Sanday reads the Statesman as intertwining images with dialectical thinking. On the one hand, we advance from opinions to knowledge by gradually turning away from images and embracing rational arguments instead; on the other, dialectical knowledge must rely on images in order to be effective for the political community. My present comments come not to challenge, but rather to complement, and perhaps refine, Sanday’s account. I begin by highlighting the distinction that the Stranger draws between types of images, namely as (...) perceptible likenesses and as likenesses in account respectively, and then reflect on how this distinction helps in leading the interlocutor’s search for the nature of statesmanship as well as in implementing insights in the practical life of the city. All of this supports the view that Plato has never had a problem with imitation or images as such, but only with our ignorance vis-à-vis our engagement with imitation and usage of images, and with our ignorance as to what are the objects that we imitate, in other words, figuring out whether they are images of Forms or of sensible things. (shrink)

The Meno is often interpreted as an illustration of Plato’s decision to replace elenchus with recollection and the method of hypothesis. My paper challenges this view and defends instead two theses: that far from replacing elenchus, the method of hypothesis incorporates and uses elenctic arguments in order to test and build its own steps; and that recollection is not a method of search on a par with elenchus and the method of hypothesis, but is rather primarily a theory that accounts (...) for the metaphysical horizon within which the method of hypothesis, coupled with elenchus and perhaps other dialectical methods, can lead us from opinions to knowledge. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: This article addresses two main concerns: first, the relation between the truth/falsehood and purity/impurity criteria as applied to pleasure, and, second, the status of our pleasures of learning. In addressing the first, I argue that Plato keeps the truth/falsehood and purity/impurity criteria distinct in his assessment of pleasures and thus leaves room for the possibility of hybrid pleasures in the form of true impure pleasures and false pure pleasures. In addressing the second issue, I show that Plato's view is (...) perfectly able to accommodate an understanding of our pleasures of learning as pure pleasures even if such pleasures are preceded by awareness of a lack (ignorance).RÉSUMÉ: Cet article aborde deux concepts principaux: premièrement, la relation entre les critères de vérité/fausseté et de pureté/impureté appliqués au plaisir, et deuxièmement, le statut de notre plaisir d'apprendre. En abordant le premier concept, j'argumente que Platon tient distincts les critères de vérité/fausseté et de'pureté Iimpureté dans son évaluation du plaisir, laissant ouverte la possibilité de plaisirs hybrides sous forme de vrais plaisirs impurs et faux plaisirs purs. En abordant le deuxième concept, je montre que le point de vue de Platon est parfaitement capable d'accommoder la compréhension de nos plaisirs d'apprendre comme plaisirs purs si de tels plaisirs sont précédés par la conscience d'un manque (ignorance). (shrink)

When dealing with the metaphysical and epistemological implications of the Phaedrus, scholars have had the tendency to focus either on recollection or on discerning the methodological articulations of dialectical rhetoric. The present paper explores the relation between recollection and the dialectical method, and argues that recollection and the method of collection and division are complementary aspects of dialectical investigation, the method providing a strategy of reasoning, while the theory of recollection provides the metaphysical horizon within which collection and division can (...) lead to successful results. (shrink)

When dealing with the metaphysical and epistemological implications of the Phaedrus, scholars have had the tendency to focus either on recollection or on discerning the methodological articulations of dialectical rhetoric. The present paper explores the relation between recollection and the dialectical method, and argues that recollection and the method of collection and division are complementary aspects of dialectical investigation, the method providing a strategy of reasoning, while the theory of recollection provides the metaphysical horizon within which collection and division can (...) lead to successful results. (shrink)

This essay explores the relevance of Socrates’ mythical introduction of recollection in the Meno. I argue that the passage at 81a5–e2 addresses different levels of understanding, a superficial and a deeper one, corresponding to a literal and a metaphorical reading respectively. The major themes addressed in this passage—the immortality of the soul, transmigration, rewards and punishments in the after-life, Hades, the kinship of all nature and anamnesis—have distinct meanings depending on whether we approach them with a Platonic or an Orphico-Pythagorean (...) eye. The literal understanding is appealing to Meno and is offered in reply to his challenge in order to persuade him to continue the investigation of virtue. It is, however, the deeper sense that Plato’s Socrates intends for a more philosophically attuned audience. (shrink)

Plato’s Philebus develops an ontological model in four terms to account for “all the things that are now in the all”. The fourfold model consists of Limit, the Unlimited, the Mixture of these two, and the Cause of the mixture. Traditional interpretations place pleasure in the class of the Unlimited and knowledge either in that of Limit or, sometimes, in that of the Cause of mixtures. The aim of my paper is twofold: it challenges the received interpretation and defends instead (...) the view that pleasures, insofar as they are true, are placed in the class of Mixtures, while knowledge and its cognates are among Causes of mixtures, and it explores some of the major implications of the right placement of pleasure and knowledge on the metaphysical map. In particular, I argue that Socrates’ identification of pleasure as a Mixture and of knowledge as Cause of mixtures accounts for the fact that we witness throughout the dialogue a gradual progression from the initial absolutely unbridgeable distance between pleasure and knowledge to an intimate collaboration between them. I suggest that this shift reflects a transition from the Phileban conception of pleasure as thoughtless thrill or sensation to the Platonic understanding of pleasure as cognitively structured experience that depends on our beliefs not only about factual situations, but also about the meaning and value of such situations for life generally. (shrink)

The unity of the Philebus: metaphysical assumptions of the good human life -- The placement of pleasure and knowledge in the fourfold articulation of reality -- Hybrid varieties of pleasure: true mixed pleasures and false pure pleasures -- The nature of pleasure: absolute standards of filling or replenishment and due measure -- Pleasures of learning and the role of due measure in experiencing them -- Plato's conception of pleasure confronting three Aristotelian critiques -- The Philebus' implicit response to the aporiai (...) of participation from the Parmenides. (shrink)

Plato’s definition of pleasure as perceptible replenishment of a lack has been criticized as too narrow and incapable of accounting for some of the corporeal and all the non-corporeal pleasures. Plato’s suggested reply, based on objective standards in relation to which we are to estimate the reality and degree of replenishment we experience, seems to give rise to another difficulty, concerning the legitimate diversity of our natural inclinations and tastes. I argue that Plato’sdefinition of pleasure makes perfect sense when integrated (...) in the horizon of his metaphysical presuppositions and that he is successful in reconciling the diversity of subjective tastes with his view of an ultimate objective hierarchy of value by appeal to the notion of the mean. (shrink)

This essay explores the relevance of Socrates’ mythical introduction of recollection in the Meno. I argue that the passage at 81a5–e2 addresses different levels of understanding, a superficial and a deeper one, corresponding to a literal and a metaphorical reading respectively. The major themes addressed in this passage—the immortality of the soul, transmigration, rewards and punishments in the after-life, Hades, the kinship of all nature and anamnesis—have distinct meanings depending on whether we approach them with a Platonic or an Orphico-Pythagorean (...) eye. The literal understanding is appealing to Meno and is offered in reply to his challenge in order to persuade him to continue the investigation of virtue. It is, however, the deeper sense that Plato’s Socrates intends for a more philosophically attuned audience. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In the Symposium Socrates shows how Diotima initiated him into the mysteries of love in two stages. Yet, at first sight, the teachings offered at the two stages seem divergent and discontinuous. In this article I argue that we can understand the continuity between them if we regard Diotima’s notions of spiritual pregnancy and birth-giving as metaphors suggesting that the metaphysical horizon looming in the background of her teaching is that of Plato’s theory of recollection.RÉSUMÉ: Socrate explique dans le (...) Banquet comment Diotime l’a initié aux mystères de l’amour en suivant deux niveaux. Pourtant, de prime abord, les enseignements dispensés à ces deux niveaux semblent divergents et séparés par une solution de continuité. Je soutiens dans cet article qu’il est possible de comprendre la continuité entre ces deux niveaux si on considère les notions de grossesse spirituelle etd’enfantement avancées par Diotime comme des métaphores qui laissent entrevoir la théorie de la réminiscence à l’horizon métaphysique de cet enseignement. (shrink)

Charles E. SCOTT, Susan M. SCHOENBOHM, Daniela VALLEGA-NEU, Alejandro VALLEGA, Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, IndianaUniversity Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 2001 ; Gernot BÖHME, Aisthetik. Vorlesungen über Ästhetik als allgemeine Wahrnehmungslehre, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München, 2001 ; Dean KOMEL, Osnutja k Filozofski in Kulturni Hermenevtiki [Outlines to Philosophical and Cultural Hermeneutics], Nova revija, Ljubljana, 2001 ; Marc RICHIR, L’institution de l’idéalité. Des schématismes phénoménologiques, Association pour la promotion de la Phénoménologie, Paris, 2002 ; Fred EVANS & Leonard LAWLOR, Chiasms. (...) Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Flesh, State University of New York Press, 2000 ; Udo TIETZ, Ontologie und Dialektik. Heidegger und Adorno über das Sein, das Nichtidentische, die Synthesis und die Kopula, Passagen Verlag, Wien, 2003 ; Etienne FERON, Phénoménologie de la mort. Sur les traces de Levinas, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1999. (shrink)

Charles E. SCOTT, Susan M. SCHOENBOHM, Daniela VALLEGA-NEU, Alejandro VALLEGA, Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, IndianaUniversity Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 2001 ; Gernot BÖHME, Aisthetik. Vorlesungen über Ästhetik als allgemeine Wahrnehmungslehre, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München, 2001 ; Dean KOMEL, Osnutja k Filozofski in Kulturni Hermenevtiki [Outlines to Philosophical and Cultural Hermeneutics], Nova revija, Ljubljana, 2001 ; Marc RICHIR, L’institution de l’idéalité. Des schématismes phénoménologiques, Association pour la promotion de la Phénoménologie, Paris, 2002 ; Fred EVANS & Leonard LAWLOR, Chiasms. (...) Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Flesh, State University of New York Press, 2000 ; Udo TIETZ, Ontologie und Dialektik. Heidegger und Adorno über das Sein, das Nichtidentische, die Synthesis und die Kopula, Passagen Verlag, Wien, 2003 ; Etienne FERON, Phénoménologie de la mort. Sur les traces de Levinas, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1999. (shrink)

"Gabriel Cercel: Martin HEIDEGGER, Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges; Attila Szigeti: Emmanuel LEVINAS, Positivité et transcendance. Suivi de Lévinas et la phenomenology; Cristian Ciocan: Jean-Luc MARION, Crucea vizibilului; Gabriel Cercel: Mădălina DIACONU, Blickumkehr. Mit Martin Heidegger zu einer relationalen ästhetik; Cristina Ionescu: Mark WRATHALL, Jeff MALPAS, Essays in Honour of Hubert L. Dreyfus; Cristian Ciocan: Ion COPOERU, Aparenţă şi sens. Repere ale fenomenologiei constitutive; Cristian Ciocan: Michael INWOOD, A Heidegger Dictionary; Cristian Ciocan: Linda FISCHER, Lester EMBREE, Feminist (...) Phenomenology; Mădălina Diaconu: Renato CRISTIN, Fenomeno storia. Fenomenologia e storicità in Husserl e Dilthey; Cristian Ciocan: Michel HAAR, La philosophie française entre phénoménologie et métaphysique; Gabriel Cercel: Otto PÖGGELER, Heidegger in seiner Zeit; Roxana Albu: James RISSER, Heidegger toward the Turn, Essays on the work of the 1930s; Cristian Ciocan: Virgil Ciomoş, Timp şi Eternitate. Aristotel, Fizica IV 10-14, Interpretare fenomenologică; Cristina Ionescu: William D. BLATTNER, Heidegger's Temporal Idealism; Bogdan Mincă: Gino ZACCARIA, L'inizio greco del pensiero. Heidegger e l'essenza futura della filosofia; Mădălina Diaconu: Ute GUZZONI, Wohnen und Wandern; Bogdan Tătaru-Cazaban: Emmanuel LÉVINAS, Totalitate şi infinit; Mihail Neamţu: Jean-Luc MARION, Étant donné. Essai d'une phénoménologie de la donation; Gabriel Cercel: Robert PETKOVŠEK, Heidegger-Index ; Cristian Ciocan: Einar ØVERENGET, Seeing The Self. Heidegger on Subjectivity Mihail Neamţu: Rolf KÜHN, Husserls Begriff der Passivität. Zur Kritik der passiven Synthesis in der genetischen Phänomenologie.". (shrink)

The functional role of mirror neurons has been assessed in many different ways. They have been regarded, inter alia, as the core mechanism of mind reading, the mechanism of language understanding, the mechanism of imitation. In this paper we will discuss the thesis according to which MNs are a conceptual mechanism. This hypothesis is attractive since it could accommodate in an apparently simple way all the above-mentioned interpretations. We shall take into consideration some reasons suggesting the conceptualist characterization of MNs, (...) as well as some possible replies. We shall figure out how an argument for the conceptualist hypothesis could be deployed, focusing on the notion of off-line processes, which turns out to be the crucial property necessary to ascribe concept possession. Our conclusion will be that, despite of there being some evidence for the conceptualist account, the issue cannot be definitely settled, because there are both experimental shortages and conceptual difficulties. In particular, there are three distinct senses in which MNs can be regarded as a conceptual mechanism, but we shall argue that only one of these interpretations can be defended. (shrink)

Resumo: A Kehre (viragem) no pensamento de Heidegger foi amplamente discutida e debatida. A introdução da noção de metontologia (Metontologie), em 1927, informou proveitosamente esse debate, uma vez que implica uma preocupação com o domínio ôntico, por parte de Heidegger, que não está presente em trabalhos anteriores. O fato de essa noção desaparecer logo após ser introduzida, porém, desafia sua contribuição para esse debate. Neste artigo, mostra-se que o desaparecimento da metontologia não significa o desaparecimento da preocupação de Heidegger com (...) o ôntico, mas o contrário. Começa-se apresentando a visão de Freeman de uma tensão entre o ôntico e o ontológico, no pensamento de Heidegger, em meados da década de 1920, que resulta na introdução da metontologia, em 1927. Mais tarde, evidencia-se que a explicação de McNeill para o desaparecimento da metontologia, como consequência da visão de Heidegger, de meados dos anos 30, de que a projeção a priori do ser é uma retirada do ser (Entzug des Seins), permite dizer que esse desaparecimento não acarreta uma repentina falta de preocupação de Heidegger com o ôntico. Ao considerar a análise de Heidegger de “o matemático”, em Die Frage nach dem Ding, finalmente, argumenta-se que a metontologia desaparece do pensamento de Heidegger, porque sua dependência da ontologia a impede de explicar sua crescente preocupação com o ôntico, de maneira adequada. (shrink)

In The Grammar of Society, first published in 2006, Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and change. Drawing on several intellectual traditions and methods, including those of social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account of how social norms emerge, why and when we follow them, and the situations where we are (...) most likely to focus on relevant norms. Examining the existence and survival of inefficient norms, she demonstrates how norms evolve in ways that depend upon the psychological dispositions of the individual and how such dispositions may impair social efficiency. By contrast, she also shows how certain psychological propensities may naturally lead individuals to evolve fairness norms that closely resemble those we follow in most modern societies. (shrink)

In Norms in the Wild, distinguished philosopher Cristina Bicchieri argues that when it comes to human behavior, social scientists place too much stress on rational deliberation. In fact, she says, many choices occur without much deliberation at all. Two people passing in a corridor automatically negotiate their shared space; cars at an intersection obey traffic signals; we choose clothing based on our instincts for what is considered appropriate. Bicchieri's theory of social norms accounts for these automatic components of coordination, (...) where individuals react automatically to cues that focus their attention on what the norm is in that situation. Social norms thus act as rules for making choices in a social world where people expect others -- often unconsciously -- to follow the same rule. Some norms enable seamless social co-operation, while others are less beneficial to human flourishing.Bicchieri is famous for her interdisciplinary work on game theory and most recently her work on social norms, and Norms in the Wild represents her latest challenge to many of the fundamental assumptions of the social sciences. Bicchieri's work has broad implications not only for understanding human behavior, but for changing it for better outcomes. People have a strongly conditioned preference for following social norms, but that also means that manipulating their expectations can cause major behavioral changes. Bicchieri has been working recently with UNICEF and other NGO's to explore the applicability of her views to issues of human rights around the world. Is it possible to change social expectations around forced marriage, genital mutilations, and public health practices like vaccinations and sanitation? If so, how? What tools might we use? This short book explores how social norms work, and how changing them - changing preferences, beliefs, and especially social expectations - can potentially improve lives all around the world. It will appeal to an unusually broad range of readers including philosophers, psychologists and others in behavioral sciences, and anyone involved in public policy or at NGOs. (shrink)

The New Evil Demon Problem presents a serious challenge to externalist theories of epistemic justification. In recent years, externalists have developed a number of strategies for responding to the problem. A popular line of response involves distinguishing between a belief’s being epistemically justified and a subject’s being epistemically blameless for holding it. The apparently problematic intuitions the New Evil Demon Problem elicits, proponents of this response claim, track the fact that the deceived subject is epistemically blameless for believing as she (...) does, not that she is justified for so believing. This general strategy—which I call the “unjustified-but-blameless maneuver”—is motivated, in part, by the assumption that the distinction between epistemic justification and blamelessness is merely an extension of the familiar distinction between moral justification and blamelessness. In this paper, I consider three ways of drawing the distinction between justification and blamelessness familiar from the moral domain: the first in terms of a connection with reactive attitudes, the second in terms of the distinction between wrongness and wronging, and the third in terms of reasons-responsiveness. All three ways of drawing the distinction, I argue, make it difficult to see how an analogous distinction in the epistemic domain could help externalists explain away the intuitions which underwrite the New Evil Demon Problem. Motivating the unjustified-but-blameless maneuver, I conclude, is a much less straightforward task than its proponents tend to assume. (shrink)

Les études réunies et publiés dans ce volume sont d'abord concentrées sur les problèmes relatifs à la nature de l'âme en général, notamment par le biais d'une confrontation avec des penseurs antérieurs a Aristote ou qui leur sont contemporains - spécialement Platon et Xenocrate.

Embora a relação entre subjectividade e tempo seja fulcral para a fenomenologia, é-o sempre com o intuito de fundamentar ontologicamente a consciência na sua verdade A grande originalidade de Levinas consiste em abandonar o plano do cogito e, consequentem.

Dans Adv. math., X, 216-218, Sextus Empiricus rapporte une mystérieuse doctrine d' « Énésidème selon Héraclite » d'après laquelle le temps est identifié à un corps. L'hypothèse défendue ici est que cette formule exprime une théorie à usage dialectique et critique, construite par Énésidème afin d'inserer la thèse d' Héraclite dans un débat fictif où interviennent d'autres positions dogmatiques. Alors que la plupart des historiens de la philosophie nient l'authenticité héraclitéenne de ce témoignage, dans ses Leçons sur l'histoire de la (...) philosophie Hegel l'accepte sans réticence, aussi bien du point de vue historique que du point de vue théorique et y voit l'anticipation de sa propre notion du temps comme première forme du devenir. In Adv. Math., X, 216-218, Sextus Empiricus recalls a mysterious doctrine of a so-called « Enesidemus according to Heraclitus » according to which time is identified to a body. The hereby sustained hypothesis goes to saying that such a saying expresses some kind of theory meant to be used both dialectically and critically. It is said to have been erected by Enesidemes so as to be able to insert Heraclitus' thesis into a fictitious debate in which other dogmatic positions may interplay. Whereas most historians of philosophy deny the Heraclitean authenticity of such a testimony, Hegel, in his Lessons on the History of Philosophy, accepts it without any form of reticence, both on the historical point of view and on the theoretical point of view, thus viewing in it the foresight of his own concept of time as first form of the becoming. (shrink)

David Lewis may be regarded as an antiessentialist. The reason is that he is said to believe that individuals do not have essential properties independent of the ways they are represented. According to him, indeed, the properties that are determined to be essential to individuals are a matter of which similarity relations among individuals are salient, and salience, in turn, is a contextual matter also determined to some extent by the ways individuals are represented. Todd Buras argues that the acknowledgment (...) of natural properties in counterpart theoretic ontology affects Lewis’s theory with regard to essentialism. Buras’s reasoning is appealing. He claims that, since natural properties determine the existence of similarity relations among individuals that are salient independent of context, Lewis can no longer be claimed to be an antiessentialist. The aim of this paper is to argue, against Buras, that if counterpart theory was antiessentialist before natural properties were taken into account, then it remains so afterwards. (shrink)

The thesis of mental fragmentation has recently attracted increased attention as a way of explaining facts about mind and language. This volume provides an accessible introduction and essays on foundations and applications of fragmentation.