The paper challenges William Alston’s argument against doxastic deontology, the view that we have epistemic duties concerning our beliefs. The core of the argument is that doxastic deontology requires voluntary control over our beliefs, which we do not have. The idea that doxastic deontology requires voluntary control is supposed to follow from the principle that ought implies can. The paper argues that this is wrong: in the OIC principle which regulates our doxastic duties the “can” does not stand for the (...) ability to shape our beliefs voluntarily. As an examination of everyday examples shows, it stands for cognitive competence, the reliable ability to acquire beliefs in compliance with the epistemic norms. The doxastic OIC principle asserts, in brief, that one is only obliged to believe something if one’s cognitive capacities are sufficiently strong. It is also explained why the doxastic duties do not require voluntary control as opposed to moral duties. This understanding of doxastic duties saves our everyday doxastic deontic judgments from Alston’s argument, but does not help the deontological conception of justification, which understands justification as not violating one’s epistemic duties. It actually provides another argument against the deontological conception: if the OIC regulating our doxastic duties is construed as suggested, the deontological conception of justification implies that one’s doxastic duties and, consequently, whether one’s belief is justified depend on one’s cognitive competence. Since cognitive competence varies from person to person, justification will not matter to truth and knowledge in the way epistemic justification is supposed to do. (shrink)

Several bioethicists have recently advocated the force-feeding of prisoners, based on the assumption that prisoners have reduced or no autonomy. This assumed lack of autonomy follows from a decrease in cognitive competence, which, in turn, supposedly derives from imprisonment and/or being on hunger strike. In brief, causal links are made between imprisonment or voluntary total fasting and mental disorders and between mental disorders and lack of cognitive competence. I engage the bioethicists that support force-feeding by severing both of (...) these causal links. Specifically, I refute the claims that VTF automatically and necessarily causes mental disorders such as depression, and that these mental disorders necessarily or commonly entail cognitive impairment. Instead, I critically review more nuanced approaches to assessing mental competence in hunger strikes, urging that a diagnosis of incompetence be made on a case-by-case basis—a position that is widely shared by the medical community. (shrink)

I review recent evidence that very young, pre-verbal infants attribute belief-like states when anticipating the behavior of others. This evidence is drawn from infant performance on non-verbal false belief tasks. I argue that, contrary to typical interpretations, such evidence does not show that infants attribute belief-like states. Rather, it shows that infants apply an enhanced version of what Gergely ( 2011 ) calls the “teleological stance” to brief bouts of behavior. This requires them to parse behavioral sequences into goals and (...) rationally/informationally-constrained means of achieving them; however, it does not require the attribution of unobservable mental states, like beliefs, that are causally responsible for behavior. (shrink)

School performance and cognitive competence can be conceptualized as social and relational constructs. Thus, we expect their association to vary as a function of other socially-embedded variables which have proven meaningful in the academic domain. The present study takes a critical theory approach to assess gender-related and contextual variability in the association between peer-assessed school performance and self-perceived cognitive competence. The sample consisted of 719 preadolescents living in lower- and upper-middle-class neighborhoods in Montreal, Canada and Barranquilla, Columbia. Multigroup (...) comparisons revealed that peer-assessed school competence was more strongly associated with self-perceived cognitive competence for upper-middle-class than lower-middle-class participants from Barranquilla, whereas the opposite pattern was observed with Montreal participants, and that the association between communal orientation and self-perceived cognitive competence was stronger for girls than for boys across the sample, especially in the upper-middle-class school in Montreal. These findings highlight the nuanced degree of gender differences in preadolescents’ perceived academic competence and emphasize the role of SES in shaping self-perceptions. (shrink)

This paper summarizes a theory of cognitive development and elaborates on its educational implications. The theory postulates that development occurs in cycles along multiple fronts. Cognitive competence in each cycle comprises a different profile of executive, inferential, and awareness processes, reflecting changes in developmental priorities in each cycle. Changes reflect varying needs in representing, understanding, and interacting with the world. Interaction control dominates episodic representation in infancy; attention control and perceptual awareness dominate in realistic representations in preschool; inferential (...) control and awareness dominate rule-based representation in primary school; truth and validity control and precise self-evaluation dominate in principle-based thought in adolescence. We demonstrate that the best predictors of school learning in each cycle are the cycle’s cognitive priorities. Also learning in different domains, e.g., language and mathematics, depends on an interaction between the general cognitive processes dominating in each cycle and the state of the representational systems associated with each domain. When a representational system is deficient, specific learning difficulties may emerge, e.g., dyslexia and dyscalculia. We also discuss the educational implications for evaluation and learning at school. (shrink)

This commentary questions the general assumptions concerning the cognitive value of analogical reasoning on which the argument developed by Leech et al. appears to rest. In order to better assess the findings of their meta-analysis, it shifts the perspective from development to evolution, and frames their concern within a broader issue.

There have been several recent attempts to think about psychological kinds as homologies. Nevertheless, there are serious epistemic challenges for individuating homologous psychological kinds, or cognitive homologies. Some of these challenges are revealed when we look at competing claims of cognitive homology. This paper considers two competing homology claims that compare human anger with putative aggression systems of nonhuman animals. The competition between these hypotheses has been difficult to resolve in part because of what I call the boundary (...) problem: boundaries between instances of psychological kinds (e.g., anger and fear) cannot be directly observed. Thus, there are distinctive difficulties for individuating psychological kinds across lineages. I draw four conclusions from this case study: First, recent evidence from the neuroscience of fear suggests that one of the proposed homologies involves a straightforward conflation of anger and fear. Second, this conflation arises because of the boundary problem. Third, there is an implicit constraint on the operational criteria that is easy to overlook in the psychological case. In this case, ignoring the constraint is part of the problem. Fourth, this is a clear case in which knowledge of homology cannot be accumulated piecemeal. Identifying homologs of human anger requires identifying homologs of fear. (shrink)

Cognitive archaeologists attempt to infer the cognitive and cultural features of past hominins and their societies from the material record. This task faces the problem of _minimum necessary competence_: as the most sophisticated thinking of ancient hominins may have been in domains that leave no archaeological signature, it is safest to assume that tool production and use reflects only the lower boundary of cognitive capacities. Cognitive archaeology involves selecting a model from the cognitive sciences and (...) then assessing some aspect of the material record through that lens. We give examples to show that background theoretical commitments in cognitive science that inform those models lead to different minimum necessary competence results. This raises an important question: what principles should guide us in selecting a model from the cognitive sciences? We outline two complementary responses to this question. The first involves using _independent_ lines of evidence to converge on a particular capacity. This can then influence model choice. The second is a broader suggestion. Theoretical diversity is a good thing in science, but is only beneficial over a limited amount of time. According to recent modelling work, one way of limiting diversity is to introduce extreme priors. We argue that having a broad spectrum of views in the philosophy of cognitive science may actually help cognitive archaeologists address the problem of minimum necessary competence. (shrink)

Barresi & Moore's account has at least two implications for moral psychology. First, it appears to provide support for cognitive theories of moral competence. Second, their claim that the development of social understanding depends upondomain-generalchanges in cognitive ability appears to oppose the idea that moral competence is under-pinned by a moral module.

The purpose of this study is to examine preservice Chinese language teachers’ cognition in teaching intercultural communicative competence. In the study we collected data through in-depth interviews with seven preservice teachers in a Master of Education program at a university in Hong Kong SAR, China. The findings indicated that the participants had a relatively positive attitude and inclination toward the development of students’ intercultural communicative competence, while their conceptualizations of culture tended to be static and ambiguous. In addition, the participants’ (...) objectives in teaching intercultural communicative competence were found to be more attitude-than knowledge- or skill-oriented. The study offers valuable insights that preservice language teachers’ cognition plays a crucial role in their future professional development and calls for curricular innovations with intercultural aims in teacher education programs. (shrink)

Theorizing about religious ritual systems from a cognitive viewpoint involves (1) modeling cognitive processes and their products and (2) demonstrating their influence on religious behavior. Particularly important for such an approach to the study of religious ritual is the modeling of participants' representations of ritual form. In pursuit of that goal, we presented in Rethinking Religion a theory of religious ritual form that involved two commitments. The theory’s first commitment is that the cognitive apparatus for the representation (...) of action in general is the same system deployed for the representation of religious ritual form. The differences between everyday action and religious ritual action turn out to be fairly minor from the standpoint of their cognitive representation. This system for the representation of action includes representations of agents. Whether we focus on an everyday action such as closing a door or a ritual action such as initiating a person into a religious group, our understanding of these forms of behavior as actions at all turns critically on recognizing agents. The theory's second crucial commitment (1990, p. 61) is that the roles of culturally postulated superhuman agents (CPS-agents hereafter) in participants' representations of religious rituals will prove pivotal in accounting for a wide variety of those rituals' properties. On our view religious ritual systems typically involve presumptions about CPS-agents. This theoretical commitment is orthogonal to the pervasive assumption throughout the study of religion that only meanings matter. By contrast, we hold that other things matter too (specifically, cognitive representations of religious ritual form). Large conflicts lurk behind the previous sentences but we cannot adequately address them here. For now we will only identify two of the most fundamental and comment on them briefly. First, amazingly (by our lights anyway), our claim that (conceptual) commitments to the existence of CPS-agents is the most important recurrent feature of religion across cultures is quite controversial.. (shrink)

underpinning of the cognitive sciences. I argue, however, that it often fails to provide adequate explanations, in particular in conjunction with competence theories. This failure originates in the idealizations in competence descriptions, which either ?block? the cascade, or produce a successful cascade which fails to explain cognition.

This research aimed to know the intercultural competency teaching model of Jesus using a parable technique based on Luke 10:25-37 to improve intercultural competence. The authors used a method of diacognitive analysis with three lenses that include dialogue, cognition and position. The results of the study have shown that the application of the parable technique can improve the competence of intercultural students towards people with different cultures, as well as increase the understanding and awareness that love is the basis of (...) intercultural competence, compassion as an internal outcome and must act as an intercultural agent. The teacher's pyramid model of intercultural competence moves from love, attitude, knowledge, skill, internal outcome, external outcome and becomes an intercultural agent.CONTRIBUTION: Research on Luke 10:25-37 has shown that the parable technique can improve students' intercultural competence based on love and compassion. Teachers can apply parable techniques to attract, encourage, and stimulate the student's active involvement to think critically and perform interpretations to discover the real truth in the context of cultural differences. (shrink)

While translation competence assessment has been playing an increasingly facilitating role in translation teaching and learning, it still failed to offer fine-grained diagnostic feedback based on certain reliable translation competence standards. As such, this study attempted to investigate the feasibility of providing diagnostic information about students’ translation competence by integrating China’s Standards of English with cognitive diagnostic assessment approaches. Under the descriptive parameter framework of CSE translation scales, an attribute pool was established, from which seven attributes were identified based (...) on students’ and experts’ think-aloud protocols. A checklist comprising 20 descriptors was developed from CSE translation scales, with which 458 students’ translation responses were rated by five experts. In addition, a Q-matrix was established by seven experts. By comparing the diagnostic performance of four widely-used cognitive diagnostic models, linear logistic model was selected as the optimal model to generate fine-grained information about students’ translation strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, relationships among translation competence attributes were discovered and diagnostic results were shown to differ across high and low proficiency groups. The findings can provide insights for translation teaching, learning and assessment. (shrink)

Nonhuman primates represent the most significant extant species for comparative studies of cognition, including such complex phenomena as numerical competence, among others. Studies of numerical skills in monkeys and apes have a long, though somewhat sparse history, although questions for current empirical studies remain of great interest to several fields, including comparative, developmental, and cognitive psychology; anthropology; ethology; and philosophy, to name a few. In addition to demonstrated similarities in complex information processing, empirical studies of a variety of potential (...) cognitive limitations or constraints have provided insights into similarities and differences across the primate order, and continue to offer theoretical and pragmatic directions for future research. An historical overview of primate numerical studies is presented, as well as a summary of the 17‐year research history, including recent findings, of the Comparative Cognition Project at The Ohio State University Chimpanzee Center. Overall, the archival literature on number‐related skills and counting in nonhuman primates offers important implications for revising our thinking about comparative neuroanatomy, cross‐species (human/ape) cognitive similarities and differences, and the evolution of cognition represented by the primate continuum. (shrink)

There are currently considerable confusion and disarray about just how we should view computationalism, connectionism and dynamicism as explanatory frameworks in cognitive science. A key source of this ongoing conflict among the central paradigms in cognitive science is an equivocation on the notion of computation simpliciter. ‘Computation’ is construed differently by computationalism, connectionism, dynamicism and computational neuroscience. I claim that these central paradigms, properly understood, can contribute to an integrated cognitive science. Yet, before this claim can be (...) defended, a better understanding of ‘computation’ is required. ‘Digital computation’ is an ambiguous concept. It is not just the classical dichotomy between analogue and digital computation that is the basis for the equivocation on ‘computation’ simpliciter in cognitive science, but also the diversity of extant accounts of digital computation. There are many answers on what it takes for a system to perform digital computation. Answers to this problem range from Turing machine computation, through the formal manipulation of symbols, the execution of algorithms and others, to the strong-pancomputational thesis, according to which every physical system computes every Turing-computable function. Despite some overlap among them, extant accounts of concrete digital computation are non-equivalent, thus, rendering ‘digital computation’ ambiguous. The objective of this dissertation is twofold. First, it is to promote a clearer understanding of concrete digital computation. Accordingly, my main thesis is that not only are extant accounts of concrete digital computation non-equivalent, but most of them are inadequate. I show that these accounts are not just intensionally different (this is quite trivially the case), but also extensionally distinct. In the course of examining several key accounts of concrete digital computation, I propose the instructional information processing account, according to which digital computation is the processing of discrete data in accordance with finite instructional information. The second objective is to establish the foundational role of computation in cognitive science whilst rejecting the purported representational nature of computation. (shrink)

Mind &Language, Volume 34, Issue 3, Page 357-375, June 2019.

To measure non-cognitive facets of competence, we developed and tested a new method that we refer to as Embedded Experience Sampling (EES). Domain-specific problem-solving competence is a multi-faceted construct that is not limited to cognitive facets such as domain knowledge or problem-solving strategies but also comprises non-cognitive facets in the sense of domain-specific emotional and motivational dispositions such as interest and self-concept. However, in empirical studies non-cognitive facets are usually either neglected or measured by generalized self-report (...) questionnaires that are detached from the performance assessment. To enable an integrated measurement, we developed the EES method to collect data on non-cognitive facets during scenario-based low-stakes assessments. Test-takers are requested to stop at certain times and spontaneously answer short items (EES items) regarding their actual experience of the problem situation. These EES items are embedded in an EES event that resembles typical social interactions with non-player characters. To evaluate the feasibility and validity of the method, we implemented EES in a series of three studies in the context of commercial vocational education and training (VET): A feasibility study with 77 trainees, a pilot study with 20 trainees, and the main study with 780 trainees who worked on three complex problem scenarios in a computer-based office simulation. In the present paper, we investigate how test-takers perceived the EES events, and whether social desirability biased their answers, and investigate the internal structure of the data and the relationship between EES data and data from several other sources. Interview data and survey data indicated no biases due to social desirability and no additional burden for the test-takers due to the EES events. A correlation analysis following the multitrait-multimethod approach as well as the calibration of a multidimensional model based on Item Response Theory (IRT) also supported the construct validity. Furthermore, EES data shows substantial correlations with test motivation but almost zero correlations with data from generalized retrospective self-report questionnaires on non-cognitive facets. Altogether, EES offers an alternative approach to measuring non-cognitive facets of competence under certain conditions. For instance, EES is also based on self-reporting and thus might not be suitable for high-stakes testing. (shrink)

In the study of cognitive processes, limitations on computational resources (computing time and memory space) are usually considered to be beyond the scope of a theory of competence, and to be exclusively relevant to the study of performance. Starting from considerations derived from the theory of computational complexity, in this paper I argue that there are good reasons for claiming that some aspects of resource limitations pertain to the domain of a theory of competence.

A competence model describes the abstract structure of a solution to some problem. or class of problems, facing the would-be intelligent system. Competence models can be quite derailed, specifying far more than merely the function to be computed. But for all that, they are pitched at some level of abstraction from the details of any particular algorithm or processing strategy which may be said to realize the competence. Indeed, it is the point and virtue of such models to specify some (...) equivalence class of algorithms/processing strategies so that the common properties highlighted by the chosen class may feature in psychologically interesting accounts. A question arises concerning the type of relation a theorist might expect to hold between such a competence model and a psychologically real processing strategy. Classical work in cognitive science expects the actual processing to depend on explicit or tacit knowledge of the competence theory. Connectionist work, for reasons to be explained, represents a departure from this norm. But the precise way in which a connectionist approach may disturb the satisfying classical symmetry of competence and processing has yet to be properly specified. A standard ?Newtonian? connectionist account, due to Paul Smolensky, is discussed and contrasted with a somewhat different ?rogue? account. A standard connectionist understanding has it that a classical competence theory describes an idealized subset of a network's behaviour. But the network's behaviour is not to be explained by its embodying explicit or tacit knowledge of the information laid out in the competence theory. A rogue model, by contrast, posits either two systems, or two aspects of a single system, such that one system does indeed embody the knowledge laid out in the competence theory. (shrink)

Although the importance of operational definitions is obvious while researching new areas of work, taking time to define terms, especially key ones, is also important for mature fields. The study of self-esteem, for instance, is one of the oldest themes in psychology and it is characterized by work based on at least three different definitions of selfesteem. Each one of them has given rise to a school of thought with its own body of supportive research and findings. Such situations often (...) generate confusion in a field, especially when it comes to establishing consensus or integrating material. Thus, this article first presents the two-factor approach to self-esteem in order to demonstrate how defining it as a relationship between competence and worthiness helps to resolve issues that other leading definitions do not, especially the common practice of defining self-esteem simply as a feeling of “worth.” Second, an attempt is made to show how a two-factor approach also better integrates work on the cognitive and affective of dimensions of self-esteem. (shrink)

In this paper the theoretical power of the concept of robustness is discussed in order to characterize the argumentative competence of a speaker. This notion is countered with the extended use of the idea complexity. As a general background some empirical results are used to support the theoretical discussion. The paper mainly relies on the theory of cultural cognition to situate the category of robustness and offers particular criteria to specify the possible operationalization of the notion. These criteria could later (...) be applied, and even tested, in the analysis of other social behaviours that involve collective intentionality, cooperation and recursivity. En este trabajo se discute el alcance teórico del concepto robustez para caracterizar la competencia argumentativa de un hablante. Se contrapone la categoría al uso extendido de la idea de complejidad. Como referencia se utilizan algunos resultados empíricos para apoyar la discusión. El trabajo se apoya principalmente en el anclaje conceptual proveniente de la cognición cultural para situar la categoría robustez y ofrece criterios particulares que especifican la posible operacionalización de la noción, criterios que podrán luego ser aplicados, e incluso testeados, en el análisis de otros comportamientos sociales que involucran intencionalidad colectiva, cooperación y recursividad. (shrink)

Both law and medicine rely on self-regulation and codes of professionalism to ensure duties are performed in a competent, ethical manner. Unlike physicians, however, judges are lawyers themselves, so judicial oversight is also self-regulation. As previous literature has highlighted, the hesitation to report a cognitively-compromised judge has resulted in an “opensecret” amongst lawyers who face numerous conflicts of interest.Through a case study involving a senior judge with severe cognitive impairment, this article considers the unique ethical dilemmas that cognitive (...) specialists may encounter when navigating duties to patient, society, and the medical profession, without clear legal guidance.Systemic self-regulatory inadequacies in the legal profession are addressed, as well as challenges that arise when trying to preserve the trust and dignity of an incapacitated patient who must fulfill special duties to society.Ultimately, because of their unique neurological expertise and impartial assessments, we submit that allowing cognitive specialists to submit their assessments to an internal judiciary board may act as an additional check and balance to ensure the fair and competent administration of justice. (shrink)

Background: No studies have examined the underlying structure or predictive validity of the Cognitive Therapy Adherence and Competence Scale. Examining the structure of the CTACS is of great relevance because it could provide information on what constitutes competence in CBT, and whether some underlying factors are more important for predicting treatment outcomes than others. This study investigates the psychometric properties of the Norwegian version of CTACS and its associations with treatment outcomes in a sample of primary care clients who (...) received CBT for anxiety and/or depression.Method: Independent assessors rated audiotaped therapy sessions in a sample of 132 primary care clients, participating in the Prompt Mental Health Care trial. Outcomes were symptoms of anxiety and depression assessed by patient self-report questionnaires. Structural validity was examined by means of confirmatory and exploratory factor analyses, whereas longitudinal associations with treatment outcome were explored by adopting multilevel modeling.Results: No evidence was found for the divergent validity of the constructs competence and adherence as indicated by a very high correlation between these two subscales in CTACS. Regarding reliability, ICCs for the mean score of the full competence scale and its associated subscales were generally good to excellent, although the subscale measuring the quality of the therapeutic relationship was relatively low. Internal consistency was overall acceptable, but our CFA models did not provide an acceptable fit for the pre-specified one-factor and four-factor solutions. EFA results were difficult to interpret, with a sub-optimal three-factor solution providing best model fit and only two meaningful factors [CBT specific skills and session structure ]. Overall, the results indicated no evidence for the scales' predictive validity.Conclusion: Our findings point to several psychometric problems of the CTACS that may limit both its research and clinical utility. The importance of providing empirical evidence for both reliability and validity aspects of scales are discussed and suggestions for future research are provided. (shrink)

The mainstream view in contemporary analytic philosophy is that perception is primarily in the business of representing the mind-independent world as it is. My dissertation explores an alternative conception: that the goal of perception is to guide successful action and that perceptions do not need to track mind-independent properties to play this action-guiding role. I focus on two types of perception: color perception and pain perception. I start with the former and advocate a pragmatist, empirically-guided approach which begins by inquiring (...) into the function of color vision. After arguing that none of the extant philosophical views of color are satisfactory, I answer the function question by focusing on systematic color perceptual phenomena investigated by psychophysicists. I argue that the human color visual system is an enhancement system: that is, its job is to help us better discriminate, track, and recognize meaningful objects, properties, and relations. I then build on this idea using the notion of ‘competence-embeddedness.’ I propose that color vision is embedded in a network of competences: the aim of color vision is to help organisms manifest these competences, and color experiences are correct when they result from competence-enhancing processing. The framework is explanatorily robust. For example, it allows me to conceptualize many textbook color illusions as special cases of successful color perception where the demands of the relevant competences clash. Finally, I use the notion of ‘competence-embeddedness’ to develop a new account of pain. I argue that the pain system is not a bodily disturbance detector, but a sophisticated, context-responsive security system whose primary goal is to help organisms manifest important behavioral and cognitive competences. (shrink)

Questions about the relationship between linguistic competence and expertise will be examined in the paper. Harry Collins and others distinguish between ubiquitous and esoteric expertise. Collins places considerable weight on the argument that ordinary linguistic competence and related phenomena exhibit a high degree of expertise. His position and ones which share close affinities are methodologically problematic. These difficulties matter because there is continued and systematic disagreement over appropriate methodologies for the empirical study of expertise. Against Collins, it will be argued (...) that the term ‘expertise’ should be reserved for expertise (esoteric experts) and exclude everyday performance (ubiquitous experts). Wittgensteinian ideas will be employed to maintain that it is mistaken and misleading to derive substantive conclusions about the epistemology of expertise from ordinary linguistic competence and vice versa. Significant attention will be devoted to the notion of following a rule with particular reference to the intelligibility of tacit rule following. A satisfactory theoretical approach to expertise should not involve making important claims about ordinary linguistic competence. (shrink)

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.

Informed consent is valid only if the person giving it is competent. Although allegedly informed consents are routinely tendered, there are nonetheless serious problems with the concept of competence as it stands. First, conceptual work upon competence is incomplete: the concept is unanalyzed and no logic of competence has been identified. It is thus virtually impossible to reliably discern who is competent. ;Traditional work on competence has explicated three dichotomies from which the necessary conditions for the possibility of competence will (...) be identified, viz., that competence is either a global or a specific notion; is present in varying degrees or in virtue of a threshold; and may or not include appeals to consequences. Past efforts have failed to notice a fourth dichotomy: competence as an affective or cognitive notion. Failure to designate the appropriate arms of these dichotomies is responsible for there being, at present, no reliable test for competence. The inadequacies of a highly regarded particular test for competence, the mental status examination, are examined in light of this failure. ;Competence is located within the rule-governed practice of informed consent. That practice and hence, competence, is justified through a Kantian analysis of respect for persons. This analysis reveals that the logic of competence requires assessment in terms of specific rather than global concerns; degrees of ability rather than a threshold; both cognitive and affective abilities; and no appeal to consequences. ;Based upon the analyses of consent as an example of decision making within the practice of informed consent and of respect for persons, the capacities which jointly comprise competence are identified. These are the capacities to receive, recognize, and retrieve information; to reason about, relate to oneself, and rank options; to choose among alternatives; and, under certain circumstances, to defend one's choice. ;Identification of the logic of competence and explication of and justification for the capacities that comprise competence to consent provide a conceptual foundation for the crucial concept of competence that the informed consent process currently lacks. It should facilitate construction of a test for competence. (shrink)

Competing Explanations of Competing Explanations: Accounting for Conflict Between Scientific and Folk ExplanationsThis paper focuses on the level of people’s explanatory reasoning. It examines why laypeople prefer folk explanations of various physical or biological phenomena to alternative, well‐understood scientific explanations. Shtulman and Legare call this psychological phenomenon “explanatory co‐existence.” On the basis of new experimental data, they evaluate two possible accounts of explanatory co‐existence, a theory‐based and an associative account, and argue that a theory‐based account is the better supported.

Virtue epistemology (VE) suggests that S knows just in case S’s true belief is creditable to S’s competence. While Lackey’s ( 2007, 2009 ) objection from testimonial knowledge had raised concerns that VE is too strong, some virtue epistemologists (Sosa 2007, Pritchard 2012 ) adopted a weaker condition requiring only partial credit on agent’s part. This paper, however, argues that in addition to the creditable relation, the agent’s competence manifestation could be partial too—in the sense that only part of his/her (...) whole competence regarding the cognitive task is manifested. Interesting consequences follow as we explore this new way of dissecting cognitive agency—in particular, difficult cases for VE arise when one’s cognitive competence is partly apt and partly Gettiered. (shrink)

Entrepreneurship education has a lot of research on influencing factors of entrepreneurial intention but rarely studies the influence mechanism of emotional competences on entrepreneurial intention from the perspective of social entrepreneurship. This article takes college students’ social entrepreneurs as research objects, drawing on Krueger’s model, theory of planned behavior, social cognitive theory, and triadic reciprocal determinism theory. This paper constructs a conceptual model with emotional ability, entrepreneurial self-efficacy, and entrepreneurial intention, to further study their relationship. The 312 students from (...) China College Students’ Social Entrepreneurship Project engaged in early entrepreneurship practice, conducted a questionnaire survey and used the empirical test of the structural equation model to analyze the relationship between college students’ emotional competences, entrepreneurial self-efficacy, and entrepreneurial intention. The result show: First, social–emotional competence had a positive effect on entrepreneurial intention, and the positive effect of personal affective competence on entrepreneurial intention was not supported or only partially supported. Second, all the dimensions of entrepreneurial self-efficacy were significantly and positively correlated with entrepreneurial intention. Third, emotional competence has a significant positive impact on entrepreneurial self-efficacy. Fourth, entrepreneurial self-efficacy mediated the relationship between emotional competence and entrepreneurial intention. (shrink)

This paper proposes an outline of a view concerning intuitions, tying them to our basic cognitive competences, or virtues-capacities, a view that is here called The Moderate Voice-of-Competence view. This view claims that intuitions form a kind, albeit a relatively superficial one, united by their phenomenal appearance, but linked to capacities for understanding various domains. Further, intuitions are extroverted, turned towards the items they are explicitly about, and normatively answerable to them; they teach us about things “outside”, not merely (...) about our representation(s) of them. This view also takes seriously the actual dialectics of having intuitions: asking (or being asked) a question, imagining a scenario, giving a simple, preliminary answer to the question, formulating the immediate intuition which is often developed by considering other examples, and so on. This work involves more than mere inference following rules of logic. Further, this view is for the most part committed to realism about the objects of intuitions, and is very keen on their explainability. Finally, this view offers a complex answerabout the normative epistemic status of intuitions, tilted towards a posteriority: although intuitions are prima face a priori, their reflective justification has a rich structure in which a posteriori elements play a crucial role. (shrink)

This study conceptualized digital competence in line with self-determined theory and investigated how it alongside help-seeking and learning agency collectively preserved university students’ psychological well-being by assisting them to manage cognitive load and academic burnout, as well as increasing their engagement in online learning during the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. Moreover, students’ socioeconomic status and demographic variables were examined. Partial least square modeling and cluster analysis were performed on the survey data collected from 695 students. The findings show that (...) mental load and mental effort were positively related to academic burnout, which was significantly negatively associated with student engagement in online learning. Digital competence did not directly affect academic burnout, but indirectly via its counteracting effect on cognitive load. However, help-seeking and agency were not found to be significantly negatively related to cognitive load. Among the three SDT constructs, digital competence demonstrated the greatest positive influence on student engagement. In addition, female students from humanities and social sciences disciplines and lower-income families seemed to demonstrate the weakest digital competence, lowest learning agency, and least help-seeking behaviors. Consequently, they were more vulnerable to high cognitive load and academic burnout, leading to the lowest learning engagement. This study contributes to the ongoing arguments related to the psychological impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and informs the development of efficient interventions that preserve university students’ psychological well-being in online learning. (shrink)

Does the human mind resemble the machines that can behave like it? Biologically inspired machine-learning systems approach “human-level” accuracy in an astounding variety of domains, and even predict human brain activity—raising the exciting possibility that such systems represent the world like we do. However, even seemingly intelligent machines fail in strange and “unhumanlike” ways, threatening their status as models of our minds. How can we know when human–machine behavioral differences reflect deep disparities in their underlying capacities, vs. when such failures (...) are only superficial or peripheral? This article draws on a foundational insight from cognitive science—the distinction between performance and competence—to encourage “species-fair” comparisons between humans and machines. The performance/competence distinction urges us to consider whether the failure of a system to behave as ideally hypothesized, or the failure of one creature to behave like another, arises not because the system lacks the relevant knowledge or internal capacities (“competence”), but instead because of superficial constraints on demonstrating that knowledge (“performance”). I argue that this distinction has been neglected by research comparing human and machine behavior, and that it should be essential to any such comparison. Focusing on the domain of image classification, I identify three factors contributing to the species-fairness of human–machine comparisons, extracted from recent work that equates such constraints. Species-fair comparisons level the playing field between natural and artificial intelligence, so that we can separate more superficial differences from those that may be deep and enduring. (shrink)