While Einstein considered that sub specie astern the correct philosophical position regarding geometry was that of the conventionality of geometry, he felt that provisionally it was necessary to adopt a non-conventional stance that he called practical geometry. here we will make the case that even when adopting Einstein’s views we must conclude that practical geometry is conventional after all. Einstein missed the fact that the conventionality of simultaneity leads to a conventional element in the (...) chrono-geometry, since it corresponds to the possibility of different space-time metrics. (shrink)

The conventionality of simultaneity thesis as established by Reichenbach and Grünbaum is related to the partial freedom in the definition of simultaneity in an inertial reference frame. An apparently altogether different issue is that of the conventionality of spatial geometry, or more generally the conventionality of chronogeometry when taking also into account the conventionality of the uniformity of time. Here we will consider Einstein’s version of the conventionality of geometry, according to which we (...) might adopt a different spatial geometry and a particular definition of equality of successive time intervals. The choice of a particular chronogeometry would not imply any change in a theory, since its “physical part” can be changed in a way that, regarding experimental results, the theory is the same. Here, we will make the case that the conventionality of simultaneity is closely related to Einstein’s conventionality of chronogeometry, as another conventional element leading to it. (shrink)

The existence of fields besides gravitation may provide us with a way to decide empirically whether spacetime is really a nonflat Riemannian manifold or a flat Minkowskian manifold that appears curved as a result of gravitational distortions. This idea is explained using a modification of Poincaré's famous 'diskworld'.

There is a venerable position in the philosophy of space and time that holds that the geometry of spacetime is conventional, provided one is willing to postulate a “universal force field.” Here we ask a more focused question, inspired by this literature: in the context of our best classical theories of space and time, if one understands “force” in the standard way, can one accommodate different geometries by postulating a new force field? We argue that the answer depends on (...) one’s theory. In Newtonian gravitation the answer is yes; in relativity theory, it is no. (shrink)

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What if gravity satisfied the Klein-Gordon equation? Both particle physics from the 1920s-30s and the 1890s Neumann-Seeliger modification of Newtonian gravity with exponential decay suggest considering a "graviton mass term" for gravity, which is _algebraic_ in the potential. Unlike Nordström's "massless" theory, massive scalar gravity is strictly special relativistic in the sense of being invariant under the Poincaré group but not the 15-parameter Bateman-Cunningham conformal group. It therefore exhibits the whole of Minkowski space-time structure, albeit only indirectly concerning volumes. Massive (...) scalar gravity is plausible in terms of relativistic field theory, while violating most interesting versions of Einstein's principles of general covariance, general relativity, equivalence, and Mach. Geometry is a poor guide to understanding massive scalar gravity: matter sees a conformally flat metric due to universal coupling, but gravity also sees the rest of the flat metric in the mass term. What is the 'true' geometry, one might wonder, in line with Poincaré's modal conventionality argument? Infinitely many theories exhibit this bimetric 'geometry,' all with the total stress-energy's trace as source; thus geometry does not explain the field equations. The irrelevance of the Ehlers-Pirani-Schild construction to a critique of conventionalism becomes evident when multi-geometry theories are contemplated. Much as Seeliger envisaged, the smooth massless limit indicates underdetermination of theories by data between massless and massive scalar gravities---indeed an unconceived alternative. At least one version easily could have been developed before General Relativity; it then would have motivated thinking of Einstein's equations along the lines of Einstein's newly re-appreciated "physical strategy" and particle physics and would have suggested a rivalry from massive spin 2 variants of General Relativity. The Putnam-Grünbaum debate on conventionality is revisited with an emphasis on the broad modal scope of conventionalist views. Massive scalar gravity thus contributes to a historically plausible rational reconstruction of much of 20th-21st century space-time philosophy in the light of particle physics. An appendix reconsiders the Malament-Weatherall-Manchak conformal restriction of conventionality and constructs the 'universal force' influencing the causal structure. Subsequent works will discuss how massive gravity could have provided a template for a more Kant-friendly space-time theory that would have blocked Moritz Schlick's supposed refutation of synthetic _a priori_ knowledge, and how Einstein's false analogy between the Neumann-Seeliger-Einstein modification of Newtonian gravity and the cosmological constant \Lambda generated lasting confusion that obscured massive gravity as a conceptual possibility. (shrink)

The issue of the conventionality of geometry is considered in the light of the special theory of relativity. The consequences of Minkowski's insights into the ontology of special relativity are elaborated. Several logically distinct senses of "conventionalism" and "realism" are distinguished, and it is argued that the special theory vindicates some of these possible positions but not others. The significance of the usual distinction between relativity and conventionality is discussed. Finally, it is argued that even though the (...) spatial metric within an inertial reference frame is euclidean, it is impossible to define unique objects which can serve as the relativistic surrogates of the spatial points of classical geometry. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze three artificial examples of empirical equivalence: van Fraassen’s alternative formulations of Newton’s theory, the Poincaré-Reichenbach argument for the conventionality of geometry; and predictively equivalent ‘systems of the world’. These examples have received attention in the philosophy of science literature because they are supposed to illustrate the connection between predictive equivalence and underdetermination of theory choice. I conclude that this view is wrong. These examples of empirical equivalence are harmless with respect to the problem (...) of underdetermination. (shrink)

As Max Jammer has rightly said, contemporary discussion of the metrical properties of space have been dominated in recent years by the work of Adolf Grünbaum. One of Grünbaum's most important essays in this area, "Geometry, Chronometry and Empiricism" is reprinted in its entirety as the first chapter of this work. The third and final chapter is a lengthy reply to Hilary Putnam who published a critique of Grünbaum's original essay in 1963. Putnam's criticisms have not led Grünbaum to (...) substantially change his views but they have provided the means for some clarification and extension of those views, e.g., with respect to the notions of congruence and conventionality and in relation to Zeno's paradoxes, color attributes, and other topics. Between the original essay and the lengthy reply to Putnam there is a shorter chapter which deals with, among other things, the hypothesis that everything has doubled overnight, a related topic to which Grünbaum has given some attention in journal articles. It is safe to say that persons concerned with the problem of conventionalism and other philosophical problems about space will have to work their way through this important book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

As Max Jammer has rightly said, contemporary discussion of the metrical properties of space have been dominated in recent years by the work of Adolf Grünbaum. One of Grünbaum's most important essays in this area, "Geometry, Chronometry and Empiricism" is reprinted in its entirety as the first chapter of this work. The third and final chapter is a lengthy reply to Hilary Putnam who published a critique of Grünbaum's original essay in 1963. Putnam's criticisms have not led Grünbaum to (...) substantially change his views but they have provided the means for some clarification and extension of those views, e.g., with respect to the notions of congruence and conventionality and in relation to Zeno's paradoxes, color attributes, and other topics. Between the original essay and the lengthy reply to Putnam there is a shorter chapter which deals with, among other things, the hypothesis that everything has doubled overnight, a related topic to which Grünbaum has given some attention in journal articles. It is safe to say that persons concerned with the problem of conventionalism and other philosophical problems about space will have to work their way through this important book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Nature seems to be such that we can describe it accurately with quantum theories of bosons and fermions alone, without resort to parastatistics. This has been seen as a deep mystery: paraparticles make perfect physical sense, so why don’t we see them in nature? We consider one potential answer: every paraparticle theory is physically equivalent to some theory of bosons or fermions, making the absence of paraparticles in our theories a matter of convention rather than a mysterious empirical discovery. We (...) argue that this equivalence thesis holds in all physically admissible quantum field theories falling under the domain of the rigorous Doplicher–Haag–Roberts approach to superselection rules. Inadmissible parastatistical theories are ruled out by a locality-inspired principle we call charge recombination. 1 Introduction2 Paraparticles in Quantum Theory3 Theoretical Equivalence3.1 Field systems in algebraic quantum field theory3.2 Equivalence of field systems4 A Brief History of the Equivalence Thesis4.1 The Green decomposition4.2 Klein transformations4.3 The argument of Drühl, Haag, and Roberts4.4 The Doplicher–Roberts reconstruction theorem5 Sharpening the Thesis6 Discussion6.1 Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics6.2 Structuralism and haecceities6.3 Paraquark theories. (shrink)

The representational theory of measurement provides a collection of results that specify the conditions under which an attribute admits of numerical representation. The original architects of the theory interpreted the formalism operationally and explicitly acknowledged that some aspects of their representations are conventional. There have been a number of recent efforts to reinterpret the formalism to arrive at a more metaphysically robust account of physical quantities. In this paper we argue that the conventional elements of the representations afforded by the (...) representational theory of measurement require careful scrutiny as one moves toward such an interpretation. To illustrate why, we show that there is a sense in which the very number system in which one represents a physical quantity such as mass or length is conventional. We argue that this result does not undermine the project of reinterpreting the representational theory of measurement for metaphysical purposes in general, but it does undermine a certain class of inferences about the nature of physical quantities that some have been tempted to draw. (shrink)

In his first paper on the special theory of relativity, Einstein indicated that the question of whether or not two spatially separated events were simultaneous did not necessarily have a definite answer, but instead depended on the adoption of a convention for its resolution. Some later writers have argued that Einstein's choice of a convention is, in fact, the only possible choice within the framework of special relativistic physics, while others have maintained that alternative choices, although perhaps less convenient, are (...) indeed possible. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Philosophy of PhysicsMartin CurdRoberto Torretti. The Philosophy of Physics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xvi + 512. Cloth, $64.95. Paper, $23.95.This is the first volume in a new Cambridge series, "The Evolution of Modern Philosophy." It is a historical work, tracing the interaction between physics and philosophy from the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century through general relativity and quantum mechanics in the twentieth century. The (...) emphasis is on the philosophy in physics (rather than philosophizing about physics) and, with the exceptions noted below, the focus is on scientists (scientist-philosophers in many cases) rather than philosophers outside of science. Most of the book is about the conceptual and mathematical development of the core branches of physics (mainly mechanics, but also geometry, thermodynamics, and field theory). There are seven chapters plus three supplements giving the mathematical essentials of vector analysis, lattice theory, and topology.The hero of chapter one is Galileo who, more than anyone else prior to Newton, set physics on its modern path towards mathematization and away from Aristotle. Also discussed in chapter one are Descartes, Huyghens, and Leibniz. Chapter two is devoted to Newton (both the foundations of Newtonian mechanics and the derivation of the law of universal gravitation) and follows the development of analytical mechanics up to Lagrange and Hamilton. Chapter three, appropriately entitled "Kant," is the only chapter devoted to a philosopher. After a brief discussion of Leibniz, Berkeley, and Kant's pre-critical writings, it covers the important scientific topics in the Critique of Pure Reason (space, time, the three Analogies) but avoids the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (referring the reader to Michael Friedman's Kant and the Exact Sciences). Chapter four looks at scientific developments in three areas that proved to be important for twentieth-century physics: non-Euclidean geometry from Lobachevsky to Riemann, electromagnetic field theory (Maxwell), and thermal physics (classical thermodynamics, the kinetic theory, and statistical mechanics) from Carnot to Boltzmann. The chapter concludes, somewhat untidily, with a section on four philosophers of science (Whewell, Peirce, Mach, and Duhem), selected, we are told, because of their influence on philosophy of science in the second half of the twentieth century. (For the "two great philosopher-scientists" Helmholtz and Poincaré, the reader is referred to Torretti's earlier books, Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincaré, and Relativity and Geometry.) Chapter five covers both the special and general theory of relativity. After a masterful exposition of the special theory and its Minkowski spacetime representation, the usual topics of philosophical interest are discussed; these include the conventionality of simultaneity thesis, the twin paradox, the relativistic concept of mass, and determinism. The rather brief treatment of the general theory is, unavoidably, mathematically demanding and carries the subject through to recent inflationary cosmological models. Chapter six (also mathematically demanding at times) examines the development and structure of quantum mechanics, aptly praised as "one of the most elegant creations of the human spirit" (340). Torretti wisely ignores the complexities of quantum field theory since the philosophical problems discussed—measurement, the EPR paradox, the interpretation of the y-function—remain when quantum mechanics is made Lorentz invariant; but he urges philosophers of science to follow the lead of Michael Redhead and [End Page 602] Paul Teller in exploring its metaphysical ramifications. Of special note are the author's trenchant criticisms of attempts to solve the quantum mysteries by Bohr (complementarity), Bohm (hidden variables), Putnam (quantum logic), and Everett (the many worlds interpretation). The book concludes with the author's reflections on issues in the philosophy of science. Torretti defends the structuralist explication of physical theories (more familiarly known as the semantic conception or the model-theoretic view) that informs much of his book, arguing that it succeeds where the "received view" of logical empiricism failed while avoiding Kuhnian incommensurability—"a pseudoproblem that made philosophy of science the laughing stock of practicing physicists" (404). The chapter ends with an attack on inductive logic: "one of the blindest alleys in twentieth-century philosophy" (437).The writing is admirably clear and the author has done a commendable job of explaining the arguments of historical scientists while presenting their theories in a clear... (shrink)

Lewis sender‐receiver games illustrate how a meaningful term language might evolve from initially meaningless random signals (Lewis 1969; Skyrms 2006). Here we consider how a meaningful language with a primitive grammar might evolve in a somewhat more subtle sort of game. The evolution of such a language involves the co‐evolution of partitions of the physical world into what may seem, at least from the perspective of someone using the language, to correspond to canonical natural kinds. While the evolved language may (...) allow for the sort of precise representation that is required for successful coordinated action and prediction, the apparent natural kinds reflected in its structure may be purely conventional. This has both positive and negative implications for the limits of naturalized metaphysics. (shrink)

본 연구는 기하학에 대한 구조-구성주의 인식론을 정당화하는 것이다. 즉 구조주의와 구성주의를 융합하는 필자의 고유한 인식론으로 기하학적 인식의 본성을 해명하는 것이다. 그러나 현재의 연구는 이러한 큰 주제에 접근하기 위한 예비적 연구로서 칸트의 기하학적 직관 개념에 대한 역사-비판적 분석을 제공하는 데 한정된다. 잘 알려져 있는 것처럼, 칸트는 수학적 인식, 특히 기하학적 인식을 위해서 직관이 핵심적으로 중요하다고 주장했다. 그런데 칸트가 말하는 기하학적 인식을 위한 직관의 역할이 무엇인지는 여전히 논쟁적이다. 이점과 관련해서 역사적으로 대립적인 두 가지 해석이 있다. 하나는 베스(E. Beth), 힌티카(J. Hintikka), 프리드만(M. Fridman) (...) 등으로 이어지는 논리적 해석이며, 다른 하나는 파슨스(Parsons)와 칼슨(E. Carson)에 의해 제공된 현상학적 해석이다. 이에 필자는 특히 프리드만과 칼슨의 논쟁을 중심으로 두 해석의 내용을 재구성하고, 다음에 두 해석의 종합 가능성을 해명하고자 한다. 이를 위해 헬름홀츠-피아제의 인식론, 즉 “군 이론”에 근거한 새로운 구성주의 인식론을 제안할 것이다. 그러나 본고에서는 1차적 근사의 차원에서 그 개략적 구조만을 소개하는 데 만족하고, 종합의 구체적 내용인, 헬름홀츠-피아제의 공간 인식론에 근거한 구조-구성주의 공간 이론은 다른 지면에서 전개될 것이다. (shrink)

I examine the development of Reichenbach's ideas concerning the conventionality of simultaneity in connection with his ``epsilon''-definition of simultaneity. It does not appear that he ever considered non-standard choices of ``epsilon'' that yield the same ``light-geometry'' as that of special relativity. Rather, it appears he believed that non-standard choices, though always epistemically justified, lead to different ``light-geometries'' (e.g., classical space-time) and thus would necessitate more complicated ``matter axioms'' than those postulated in his axiomatization of relativity.

After describing a new method of synchronizing spatially separated clocks by means of clock transport, this paper discusses the philosophical import of the existence of such methods, including those of Ellis and Bowman and of Bridgman, with special reference to the Ellis-Bowman claim that "the thesis of the coventionality of distant simultaneity... is thus either trivialized or refuted." I argue that the physical facts do not support this philosophical conclusion, and that a substantial part of their argument against Reichenbach, in (...) particular, is misdirected. Finally, I suggest that Ellis and Bowman employ seriously unclear notions of triviality and "good physical reasons" that tend to obscure rather than clarify the basic philosophical issues. An objective criterion of nontriviality of conventions is advanced. (shrink)

Does geometry constitues a core set of intuitions present in all humans, regarless of their language or schooling ? We used two non verbal tests to probe the conceptual primitives of geometry in the Munduruku, an isolated Amazonian indigene group. Our results provide evidence for geometrical intuitions in the absence of schooling, experience with graphic symbols or maps, or a rich language of geometrical terms.

Derrida's introduction to his French translation of Husserl's essay "The Origin of Geometry," arguing that although Husserl privileges speech over writing in an account of meaning and the development of scientific knowledge, this privilege is in fact unstable.

The language game approach has recently been adopted to explore the conventionalization of linguistic knowledge in a social environment. Most contemporary studies focus on the dynamics of language games in random or predefined social networks, but neglect the reverse roles of communicative constraints in language evolution and social structures. This article, based on two forms of language games , examines whether a simple, distance-based communicative constraint can affect the conventionalization of linguistic knowledge. The study bridges the gap between random networks (...) and complex social structures, and illustrates that the internal properties of language games can influence the effects of communicative constraints and social structures. (shrink)

The logical positivists adopted Poincare's doctrine of the conventionality of geometry and made it a key part of their philosophical interpretation of relativity theory. I argue, however, that the positivists deeply misunderstood Poincare's doctrine. For Poincare's own conception was based on the group-theoretical picture of geometry expressed in the Helmholtz-Lie solution of the space problem, and also on a hierarchical picture of the sciences according to which geometry must be presupposed be any properly physical theory. But (...) both of this pictures are entirely incompatible with the radically new conception of space and geometry articulated in the general theory of relativity. The logical positivists's attempt to combine Poincare's conventionalism with Einstein's new theory was therefore, in the end, simply incoherent. Underlying this problem, moreover, was a fundamental philosophical difference between Poincare's and the positivists concerning the status of synthetic a priori truths. (shrink)

An important epistemological lesson can be learned from the impossibility to determine the one-way velocity of light and the immediate implication that simultaneity is conventional. The vicious circle -- to determine whether two distant events are simultaneous we need to know the one-way velocity of light between them, but to determine the one-way velocity of light we need to know that the two events are simultaneous -- is an indication of the need for a profound change of our view on (...) reality. (shrink)

A review of Roberto Torretti's book, "Philosophy of Geometry from Riemann to Poincare.".

The aim of this paper is to introduce Wittgenstein’s concept of the form of a language into geometry and to show how it can be used to achieve a better understanding of the development of geometry, from Desargues, Lobachevsky and Beltrami to Cayley, Klein and Poincaré. Thus this essay can be seen as an attempt to rehabilitate the Picture Theory of Meaning, from the Tractatus. Its basic idea is to use Picture Theory to understand the pictures of (...) class='Hi'>geometry. I will try to show, that the historical evolution of geometry can be interpreted as the development of the form of its language. This confrontation of the Picture Theory with history of geometry sheds new light also on the ideas of Wittgenstein. (shrink)

In this paper the classical topic of “conventionality” in defining the simultaneity (or synchrony) of distant events is tackled again, and the validity of Reichenbach's view is carefully circumscribed. In particular, the role of “one-way” assumptions in the foundations of special relativity is emphasized. The restriction by the round-trip isotropy condition on the admissible distance functions in inertial frames is studied, and its relevance to several issues (absolute simultaneity, the interpretation of Michelson–Morley type experiments, the self-measured speed of a (...) clock) is shown. Two “clock transport” synchronizations in an inertial frame, using self-measured speed and “proper distance,” are presented in detail, and the agreement of the synchronies so established with standard synchrony is proven to be non- circular. By assuming a reasonable concept of “convention” this result is shown to dissolve several objections by supporters of a strong version of conventionalism. Throughout, a number of common misapprehensions in the literature are pointed out. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

As emphasized by Milne, an observer ultimately depends on the transmission and reception of light signals for the measurement of natural lengths and periods remote from his world point. The laws of geometry which are obeyed when these lengths and periods are plotted on a space-time depend, inevitably, on assumptions concerning the dependence of light velocity on the spatial and temporal coordinates. A convention regarding light velocity fixes the geometry, and conversely. However, the convention of flat space-time implies (...) nonintegrable “radar distances” unless the concept of coordinate-dependent units of measure is employed. Einstein's space-time has the advantage of admitting a special reference system $\hat R$ with respect to which the aether fluid is at rest and the total gravitational field vanishes. A holonomic transformation from $\hat R$ to another reference systemR belonging to the same space-time introduces a nonpermanent gravitational field and holonomic aether motion. A nonholonomic transformation from $\hat R$ to a reference systemR* which belongs to a different space-time introduces a permanent gravitational field and nonholonomic aether motion. The arbitrariness of geometry is expressed by extending covariance to include the latter transformation. By means of a nonholonomic (or units) transformation it is possible, with the aid of the principle of equivalence, to obtain the Schwarzschild and de Sitter metrics from the Newtonian fields that would arise in a flat space-time description. Some light is thrown on the interpretation of cosmological models. (shrink)

The work of David R. Lachterman, The Ethics of Geometry, subtitled A Genealogy of Modernity, concerns essentially the status of geometry in Euclid’s Elements and in Descartes’s Geometry. It is a remarkable work, at once by the declared breadth of its ambitions and by the very great precision of its analyses, which are always supported by a prodigious philosophical culture. David Lachterman’s concern is to grasp, by way of an in-depth commentary of certain, particularly crucial passages of (...) these two foundational works, the change in geometry’s status from the one to the other, and this, as a sort of symptom of what the Moderns, since Descartes, will always experience as a necessary, inaugural rupture with regard to tradition. This change is underlaid, according to the author, by a profound change in the philosophical ethos, and in particular, in the geometer’s ethos. One must understand ethos, Lachterman explains, in the manner of Aristotle: those characteristic means that human beings have by which to act in the world or to behave in relation to one another, or to themselves. There is thus an “ethics” of geometry, namely, in the manner and the style of doing geometry, of behaving as a mathematician both toward apprentices and toward the veritable nature of the “entities” which are to be taught or learnt, and which give their discipline its name. That there is a difference of ethos between Euclid and Descartes implies, according to Lachterman, that there is also a difference in the source of intelligibility of the “mathematical,” understood in the most general sense. This in turn implies a deeper difference in the mode of being in general: it suffices to note that, in the ancient case, the source of intelligibility of the geometric figure lies in the nature of the figure itself, and that in the modern case, the same source is found in the “strategies” and “tactics” suited to bringing the figure to its visibility or to its embodiment, 315 in order to notice that this change in the mode of access to intelligibility must have had profound repercussions upon philosophical thought. It is in this sense that the author’s design is also, at the same time, not genetic, but genealogical. The break between ancient and modern mathematics pleas in favor of a consideration of the rupture of modern thought relative to ancient thought; thus, implicitly—and it is one of the great merits of this book that it shows this—against all homogenizing levelling, in Heidegger’s fashion, of the history of thought down to the history of “the” discipline of metaphysics. If there is something Heideggerian, in the best sense of the term, in Lachterman’s way of considering ethos as coextensive with modes of being, there is, on the other hand, and we ought to be very glad of it, something anti-Heideggerian in his original manner of bringing out the effective novelty of modern thought. For, according to him, modern thought is no longer to be defined, explicitly or exclusively, by the so-called “metaphysics of subjectivity.” Instead, it is defined by a self-regulated, operative, and constructive productivity of thought—and this as much with regard to itself as to its objects. To put it briefly, whereas ancient thought is rather polarized by the logico-eidetic, modern thought is polarized by a sort of methodical constructivism, the status of which is, in reality, very complex. If Descartes speaks of “the construction of a problem,” while Leibniz speaks of the “construction of an equation,” and Kant of the “construction of a concept,” everything depends—as we might guess—upon the multiple meanings that the term ‘construction’ may take on. Is it to be taken in the sense of an absolute creation, a quasi ex nihilo creation, which would render mathematics divine? Is it the creation of artefacts, or again, is it the methodical exploration of problems posed to thought by the existence of objects or corresponding ideas, themselves supposed to be somewhere in the divine understanding? We already discern the breadth and the depth of the debate, and we sense that the essential will be played out in Lachterman’s commentaries on the famous Cartesian solution of the problem of Pappus—the birth certificate, as we know, of analytic geometry. (shrink)

Kant’s three Analogies of Experience, in his Critique of Pure Reason, represent a highly condensed attempt to establish the metaphysical foundations of Newtonian physics. His strategy is to show that the organization of experience in terms of a world of enduring substances undergoing mutual causal interaction is a necessary condition of the temporal ordering even of one’s own subjective states, and thus of coherent experience itself. In his Third Analogy—an examination of the necessary conditions of judgments of simultaneous existence—he argues (...) that certain conceptual presuppositions consistent with Newtonian physics are necessary to time-awareness. His argument, however, appears to be undermined by conventionalism in natural science generally, and by the conventionality of simultaneity in particular. In this paper I discuss Kant’s claims in light of contemporary relativity theory. I suggest that, while his project is obsolete in major respects, there may still be useful insights into time-awareness to be drawn from his work. (shrink)

The question to be addressed is, In what sense and to what extent do quantum statistics for, and the standard formal quantum-mechanical description of, systems of many identical particles entail that identical quantum particles are indistinguishable? This paper argues that whether or not we consider identical quantum particles as indistinguishable is a matter of theory choice underdetermined by logic and experiment.

In 1977, David Malament proved the valuable technical result that the simultaneity relation of standard synchrony $\epsilon=\frac{1}{2}$ with respect to an inertial observer O is uniquely definable in terms of the relation κ of causal connectibility. And he claimed that this definability undermines my own version of the conventionality of metrical simultaneity within an inertial frame.But Malament’s proof depends on the imposition of several supposedly “innocuous” constraints on any candidate for the simultaneity relation relative to O. Relying on Allen (...) I. Janis’s 1983 challenge to one of these constraints, I argue that Malament’s technical result did not undermine my philosophical construal of the ontological status of relative metrical simultaneity. Furthermore, I show that (a) Michael Friedman’s peremptorily substantivalist critique of my conception, which Malament endorses, is ill-founded, and (b) if Malament had succeeded in discrediting my own conventionalist version of metrical simultaneity, he would likewise have invalidated Einstein’s pioneering version of it. (shrink)

In this paper, I elucidate the main points involved in the question of the non-triviality of the conventionality of simultaneity within the kinematics of special relativity. I argue that there is an important distinction to be made between the inherited component and the sui generis component of the conventionality of simultaneity. The factual core of the kinematics of special relativity is explored, and it is shown that the Round-Trip Clock Retardation effect obtains if, and only if Winnie's Passage (...) Time Principle holds. Some consequences of this fundamental fact are then explored. In particular, Grunbaum's view that the epistemological conventionality of simultaneity is logically prior to the physical inter-frame relativity of simultaneity is found to be based largely on what I call the inherited component of the former. Finally, a question is raised as to the very self-consistency of the claim, made by Ellis and Bowman, that standard signal synchrony and slow-transport synchrony are logically independent. In some concluding remarks, the author's general agreement with Grunbaum's conception of bridled conventionalism is indicated. (shrink)

We take another look at Reichenbach’s 1920 conversion to conventionalism, with a special eye to the background of his ‘conventionality of distant simultaneity’ thesis. We argue that elements of Reichenbach earlier neo-Kantianism can still be discerned in his later work and, related to this, that his conventionalism should be seen as situated at the level of global theory choice. This is contrary to many of Reichenbach’s own statements, in which he declares that his conventionalism is a consequence of the (...) arbitrariness of coordinative definitions. (shrink)