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Attention and Inscrutability: A commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness.Austen Clark - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (2):167-193.details
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Infants' knowledge of objects: beyond object files and object tracking.Susan Carey & Fei Xu - 2001 - Cognition 80 (1-2):179-213.details
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Infants' knowledge of objects: beyond object files and object tracking.Susan Carey & Fei Xu - 2001 - Cognition 80 (1-2):179-213.details
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Strong representationalism and centered content.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.details
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In defense of hearing meanings.Berit Brogaard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2967-2983.details
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The Object View of Perception.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):215-227.details
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Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.details
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Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.David Bourget - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.details
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Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.details
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Perceptual symbol systems.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.details
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Reference and description revisited.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:201-218.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.details
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Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 54-74.details
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Conceptual Role Semantics.Ned Block - 1998 - In Edward Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 242-256.details
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Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.details
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The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.details
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The Goldilocks Problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content.Robert Schroer - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):476-495.details
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Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.details
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Object persistence in philosophy and psychology.Brian J. Scholl - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (5):563–591.details
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Visual indexes, preconceptual objects, and situated vision.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 2001 - Cognition 80 (1-2):127-158.details
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Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis.Jesse J. Prinz - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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The Phenomenology of Cognition: Or What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.details
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Intentional Psychologism.David Pitt - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):117-138.details
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Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation.Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):57-92.details
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Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.details
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Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.details
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Kolors Without Colors, Representation Without Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):476-483.details
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The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience.Neil Mehta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (6):311-331.details
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How Naïve Realism can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience.Craig French & Anil Gomes - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):41-63.details
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Constructing a World for the Senses.Katalin Farkas - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-115.details
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How to build a brain: from function to implementation.Chris Eliasmith - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):373-388.details
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The Sources of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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