The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2021)
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Abstract

What is going on when we are consciously aware of a visual scene, or hear sounds, or otherwise enjoy sensory experience? David Papineau argues controversially for a purely qualitative account: conscious sensory experiences are intrinsic states with no essential connection to external circumstances or represented properties.

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David Papineau
King's College London

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