The article is concerned with the general characteristics of Aristotle’s theory of a genus-differentia definition. The authors examine the validity of the definitions in the framework of legal language and present some objections against the definitions of per genus proximum et differentia specificam as they are considered by Aristotle. At the same time, through the objections to the position of genus-differentia definition critics, it is proved that in a number of cases Aristotle’s theory is more (...) preferable than the approach offered by Herbert Hart, the proponent of analytical legal philosophy. The argument of Peter Hacker is used to reinstate Aristotle’s genus-differentia definitions. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with the applicability in modern conceptual jurisprudence of a particular methodology for defining concepts, namely, per genus proximum et differentiam specificam. We explicate the origin of this method and how it was applied by Aristotle, Porphyry, and Boethius, arguing that H. L. A. Hart’s views about the “open texture” of language, which is context-sensitive, call into question the applicability of this methodology in modern conceptual jurisprudence.

Re-activating the philosophical quest for real definitions, I dare propose that its fulfillment is most convincingly represented, close to home, where one probably least expects it, notably in the first half of Section 36 of Word and Object, in the pages of Quine. Aristotle must inevitably remain our guide even as we insist on respecting Quine's anti-essentialism, and I must then explain how Aristotle, truncated, can be put here to use. Well, we may begin, appropriately, with a definition or with (...) what, nearly enough, smacks of being one, namely the Aristotelian slogan, definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam. Although that may be itself a real definition (of real definition), I shall not pursue this scholastic point, preferring to concentrate on my principal task which I take to be to vindicate the feasibility of formulating a real definition of some mind-independent reality. Such a vindication can scarcely succeed today unless it is recognized from the outset that we have here at hand one of those cases where the very (logical) possibility of a problematic thing can be established only by having recourse to the modal principle that actuality entails possibility. Nothing less than a concrete instance of a real definition will then suffice, and I thus expect my sceptical reader (I count on her scepticism) to be in doubt whether the scholastic bit of jargon 'real definition' picks out one of the concepts in her repertoire. (shrink)

The traditional definition per genus et differentiam is argued to be cognitively grounded in perception and in order to avoid needless argument, definitions are stipulated to assert boundaries. An analysis of the notion of perspective shows that a boundary is a composite of two distinctions: similarity that includes and difference that excludes. The concept is applied to the type-token distinction and percepts are shown to be the result of a comparison between a token as representing some phenomenon and (...) a type as representing the kind of object the phenomenon might be. The Principle of Connection is proposed as the mental architecture that gives rise to percepts. The value of a percept is shown to be one of Identical, Similar, Different or Contrary and its perceptual aspects represent the cognitive schema of Essence, Quality, Quantity and Relation. The two notions of similarity and difference are claimed to constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for definitions. Accordingly, the qualitative elements of a definition signify the genus as representing the similarity of the defined entity in terms of others of its kind and the quantitative elements signify the differentia as representing the difference it has from everything else. Paying proper attention to both qualitative and quantitative aspects will enable formulation of definitions that are ‘good’. (shrink)

The traditional definition per genus et differentiam is argued to be cognitively grounded in perception and in order to avoid needless argument, definitions are stipulated to assert boundaries. An analysis of the notion of perspective shows that a boundary is a composite of two distinctions: similarity that includes and difference that excludes. The concept is applied to the type-token distinction and percepts are shown to be the result of a comparison between a token as representing some phenomenon and (...) a type as representing the kind of object the phenomenon might be. The Principle of Connection is proposed as the mental architecture that gives rise to percepts. The value of a percept is shown to be one of Identical, Similar, Different or Contrary and its perceptual aspects represent the cognitive schema of Essence, Quality, Quantity and Relation. The two notions of similarity and difference are claimed to constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for definitions. Accordingly, the qualitative elements of a definition signify the genus as representing the similarity of the defined entity in terms of others of its kind and the quantitative elements signify the differentia as representing the difference it has from everything else. Paying proper attention to both qualitative and quantitative aspects will enable formulation of definitions that are ‘good’. (shrink)

The traditional definition per genus et differentiam is argued to be cognitively grounded in perception and in order to avoid needless argument, definitions are stipulated to assert boundaries. An analysis of the notion of perspective shows that a boundary is a composite of two distinctions: similarity that includes and difference that excludes. The concept is applied to the type-token distinction and percepts are shown to be the result of a comparison between a token as representing some phenomenon and (...) a type as representing the kind of object the phenomenon might be. The Principle of Connection is proposed as the mental architecture that gives rise to percepts. The value of a percept is shown to be one of Identical, Similar, Different or Contrary and its perceptual aspects represent the cognitive schema of Essence, Quality, Quantity and Relation. The two notions of similarity and difference are claimed to constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for definitions. Accordingly, the qualitative elements of a definition signify the genus as representing the similarity of the defined entity in terms of others of its kind and the quantitative elements signify the differentia as representing the difference it has from everything else. Paying proper attention to both qualitative and quantitative aspects will enable formulation of definitions that are ‘good’. (shrink)

J’explore de façon critique la supposition du DSM[1] et de théoriciens tels que Wakefield et Gert selon laquelle les troubles mentaux doivent être attribués à un individu plutôt qu’à un groupe de personnes. Cette supposition est particulièrement problématique en pédopsychiatrie où le système familial est très souvent au centre de l’attention clinique. Il y a bien sûr des éléments de preuve substantiels indiquant que certains troubles mentaux des individus sont causés par leurs relations avec les autres et que leur guérison (...) est grandement facilitée en traitant le groupe, tel que la famille, comme un tout. Malgré cela, il y a eu beaucoup moins de travail conceptuel visant à définir ce que cela pourrait être pour un couple, une famille ou un autre groupe que de se voir attribuer un trouble mental. Pour traiter de cette question, j’utilise un débat entre Wakefield et Murphy et Woolfolk sur la question de savoir s’il fait partie du concept de trouble mental que celui-ci soit causé par une dysfonction interne de la personne. Je discute aussi de la proposition faite par Bolton d’abandonner complètement le concept de trouble mental et d’utiliser plutôt le concept, plus large, de problème de santé mentale. Je soutiens qu’en fin de compte le caractère individuel des troubles mentaux ne constitue pas une vérité conceptuelle a priori, et qu’il faut faire intervenir des considérations pragmatiques pour décider s’il est utile de nous limiter à une telle définition ou si nous pourrions être mieux servis par une définition plus extensive. Je fais le lien avec le pragmatisme et je soutiens qu’une approche pluraliste non réductive est particulièrement appropriée en pédopsychiatrie.I critically explore the assumption of the DSM and theorists such as Wakefield and Gert that mental disorder must be attributed to an individual rather than a group of people. This assumption is especially problematic in child and adolescent psychiatry where very often the focus of clinical attention is the family system. There is of course substantial evidence that some mental disorders of individuals are caused by their relationships with other people and that their recovery is greatly facilitated by treating the group, such as a family, as a whole. However, there has been much less conceptual work on defining what it might be for a couple, family or other group to itself be attributed a mental disorder. To address this issue, I employ a debate between Wakefield , Murphy and Woolfolk on whether it is part of the concept of a mental disorder that it is caused by an internal malfunction of a person. I also discuss the proposal of Bolton that we do away with the concept of mental disorder altogether and instead use a broader concept of mental health problem. I argue that ultimately it is not an a priori conceptual truth that mental disorders are individual, and we need to bring in pragmatic considerations to decide whether it is helpful to restrict ourselves to such a definition or whether we could be better served by a more expansive definition. I link this to the philosophical view of pragmatism and argue that a pluralistic nonreductive approach is especially appropriate in child and adolescent psychiatry. (shrink)

In Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque, René Girard attempts to explain how desire has been depicted in different European novels. According to Girard, the lesser novelists have retracted to some kind of romantic worldview in their description of human relationships. While the “romantic writer” does not see that desires are mediated by other people’s desires, and instead describes desire as object-related, linear, and devoid of any ongoing mimetic contagion, a number of novelists, are, nonetheless, able to reveal the illusion of (...) romantic desire. In Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, the author tries to peer into the desires that govern Emma Bovary's relentless search for a romantic life.... (shrink)

På husmuren i Rue Jussieu, hvor et af Paris' universiteter holder til, kan man læse følgende grafitiske memento: La femme comme objet sexuel est le point noir de l'humanite.

This article reviews suggestions for how ethical tools are to be evaluated and argues that the concept of ethical soundness as presented by Kaiser et al. is unhelpful. Instead, it suggests that the quality of an ethical tool is determined by how well it achieves its assigned purpose. Those are different for different tools, and the article suggests a categorization of such tools into three groups. For all ethical tools, it identifies comprehensiveness and user-friendliness as crucial. For tools that have (...) reaching a decision in a democratic context as a main purpose, it identifies transparency, guiding users toward a decision and justification of the decision-supporting mechanism. For tools that aim to engage the public, it identifies procedural fairness as essential. It also notes that the scope of use for ethical tools is limited to the same moral community, and that this feature is frequently overlooked. (shrink)

Cusanus, Abstract As a rule Cusanus is interpreted in a theological way, under strong theological presuppositions and within the range of religion. This may be quite understandable since he was a cardinal and had important functions in the Papal States. But, what are the results, when we read his texts under pure philosophical conditions? We may see then that some of his texts are meant neither to assert a belief nor to search for reasons for it, but only to reflect (...) upon the presuppositions of this belief and its different traditions. Instead of asserting his belief Cusanus is beginning to reflect upon his presupositions. We try to give an exemple for this shift with the first proposition in the collection of propositions that follow the dialog De non aliud: „definitio quae se et omnia definit, ea est, quae per omnem mentem quaeritur.“ We will see a quite another Cusanus. Cusanus picks up „definitio“ in the sense of self-determination, developped in the dialog. He begins in quite a traditional manner and ends in a supremely abstract and speculative intuition. The 'Not-other' determines itself in a vision; this vision is an order in which every thing gets its proper place; we as human beings aspire to repeat this vision in our mental life in contact with the world. In this way Cusanus does what all great philosophers do: he reflects in a given set of opinions what is the meaning of „to be“. (shrink)

Objective The objective of this article is to provide an ethical analysis of a high-risk, advanced treatment case where the patient received transcatheter aortic valve insertion, for aortic valve stenosis. Particular emphasis will be placed upon the significance of evidence and the implications for priority setting. Method One paradigmatic case involving a TAVI patient from a large university hospital in Norway is described and analysed. The method used was ethical case analysis modified after Kymlicka by Miljeteig et al. Perioperative mortality (...) risk was estimated using the Euroscore risk-logarithm and the Society of Thoracic Surgeons’ risk model, STS. These predict the risk of operative mortality and morbidity associated with adult cardiac surgery. GRADE, the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation, was used to evaluate the evidence. Results In the case analysis, we found that it would be ethically justifiable not to recommend TAVI treatment for this patient. Although the patient had a severe condition in need of treatment, the expected improvement was marginal, the quality of evidence was low and the opportunity costs for other patients and society were higher than usually deemed appropriate. Conclusions Decision-making in the absence of high quality evidence from randomized trials is a complex process involving difficult ethical judgments. Novel high-risk devices often enter the European market with limited clinical evidence. Transparency and improved clinical evaluation are required so patient safety is not jeopardized. We argue that implementation of high risk, high cost interventions should be better regulated at a national level. Background All clinical decisions imply priority setting and therefore indirectly affect other patients and other patient groups. The use of expensive, innovative health technologies has an affect on individual patients as well as on other patient groups competing for the same resources. (shrink)

Quaestio, Volume 20, Issue, Page 519-523, January 2020.

The doctrine of friendship with God is one of the most classical in the Christian tradition. Building on the teachings of the Fathers of the Church and of the Middle Ages, the Theology of the Siglo de Oro explored its meaning in greater depth, stimulated also by the Decree on Justification of the Council of Trent, which places this theme in the context of its reflection on grace. Outstanding among the authors of that epoch was the Jesuit, F. Toledo , (...) Master of the Roman College; the well-articulated reflection, which he offers in his Commentary on St. John examines in depth the relationship between friendship with God and the doctrine of Grace, and includes many ideas which are still of great value and interest for contemporary theology. (shrink)

Le bien-fondé de l’herméneutique d’Augustin dans son De doctrina christiana est d’ordre communautaire, plus qu’épistémologique. Occasion d’enseigner et d’apprendre, de se parler et de s’entendre, l’activité herméneutique se révèle toute désignée à la pratique de la charité; les médiations humaines qu’elle met en jeu, et qu’elle structure à l’intérieur d’un certain cadre éthique, sont propres à affermir les liens communautaires. Le De doctrina christiana veut promouvoir la double économie du sens et de l’amour. Il s’y essaie d’une manière originale, qui (...) trouve à se refléter et à se synthétiser dans son prologue, comme je me propose de le démontrer. (shrink)

After a methodological premise defining the state of the art as regards the relationship between Albert the Great and the Magistri Artium tradition on De anima, this article examines the second part of De unitate intellectus (ed. Coloniensis 1975), in which Albert expounds the rationes in contrarium to the thesis of the unicity of the intellect. In parallel, an analysis is conducted of the Sed contra section of q. 77 (membr. III), tract. XIII, pars II, of the Summa Theologiae (ed. (...) Borgnet 1895). Beginning with an examination of the formal structure of these sections from the two works and a detailed survey of some of the rationes laid out therein, the article highlights both the aspects common to the two redactions and those which most distinguish them, so as to formulate some hypotheses regarding the reasons and methods behind this reworking carried out by Albert. (shrink)

In the commentary on the Isagoge ascribed to John Pagus, one of the major figures in the mid-thirteenth century Parisian Faculty of Arts, we encounter a statement according to which uniuersale per continentiam et ambitum is the sort of universal that is relevant in the context of the Porphyrian question about the ontological status of genera and species. The aim of this article is to decode this enigmatic phrase. We proceed in two steps, first examining some thirteenth-century texts in which (...) this phrase is found, and second providing a careful analysis and original interpretation of decisive passages in Pagus’ commentary. By means of this hermeneutical analysis, we develop a more precise understanding of the nature and significance of the realist teaching about universals, which was promoted by the vast majority of mid-thirteenth-century Latin thinkers. (shrink)