We report the identification of a recurrent, 520-kb 16p12.1 microdeletion associated with childhood developmental delay. The microdeletion was detected in 20 of 11,873 cases compared with 2 of 8,540 controls and replicated in a second series of 22 of 9,254 cases compared with 6 of 6,299 controls. Most deletions were inherited, with carrier parents likely to manifest neuropsychiatric phenotypes compared to non-carrier parents. Probands were more likely to carry an additional large copy-number variant when compared to matched controls. The clinical (...) features of individuals with two mutations were distinct from and/or more severe than those of individuals carrying only the co-occurring mutation. Our data support a two-hit model in which the 16p12.1 microdeletion both predisposes to neuropsychiatric phenotypes as a single event and exacerbates neurodevelopmental phenotypes in association with other large deletions or duplications. Analysis of other microdeletions with variable expressivity indicates that this two-hit model might be more generally applicable to neuropsychiatric disease. © 2010 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A "Conception" of Truth in Plato's SophistBlake E. Hestir (bio)1. IntroductionPlato's solution to the problem of falsehood carries a notorious reputation which sometimes overshadows a variety of interesting developments in Plato's philosophy. One of the less-noted developments in the Sophist is a nascent conception of truth which casts truth as a particular relation between language and the world. F. M. Cornford, for one, in his translation and commentary on (...) the Sophist takes Plato's account of truth to involve something like correspondence: "The [true] statement as a whole is complex and its structure corresponds to the structure of the fact. Truth means this correspondence."1 In more general contexts, we find A. N. Prior claiming in his Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the correspondence theory of truth: "Aristotle did not originate the correspondence theory but took it over from Plato's Sophist."2However, all this assumes a lot about Plato, much less Aristotle. For one, it assumes that to claim that the statement 'Theaetetus is sitting' is true is to claim that it is true because it corresponds with the fact that Theaetetus is sitting. Other scholars, for a wide variety of interpretational reasons, have been reluctant to accept Cornford's view, but few offer any explanation of what sort of account of truth we might ascribe to Plato by the end of the Sophist. Michael Frede claims [End Page 1] that Plato thinks a true statement is true precisely if a form is something that is with reference to a subject. Frede is quiet about whether this expresses a particular conception of truth, but if he's right, truth involves something other than correspondence. Alfred Tarski has argued at length that truth is a simpler notion than that of correspondence or coherence or whatever. In fact, one claim he emphasizes about his own "conception" of truth is that it is similar to the classical conception of truth we find in places like Aristotle's Metaphysics—a conception of truth which is formulated in Greek in very much the same way Plato formulates it in the Sophist. Unfortunately, Tarski never sufficiently explains exactly what it is about the classical conception that makes it closer to his own.I shall argue that in a very general sense Tarski is right about the ancient conception of truth, but this is not to claim that Tarski's own conception of truth can be found in Plato. By interpreting in a certain way Plato's solution to the paradox of not being and his solution to the problem of falsehood, I argue that the account of true and false statement that emerges within the discussion of not being and falsehood generally neither entails nor outwardly suggests any of the traditional characterizations of a correspondence "theory" of truth.3 On the contrary, what emerges from the Sophist is a very minimalistic "conception" of truth which requires neither positing the existence of facts or states of affairs nor formulating a precise, explanatory definition of truth. Aristotle's discussion of truth in the Categories and De Interpretatione is in many respects remarkably similar to Plato's; and I argue that although some, including W. D. Ross and J. L. Ackrill, have found forms of the correspondence theory in these early works, Aristotle's conception of truth makes no radical departures from Plato's and in fact stands as an obvious extension of the ideas about truth Plato presents in the Sophist. In the final section, I offer a few reasons why one should not expect to find the emergence of a "theory" of truth in the Sophist. If my general interpretation of Plato is correct, we should revise at least one historically significant footnote to Plato accordingly: Plato did not father the correspondence theory of truth and those claiming otherwise risk anachronistically attributing a problem-laden theory to Plato and/or missing one of Plato's points about the fundamental nature of truth.2. The Target Passage: Sophist 2 6 3 B 4Interesting philosophical developments in Plato's dialogues are frequently obscured by vexing translational issues, and the Sophist certainly contains a few. In fact, Plato's account... (shrink)

The relationship between ethics and trust is ambiguous as ethics can promote trust, whilst trust can simultaneously be abused resulting in unethical behaviour. In this contribution to the debate on trust and ethics the focus is specifically on the role that ethics can play in facilitating trustworthiness. The article starts with a definition of the concept trustworthiness. It then reports on an empirical longitudinal study on trustworthiness that was conducted in a South African company in the insurance industry. The facilitators (...) of trustworthiness that were identified in this study and their relative contributions to trustworthiness are then discussed. Finally the implications of these findings for the ethical conduct of managers are discussed. It is demonstrated how ethical managerial conduct can enhance the trustworthiness of managers. (shrink)

Two kindred glossaries, Affatim and the Second Amplonian, have been shown to derive their materials mainly from the Abstrusa and Abolita glossaries, but partly also from Virgil marginalia. This Virgil thread is most clearly seen in the I-section of Affatim. The Affatim compiler tells us that the exemplar had lost four leaves at this point: ‘Here the exemplar lacks four leaves in the H–I portion’ . We find the following unmistakable Virgil batches:Affatim 525, 41 sqq. Infandum: inenarrandum, nee loquendum ; (...) Inpar: inaequalis uiribus ; Iamdudum: iam pridem, iam olim ; In arce: in excelso ; Infabricata: inperfecta ; Iam uertitur: iam transit ; : iam ualidum minus, minus fortem ; Imago: uultus ; In iaculis: in armis, in telis. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Interactivity and Enaction in Human Cognition” by Matthew Isaac Harvey, Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen & Sune Vork Steffensen. Upshot: To sort out their differences with enactive theory, interactivity theorists would do better to focus on operational closure only insofar as it constitutes a condition of intrinsic normativity or self-regulated coupling.

A previous speaker has compared man's earth with communal quarters. The comparison makes its point but is probably not quite exact. If one were to look for a more accurate simile of the same nature, one might say that mankind is now living in a bus following an exponential highway. In front of it looms either an insurmountable hill or a chasm, and the passengers on the bus see the future through the prism of their emotional mood. Some insist that (...) it stop and that they move into caves, while others urge ascent into outer space or placing hopes on the "perhaps" of self-regulation. These extreme points of view have in common the fact that they are based on a feeling of hopeless helplessness. Terrestrial caves are not much better than those in outer space, while existence on other cosmic bodies requires not only the creation of an earthly environment in the ordinary meaning of the word but of artificial gravitation as well, or else the weakened muscles would be unable to support the mortal bodies of the "lunatics" and "martians." To stop dead or slow things down with a yellow light is also impossible. To stop is the equivalent of death or vegetating anabiotically, since natural systems cannot function under conditions approximating idling speed. (shrink)