- Degrees of belief.Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) - 2009 - London: Springer.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules.Marc-Kevin Daoust & Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1741-1765.details
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Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.details
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How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs: Probability, Quasi-Dogmatism and Contextualism.Stefano Bonzio, Gustavo Cevolani & Tommaso Flaminio - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):965-990.details
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Relevant Information and Relevant Questions: Comment on Floridi’s “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”. [REVIEW]Patrick Allo - 2014 - Minds and Machines 24 (1):71-83.details
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Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.details
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Degrees all the way down: Beliefs, non-beliefs and disbeliefs.Hans Rott - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 301--339.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 49--74.details
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Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface.Mark Kaplan - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-35.details
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Seeking confirmation: A puzzle for norms of inquiry.Jared Millson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):683-693.details
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Disagreement and the value of self-trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.details
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Prefaces, Sorites and Guides to Reasoning.Rosanna Keefe - 2021 - In Lee Walters & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington. Oxford, England: Oxford University press. pp. 212-226.details
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
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Rational acceptance and conjunctive/disjunctive absorption.Gregory Wheeler - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):49-63.details
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On The Structure of Rational Acceptance: Comments on Hawthorne and Bovens.Gregory R. Wheeler - 2005 - Synthese 144 (2):287-304.details
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Ultralarge lotteries: Analyzing the Lottery Paradox using non-standard analysis.Sylvia Wenmackers - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):452-467.details
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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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On the Rationality of Inconsistent Predictions: The March Madness Paradox.Rory Smead - 2016 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 43 (1):163-169.details
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Credal accuracy and knowledge.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Lockean Beliefs, Dutch Books, and Scoring Systems.Daniel Rothschild - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1979-1995.details
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Rational requirements for suspended judgment.Luis Rosa - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):385-406.details
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Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.details
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What does decision theory have to do with wanting?Milo Phillips-Brown - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):413-437.details
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Dynamic Epistemic Logic I: Modeling Knowledge and Belief.Eric Pacuit - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (9):798-814.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis.Dustin Troy Locke - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):28-54.details
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Cut-off points for the rational believer.Lina Maria Lissia - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-19.details
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Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.details
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The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.details
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Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.details
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Intellectual Humility: Lessons from the Preface Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (3):1-532.details
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How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.details
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This paper surely contains some errors.Brian Kim - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1013-1029.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12670.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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It's OK to Make Mistakes: Against the Fixed Point Thesis.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):175-185.details
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Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments.Don Fallis - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):215-246.details
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The Logic of Conditional Belief.Benjamin Eva - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):759-779.details
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What are degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.details
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Verities, the sorites, and Theseus’ ship.Igor Douven - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3867-3878.details
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The preface paradox revisited.Igor Douven - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420.details
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The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.details
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A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.details
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From Degrees of Belief to Binary Beliefs: Lessons from Judgment-Aggregation Theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (5):225-270.details
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Categorical versus graded beliefs.Franz Dietrich - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 18.details
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