It is generally considered that empirical science is tied to the hypothetico-deductive method. The method consists basically of four steps: 1. framing a hypothesis, 2. deducing consequences from the hypothesis, 3. checking by observation whether the consequences are true or false, 4. accepting or rejecting the hypothesis accordingly. Is the method really an essential feature of science, or is it possible to envisage doing science without it?

One of the conclusions reached by Antony Flew in his interesting paper “Is There a Case for Disembodied Survival?” is that “if there is to be a case for individual and personal survival, what survives must be some sort of astral body.” In the present paper I shall investigate whether he is really justified, on the basis of the arguments he presents, in drawing this conclusion.

I feel most flattered by the careful attention which Dr. Roger Smook has devoted to my paper “Is There a Case for Disembodied Survival?” and I am duly grateful to him.We certainly agree that the most important thing in his reply is his response to my challenge “to show: that there can be a coherent notion of an incorporeal personal being, and that a being of this sort could significantly be said to be the same person as he (...) was when he was a creature of flesh and blood”. Smook's response runs: “By a conscious being I understand any entity which has an ongoing conscious life of however rudimentary a sort …. I begin by assuming 1. (shrink)

I argue that its appearing to you that P does not provide justification for believing that P unless you have independent justification for the denial of skeptical alternatives – hypotheses incompatible with P but such that if they were true, it would still appear to you that P. Thus I challenge the popular view of ‘dogmatism,’ according to which for some contents P, you need only lack reason to suspect that skeptical alternatives are true, in order for an experience as (...) of P to justify belief that P. I pursue three lines of objection to dogmatism, having to do with probabilistic reasoning, considerations of future or hypothetically available justification, and epistemic circularity. I briefly sketch a fall-back position which avoids the problems raised. (shrink)

I believe that Tom is the proud father of a baby boy. Why do I think his child is a boy? A natural answer might be that I remember that his name is ‘Owen’ which is usually a boy’s name. Here I’ve given information that might be part of a causal explanation of my believing that Tom’s baby is a boy. I do have such a memory and it is largely what sustains my conviction. But I haven’t given you just (...) any causally relevant information, I’ve given my grounds for my belief. I’ve given reasons that might justify me in supposing that Tom’s baby is a boy. Less naturally, the question might be taken as a request for a broader causal explanation of my holding this belief. Appropriate answers might cite all manner of facts concerning the evolution of the human race, why I chose to pursue philosophy and hence came to know Tom, the mechanisms of email transmission, the firing of various neurons, the circumstances of concept formation as a result of which I’m able to grasp the thought that Tom’s baby is a boy, and so on. It is an interesting question what distinguishes the narrower set of answers that I first suggested. I won’t pursue that here. I assume you have a good enough sense of the distinction I’m drawing. We might call the narrower set of answers justifying reasons, the kind of reasons I might cite in justifying my belief. Answers of the first sort are clearly relevant to epistemological evaluation. In assessing whether you know p or are rational in believing it to the degree you do, I will naturally want to consider what reasons you have for your belief. In deliberating myself about whether to believe p, in seeking an answer to the question of whether p, I will naturally consider what reasons or grounds I have to suppose that p. But what I want to focus on here is how explanations of the broader sort bear on such questions as whether to believe p. From a third-person perspective we can ask, ‘In assessing the epistemic status of S’s belief that p, what is the relevance of causal information that lies outside of the realm of justifying reasons?’ From the first-person standpoint we can ask ‘In seeking to answer whether p, how should such causal information affect my deliberations?’ At first it might seem that such broader causal information could have little relevance if any. Like any belief my belief that p can be traced back to innumerable causes from far and wide.. (shrink)

My intention is to show that, starting from an empiricist philosophy of mind, it is possible to give a systematic account of aesthetic experience. I argue that empiricism involves a certain theory of meaning and truth; one problem is to show how this theory is compatible with the activity of aesthetic judgment. I investigate and reject two attempts to delimit the realm of the aesthetic: one in terms of the individuality of the aesthetic object, and the other in terms of (...) 'aesthetic properties'. I go on to argue that aesthetic descriptions must not be thought to ascribe properties to their objects, and I show how the suggestion that they are non-descriptive need not conflict with the empiricist view of meaning. The problem is then seen to lie with the analysis of the 'acceptance-conditions' of aesthetic descriptions. I counter certain idealist objections to this approach, and then present a theory of imagination, in terms of which the acceptance conditions of aesthetic judgments may be described. This theory attempts to explain how the element of thought in aesthetic appreciation may become inseparable from an experience of its object, and how the aesthetic emotions are both like and unlike their equivalents in life. The first part concludes with an analysis of the general conditions of aesthetic experience. I try to show that aesthetic experience can be described in terms of certain 'formal' properties, independently of its material object. In the second part I am concerned to show that this empiricist theory of aesthetics does not, like most empiricist theories, make nonsense of our appreciation of art. First, I attempt to show that 'understanding' art is not merely a cognitive process, but involves certain experiences that can be accounted for in terms of the previous theory. I then analyse the concepts of representation and expression, and in the course of this analysis I attempt to refute what I take to be the most serious rival analysis of our appreciation of art - the semantic theory. (shrink)

Introduction -- The mathematical roots of the concept of analogy -- Aristotle : the uses of analogy -- Aristotle : analogy and language -- Thomas Aquinas -- Immanuel Kant -- Karl Barth -- Final reflections.

Starting from an examination of foundational issues, the book covers a range of topics, including animals, agency, enjoyment, the good life, contemplation, ...

In addition the book also includes a good number of unpublished essays.

Abstract Scientific advances have made the end of life into the primary concern of medicine. But medicine also postpones the end of life, often until the time when we no longer have the mental and physical capacity to deal with it. I argue that we need to develop Nietzsche's idea of timely death, in order to find a moral basis for health care at the end of life, and that the crucial factor is the cultivation of the virtues that would (...) enable us to live in another and more reckless way. We should look on the problem not from the first-person point of view, but from the perspective of the other, and ask ourselves what is most admirable in another person, in his or her attitude to death. The point of timely death is to make death into the completion of life, where life is understood as a moral rather than a biological idea. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Understanding and Reality Tradition and Interpretation Forms of Realism Works cited.

Aesthetics, hermeneutics, criticism -- Social Werktreue and the subjectivization of aesthetics -- From musike to metaphysics -- Formalist aesthetics and musical hermeneutics -- Deconstructing the disciplinary divide -- The question of metaphor -- Mimesis and the hermeneutics of music -- Political critique and the politics of music criticism -- Toward a hermeneutics of music criticism.

Everyone misses the point of Plato's cave. What a coincidence, because everyone also misses the point of BioShock. The moment one's interactivity with the game is revealed as a fake isn't the moment when one kills Andrew Ryan in a cutscene. It's what happens after that. Atlas tells to abort the self‐destruct sequence. One has the choice of whether to abort self‐destruct sequence or not, but, positioned as it is, that choice has been exposed as meaningless within the basic fabric (...) of game's mechanics. The non‐choice of disarming self‐destruct sequence ends up in the same place as the other, more famous ethical dilemma of BioShock; the choice of whether to harvest the Little Sisters or to save them. That's the part that everyone gets wrong where BioShock is concerned, and so it's the part where comparing the game to Plato's cave can really help get both of them right. (shrink)

If within the borders of human life the truth is, as Vico has said, what is made, then the task of a student of human life can be and should be to find out from what human beings have made what manner of makers they are and what sorts of production their circumstance allows.

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes.

This book tackles the question of why the brain is so difficult to fully understand. In neuroscience, data are acquired and analyzed with astonishing techniques and accumulate rapidly. Nevertheless, try to explain how a person can think or why there is such a condition as schizophrenia, and it appears that we really know little. To approach these difficulties, the authors first present a number of case studies in which the operation of a neural circuit is worked out in some detail (...) and, at the same time, the functional significance of the operation is also understood. These examples are complicated in their biologic specifics but are conceptually straightforward. The examples are hoped to provoke an appreciation for what neuroscience can accomplish. The authors then develop some thoughts on how these issues can be addressed----instead of considering cognition in general, taking instead a subset of cognition that does lend itself to formal description. (shrink)

Is science the sole authority? -- Science and reality -- World and mind -- Is the world intelligible? -- The unity of science -- The success of science.

Critiquer Kant? C'est remettre son oeuvre majeure, la Critique de la raison pure, face à son intention initiale, et lui appliquer le projet critique qu'elle expose. C'est en approfondir la compréhension en la resituant dans son contexte philosophique, et en se forçant de pénétrer son argumentation. C'est surtout analyser, avec Kant, la nature et les possibilités de la connaissance humaine, en cherchant, à travers les thèses qu'il développe, ce qui rejoint notre expérience. C'est faire de son oeuvre une lecture proprement (...) philosophique, au service d'une meilleure compréhension des rapports entre notre esprit et ce qu'il cherche à connaître. Ainsi, qu'on arrive ou non aux mêmes conclusions, on aura philosophé avec Kant, et progressé grâce à lui. (shrink)

Surveying spiritual and philosophical traditions, revives the search for wisdom for modern times"--Provided by publisher.