- The surplus value of knowledge.Wolfgang Spohn - forthcoming - Theoria.details
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Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeleydetails
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A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism.Mark Satta - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):625-640.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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Probabilistic stability, agm revision operators and maximum entropy.Krzysztof Mierzewski - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-38.details
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Three Puzzles about Lotteries.Julia Staffel - 2020 - In Igor Douven (ed.), Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology.Paul Silva Jr & Matthew Brandon Lee - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):111-129.details
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Rigged lotteries: a diachronic problem for reducing belief to credence.Jonathan Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1355-1373.details
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
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Intention as commitment toward time.Marc van Zee, Dragan Doder, Leendert van der Torre, Mehdi Dastani, Thomas Icard & Eric Pacuit - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence 283 (C):103270.details
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Hedged testimony.Peter van Elswyk - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):341-369.details
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A Causal Safety Criterion for Knowledge.Jonathan Vandenburgh - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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Hybrid Impermissivism and the Diachronic Coordination Problem.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):267-285.details
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The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief.Paul D. Thorn - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5389-5409.details
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Against Deductive Closure.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):103-119.details
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The Normative Force of Logical and Probabilistic Reasoning in Improving Beliefs.Corina Strössner - 2019 - Theoria 85 (6):435-458.details
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Body Checking in Anorexia Nervosa: from Inquiry to Habit.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Somogy Varga - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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The probabilistic no miracles argument.Jan Sprenger - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):173-189.details
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Epistemic justification: its subjective and its objective ways.Wolfgang Spohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3837-3856.details
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The Ramsey Test and Evidential Support Theory.Michał Sikorski - 2022 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 31 (3):493-504.details
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Collective Opinion as Tendency Towards Consensus.Chenwei Shi - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (3):593-613.details
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Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.details
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Impossibility Results for Rational Belief.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):134-159.details
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Degrees of Doxastic Justification.Moritz Schulz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2943-2972.details
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Bilateralism and Probabilism.Mariela Rubin - 2022 - Análisis Filosófico 42 (1):5-29.details
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How can representationalism accommodate degrees of belief? A dispositional representationalist proposal.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8943-8964.details
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs.Hans Rott - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):167-197.details
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Lockean Beliefs, Dutch Books, and Scoring Systems.Daniel Rothschild - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1979-1995.details
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Rational requirements for suspended judgment.Luis Rosa - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):385-406.details
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Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities.Sven Rosenkranz & Moritz Schulz - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (4):551-586.details
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The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.details
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Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
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Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.details
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Normative certitude for expressivists.Michael Ridge - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3325-3347.details
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Epistemic-State Parallelism: Translating Between Probabilities and Ranks.Eric Raidl - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (1):209-236.details
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Bridging Ranking Theory and the Stability Theory of Belief.Eric Raidl & Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (6):577-609.details
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Probabilistic Entailment on First Order Languages and Reasoning with Inconsistencies.R. A. D. Soroush Rafiee - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (2):351-368.details
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Veritistic Teleological Epistemology, the Bad Lot, and Epistemic Risk Consistency.Raimund Pils - forthcoming - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-21.details
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Frontloading, Supposition, and Contraction.Bryan Pickel - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):559-578.details
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II—Pluralism about Belief States.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):187-204.details
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The Fragility of Common Knowledge.Cédric Paternotte - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):451-472.details
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Credence and belief.Ram Neta - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):429-438.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.details
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Belief: What is it Good for?John MacFarlane - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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