Neither laziness nor its condemnation are new inventions, however, perceiving laziness as a social condition that afflicts a 'nation' is. In the early modern era, Ottoman political treatises did not regard the people as the source of the state's problems. Yet in the nineteenth century, as the imperial ideology of Ottomanism and modern discourses of citizenship spread, so did the understanding of laziness as a social disease that the 'Ottoman nation' needed to eradicate. Asking what we can (...) learn about Ottoman history over the long nineteenth-century by looking closely into the contested and shifting boundaries of the laziness - productivity binary, Melis Hafez explores how 'laziness' can be used to understand emerging civic culture and its exclusionary practices in the Ottoman Empire. A polyphonic involvement of moralists, intellectuals, polemicists, novelists, bureaucrats, and, to an extent, the public reveals the complexities and ambiguities of this multifaceted cultural transformation. Using a wide variety of sources, this book explores the sustained anxiety about productivity that generated numerous reforms as well as new understandings of morality, subjectivity, citizenship, and nationhood among the Ottomans. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'middle ground (MG)'. Like almost all fallacies, MG is prevalent because it closely resembles a non‐fallacious way of reasoning. In many disputes, especially when there is a spectrum of opinions, the truth often lies somewhere in between the most extreme views on either side. The fallacy is committed by people who don't listen to the reasons that have been offered by each side to defend their theories – they (...) simply assume that the truth is in the middle. The fallacy is the result of intellectual laziness. Fortunately, this is an easy fallacy to avoid. Simply keep in mind the fact that merely because someone asserts a theory, especially an extreme theory, this does not by itself provide evidence for any conclusion at all. (shrink)

The Alcibiades was widely read in antiquity as the very best introduction to Plato. Alcibiades in his youth associated with Socrates, and went on to a spectacularly disgraceful career in politics. When Socrates was executed for 'corrupting the young men', Alcibiades was cited as a prime example. This dialogue represents Socrates meeting the charming but intellectually lazy Alcibiades as he is about to enter adult life, and using all his wiles in an attempt to win him for philosophy. In spite (...) of its ancient reputation, many modern scholars have thought that the Alcibiades is not by Plato and it has therefore lacked a decent commentary. This edition remedies that lack. The notes explain difficulties of linguistic, literary and philosophical detail. The introduction includes a discussion of the dialogue's authenticity, and of the consequences that acknowledging its authenticity has for our conception of Plato's intellectual development. (shrink)

Some fashionable leftist movements and populist intellectuals habitually blame the sources of information for public ignorance about the miserable state of the world. It could be argued, however, that the masses are ignorant because they prefer ignorance. A mass individual is politically apathetic and intellectually lazy. As a result, even when huge amounts of information are available, which is the case in this epoch, the masses insist on choosing ignorance. It is true that there is not enough information about what (...) has happened in a place such as Darfur, but the masses choose not to access even the amount of information that is available. The great majority of people in China, Iran, and America, despite the fact that they have varying amounts of access to various types of “knowledge,” still tend to be misinformed. It seems that a mass individual is curious only about what directly affects his/her own personal life. I will explore the connection between mass mentality and the culture industry in order to capture the essential role of the former in the latter. I will also argue that a mass individual is the source of fascism although fascism as a phenomenon needs a mass culture in which to flourish. (shrink)

Computer science only became established as a field in the 1950s, growing out of theoretical and practical research begun in the previous two decades. The field has exhibited immense creativity, ranging from innovative hardware such as the early mainframes to software breakthroughs such as programming languages and the Internet. Martin Gardner worried that "it would be a sad day if human beings, adjusting to the Computer Revolution, became so intellectually lazy that they lost their power of creative thinking" (Gardner, 1978, (...) p. vi-viii). On the contrary, computers and the theory of computation have provided great opportunities for creative work. This chapter examines several key aspects of creativity in computer science, beginning with the question of how problems arise in computer science. We then discuss the use of analogies in solving key problems in the history of computer science. Our discussion in these sections is based on historical examples, but the following sections discuss the nature of creativity using information from a contemporary source, a set of interviews with practicing computer scientists collected by the Association of Computing Machinery’s on-line student magazine, Crossroads. We then provide a general comparison of creativity in computer science and in the natural sciences. (shrink)

Nagel’s most recent book is a defense of rationalism, which places the “last word” in justification within rational justifications themselves, against subjectivism, which reduces rational justifications to the first person singular or plural so that the “last word” is something more fundamental than reason. He admits that the arguments he poses against subjectivism “are as old as the hills”. There are, nonetheless, several reasons why The Last Word is important and novel. First, because the arguments “require constant repetition”, especially in (...) our own time. Beyond the subjectivism within philosophy, the “actual result [of subjectivism] has been a growth in the already extreme intellectual laziness of contemporary culture and the collapse of serious argument throughout the lower reaches of the humanities and social sciences...”. (shrink)

Cognitive psychologists have uncovered a number of natural tendencies to systematic errors in thinking. This paper proposes some ways that intellectual character virtues might help correct these sources of epistemic unreliability. We begin with an overview of some insights from recent work in dual-process cognitive psychology regarding ‘biases and heuristics’, and argue that the dozens of hazards the psychologists catalogue arise from combinations and specifications of a small handful of more basic patterns of thinking. We expound four of these, (...) and sketch how they conspire to produce the myriad biases, heuristics, and illusions. We then offer accounts of two character virtues—self-vigilance and intellectual vitality—and explain how these virtues could help correct our error-prone thinking. The self-vigilant person appreciates her vulnerability to natural epistemic defects, is on the watch for cues to the working of these possible error-makers, and intelligently acts to correct for them. The intellectually vital person is naturally or has learned to be energetic, active, alert, attentive, and inquisitive, contrary to the natural tendency to cognitive laziness. We suggest that these intellectual virtues, like the moral virtues, will cluster in the personality, and will tend to be mutually reinforcing and mutually recruiting, even as each has its own corrective function. (shrink)

‘Bad’ epistemic behaviour is unfortunately commonplace. Take, for example, those who believe in conspiracy theories, trust untrustworthy news sites or refuse to take seriously the opinion of their epistemic peers. Sometimes this kind of behaviour is sporadic or “out of character”; however, more concerning are those cases that display deeply embedded character traits, attitudes and thinking styles (Cassam 2016). When this is the case, these character traits, attitudes and thinking styles are identified by vice epistemologists as epistemic or intellectual (...) vices. Considering that these vices often block or subvert the acquisition of epistemic goods such as knowledge or truth, it is important for epistemologists to understand how these kinds of traits can be most effectively mitigated. One currently unexplored way in which we might go about doing so is by employing epistemically paternalistic strategies, particularly the strategy of “epistemic nudging” (here on EN)—the practice of altering an agent’s decision-making capacities toward a desired outcome (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). -/- By bringing together two underexplored areas of epistemology yet to be discussed in connection to one another, this chapter will examine whether epistemic nudging can be employed as a successful practice to combat our epistemic vices. Despite prima facie appeal, I will argue that epistemic nudging at the very best amounts to a superficial and short-lived way of addressing epistemic vices. Additionally, I argue that the practice of EN can often lead to the creation of further vices, specifically the vice of epistemic laziness, as identified by Ian Kidd (2017). (shrink)

The article manifests and analyzes the process of decentration of the Author, which corresponds to a number of trends, such as: decentration of the subject, dividualization, decentralization of information systems, etc., which determine contemporary transformations of the Lifeworld of a human, who appears precisely as a decentralized, multilayered, split, multiple being. It is noted that the model of authorship, which was constituted according to the concept of a centered/holistic subject/individual, which, in particular, is embodied in copyright, needs to be reconsidered. (...) The meaning of such a model, which is conceptualized in the figure of "authenticity of an authoritative author", is reduced to the creation of Surplus Value with behalf of the author of the product/work/goods. The article presents the stages of decentration of the Author, authority and authenticity, which are personified by the figures of S. Kierkegaard, M. Duchamp, and R. Stallman. For Kierkegaard, it is fundamental to separate the function of the author from authority and the formation of existence/singularity, which, in particular, is embodied in his use of pseudonyms. Duchamp problematizes the author as a producer of a product, contrasting him with the practice of using ready-made objects, and contrasts the tradition of the author's signature with the multiplication of names/signatures. Duchamp exposes the exploitative essence of work even in relation to artistic creativity, manifesting as an alternative to laziness/"lazy activity", which allows shifting the emphasis from the production of things to the process of becoming subjectivity. In the end, the author as integrity and unity loses its meaning in the context of the development of contemporary technologies and network communication. Stallman presents a strategy of friendly exchange of free software instead of selling it based on copyright (intellectual property). This is what should increase productive activity and free up time, and in the long run, creativity should hardly be distinguished from laziness. These three examples testify to the possibility and necessity of overcoming the repressive component of authorship and copyright as a way of controlling/restricting human life, which is not a totality, does not have substantial authenticity, does not require authority, and does not focus on authorship. (shrink)

In terms of my own first-personal narrative, the most obvious proximal cause of my theorizing about agency was a graduate seminar on free will taught by Peter van Inwagen. It was my first semester of graduate school, and van Inwagen’s forceful presentation of incompatibilism made a big impression on me. I left that course thinking incompatibilism was both obvious and irrefutable. The only problem was that I didn’t stay at Notre Dame. I transferred to Stanford in the following year, where (...) I discovered the truth of a remark John Fischer once made: Indiana is for Incompatibilists and California is for Compatibilists. Some of the folks there who most influenced me, especially Michael Bratman and Ken Taylor, are thoroughgoing compatibilists. I was really struck by the fact that both of these smart, thoughtful guys seemed genuinely puzzled by the impulse to incompatibilism. I wasn’t entirely ready to give up on my incompatibilism (which was by then shifting from libertarianism to hard incompatibilism), but I felt a need to be able to find some way to reconcile it with an appreciation for the appeal that compatibilism clearly seemed to have for some otherwise compelling philosophers. And, so my interest in thinking about free agency and free action began to take root. So, that’s the intellectualized part of the story. But there is also the fact of my local conditions when all of this was going on. For good or ill, I kept taking seminars where the problem of free will would crop up in the course of things. Out of sheer laziness (or, as I like to think about it, out of a dimly sensed need to conserve my energies for later), I kept seizing on the topic as a subject matter for seminar papers, whether the course was on Hume, Aristotle, Nietzsche, philosophy of mind, or philosophy action. Thus, when it came time to write a dissertation, free will seemed like an obvious choice.. (shrink)

The demarcation of pseudoscience has been one of the most important philosophical tasks since the 1960s. During the 1980s, an atmosphere of defeatism started to spread among philosophers of science, some of them claimed the failure of the demarcation project. I defend that the more auspicious approach to the problem might be through the intellectual character of epistemic agents, i.e., from the point of view of vice epistemology. Unfortunately, common lists of undesirable character features are usually based on a (...) priori reasoning, and therefore might be considered artificial or too vague. When we base our position on contemporary behavioural sciences, we can see that the epistemic character of believers in pseudoscience is for the most part determined by two related factors. Firstly, these epistemic agents show a higher level of cognitive laziness. By this I mean an inability or unwillingness to engage in reflective thinking and a reluctance to account for counterevidence. Secondly, they yield more easily to metacognitive overconfidence. This can be broadly understood as so-called “knowledge illusion”, the inability to recognize one’s own intellectual limits. The deficiency usually stems from a misunderstanding of the division of cognitive labour and of the agent’s role in epistemic society. I find the proposed epistemological approach to pseudoscience crucial. Only if we understand the descriptive aspects of the problem, can we think of normative solutions to it. (shrink)

U tekstu se traga za vezom između Descartesovih životnih obrata i razloga zbog kojih filozof u Raspravi o metodi i Meditacijama o prvoj filozofiji primjenjuje ispovjednički način pisanja. Takvo nastojanje otkriva posebnu ulogu maske pod kojom se Descartes namjerava prvi put pojaviti pred javnošću. Iako masku spominje još u dnevničkim bilješkama, on je konačno oblikuje, i to kao ‘osobu’, tek s otkrićem cogito, dakle, u vrijeme dok piše Raspravu o metodi. U tom mu djelu ‘osoba’, shvaćena kao čist razum, daje (...) mogućnost svoje filozofsko preobraćanje ispovijediti kao obrazac intelektualnog preobražaja čovječanstva, čime se njegova ispovijest pretvara u propovijed. U Meditacijama, međutim, Descartes ide korak dalje. Njegova vještina služenja maskom, te njegovo iskustvo koje je u snovima imao sa zloduhom i Bogom, dovode ga do toga da se u ovom spisu pojavljuje kao glumac sa tri lika: kao »ja«, kao zli genije i kao istinoljubivi Bog. Iza sva tri lika, naravno, stoji Descartesov ratio; ali bitno je primijetiti da zloduh nije samo maska kojom filozof prikriva grijeh skeptičke aktivnosti u koju uvlači čitaoca. Na osnovu Descartesovih snova može se tvrditi da postoji još jedan zloduh u Meditacijama, ovoga puta stvarni, koji stoji nasuprot meditirajućem subjektu. Taj je oličenje općeprihvaćenih stavova, predrasudnog mišljenja i lijenosti ljudskog uma.The text explores the connection between Descartes’ life conversions and the reason why in the Discourse on the Method and Meditations on First Philosophy he utilizes a confessional tone to his writing. Such an endeavour exposes a specific role of the mask under which the philosopher intends to present himself to the public for the first time. Although the mask is already mentioned in his Private thoughts, Descartes gives it a form of persona only after the discovery of cogito, as he is writing the Discourse. The mask of persona, conceived as a pure reason, allows him to confess his philosophical conversions as a paradigm of intellectual conversion of humanity, transforming his confession into a sermon. However, in the Meditations, Descartes takes a step further. His ability to utilize the mask, combined with his experience in dreams with a malicious demon and God, enable him to appear in this work as a multi-faced actor: as »I«, as a malicious genius and as a truthful God. Behind all three masks is evidently Descartes’ ratio, however it is important to recognize that the malicious genius is not only the mask the philosopher uses to hide the sins of the sceptical activity in which he involves the reader. On the basis of Descartes’ dreams, we can argue that there is one more malicious genius in the Meditations, this time a real one, standing opposite the meditating subject. This one is the embodiment of widely accepted opinions, prejudices and laziness of human intellect. (shrink)

As I put down my copy of The Making of Men and take up Volumes III and IV of Philosophy in Process, the period of the diary when Weiss was writing the book, I wondered whether the longer work showed more awareness of human weakness and disability. The philosophic program calls for the overcoming of bias and achievement of neutrality. Has Weiss ever admitted that men are sometimes born tired, suffer weaknesses, yield to the temptation of aiming low rather than (...) high, fail to put out much effort in capturing "the free energy" that Weiss ascribes to us all? If Weiss doesn't correct his account of human life that is too much based on his own great strengths, then the philosophy must be criticized as one-sided. Even if he has swept aside laziness as subhuman, much as a good teacher encourages students by expecting the superhuman and ignoring the subhuman, this practical encouragement cannot fully excuse theoretical failure in adequacy. For surely we who know Weiss know that he is not merely a performing artist who sometimes takes the classroom as a stage, but rather is a coach who knows how to bring the best performance out of his team of intellectual athletes. Most coaches expect to win every game and have a philosophy that never anticipates or prepares for failure. Is that why Weiss found himself so much at home in the world of Sport? (shrink)

When all the people of the world finally speak the same language and commune in the same message or the same norm of reason, we will descend, idiot imbeciles, lower than rats, more stupidly than lizards. The same maniacal language and science, the same repetitions of the same in all latitudes–an earth covered with screeching parrots. The goal of instruction is the end of instruction, that is to say invention. Invention is the only true intellectual act, the only act (...) of intelligence. The rest? Copying, cheating, reproduction, laziness, convention, battle, sleep. Only discovery awakens. Only invention proves that one truly thinks what one thinks, whatever that may be. (shrink)

When all the people of the world finally speak the same language and commune in the same message or the same norm of reason, we will descend, idiot imbeciles, lower than rats, more stupidly than lizards. The same maniacal language and science, the same repetitions of the same in all latitudes–an earth covered with screeching parrots. The goal of instruction is the end of instruction, that is to say invention. Invention is the only true intellectual act, the only act (...) of intelligence. The rest? Copying, cheating, reproduction, laziness, convention, battle, sleep. Only discovery awakens. Only invention proves that one truly thinks what one thinks, whatever that may be. (shrink)

In his professional life, Richard Posner is addressed as “Your Honor,” inasmuch as he is Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. He is also a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. Finally, he is a prolific author of books and articles in scholarly journals in which he expounds at length and with copious footnotes his particular views of jurisprudence and public policy. One of his frequent intellectual adversaries, legal philosopher Ronald (...) Dworkin, wryly described Judge Posner as “the lazy judge who writes a book before breakfast, decides several cases before noon, teaches all afternoon at the Chicago Law School, and performs brain surgery after dinner.”. (shrink)

This book is the first systematic treatment of 'responsibilist' or character-based virtue epistemology, an approach to epistemology that focuses on intellectual ...

The Russian philosopher and cultural theorist Mikhail Bakhtin has traditionally been seen as the leading figure in the group of intellectuals known as the Bakhtin Circle. The writings of other members of the Circle are considered much less important than his work, while Bakhtin's achievement has been exaggerated in proportion to the downgrading of the thinkers with whom he associated in the 1920s. This volume, which includes new translations and studies of the work of the most important members of the (...) Circle, sets out to correct the distortions in the established representations of its activity. The original contributions to literary and linguistic theory made by Valentin Voloshinov and Pavel Medvedev (but frequently credited to Bakhtin) are assessed, and the distinctiveness of their approaches is highlighted. (shrink)

Between innocence and commitment: speculation and experience -- Reasonable commitment -- Some comparisons -- Commitment to reason and to scientific realism -- Humanist commitment -- Humanism and the cosmic agent -- Commitment to God -- Corollaries.

Increasing attention is paid in the social sciences and management studies to the constitution and claims of different theories, perspectives, and "paradigms." This book is one of the most respected and robust analyses of these issues. For this new paperback edition Richard Whitley--a leading figure in European business education--has written a new introduction which addresses the particular epistemological issues of business management studies.

After a brief overview of what intellectual virtues are, I offer three arguments for the claim that education should aim at fostering ‘intellectual character virtues’ like curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual honesty. I then go on to discuss several pedagogical and related strategies for achieving this aim.

Highlighting the social tensions that confront the liberal tradition, Pierre Manent draws a portrait of what we, citizens of modern liberal democracies, have become. For Manent, a discussion of liberalism encompasses the foundations of modern society, its secularism, its individualism, and its conception of rights. The frequent incapacity of the morally neutral, democratic state to further social causes, he argues, derives from the liberal stance that political life does not serve a higher purpose. Through quick-moving, highly synthetic essays, he explores (...) the development of liberal thinking in terms of a single theme: the decline of theological politics. The author traces the liberal stance to Machiavelli, who, in seeking to divorce everyday life from the pervasive influence of the Catholic church, separated politics from all notions of a cosmological order. What followed, as Manent demonstrates in his analyses of Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, Guizot, and Constant, was the evolving concept of an individual with no goals outside the confines of the self and a state with no purpose but to prevent individuals from dominating one another. Weighing both the positive and negative effects of such a political arrangement, Manent raises important questions about the fundamental political issues of the day, among them the possibility of individual rights being reconciled with the necessary demands of political organization, and the desirability of a government system neutral about religion but not about public morals. (shrink)

This is the first book to provide a comprehensive overview of the entire career of one of Britain's greatest men of letters. It sets in biographical and historical context all of Hume's works, from A Treatise of Human Nature to The History of England, bringing to light the major influences on the course of Hume's intellectual development, and paying careful attention to the differences between the wide variety of literary genres with which Hume experimented. The major events in Hume's (...) life are fully described, but the main focus is on Hume's intentions as a philosophical analyst of human nature, politics, commerce, English history, and religion. Careful attention is paid to Hume's intellectual relations with his contemporaries. The goal is to reveal Hume as a man intensely concerned with the realization of an ideal of open-minded, objective, rigorous, dispassionate dialogue about all the principal questions faced by his age. (shrink)

Of all the thinkers of the century of genius that inaugurated modern philosophy, none lived an intellectual life more rich and varied than Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Maria Rosa Antognazza's pioneering biography provides a unified portrait of this unique thinker and the world from which he came. At the centre of the huge range of Leibniz's apparently miscellaneous endeavours, Antognazza reveals a single master project lending unity to his extraordinarily multifaceted life's work. Throughout the vicissitudes of his long life, Leibniz (...) tenaciously pursued the dream of a systematic reform and advancement of all the sciences. As well as tracing the threads of continuity that bound these theoretical and practical activities to this all-embracing plan, this illuminating study also traces these threads back into the intellectual traditions of the Holy Roman Empire in which Leibniz lived and throughout the broader intellectual networks that linked him to patrons in countries as distant as Russia and to correspondents as far afield as China. (shrink)

Academic research is increasingly centering on interdisciplinary work. Strong interdisciplinary research (SIR), involving researchers from very different fields, such as scientists and humanists, is often encouraged, if not required, by funding agencies. I argue that two intellectual virtues, open-mindedness and intellectual humility, are crucial for overcoming obstacles to SIR and achieving success. In part I, I provide a primer on intellectual virtue and the two virtues in question. In part II, I distinguish SIR from weak interdisciplinary research (...) (WIR), which involves research teams from neighboring fields, such as physics and chemistry, and from disciplinary research (DR), which involves researchers from the same discipline. I also outline what counts as success in SIR, and explain why it’s more challenging to attain than in WIR and DR. In part III, I explain how both intellectual virtues are essential for achieving success in SIR and for overcoming obstacles that can arise in its pursuit. (shrink)

In his book, the Author establishes a connection between al-Juwayni's thought system and the period in which he lived by dealing in detail with the political and legal environment of al-Juwayni's time. This connection is valuable as it helps to clarify his thoughts in many fields. It allows us to understand the intellectual project in the mind of al-Juwayni. This academic project also requires that he not treat his al-Juwayni's works as separate units. The Author's approach was in this (...) direction. According to him, al-Juwayni has an intellectual project seen in his books. The Author, aware that this idea, which shaped al-Juwaynî's academic concerns, was not formulated in a vacuum, examines the sociopolitical environment that left an indelible mark on him. In this context, the Author emphasizes that al-Juwayni witnessed the debates between the Ashʿarīs and the Muʿtazila on the intellectual stage. According to him, the tension produced by the contradictory epistemologies of these two schools in al-Juwayni was influential in his search for certainty in knowledge. While the Author cares about the influence of al-Juwayni's intellectual environment on him, he also states that this is not the only influence on al-Juwayni. According to him, the fact that al-Juwayni lived in a politically turbulent period should also be considered, especially in the search for the certainty of knowledge and continuity of Islamic society. al-Juwayni lived at a time when the rise of powerful dynastic families forced the ʿAbbasid Caliphate into a position of only nominal power and, in a short period, saw contradictory policies implemented against the Ashʿarī/Shāfiʿīs. It led him to preserve and maintain religious thought apart from politics. As a result, al-Juwayni started to think about the role of the leader in maintaining the social order and the role of the scholars in protecting the religion. In an environment where the political elites are constantly changing, his focus has been on enabling the Muslim community to continue its existence in any case. (shrink)

According to one prominent account of intellectual humility, it consists primarily of a disposition to “own” one’s intellectual limitations. This account has been criticized for neglecting the _interpersonal _dimensions of intellectual humility. We expect intellectually humble persons to be respectful and generous with their interlocutors and to avoid being haughty or domineering. I defend the limitations-owning account against this objection. I do so in two ways: first, by arguing that some of the interpersonal qualities associated with (...) class='Hi'>intellectual humility are qualities expressive of virtues _other_ than intellectual humility; and second, by arguing that, when properly described, the kind of limitations-owning characteristic of intellectual humility in fact is robustly interpersonal. The result is a considerably broader and richer notion of the limitations the owning of which is characteristic of intellectual humility. (shrink)

Despite the recent growth of studies in virtue epistemology, the intellectual virtue of epistemic collaborativeness has been overlooked by scholars working in virtue theory. This is a significant gap in the literature given the import of well-motivated and skillful epistemic collaboration for the flourishing of human societies. This paper engages in an in-depth examination of the intellectual virtue of epistemic collaborativeness. It argues that the agent who possesses this acquired character trait is (i) highly motivated to engage in (...) epistemic collaboration (out of her rational desire for intellectual ends), (ii) competent at the characteristic activity of epistemic collaborativeness and (iii) has good judgement as to when and with whom it is epistemically appropriate to engage in epistemic collaboration. Furthermore, this paper discusses the place of epistemic collaborativeness among the virtues and argues that it is an overarching virtue—i.e. it presupposes certain other intellectual virtues although it remains distinguishable from them. Theoretical and practical merits of this virtue are also presented and considered. The virtue of collaborativeness highlights the social dimension of intellectual virtues and could be of significant value for contemporary virtue-based approaches to education. (shrink)

Presenting a detailed and critical account of the ideas that underpin the practice of educational leadership, this book moves from abstracted accounts of knowledge claims based on studying field outputs, towards the biographies and practices of those actively involved in the production and use of field knowledge. It presents a critical account of the ideas underpinning educational leadership, and engages with those ideas by examining the origins, development and use of conceptual frameworks and models of best practice.

For decades, intelligence and achievement tests have registered significant differences between people of different races, ethnicities, classes, and genders. We argue that most of these differences are explained not as reflections of differences in the distribution of intellectual virtues but as evidence for the metacognitive mediation of the intellectual virtues. For example, in the United States, blacks typically score worse than whites on tests of mathematics. This might lead one to think that fewer blacks possess the relevant (...) class='Hi'>intellectual virtues, or that they possess them less fully. However, research on stereotype threat shows that when blacks are not reminded of their race, they do much better on these tests than when they are. Simply raising to salience the race of the student triggers the activation of the stereotype, which in turn leads to poorer performance. However, learning about stereotype threat to a large extent immunizes people against it. This suggests that the psycho-social dimension of intelligence that recognizes the possibility of effects like stereotype threat is a crucial mediating variable in the development and expression of the intellectual virtues. The Socratic, “Know thyself” needs to be expanded to, “Know thyself and thy society.” Self-knowledge and knowledge of relevant stereotypes are a necessary condition for optimal development and expression of the other intellectual virtues. (shrink)

There is a worry about the intellectual legitimacy of philosophy. Although the sciences have a progressive history, with later theories largely building on earlier ones, and a tremendous amount of agreement within the scientific community about the approximate truth of current theory, philosophy is different. We do not see a progressive history of philosophical theorizing, and there is little agreement within the philosophical community about which theories are even roughly correct. This not only encourages a certain skepticism about the (...) possibility of philosophical knowledge, but a real question about whether the activity of philosophical theorizing is intellectually legitimate. It is argued here that there are features of a naturalistic methodology in philosophy which have the resources to respond to these concerns. (shrink)

This paper explores the thesis that the overarching goal of education is to cultivate virtuous intellectual character. It is shown how finally valuing the truth is central to this theory on account of how such valuing is pivotal to intellectual virtues. This feature of the proposal might be thought to be problematic for a number of reasons. For example, it could be argued that truth is not valuable, that insisting on valuing the truth in educational contexts could be (...) politically dubious, or that there is something unduly prescriptive about an educational methodology that has this component. It is argued, however, that many of these grounds for concern are not sound on closer inspection. Properly understood, educating for virtuous intellectual character, even once the truth-valuing aspect of this thesis is made explicit, should not be a contentious proposal. (shrink)

Ernest Gellner was a multilingual polymath who set the agenda in the study of nationalism and the sociology of Islam for an entire generation of academics and students. This definitive biography follows his trajectory from his early years in Prague, Paris and England to international success as a philosopher and public intellectual. Known both for his highly integrated philosophy of modernity and for combining a respect for nationalism with an appreciation for science, Gellner was passionate in his defence of (...) reason against every for of relativism. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility of extending Locke’s theory with respect to tangible property so that it might offer a feasible theoretical basis for intellectual property too. The main conclusion is that such an attempt must fail. Locke’s theory comes in three parts: a general justification of property which serves to explain why assets ought to be under the exclusive control of individuals; a positive method of private appropriation whereby an individual acquires a prima facie exclusive claim to previously (...) commonly held natural resources; and third, a negative requirement that other individuals’ crucial interests are not harmed by such an appropriation. For each of these, the difficulties involved in applying that part of the theory to the sphere of ideas are discussed, and a central aspect of intellectual property that raises the problems of application is highlighted. (shrink)

Descartes maintains that we can love God and that it is pleasant and morally beneficial to do so. In this essay, I examine the necessary conditions for such an intellectual love of God. I argue that the intellectual love of God is incited by a judgment that we are joined to God in reality, which is constitutive of an intellectual joy. I go on to show that the intellectual love of God is, itself, constituted by a (...) stripping of our private interests in favor of God’s divine will. (shrink)

Volume 1. Knowledge, thought, and belief before the seventh century CE -- volume 2. Knowledge, thought, and belief from the seventh through the nineteenth century.