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Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation
Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443 (2013)
Abstract
It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against themAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Teleological theories of mental content.Peter Schulte & Karen Neander - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel, The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.
Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.
References found in this work
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.
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