse als Funktionen aufgefasst werden können. Andererseits beeinflusst jeder Begriff von «Prozess», der in der Physik entwickelt wird, die Biologie und jeder Begriff von «Funktion», der in der Biologie auftritt, hat Bedeutung für die Physik. Im Grunde genommen, sind die beiden genannten Begriffe die Grenzpunkte des Weges, den die Entwicklung der, aus der antiken Philosophie stammenden Begriffe «Sein» und «Substanz» genommen hat. Beide haben ihre berechtigte methodische Verwendung in der Wissenschaft. Vielleicht könnte die Philosophie, deren Grundfragen in den Wissenschaften eine fundamentale Rolle spielen, aus diesem Vorgehen der Wissenschaften lernen, ihre Begriffe genauer zu präzisieren, indem sie, statt ihre Thesen zu verabsolutieren, diese als Forschungshypothesen auffasst, deren Folgen zu untersuchen sind. Auch könnte man auf diese Weise dazu kommen, die philosophischen Thesen nicht als absolute, ausschliessende Gegensätze, sondern als «komplementär» aufzufassen und diese «komplementären» Gesichtspunkte für die wissenschaftliche Forschung auszuwerten. (shrink)

I am under no illusion that the statement of common issues will forestall controversy. On the contrary, one of the venerable devices of the experienced controversialist is to state all possible positions in his own terms. The three questions concealed behind the three terms in the title of this paper do not have a privileged or architectonic universality. They will not reconcile the oppositions of philosophic positions concerning the possibility, order, and relative importance of questions, and it is easy to (...) anticipate reassortments they will undergo, if they are thought worthy of the effort, in the types of philosophy for which they find a place. My starting-point is "what is," rather than "being" or "existence," and I depart radically, therefore, from some of the dominant fashions of metaphysical discussion as well as from the fashions of non-metaphysical discussion of metaphysical issues. As a mark of that departure, I shall not base what I have to say on exposure of errors in Descartes or on refinements of insights in Hume or Kant, and I shall not express myself in neologisms constructed to retain, in English, distinctions or paradoxes derived from Descartes, Kierkegaard, or Nietzsche, or profundities grasped from the exegesis of the analogies of poets or from the etymologies of words used by Greek philosophers. If I were to choose a dictum for aphoristic elaboration or paradoxical propulsion, I should interpret a statement from Avicenna: "That which the understanding conceives first and best, and into which it resolves all other conceptions, is 'that which is,' 'thing,' and 'necessary'." I should make this choice, not because I prefer or even understand Avicenna's position concerning that which is, but because I want to raise three questions which are suggested when Avicenna's statement is introduced in the context of problems of existence. (shrink)

The history of freedom is the record of what men have said and done and the interpretation of the remains of what they have made. The history of freedom of thought and expression, the history of literature and of criticism, is constructed by interference from those records and remains. The documents and artifacts in which thoughts are embodied and expressed and in which historians detect ideas and uncover their consequences in thought and action are the primary matter of the history (...) of freedom of thought and expression. The production of books or other modes of expression, their preservation, dissemination, interpretation, and use are results at each stage of the interplay of freedom and restraint, spontaneity and judgment. The freedom of writers to write, the freedom of readers to read, and the freedom of critics or judges or censors to select criteria which establish communities united by common opinions, beliefs, or institutions supplement and delimit each other. Richard McKeon, editor of The Basic Works of Aristotle, delivered this paper at the International Conference on Freedom of Thought and Expression in the History of Ideas held by the International Society for the History of Ideas in Venice, September 28—October 2, 1975. The essay will be included in a volume of the papers read at the conference to be published by the Society. His contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Arts of Invention and Arts of Memory: Creation and Criticism" and “Pride and Prejudice: Thought, Character, Argument, and Plot”. (shrink)