Is free will compatible with determinism?

Philosophical Review 72 (October):500-501 (1963)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

If we maintain that free will requires the absence of determinism, Then can we claim to be free without any wants? if we had no wants at all, What sense would there to be talk about free will? the difference between free will and the absence of free will is not that between indeterminism and determinism. Free choice presupposes determinism in that in order to make a choice an individual must have some motive or reason for so doing. The difference is found within determinism, Among the different kinds of motives that can influence an individual to make a choice. Furthermore, If I already possess the motive to change or eliminate undesirable motives then I increase my opportunity to realize more desires and thus increase freedom of choice, Even though my motive to change or eliminate undesirable motives is already predetermined

Similar books and articles

Free will and determinism: A reply.John V. Canfield - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (October):502-504.
Determinism, Randomness, and Value.Noa Latham - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):153-167.
Arguments for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility.Gerald Dworkin (ed.) - 1970 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Free will remains a mystery.Peter Van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Is free will incompatible with determinism?Marvin Zimmerman - 1966 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (March):415-420.
The compatibility of free will and determinism.John V. Canfield - 1962 - Philosophical Review 71 (July):352-368.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
462 (#39,509)

6 months
79 (#52,887)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references