Moral competence is cognitive but (perhaps) nonmodular

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):128-129 (1996)
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Abstract

Barresi & Moore's account has at least two implications for moral psychology. First, it appears to provide support for cognitive theories of moral competence. Second, their claim that the development of social understanding depends upondomain-generalchanges in cognitive ability appears to oppose the idea that moral competence is under-pinned by a moral module.

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Susan Jane Dwyer
University of Maryland, College Park

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