At the heart of this article lies the unique question of whether feelings of (in)authenticity can act as a resource for ethical social work practice. In adopting an affirmative position, I posit that emotional labour is traceable to feeling inauthentic and that for social workers possessing a virtuous sensibility such feelings represent sites of ethical struggle. For workers who are reflectively alert to their sense of self I argue that these feelings become ethical markers for practice, offering guidance for that (...) which is ethically just. Within this debate, the idea of virtue as being morally good is framed around an interpretation that sees it as supportive of social justice. The article thus concludes that the deliberation of feelings – of being (in)authentic – can act as a disruptive prompt for practice that could prove unjust or oppressive. Within this original discussion, conceptions of authenticity, emotional work and virtue are critically explored in relation to the self. (shrink)

If we maintain that free will requires the absence of determinism, Then can we claim to be free without any wants? if we had no wants at all, What sense would there to be talk about free will? the difference between free will and the absence of free will is not that between indeterminism and determinism. Free choice presupposes determinism in that in order to make a choice an individual must have some motive or reason for so doing. The difference (...) is found within determinism, Among the different kinds of motives that can influence an individual to make a choice. Furthermore, If I already possess the motive to change or eliminate undesirable motives then I increase my opportunity to realize more desires and thus increase freedom of choice, Even though my motive to change or eliminate undesirable motives is already predetermined. (shrink)

Many theodicists have maintained that God is justified in permitting suffering on the ground that His doing so is a necessary condition of the realization of certain intrinsically valuable ends which the suffering serves and whose value outweighs the suffering which occasions them. Examples of ends which are frequently cited in this connection are freely chosen actions in accordance with stringent obligations to be charitable and steadfast. To say that the value of these ends outweighs the suffering which gives rise (...) to them is to say that the existence both of these ends and of suffering is better than the non-existence of both. (shrink)

People who are agnostics, rather than theists or atheists, frequently defend the claim that their position is more rational than either theism or atheism in the following manner: It looks [they say] as though there is some reason to believe that God exists ; but it also looks as though there is evidence that God does not exist ; and whenever there is evidence that a given proposition, p , is true and also evidence that it is false, the most (...) rational thing for anyone who knows that this is the case is to suspend judgement with respect to p . It follows that agnosticism is epistemically preferable to theism and to atheism. (shrink)

Media use is a pervasive aspect of children’s home experiences but is often not considered in studies of the home learning environment. Media use could be detrimental to children’s language and literacy skills because it may displace other literacy-enhancing activities like shared reading and decrease the quantity and quality of caregiver-child interaction. Thus, the current study asked whether media use is associated with gains in children’s language and literacy skills both at a single time point and across a school year (...) and whether age moderates any association. Children (N = 1583) were from preschool through third grade classrooms and language and literacy skills were measured in the fall and spring of the school year. Parents reported how much time their child spends using media on a typical school day. Regression analyses showed that using 4 hours or more of media was related to lower literacy gains, but not to language gains. Multilevel models conducted as a robustness check showed that this effect did not hold when accounting for classroom. In neither set of models was there an interaction between age and media use. Single-time-point models did show some associations that did not manifest in more stringent models, highlighting the limitations of correlational designs that do not have measures of children’s skills over time. Given the concern and popular press coverage around children’s media use, it is important to acknowledge nonsignificant effects in this domain. These nonsignificant associations suggest that societal fears around children’s media use may be exaggerated. Notably, however, characteristics of children’s media use, like educational content or adult co-use, may moderate any effects. The relation between media use and language and literacy growth did not differ across the age range investigated suggesting that, within this range, younger children are not more vulnerable to detrimental effects. (shrink)

In this paper I try to show that three of William L. Rowe’s criticisms of my book, Theism, are much less than conclusive.(1) Rowe agrees that I have established, via my defense of Descartes’s Meditation Five argument for God’s existence, that God is not a non-existing being. He denies, however, that it follows that God is an existing being. In reply, I reject the thesis that something might be neither an existing nor a non-existing object.(2) Rowe maintains that the impossibility (...) of God’s non-existence might consist simply of its being the case that no one can destroy God---a kind of impossibility which is not strong enough to sustain my (S5) modal argument for God’s existence. In reply, I argue that the impossibility of God’s non-existence must be logical.(3) Rowe maintains that it may well be that religious experiencers have experienced God without experiencing him qua maximally great being, so that religious experiences do not provide us with a reason to believe that a maximally great being is logically possible. I argue in reply that if religious experiencers do not experience God qua supremely perfect, then they have no reason to believe that they experience God. (shrink)

In the final chapter of his book, The View from Nowhere , the American philosopher, Thomas Nagel, writes as follows about death: We do not regard the period before we were born in the same way we regard the prospect of death, yet most of the things that can be said about death are equally true of the former. Lucretius thought this showed that it was a mistake to regard death as an evil. But I believe it is an example (...) of a more general future-past asymmetry... [Derek] Parfit has explored the asymmetry in connection with other values such as... pain. The fact that a pain is in prospect rather than in the past has a very great effect on our attitude toward it, and this effect cannot be regarded as irrational... [the former asymmetry] can't be accounted for in terms of some other difference between past and future nonexistence, any more than the asymmetry in the case of pain can be accounted for in terms of some other differences between past and future pains, which makes the latter worse than the former. Nagel is maintaining in this quote that it is rational for a person to view pains which he is apt to experience in the future in a manner different from the way in which he views pains which he has experienced in the past. Nagel is saying that it is rational for a person to think of his future pains as more undesirable than his past ones. And Nagel claims that there is a similar asymmetry between a rational person's attitude towards a past in which he did not exist and a time in the future when he will not exist. In Nagel's view, just as a rational person will think of pains which he will experience as more undesirable than pains which he had in the past, he will think of his not existing in the future as much more undesirable than his not having existed in the past. (shrink)

Much empirical analysis and econometric work recognizes that there are nonlinearities, regime shifts or structural breaks, asymmetric adjustment costs, irreversibilities and lagged dependencies. Hence, empirical work has already transcended neoclassical economics. Some progress has also been made in modeling endogenously generated cyclical growth and fluctuations. All this is inconsistent with neoclassical general equilibrium. Hence there is growing evidence of Kuhnian anomalies. It therefore follows that there is a Kuhnian crisis in economics and further research in nonlinear dynamics and complexity can (...) only increase the Kuhnian anomalies. This crisis can only deepen. However, there is an ideological commitment to general equilibrium that justifies “free enterprise” with only minimal state intervention that may still sustain neoclassical economics despite the growing evidence of Kuhnian anomalies. Thus, orthodox textbook theory continues to ignore this fact and static neoclassical theory remains a dogma with no apparent reformulation to replace it. (shrink)

The problem of evil may be characterized as the problem of how precisely to specify a property, P , about which it is possible for a morally sensitive man to believe that a person who possesses it would be morally justified on that account in not preventing instances of intense innocent suffering and it is neither impossible nor unlikely that if there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, he possesses it. Atheists have typically claimed that P cannot be precisely specified. (...) Moreover, they have maintained that in view of our inability to give a precise specification of P , it is irrational to believe that there is an omnipotent and omniscient being who is perfectly good and, hence, irrational to believe that God exists. In the remainder of this paper, I want to discuss the question whether there is any good reason for believing that this latter thesis is true. 1 If there is no such reason, then no matter how much he may busy himself with an attempt at formulating a precise specification of P , the theist can be justifiably contented with the thought that it doesn't much matter whether he succeeds. (shrink)

Consider the following argument for the non-existence of God: Some men are morally reprehensible for failing to perform certain actions, e.g. actions of abolishing suffering which is destructive of character. Concentrate, for simplicity, just on actions of this latter sort. If there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, then he, too, fails to perform actions of this sort, and, hence, he is also morally reprehensible unless some such difference obtains between him and the men mentioned in as his being unable (...) to abolish this suffering, while M is able to abolish it, or his not knowing that this suffering is in fact destructive of character, while M does know this. But being omnipotent and omniscient is incompatible with any such difference obtaining. (shrink)

In the history of Brazilian education, it is only since the 1980s, during the redemocratization of Brazil, that proposals for public education in a socialist perspective have been presented. The past two decades have been marked by a growing interest in Gramscian thought, mainly in the educational field, making possible the elaboration of proposals for public school organization in Brazil. However, intellectuals and pedagogues in Brazil have confused the Gramscian ‘unitary school’ with what is known in Brazil as the ‘polytechnical (...) school’, a vague idea of education which is attributed to Marx and taken up by Lenin in the course of the Soviet Revolution. The two conceptions of education differ because of the varying historical contexts in which Marx, Lenin and Gramsci lived and developed their thinking on the roles of State and school. These fundamental differences have been overlooked during the diffusion of Gramscian thought in Brazil, causing confusion in the understanding of the ‘unitary school’ and the ‘polytechnical school’. (shrink)

Homo Juridicus focuses on the normative foundations underlying all socio-cultural formations. The book uses the concept of ''normativity'' in an inclusive sense. It includes law, but it is not limited to it. As such, it explores the various social and cultural forces that persuade, incite, seduce, influence, direct, restrain, repress or control behavior. It is a major interdisciplinary study cutting across several disciplines of social science, such as law, anthropology, sociology, psychology, linguistics and philosophy. Its primary audience is law students, (...) as well as the scholarly community across law and the social sciences. ''Isaak Dore is one of the very few scholars who straddles a broad range of legal and nonlegal disciplines. This important book deconstructs the idea of normativity in culture and illuminates it through various strains of thought in anthropology, sociology, psychology, linguistics and philosophy. Its grasp of these disciplines is impressive in terms of nuance, breadth, particularity and lucidity. It is a unique work, brilliantly executed, providing a rich background against which the promotion of social order through legal and nonlegal norms can be evaluated. It both provokes and compels one to think outside of the conventional structures and assumptions of law and social order. I know of no other work that offers the broad intellectual reach that this ambitious book presents.'' - Laura S. Underkuffler, J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. (shrink)

The Italian law of December 2010 establishes new criteria and parameters for the evaluation of faculty members. The parameters are represented by the number of articles published in journals listed in the main international data banks, the total number of citations and the h index. Candidates with qualifications at least in two out of three parameters may access the national competitions for associate or full professor and apply for an academic appointment. This system developed with the aim to fight nepotism (...) and promote meritocracy, progressively led to the deterioration of the Italian university system. Since promotion in academia is strictly dependent on publications the faculty members found the solution to get over this system by organizing themselves into large consortia or small groups with the purpose of sharing authorship in scientific publications. In this way parameter thresholds may be easily reached and even surpassed. An Italian adagio says: “Fatta la Legge, Trovato l’Inganno”; “Every law has its Loophole”. However, there is no science without ethics and researchers must stay away from any kind of compromise. (shrink)

La théologie fondamentale est passée d'une position où elle se donnait pour tâche d'apporter à la foi un soutien extérieur en procédant à une démarche argumentative à l'aide de preuves apportées du dehors, à une position où elle se conçoit, au contraire, comme une fonction de la foi comme telle. Corrélativement, elle est passée d'une position où elle se présentait comme préalable et extérieure à la théologie comme telle, à une autre où elle apparaît, au contraire, être à la fois (...) partie intégrante et spécifique et dimension constante de la théologie. La théologie fondamentale a beaucoup rapproché ses propres objectifs, scientifiques et critiques par définition, de ceux qui spécifient par ailleurs les urgences pastorales et les besoins spirituels de la foi et de son avenir dans notre monde et notre société. Ainsi la théologie fondamentale est-elle devenue l'un des chantiers majeurs de la théologie dans l'Eglise d'aujourd'hui. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw a distinction between two kinds of impossibility and maintain that one is entitled to suppose that they do not obtain, in the absence of a reason to think that they do. I claim that there is no reason to think that the first kind obtains with respect to God and that, though there are nonnegligible arguments that the second kind does, my argument for the possibility of God, which appeared in an earlier volume of this (...) journal, adequately rebuts those arguments. (shrink)

This paper critically reviews Ken Binmore’s non- utilitarian and game theoretic solution to the Arrow problem. Binmore’s solution belongs to the same family as Rawls’ maximin criterion and requires the use of Nash bargaining theory, empathetic preferences, and results in evolutionary game theory. Harsanyi has earlier presented a solution that relies on utilitarianism, which requires some exogenous valuation criterion and is therefore incompatible with liberalism. Binmore’s rigorous demonstration of the maximin principle for the first time presents a real alternative to (...) a utilitarian solution. (shrink)